How do you know the probability of a miracle occurring?
By the definition of a miracle. When we talk about historiography, or historical methods, we mean a way of evaluating historical evidence. So, for example, if I look at an account from the 15th century by Hans Fründ on witches, and in particular how the devil teaches them to turn into wolves and devour cattle, or if I look at a contemporary (1428/1429) text of the trial of Agnès Lombarde (and his use of magic/witchcraft to control wolves), I take into account both the documentary evidence and what is known about the period in question and about people in general and finally natural sciences.
Having done so, I would conclude that it is extremely unlikely that Fründ was correct about the ability of certain people to turn into wolves, and would also conclude that whatever Agnès Lombarde was guilty of, it wasn't supernatural familiarity with wolves.
But according to the argument, there is evidence that Jesus rose from the dead.
1st, Craig is pretty much alone even among evangelical scholars here. 2nd, the reason evangelical Christian scholars don't agree is because they acknowledge that Craig's argument is crap. What Craig has done is thrown out the historical method entirely, and then claimed to have made a historical argument.
This is because you are using the wrong tool for your inquiry. The hypothesis is not scientific. The hypothesis is that GOD RAISED JESUS FROM THE DEAD.
You may recall I mentioned W. L. Craig's debating strategies in the context of one particular debate he had with J. D. Crossan. Craig uses this argument. He lists the same "facts" you've probably come across on his or another website. And he states "In summary, there are good historical grounds for affirming that Jesus rose from the dead in".
The hypothesis Craig puts forth is a historical hypothesis. Historians
start from the position that if an historical account contradicts everything we know about the ways in which humans, physics, nature, etc. works, then it cannot be considered an accurate account. They do this because (again) history is about the most likely explanation. If you include miracles (by definition impossible to explain except through supernatural means) then you are saying that the best historical explanation of the evidence is one that is the least likely.
We have massive amounts of legal documents and historical accounts of particular witches in the 15th and 16th centuries. Much more reliable evidence than what we have for Jesus. Yet historians aren't proclaiming that those executed were actually witches. Why? Because people don't turn into wolves (just one of many crimes for which particular witches were executed).
So of course no naturalistic explanation can be given.
That's what historians work with. If they don't have these, then they can determine that Alexander was the son of a god, that witches were performing magical feats for several hundred years in Europe, and that various gods, demi-gods, and magicians were roaming the Near East and Greco-Roman territories for over a 1,000 years.
Well how do you know I am incorrect? If you know I am incorrect it should be fairly easy to explain why?
The above is not valid, because it does not follow that, under the assumption I know you are incorrect, and that you are incorrect, that therefore it should be fairly easy to explain why.
That may sound awkward, but logical arguments must be precise, which is why logicians don't just rely on language but on formal systems where symbolic representations allow the
logic behind given assumptions and what is said to follow from them. If you do not understand how to construct a derivation of a tautology in classical logic, then it is not easy to explain why your "proof" is incorrect, because it relies on classical logic
in addition to more difficult and nuanced concepts of validity, semantics, soundness, etc. Also, I quoted Plantinga explaining it to you.
That is potential infinity, not actual infinity.
It's not.
"VULETIC: Well, you can think of the temperature as a loop. So if you start at zero degrees, then most atoms are standing still. As we add energy, the energy,
the temperature becomes positive and becomes plus infinity, and when we add more energy so that there are more fast atoms than slow atoms, then we start -
we come around to negative infinity, and then we approach zero from below." (
source)
From the actual study published in
Science: "The temperature is discontinuous at maximum entropy, jumping from positive to negative infinity."
Braun, S., Ronzheimer, J. P., Schreiber, M., Hodgman, S. S., Rom, T., Bloch, I., & Schneider, U. (2013). Negative Absolute Temperature for Motional Degrees of Freedom. Science, 339(6115), 52-55
There are many ways you can show the absurdity of infinity.
Infinitely many ways I'm sure. However, every example shows only the "absurdity" of a particular instantiation of infinity. It does not explain how infinite intervals of time and space can and do exist, nor does it explain infinite states of a quantum system or traversing infinite temeratures.
now I want you to keep the set going by telling me the next 8 increments of the set, going backwards.
That was the problem for mathematicians for a long time (and the point of Zeno's paradox). It is clear that one can, like Zeno, describe any traversal over any interval of time or distance by using infinitely many subintervals. However, it could only be described, rather than formulated, which meant that two intuitively obvious but both apparently contradictory ideas were both true or both false.
Either one can travel infinitely many intervals of distance, or one cannot travel any distance. THAT is the heart of Zeno's paradox.
It was resolved by the formulations we use in analysis today, where we can employ inductive logic to demonstrate how infinitely many increments can sum to a finite point.
The first sentence of the quote contradicts the last two sentences of the quote. Misquoting, perhaps?
No, you just didn't know what you were talking about, and I showed you. Plantinga spends a very long time going into detail about
essence, which is central to his argument. His chapter in which he claims to have a "victorious" argument concerns what is entailed by
essence, distinct from
properties:
"
But for any property P, if P is possibly exemplified, then there is a world W and an essence E such that E is exemplified in W, and E entails has P in W."
This is central to the way in which Plantinga gets from "if it is even possible that God, so conceived, exists, then it is true that he does, and, indeed, necessarily true that he does", which only proves that God exists in some possible world (not ours), to God existing in all possible worlds.
However, as you don't understand the arguments you parrot, you accused me of misquoting because you don't know enough about possible world semantics to realize saying "if it is even possible that God exists...then it is...necessarily true that he does" doesn't entail God exists in our world, only (at best) that God necessarily exists in some possible world.
So maybe you should spend less time dogmatically repeating arguments you clearly don't understand, and more time studying the frameworks in which these arguments are made. (see next post for the rest of my responses)