Rough_ER
Member
But that is not the argument being made. Rather, it is argued that beginnings are caused, and that if one posits a beginning to nature and the cosmos as a whole, then this First Cause must by definition be preternatural and ineffable. I am aware of but two meaningful counter-arguments:In my opinion both of these are significant arguments which acknowledge the limitations of methodological naturalism and respect the implications of both ineffability and Gödel's insight.
- There are potential mathematically coherent theories (e.g., M-Theory) in which there is no First Cause, thereby rendering first cause arguments moot.
- Furthermore, even if one were to accept the possibility of a first cause, there are no grounds for extrapolating from this cause the sense of agency and intentionality.
Good post, now I understand. Was that so hard? There was no need to be mean. =P