The rational explanation is based off the historical evidence.
Historical methods are intended to determine how likely a particular historical account is (be it of a person, a culture, an event, etc.), and in particular to present what the historian thinks is the most likely conclusion for any determination given the evidence.
Miracles, by definition, are as improbable as you can get.
So let's take a conservative scholar's evaluation of the reliability and nature of our sources (e.g., Richard Bauckham's).
Even a very high evaluation of the quality of our evidence, and even granting that we lack good explanations for why the followers of Jesus claimed he had risen from the dead than we have, we do know one thing: There are no historically possible explanations for what Jesus is said to have done, from turning water into wine to rising from the dead.
This means that however improbable a particular explanation of Jesus' resurrection is, even if it is that Jesus never existed, it is more probable than Jesus actually rising from the dead. Historical evidence is limited to applying what we know the way the universe works (e.g., the laws of physics, the psychology of human beings, the nature of religious movements, etc.) to the evidence we have, and deriving the best explanation.
The resurrection of Jesus violates everything we could apply to the evidence because it violates everything we know about how the universe works. Which means that as far as historical analysis is concerned, anything which is possible given the laws of physics is more probable than Jesus' resurrection.
The very fact that some of you people dont seem to understand the concept of contingent truths and necessary truths
Philosophers developed notational schemata for mathematics (including logic) because of the lengthy explanations required to build an argument without rules of validity, logical operators, and notations for predicates/propositions. Moreover, by distilling an argument down to the logical structure, and stripping away anything other than the logic itself, it is far easier to spot problems. Which is why this:
The argument is as follows;...
is inadequate
prima facie. It is not formal, but does rely upon technical terms which are not defined. For illustration, here is a scan I made of possible worlds notation:
And here is a proof about perfection and existence:
When you make arguments about necessity and possible worlds, you are appealing to formal logic and formal definitions with specific rules about validity and entailment. When you don't follow these, and don't understand them, it becomes impossible to explain why you are incorrect.
no one can traverse infinity
Again with the axioms. This can be done any number of ways. Take, for example, temperature. The kelvin scale was specifically constructed because it is absolute. Temperature relates to the motion of "particles" in e.g., boiling water, and equilibrium (how "heat" moves, say from boiling water to the pot one is using once you remove the heat source). The kelvin scale increases infinitely, but it has an absolute zero. Yet we have been able to create systems which go below that mark, and thereby go beyond the range of temperatures from 0 to infinity, and are hotter than any possible temperature (an infinite range).
The point of Zeno's paradox is that it should hold true for all motion (that is, it should be impossible for anybody to move). That's why it's a paradox. The way it is solved is by realizing a flaw in the logic: summing an infinite number of increments can result in a finite point.
Every minute, 60 seconds pass. Every second, a billion nanoseconds pass. We can keep going and going to infinity by infinitely reducing the intervals of time, yet somehow we always get to the next minute.
So give me one example of something that I said that will give you the impression that I dont understand what I am talking about.
I like the Alvin Plantaga's version of it
Here's what Plantinga thinks of a better form of what you've shown:
"if it is even possible that God, so conceived, exists, then it is true that he does, and, indeed, necessarily true that he does. As it is stated, however, there is one
fairly impressive flaw: even if an essence entailing is maximally great in W is exemplified, it does not so far follow that this essence entails is maximally great in α. For all we have shown so far, this being might be at a maximum in some world W, but be pretty insignificant in α, our world.
So the argument does not show that there is a being that enjoys maximal greatness in fact; it shows at most that there is a being that in some world or other has maximal greatness" (from
The Nature of Necessity).
Basically, you've convoluted the entire argument.
Ive presented the ONTOLOGICAL argument
You haven't. You've presented one part of one version and it is logically flawed because you've conflated different proofs badly described and did not know that even Plantinga (
The Nature of Necessity) agrees that this isn't a proof unless you accept the premises (of course, you didn't indicate these and I don't know if you realize what they are): "Hence our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be
said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premiss, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion. And perhaps that is all that can be expected of any such argument."
He acknowledges that if you don't agree with the premises he and others have begun with, than the proof fails. But as you've never read Plantiga's books, you wouldn't know.
All I said was the universe began to exist. That is supported by science and logical reasoning.
"It is true that if there was no first event, then there must have been an event prior to any given event, but it is not true that there must have been an event prior to any given time...There can be infinite beginningless temporal regresses of sensible-thing efficient causes in history, even if there was a beginning to history in the sense of a time at and before which there were no sensible things and nothing happened. This makes some trouble for Craigs basic kalam cosmological argument...A problem for this argument is that the universe of sensible things could have begun to exist in the sense that there is time at and before which there were no sensible things and after which there were fast-starting beginningless series of sensible-thing causes in which series each sensible thing begins to exist and is caused by a member of the series that began to exist earlier." p. 198 of Sobel's
Logic and Theism
That's one logical objection. And as for the science, I've already quoted cosmologists and physicists who disagree with you, but you don't appear to really care about what the science says.
I do in fact explain my model of causation,
It's contradicted by empirical observation.
Absurdities cannot happen in reality.
How do you explain quantum entanglement, actual instantiations of Wheeler's delayed-choice experiment, or any number of ways in which "absurdities" like (A & not A) occur all the time in physics? You don't.