Does the non-existence of free will change your beliefs?

[LegionOnomaMoi]

No I didn't. As I mentioned before, I don't have access to his works as you do. I took him at face value.

But how did you find his work at all? Is it just a coincidence that this:

My understanding is based on conclusions such as

"The main argument against the quantum mind proposition is that quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing. This argument was elaborated by the physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.[3][4]
source

​

is identical to a small portion of the wiki page on Quantum mind? And that the two sources you site are 3 and 4 on that page? Or did you find the wiki page and look for something to contradict the idea (i.e., bypassing all the other sources and footnotes)? Because it seems as though you are simply looking for anything to support your view, rather than looking for whether or not your view is correct (not that this isn't the norm for everyone, of course).

Yes it does, and because of your findings I will no longer cite Tegmark. However, until I see evidence that quantum indeterminancy does, in fact, affect neuron activity to the extent that it interferes with the on-going mental cause/effect operation, I'll continue to contend that it does not.

You cited Tegmark based on abstracts. I linked to papers and other academic sources which, even if they are not available in full for free, nonetheless have abstracts which you can view. As abstracts counted as "evidence" against quantum indeterminancy, why can't they count as evidence for it?

It doesn't matter what the specific actions or conditions are. The fact is, your "choice" was determined

But determined how? If at the moment of choice, there there is an irreducible complexity in my brain that is capable of self-determination, then part of what "determines" the choice is "me".

Deterministic operations are not necessarily contingent on what we know. They may or may not be. One fully conversant with quantum effects and the brain is no less controlled by causes/effects than is a new born baby.

But if everything we know points to indeterminism and the ability of brains to produce emergent, irreducible properties (mental causation) which enable self-determination through self-awareness and self-reference, then we have all we need for "choice" to be indeterministic and the product of consciousness.

Only so far as to introduce a random factor into the cause/effect operation. If the human brain determines its own state then whatever that state happens to be will be X and not Y beCAUSE. . . . . . . . . Follow me?

Because of consciousness allows volition, or choice.

Thanks,

but if they're not readily available online I'll have to pass.

I can make them available to you online.

 

[Skwim]

But how did you find his work at all? Is it just a coincidence that this:

is identical to a small portion of the wiki page on Quantum mind? And that the two sources you site are 3 and 4 on that page? Or did you find the wiki page and look for something to contradict the idea (i.e., bypassing all the other sources and footnotes)? Because it seems as though you are simply looking for anything to support your view, rather than looking for whether or not your view is correct (not that this isn't the norm for everyone, of course).

I probably found it through a phrase I typed into Google, which, in fact, led me to the Wikipedia site. However, when citing my source I used the individul links as provided in the footnotes.

You cited Tegmark based on abstracts. I linked to papers and other academic sources which, even if they are not available in full for free, nonetheless have abstracts which you can view. As abstracts counted as "evidence" against quantum indeterminancy, why can't they count as evidence for it?

Well, you've made me leery of them. Live and learn.

But determined how? If at the moment of choice, there there is an irreducible complexity in my brain that is capable of self-determination, then part of what "determines" the choice is "me".

Label as you may, but the fact remains that the events that led up to your "choice," whatever they are, they were the effects of prior causes, which in turn were themselves the effects of other causes. To assert otherwise is to imply that randomess entered the works somewhere along the line.

But if everything we know points to indeterminism and the ability of brains to produce emergent, irreducible properties (mental causation) which enable self-determination through self-awareness and self-reference, then we have all we need for "choice" to be indeterministic and the product of consciousness.

So let the evidence roll in. At most I can only see it abetting determancy. Not replacing it.

Because of consciousness allows volition, or choice.

This is begging the question. You're assuming that this volition and choice is free of determining causes, which is what the issue here is all about. My point being that our volitions and "choices" are themselves the product of specific causes/effects.

I can make them available to you online.

Thanks, but before going to the trouble it would be best to run them by me to see if I'm truly interested.

 

[Skwim]

I would assume he does, which I second.

Fate has a gender?

My remark was aimed at your reply to The Doors of Perception, a "he." So my "he" = The Doors of Perception. Ich verstehe?

 

[Falvlun]

Label as you may, but the fact remains that the events that led up to your "choice," whatever they are, they were the effects of prior causes, which in turn were themselves the effects of other causes. To assert otherwise is to imply that randomess entered the works somewhere along the line.

This is something I notice a lot. In every-day English, a cause isn't always necessarily considered the thing which determined that a particular effect will happen. It is merely given as a reason why that effect happened (or was chosen). For example, Benny bought a purple tie because he wanted to match is date's purple dress. His date's purple dress was the cause of his purchase, but it did not force, or determine is purchase.

Determinists sometimes like to use how we speak as examples of a hard-determinist outlook, but that's not really how we are using the words. There can be a reason-- a cause-- for an action that did not necessarily force it.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

So let the evidence roll in. At most I can only see it abetting determancy. Not replacing it.

Thanks, but before going to the trouble it would be best to run them by me to see if I'm truly interested.

These statements certainly don't contradict each other, but neither do they seem completely compatible. Every source I have referred has been written by an expert and published by at least an academic publishing company (which entails greater review than your average publishing company) if not a refereed source. So what criteria might you use to decide whether or not you would be "truly interested" in a source? If you want "the evidence to roll in" what would disqualify a source from being "evidence"?

Label as you may, but the fact remains that the events that led up to your "choice," whatever they are, they were the effects of prior causes, which in turn were themselves the effects of other causes. To assert otherwise is to imply that randomess entered the works somewhere along the line.

Quantum processes in the "standard model" are not random nor determined but are probabilistic. In complex systems, causation doesn't work in the linear fashion you describe. There are not clearly distinguishable causes and effects, and there are nonlinear "causes", bidirectional temporality (i.e., I can say A causes B or B causes A depending on how I incorporate time into my causal model), strongly synchronized dynamically causal networks with quantum-like processes (or actual quantum processes), and so forth. Causality becomes more than a little convoluted. So convoluted, in fact, that it is not possible determine causes vs. effects (except by assignment without any empirical basis). At any time t, I can say that a particular neuron's activity causes x result in some neural network. However, I can say with equal validity that the neural network at time t causes effect y in that neuron. In other words, any reduction of causes to component parts is arbitrary, because the components are causing activity in the network which is simultaneously causing the behavior of the component parts.

This is begging the question. You're assuming that this volition and choice is free of determining causes, which is what the issue here is all about. My point being that our volitions and "choices" are themselves the product of specific causes/effects.

I'm not assuming. I'm interpreting the evidence of a few millenia of philosophy, a few centuries nonlinear modeling, a little under a century of quantum mechanics, less than a century of complex systems analysis, and a few decades of neuroscience, among other things. Most of this demonstrates only that 1) reality doesn't work in a deterministic fashion and 2) cause and effect are often simply a matter of arbitrary labels. Only when we get to the history neuropsychology and cognitive science do things start becoming evidence for free will. Clearly, we have no model for consciousness or free will that is beyond rational criticism. However, as computing power has increased (along with our ability to model complexity), most of what we have learned about the brain and mind is how vastly more complex it is than anything in the known universe. We also find that all of the properties of complex systems which allow them to exhibit emergent (seemingly or actually irreducible) properties are nothing compared to the human brain. As the deterministic model of the universe collapsed in the 20th century, and the work on dynamical complex systems grows, there really isn't anything left to challenge that which we actually experience all the time: conscious decision making. Instead, there is increasing evidence that what we experience, i.e. that we are making conscious decisions that are determined by our consciousness/minds, is accurate.

 

[Skwim]

This is something I notice a lot. In every-day English, a cause isn't always necessarily considered the thing which determined that a particular effect will happen.

Right. Often we are mistaken about what caused what, but this doesn't mean the effect was not caused.

It is merely given as a reason why that effect happened (or was chosen). For example, Benny bought a purple tie because he wanted to match is date's purple dress. His date's purple dress was the cause of his purchase, but it did not force, or determine is purchase.

It makes no difference where in the chain of cause/effect events you want to assign an ultimate reason (cause), the fact remains that the purchase had to have occurred. For it not to have happened something in the series of cause/effect events leading up to it would have had to be different, but there wasn't; therefore, the purchase was inevitable.

Determinists sometimes like to use how we speak as examples of a hard-determinist outlook, but that's not really how we are using the words. There can be a reason-- a cause-- for an action that did not necessarily force it.

But if a cause for an action is considered to be just that, "the cause," then it had to "forced" it. This is a simple matter of making a logical statement. By saying A is the cause of B then it is logically invalid to say A is not the cause of B. You can't have it both ways.

If adding two apples to the ten apples in the bowl is the reason (cause) there is now a dozen apples in the bowl, then the additional two apples forced the count to be a dozen apples.

 

[Skwim]

These statements certainly don't contradict each other, but neither do they seem completely compatible. Every source I have referred has been written by an expert and published by at least an academic publishing company (which entails greater review than your average publishing company) if not a refereed source. So what criteria might you use to decide whether or not you would be "truly interested" in a source? If you want "the evidence to roll in" what would disqualify a source from being "evidence"?

If it was beyond my grasp. If I don't understand the lingo I would be lost. My familarity with philosophy and physics is not all that broad, and I'm not about to bone up on them just to understand the issue here.

Quantum processes in the "standard model" are not random nor determined but are probabilistic.

Really!


From a May 16, 2012 article on Science Daily.

"Once again quantum physics gives us philosophical implications: physicists showed how a small amount of randomness can be amplified without limit.

Classical physics is deterministic: for example, we can determine the position and velocity of a particle at any time in the future. Quantum theory, on the other hand, states that there exist processes which are fundamentally random: for instance, the outcomes of measurements of quantum particles seem to be determined entirely by chance. This is why Einstein argued in a publication in 1935 that the quantum theory is incomplete, and yet another kind of higher theory must exist, but up to the present time there has been no proof either that the world is purely deterministic and all randomness is due solely to a lack of knowledge about certain events, or that everything happens purely by chance. However, ETH Zurich physicists have now succeeded in showing in a thought experiment that randomness can be amplified.

*SNIP*

The two scientists stress that they have not thereby proved that the world is non-deterministic. However, they say there is nothing in between. The existence of weak randomness automatically implies that there must be an unlimited amount of strong randomness.

​

In complex systems, causation doesn't work in the linear fashion you describe. There are not clearly distinguishable causes and effects, and there are nonlinear "causes", bidirectional temporality (i.e., I can say A causes B or B causes A depending on how I incorporate time into my causal model), strongly synchronized dynamically causal networks with quantum-like processes (or actual quantum processes), and so forth. Causality becomes more than a little convoluted. So convoluted, in fact, that it is not possible determine causes vs. effects (except by assignment without any empirical basis). At any time t, I can say that a particular neuron's activity causes x result in some neural network. However, I can say with equal validity that the neural network at time t causes effect y in that neuron. In other words, any reduction of causes to component parts is arbitrary, because the components are causing activity in the network which is simultaneously causing the behavior of the component parts.

And I agree, but for explanatory purposes I think it's the best way to present the concept.

As the deterministic model of the universe collapsed in the 20th century, and the work on dynamical complex systems grows, there really isn't anything left to challenge that which we actually experience all the time: conscious decision making. Instead, there is increasing evidence that what we experience, i.e. that we are making conscious decisions that are determined by our consciousness/minds, is accurate.

And I've never said that conscious decisions don't occurr, it's just that they, like everything else we do, are a result of a series of cause/effect events that inexorably led to that particular decision and no other.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

By saying A is the cause of B then it is logically invalid to say A is not the cause of B. You can't have it both ways.

Unless, of course, you can, or can at least say that A causes B at the same time B causes A:
"While the behaviour of the whole is, to some degree, constrained by the properties of its components—‘upward causation'—the behaviours of its components are also constrained to a certain extent by the properties of the system. The behaviour of a cell, for example, is controlled both by the properties of its macromolecules and by the properties of the organ of which it is a part. The whole is not only more than the sum of its parts, but also less than the sum of its parts because some properties of the parts can be inhibited by the organization of the whole. From an epistemological point of view, this means that it is not enough to analyse each individual part (reductionism), nor is it enough to analyse the system as a whole (holism). A new model of scientific investigation to understand complex systems would require shifting the perspective from the whole to the parts and back again"

(emphasis added)
from Complexity in biology: Exceeding the limits of reductionism and determinism using complexity theory

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Really!

Yes. The entirety of QM formalism is pretty much based on p.d.f.'s (probability density functions). That's what a wavefunction is: a probability function.

From a May 16, 2012 article on Science Daily.

Right. Here's a link to the actual study , rather than a summary. Apart from the fact that it says nothing about quantum mechanics being "random" (but rather whether randomness exists) you might want to check out the bottom part, where they relate their findings to "free will".

I agree, but for explanatory purposes I think it's the best way to present the concept.

And I've never said that conscious decisions don't occurr, it's just that they, like everything else we do, are a result of a series of cause/effect events that inexorably led to that particular decision and no other.

These statements are incompatible. If it is possible for a system to become so strongly coupled that networks cannot be reduced and causation is circular (and empirical investigations suggests that this happens all the time) then there is no series of causes and effects in that case. And that's the brain: circular up/down and nonlocal causation both within and between networks.

In other words, if you wish to simplify it to a cause/effect type model, then we have a series of causes for some action a person makes, one of them being choice. But there is no evidence to indicate that choices are completely determined such that no other choice was possible, and a good deal to suggest that consciousness is self-determining.

 

[Skwim]

These statements are incompatible. If it is possible for a system to become so strongly coupled that networks cannot be reduced and causation is circular (and empirical investigations suggests that this happens all the time) then there is no series of causes and effects in that case. And that's the brain: circular up/down and nonlocal causation both within and between networks.

In what way is causation circular, and why must it be that way?

In other words, if you wish to simplify it to a cause/effect type model, then we have a series of causes for some action a person makes, one of them being choice.

No, the "choice" you refer to is the designated end of the cause/effect series.

But there is no evidence to indicate that choices are completely determined such that no other choice was possible, and a good deal to suggest that consciousness is self-determining.

The evidence is a matter of logic. If I say that X can only arise from A or B, and B is not involved in X, then by default A must give rise to X.

 

[crossfire]

These statements certainly don't contradict each other, but neither do they seem completely compatible. Every source I have referred has been written by an expert and published by at least an academic publishing company (which entails greater review than your average publishing company) if not a refereed source. So what criteria might you use to decide whether or not you would be "truly interested" in a source? If you want "the evidence to roll in" what would disqualify a source from being "evidence"?



Quantum processes in the "standard model" are not random nor determined but are probabilistic. In complex systems, causation doesn't work in the linear fashion you describe. There are not clearly distinguishable causes and effects, and there are nonlinear "causes", bidirectional temporality (i.e., I can say A causes B or B causes A depending on how I incorporate time into my causal model), strongly synchronized dynamically causal networks with quantum-like processes (or actual quantum processes), and so forth. Causality becomes more than a little convoluted. So convoluted, in fact, that it is not possible determine causes vs. effects (except by assignment without any empirical basis). At any time t, I can say that a particular neuron's activity causes x result in some neural network. However, I can say with equal validity that the neural network at time t causes effect y in that neuron. In other words, any reduction of causes to component parts is arbitrary, because the components are causing activity in the network which is simultaneously causing the behavior of the component parts.



I'm not assuming. I'm interpreting the evidence of a few millenia of philosophy, a few centuries nonlinear modeling, a little under a century of quantum mechanics, less than a century of complex systems analysis, and a few decades of neuroscience, among other things. Most of this demonstrates only that 1) reality doesn't work in a deterministic fashion and 2) cause and effect are often simply a matter of arbitrary labels. Only when we get to the history neuropsychology and cognitive science do things start becoming evidence for free will. Clearly, we have no model for consciousness or free will that is beyond rational criticism. However, as computing power has increased (along with our ability to model complexity), most of what we have learned about the brain and mind is how vastly more complex it is than anything in the known universe. We also find that all of the properties of complex systems which allow them to exhibit emergent (seemingly or actually irreducible) properties are nothing compared to the human brain. As the deterministic model of the universe collapsed in the 20th century, and the work on dynamical complex systems grows, there really isn't anything left to challenge that which we actually experience all the time: conscious decision making. Instead, there is increasing evidence that what we experience, i.e. that we are making conscious decisions that are determined by our consciousness/minds, is accurate.

Part of our brain function is like a quantum computer? Kewl!
Have any of the processes by which our brain "measures" quantum events occurring within it in order to manipulate the different patterns of probabilities produced been identified? Are there several different "measuring" mechanisms interconnected, or has a centralized measuring system been identified?

<edit> ok so you mentioned wavelength as one way of measuring

 

[crossfire]

From an epistemological point of view, this means that it is not enough to analyse each individual part (reductionism), nor is it enough to analyse the system as a whole (holism). A new model of scientific investigation to understand complex systems would require shifting the perspective from the whole to the parts and back again"

This perspective shifting is one technique I use in my meditations. One thing you have to careful about is that this shifting itself will set up another vibrational dynamic that will feed back into the workings of the mind. You try to grasp it, and it transforms.

Reality really seems quite slippery at times.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

In what way is causation circular, and why must it be that way?

Did you miss the post below, or was it not a sufficient enough explanation? In case it's the latter, I'll try to put it another way, but if not here's the post:

Unless, of course, you can, or can at least say that A causes B at the same time B causes A:
"While the behaviour of the whole is, to some degree, constrained by the properties of its components—‘upward causation'—the behaviours of its components are also constrained to a certain extent by the properties of the system. The behaviour of a cell, for example, is controlled both by the properties of its macromolecules and by the properties of the organ of which it is a part. The whole is not only more than the sum of its parts, but also less than the sum of its parts because some properties of the parts can be inhibited by the organization of the whole. From an epistemological point of view, this means that it is not enough to analyse each individual part (reductionism), nor is it enough to analyse the system as a whole (holism). A new model of scientific investigation to understand complex systems would require shifting the perspective from the whole to the parts and back again"

(emphasis added)
from Complexity in biology: Exceeding the limits of reductionism and determinism using complexity theory

Neurons and neural networks, like the cell/organ relationship described above, cannot be reduced to some linear causal model except by arbitrary determination. This is because, like example of the cell and the organ it is a part of in the quote above, neural networks are nonreductive. Put another way:

If I examine some individual neuron X, I can say that the activity I'm measuring is caused by the neural population/network that neuron X is a part of. However, if I look at the neural network, I can say that the activity I'm measuring is caused by the neurons including (in part) neuron X. Causation is bidirectional (or circular) because the complexity of the network structure is such that there is no level of analysis at which I can determine a non-arbitrary causal connection. The neuron is not wholly determined by the network, nor is the network wholly determined by the neurons. This is a rather serious problem in neuroscience. Volume 2 from Springer Series in Computational Neuroscience entitled Coordinated Activity in the Brain: Measurement and Relevance to Brain Function and Behavior is largely devoted to this issue and to techniques to approximate neural network and neuronal activity. In other words, the mathematical models (usually involving graph theory) are constructed in ways which force (or distort) the actual structure of the networks into something which
1) captures as much of the properties of the actual network as possible and
2) can be analyzed using classical methods

However, while these approximations can certainly be useful, they don't provide us with what is actually happening in the brain, nor something close enough that would enable us to construct something which could do what actual neural networks do. A central reason for this is circular causation or self-determination and the resulting emergent properties of the system.

No, the "choice" you refer to is the designated end of the cause/effect series.

Except that (again) setting aside indeterminism in general the brain alone doesn't operate according to this cause/effect model. The neural activity which is involved in some choice is not "caused" by anything we can point to, because of the self-determining and circular complexity involved. If I'm scanning someone in an fMRI who is making choices, at any time t during some "choice process" there is no series of causes that created the brain state at that time nor any series of effects at that time. If I point to any neuron or other component of the brain involved in that choice at time t, I can say with equal validity that the activity of that neuron is caused by the activity of some number of neurons or neural networks around it, or that the neuron is causing the the activity of the network it is a component of.

Quite simply, the causes are also effects, and vice versa, rendering the dichotomy meaningless.

The evidence is a matter of logic. If I say that X can only arise from A or B, and B is not involved in X, then by default A must give rise to X.

Except that reality doesn't work that way (and not just in the brain). The reason that physicists believe the universe is indeterministic at a very fundamental level is because there are (to put it simply) A's and B's with no underlying cause X.

When it comes to the brain, the issue is different. I'm going to choose a word and type it: epexegetical. Now, at the time that I chose which word to type, any number of things are involved, from the fact that I know the word to the fact that I can see my keyboard, use my hands, etc. So there are certainly things identifiable as "causes" in some sense. But if we were to look at my brain at the time I made that choice as well as the moments leading up to it, we could not find a series of causes such that the state of my brain at the time of the choice of the word is determined by those causes. For any component of my brain at that time, I can identify activities in other parts of the brain which were involved in determining the activity of that component at the moment of choice. However, at the moment of that choice, that component was also causing the activity of those same components I just identified as determining it.

The only way I can delineate cause and effect is through arbitrary selection, as the parts of the brain which were involved in my choice resulted from coordinated self-determining neural networks. Even if I could point to every neuron involved, and every component of every neuron involved, this wouldn't do me any good, because for all of them I could label them as causes or effects with equal validity.

 

[Skwim]

However, while these approximations can certainly be useful, they don't provide us with what is actually happening in the brain, nor something close enough that would enable us to construct something which could do what actual neural networks do. A central reason for this is circular causation or self-determination and the resulting emergent properties of the system.

Okay. I'll take your word for it.

Neurons and neural networks, like the cell/organ relationship described above, cannot be reduced to some linear causal model except by arbitrary determination.

And this is why I said, ". . . for explanatory purposes I think it's the best way to present the concept."

Quite simply, the causes are also effects, and vice versa, rendering the dichotomy meaningless.

Not when we're considering a specific effect event: a "choosing." All the events that preceed and lead to this effect can be however you choose to regard them: linear, looping, coupling, reversing, skipping, alternating, circular, ping-pongie, or whatever. However, the point is, they and they alone resulted in this particular effect: a "choosing" of X rather than Y. From whatever initial state of the mind you choose, all that follows inexorably led to this particular effect. To lead to some other effect, perhaps Y, some aspect of mental activity would have to have been different. However, it was what it was and not something different, so the "choice" could only be what it was: determined by all the cause/effect events that preceeded it. And if this congregation of causes and effects also happened to include an "arbitrary selection," which I assume to be a completely random event, then this too would be part of the equation that produced the particular effect.

What it comes down to is that the "choosing" event isn't really freely made, but dictated by all that led up to it; looping and skipping neural events in the brain perhaps using factors lying in the distant past such as bad toilet training or a frightening experience with a banana.

​

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

And this is why I said, ". . . for explanatory purposes I think it's the best way to present the concept."

The problem is that it "explains" something which doesn't happen, and applies a "concept" which has no relevancy.

Not when we're considering a specific effect event: a "choosing." All the events that preceed and lead to this effect can be however you choose to regard them: linear, looping, coupling, reversing, skipping, alternating, circular, ping-pongie, or whatever. However, the point is, they and they alone resulted in this particular effect: a "choosing" of X rather than Y.

You still don't seem to get the issue (or, more likely, I'm not being clear enough). You are forcing a dichotomy where none exists and then proceeding as if it does. "All the events that preceed and lead to this effect..." This is linear. I can't choose "to regard them...[as] looping, coupling, skipping, alternating, circular" and so forth, because the very categorization of events leading to causes is linear, and precludes the kind of dynamics at play. You wish to view the state of the brain at some time t as having been determined by some number of events prior to it. That's linear.

However, in reality, the state of the brain at time t is an effect caused by itself (or, viewed another way, the relevant parts of the brain can be considered either causes or effects with equal validity, which makes "causes" vs "effects" meaningless).

From whatever initial state of the mind you choose, all that follows inexorably led to this particular effect.

Again, you are forcing linear causation. At the moment right before my choice, X neuron exists in a particular state. This neuron happens to be involved in my choice, such that the activity of it's components is part of what constitutes my "choice". What causes the neuron's change of state such that it is involved in my choice? The network of connections to other neurons. These, then, are causing the state change in the neuron which is part of my "choice". However, that state change causes changes in the network. The same is true for other neurons. Each is both a cause and an effect at the same time. The changes to my brain which "causes" my choice consists of the effects that is that choice. The state change in my brain is the result of neural activity which is caused by itself, and the "effect" which is my choice is the cause.

However, it was what it was and not something different, so the "choice" could only be what it was: determined by all the cause/effect events that preceeded it.

And again you are making distinctions where they do not exist. A bunch of neurons are the cause, in that they alter the neural networks which constitutes my "choice". However, those networks cause the neurons' activity in such a way that they cause my choice. Neither the neurons nor the neural networks are either causes or effects, because they are both at the same time. The component parts determine the activity of the system which determines the activity of the component parts.

 

[Skwim]

The problem is that it "explains" something which doesn't happen, and applies a "concept" which has no relevancy.



You still don't seem to get the issue (or, more likely, I'm not being clear enough). You are forcing a dichotomy where none exists and then proceeding as if it does. "All the events that preceed and lead to this effect..." This is linear. I can't choose "to regard them...[as] looping, coupling, skipping, alternating, circular" and so forth, because the very categorization of events leading to causes is linear, and precludes the kind of dynamics at play. You wish to view the state of the brain at some time t as having been determined by some number of events prior to it. That's linear.

Because time is linear. The brain state at the point of choosing at time T will have a different character than if the "choosing" takes place at time T+65. And this difference in character may well affect the "choosing," or maybe not.

However, in reality, the state of the brain at time t is an effect caused by itself (or, viewed another way, the relevant parts of the brain can be considered either causes or effects with equal validity, which makes "causes" vs "effects" meaningless).

But brain state at T+2 will no doubt be different than bs at T+1, and bsT+2 will have depended in whole or in part on bsT+1 for its character.

Again, you are forcing linear causation. At the moment right before my choice, X neuron exists in a particular state.

And this linear character is well exemplified by your use of "before."

This neuron happens to be involved in my choice, such that the activity of it's components is part of what constitutes my "choice". What causes the neuron's change of state such that it is involved in my choice? The network of connections to other neurons. These, then, are causing the state change in the neuron which is part of my "choice".

And change can't take place without the passage of time.

However, that state change causes changes in the network. The same is true for other neurons. Each is both a cause and an effect at the same time. The changes to my brain which "causes" my choice consists of the effects that is that choice. The state change in my brain is the result of neural activity which is caused by itself, and the "effect" which is my choice is the cause.

And your evidence that an effect is caused by itself?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Because time is linear.

Not exactly. We experience it that way, but changes in space can (depending on the angle) result in changes in one's temporal frame of reference. Additionally, analytically time can be bidirectional. But the arrow of time isn't really the main issue here. It's the dichotomy of cause/effect description of a system in which this has little or no meaning.

The brain state at the point of choosing at time T will have a different character than if the "choosing" takes place at time T+65. And this difference in character may well affect the "choosing," or maybe not.

Yes, the state will differ. But it's the question of what "causes" it. You rule out "choice" because you appear to conceptualize the brain as no different from the addition of fruit in the analogy you made several posts back: there are a series of activities which we can label causes such that later activities correspond to the effects of these causes.

The problem is that this isn't an adequate model when it comes to certain systems, such as (or in particular) the brain. The "state" of the brain at any time consists of neural activity which causes itself. It is its own effect. That's what this:

"While the behaviour of the whole is, to some degree, constrained by the properties of its components—‘upward causation'—the behaviours of its components are also constrained to a certain extent by the properties of the system. The behaviour of a cell, for example, is controlled both by the properties of its macromolecules and by the properties of the organ of which it is a part. The whole is not only more than the sum of its parts, but also less than the sum of its parts because some properties of the parts can be inhibited by the organization of the whole. From an epistemological point of view, this means that it is not enough to analyse each individual part (reductionism), nor is it enough to analyse the system as a whole (holism). A new model of scientific investigation to understand complex systems would require shifting the perspective from the whole to the parts and back again"

(emphasis added)
from Complexity in biology: Exceeding the limits of reductionism and determinism using complexity theory

means. You can force neural activity into your linear model, but when you do you distort what is actually happening.

But brain state at T+2 will no doubt be different than bs at T+1, and bsT+2 will have depended in whole or in part on bsT+1 for its character.

Yes, the state changes. The issue is what causes that change. You wish to view changes in state as "effects" of some series of causes. The problem is that these effects caused themselves, or (more accurately) the components of the state caused the state and were caused by it at the same time.

Thus, when I make a conscious choice, the changes which happen in my brain are not the result of any series of causes in any meaningful way, because what caused the change (or effect, or the current "state") is what changed (or is the effect). When

adding two apples to the ten apples in [a] bowl

you can rather easily seperate cause and effect (at least linguistically). At time t, there were X apples, and at time t+1 there were a new number of apples because someone put them there.

Complex systems are not so easily reduced.

And this linear character is well exemplified by your use of "before."

That linear character describes the passage of time, not the dynamics of neural activity. The change in time corresponds to state changes, but that doesn't mean we can say there are X number of causes that result in Y number of effects. In this case, we can't because (again) the causes are the effects, and vice versa. The moment I make the "choice" my neural activity has altered such that this "choice" is reflected in that activity. However, what caused that neural activity is that neural activity, as the brain (especially if we are talking about conscious processes) consists of self-determining networks.

And your evidence that an effect is caused by itself?

It's a central area of research in complex systems (theoretical biology, computational biology, dynamical systems analysis, etc.), but brains are probably the most studied of these. When trying to model synchronization, we often rely on approximation, but we don't always do so in ways that fundamentally change the system under investigation. However, biological systems (especially neural systems) are a different matter. Using neuroimaging studies, we can observe state changes and measure individual neural activity, neural populations, all the way up to the entire brain. So, for example, we have subjects do various tasks (identification, judgments, etc.) and we look at neural activity, response times, and any number of processes relevant to the subjects decisions/actions/choices/responses. What we find is consistent with complex systems in general, only more so. Coordination between and within neural networks occurs impossibly fast (zero-lag synchronization). The only way to seperate cause and effect in either a neural population or a neuron in this case is to arbitrary assign either label to one. In reality, we can't say that the activity of some set of neurons X was caused by some set of neurons Y, because the coupling of neurons and neural populations (including nonlocal coupling) creates circular causality. X neurons are causing the activity of Y neurons at the same time that the activity of X neurons are caused by the activity of Y neurons.

There are a number of modeling and mathematical techniques used in computational neuroscience (and in the modeling of dynamical systems in general) to simplify things, but this simplification comes at a cost: we aren't replicating or modeling what's actually going on.

 

[crossfire]

The problem is that it "explains" something which doesn't happen, and applies a "concept" which has no relevancy.



You still don't seem to get the issue (or, more likely, I'm not being clear enough). You are forcing a dichotomy where none exists and then proceeding as if it does. "All the events that preceed and lead to this effect..." This is linear. I can't choose "to regard them...[as] looping, coupling, skipping, alternating, circular" and so forth, because the very categorization of events leading to causes is linear, and precludes the kind of dynamics at play. You wish to view the state of the brain at some time t as having been determined by some number of events prior to it. That's linear.

However, in reality, the state of the brain at time t is an effect caused by itself (or, viewed another way, the relevant parts of the brain can be considered either causes or effects with equal validity, which makes "causes" vs "effects" meaningless).



Again, you are forcing linear causation. At the moment right before my choice, X neuron exists in a particular state. This neuron happens to be involved in my choice, such that the activity of it's components is part of what constitutes my "choice". What causes the neuron's change of state such that it is involved in my choice? The network of connections to other neurons. These, then, are causing the state change in the neuron which is part of my "choice". However, that state change causes changes in the network. The same is true for other neurons. Each is both a cause and an effect at the same time. The changes to my brain which "causes" my choice consists of the effects that is that choice. The state change in my brain is the result of neural activity which is caused by itself, and the "effect" which is my choice is the cause.



And again you are making distinctions where they do not exist. A bunch of neurons are the cause, in that they alter the neural networks which constitutes my "choice". However, those networks cause the neurons' activity in such a way that they cause my choice. Neither the neurons nor the neural networks are either causes or effects, because they are both at the same time. The component parts determine the activity of the system which determines the activity of the component parts.

Dang! We really are "action personified." I guess I owe YmirGF an apology.

 

[Skwim]

Not exactly. We experience it that way, but changes in space can (depending on the angle) result in changes in one's temporal frame of reference. Additionally, analytically time can be bidirectional. But the arrow of time isn't really the main issue here. It's the dichotomy of cause/effect description of a system in which this has little or no meaning.



Yes, the state will differ. But it's the question of what "causes" it. You rule out "choice" because you appear to conceptualize the brain as no different from the addition of fruit in the analogy you made several posts back: there are a series of activities which we can label causes such that later activities correspond to the effects of these causes.

The problem is that this isn't an adequate model when it comes to certain systems, such as (or in particular) the brain. The "state" of the brain at any time consists of neural activity which causes itself. It is its own effect. That's what this:


means. You can force neural activity into your linear model, but when you do you distort what is actually happening.



Yes, the state changes. The issue is what causes that change. You wish to view changes in state as "effects" of some series of causes. The problem is that these effects caused themselves, or (more accurately) the components of the state caused the state and were caused by it at the same time.

Thus, when I make a conscious choice, the changes which happen in my brain are not the result of any series of causes in any meaningful way, because what caused the change (or effect, or the current "state") is what changed (or is the effect). When you can rather easily seperate cause and effect (at least linguistically). At time t, there were X apples, and at time t+1 there were a new number of apples because someone put them there.

Complex systems are not so easily reduced.



That linear character describes the passage of time, not the dynamics of neural activity. The change in time corresponds to state changes, but that doesn't mean we can say there are X number of causes that result in Y number of effects. In this case, we can't because (again) the causes are the effects, and vice versa. The moment I make the "choice" my neural activity has altered such that this "choice" is reflected in that activity. However, what caused that neural activity is that neural activity, as the brain (especially if we are talking about conscious processes) consists of self-determining networks.



It's a central area of research in complex systems (theoretical biology, computational biology, dynamical systems analysis, etc.), but brains are probably the most studied of these. When trying to model synchronization, we often rely on approximation, but we don't always do so in ways that fundamentally change the system under investigation. However, biological systems (especially neural systems) are a different matter. Using neuroimaging studies, we can observe state changes and measure individual neural activity, neural populations, all the way up to the entire brain. So, for example, we have subjects do various tasks (identification, judgments, etc.) and we look at neural activity, response times, and any number of processes relevant to the subjects decisions/actions/choices/responses. What we find is consistent with complex systems in general, only more so. Coordination between and within neural networks occurs impossibly fast (zero-lag synchronization). The only way to seperate cause and effect in either a neural population or a neuron in this case is to arbitrary assign either label to one. In reality, we can't say that the activity of some set of neurons X was caused by some set of neurons Y, because the coupling of neurons and neural populations (including nonlocal coupling) creates circular causality. X neurons are causing the activity of Y neurons at the same time that the activity of X neurons are caused by the activity of Y neurons.

There are a number of modeling and mathematical techniques used in computational neuroscience (and in the modeling of dynamical systems in general) to simplify things, but this simplification comes at a cost: we aren't replicating or modeling what's actually going on.

There are a lot of words in what you say, and if I thought you were serious and believed everything you've written I might continue, but I don't, so

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

There are a lot of words in what you say, and if I thought you were serious and believed everything you've written I might continue, but I don't, so

You could ask for sources, and I'd be more than happy to provide them for you. This is, after all, my field.

EDIT: I don't exactly appreciate having my views mocked by someone who will not (or cannot) read the literature on the subject because they freely admit they lack the ability to understand it:

My familarity with philosophy and physics is not all that broad, and I'm not about to bone up on them just to understand the issue here.