Copernicus
Industrial Strength Linguist
The problem is you misrepresented me, and my previous posts were clear.
Sorry if you think I misrepresented you, but I have mostly been trying to find out what you actually believe. Your previous posts have been far from clear to me on that subject, and I'm afraid that you don't improve on it with what you said in this post either, although it looked at first blush that you were going to give it a shot.
That is part of the problem of Compatibilism the questions of Moral Responsibility and Free Will should be divorced from subjective Theological questions and problems. I do not raise red herrings.
I was talking about your references to things you admitted to agreeing with Daniel Dennett about--for example, evolution. I don't care what you think you agree with Dennett about. What I really care about is what you think you disagree with compatibilism about. What makes your "potential limited free will" different from a compatibilist position? I cannot get a straight answer on that subject from you. I suspect that part of the problem is that you really don't know what compatibilism has to say about free will and determinism. Dennett had a nice discussion on the nature of compatibilist free will with such as concepts as control and evitability, but all you do is quote mine things other people have said in criticizing him and then say that you agree with the criticisms. That doesn't begin to explain your concept of "potential limited free will". I don't care to know what it is not. I care to know what you think it is and how it differs from compatibilism.
My argument and descriptions of Potential Limited Free Will have been detailed and specific. (1) We disagree on the definition of Compatibilism, Potential Limited Free Will allows for the actual "Limited Free Will without question, Compatibilism DOES NOT.
This doesn't tell me what "potential limited free will" or "actual limited free" will is. So it is impossible to see how compatibilism does not allow for those concepts. You just state that it doesn't, without any explanation of why you believe that.
(2) I based my definition of Potential Limited Free Will on the scientific research cited.
What definition? Where did you define it?
(3) I divorce my position from Theological considerations Compatibilism does not. The natural factors some cited in the research are priority and not philosophical or theological questions,
Dennett is a well-known atheist who does not base his concept of compatibilism on "theological considerations". When you refer to "the research", what research are you referring to? If you are talking about something you referred to in some past post somewhere, the context is lost here. You seem to think that I will just know what you are thinking about, even after I have told you repeatedly that I don't.
(4) You either disagree or do not understand my view that the Chaos Theory that applies to ALL cause and effect event outcomes applies to the ranges of our possible freedom of choices as in nature where the outcomes of cause and event event outcomes fall within a range of outcomes limited by Natural Laws. Our choice are extremely limited by many factors cited, and determinism rules. As in nature our potential choices are extremely limited, but possibility of freedom of choice remains and it is not zero.
Look, Shunya. I know what chaos theory is about, but what you say about it here is virtually incoherent. There are a number of ways to model them with cellular automata, which make deterministic chaos locally predictable in useful ways. Our choices are extremely limited because our chaotic environment is not fully predictable, and that is what makes agentive free will central to the survival of organisms such as ourselves that need to navigate the chaos. That's why motile organisms (for example, animals) have evolved ever more complex brains--to enhance their ability to survive. Sessile organisms such as plants have not evolved complex nervous systems with brains, because they don't move around. They adapt to conditions in a more predictable single space. All of this is well-known and non-controversial. What you fail to show here is how compatibilism is unable to account for the limitations on choice. You have not done that. Compatibilists do not have a problem with chaos theory.
When you talk about "potential choices", are you talking about a potential from the perspective of the agent facing an uncertain future or the perspective of an omniscient observer who does not face an uncertain future?
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