Free will and omniscience?

[Rolling_Stone]

I don't feel like typing an essay, so here goes...

If God is omniscient, he knows exactly what we are going to do.
If this is true, then why does God get angry, or pleased, after people do things? Surely he already knows what was going to happen?
Why does God "punish" people for things he knew they were going to do - since he knew in advance what was going to happen, God could have prevented it from happening (since a punishment is given to the sinner, God clearly didn't want it to happen).
A good example of this is Adam and Eve - God knew what was going to happen, but got angry and punished them for it??

"No, we have free will!" I hear you say.
That makes no difference. If God created us, he created our minds and our ability to choose and reason. Just like if we build a robot,the robot may be "choosing" what to do, but it will only do what the programmer designed it to do in different situations.
Still don't believe me? How about this: If I ran outside right now and got hit by a bus, it MUST have been part of "God's plan" for me to die at that moment. Therefore, he must know what I am going to "choose" to do.

There is only one possibility I can think of: that God must somehow retard his own knowledge of what choices we are going to make. But that would contradict him being an omnipotent God.

Anyway, back to my main point... can anyone solve this problem? The only solutions I see are:
1. God is imaginary (what I believe).
2. Free will is imaginary.
3. God is not all-knowing.

Ever hear the notion of a self-limited God?

 

[camanintx]

My understanding of it is that He would simply know that you would change your mind.

All you are doing is changing the initial conditions to eliminate the paradox. In my example, I specifically said God knows I am going to have beef, irrespective of what I might have planned to have before God tells me. If my changing my mind changes God's knowledge of my choice, then how can God know anything before I do?

I don't understand your premise. Restate, please?

You agree that we operate in a universe ruled by causality, where causes must precede their effects. You would also agree that the knowledge of what I have for lunch is an effect of my choosing what to eat. If I have free will, then until I actually eat my lunch, I am able to choose what to eat, so any knowledge of what I had for lunch cannot exist until I have eaten. Are you still following this?

So how can God, regardless of it's omniscience or omnipotence, pass that knowledge back to me before I make the choice that created it?

 

[camanintx]

That's probably why God doesn't tell you what you will do tomorrow. But using your question:

If God told you would eat beef and you ate beef then he knew you would actually eat beef. If He told you you would eat beef and you didn't then He would have known He would tell you you would eat beef and He would also have known that even though He would tell you that you would still have chosen chicken. There's not conflict. The only problem is that WE don't know what we will do.

I probably should have stated that when God tells me I will have beef for lunch tomorrow that it isn't lying. Changing the initial conditions of the scenario to eliminate the paradox is not an explanation.

 

[camanintx]

Anyway, back to my main point... can anyone solve this problem? The only solutions I see are:
1. God is imaginary (what I believe).
2. Free will is imaginary.
3. God is not all-knowing.

Another possible solution: Time is imaginary and only "now" really exists. If any God does exist, it cannot know the future any more than we do.

 

[Sola'lor]

I probably should have stated that when God tells me I will have beef for lunch tomorrow that it isn't lying. Changing the initial conditions of the scenario to eliminate the paradox is not an explanation.

But His telling you of what you would eat and it's effects would already be factored into His knowledge.

 

[camanintx]

But His telling you of what you would eat and it's effects would already be factored into His knowledge.

Factored in or not, the question stated that God knows I will choose beef. Saying that God knows I will change my mind just changes the question without actually answering it.

 

[Sola'lor]

Factored in or not, the question stated that God knows I will choose beef. Saying that God knows I will change my mind just changes the question without actually answering it.

So you're saying that God telling you what you will eat will have not effect whatsoever one your choice.

 

[camanintx]

So you're saying that God telling you what you will eat will have not effect whatsoever one your choice.

Maybe it will, maybe it won't. I could either say "you're right, beef sounds great" or "forget that, I'll eat what I want". The question is not about what effect God's knowledge will have on my choice, but rather what effect my choice will have on God's knowledge.

 

[Sola'lor]

Maybe it will, maybe it won't. I could either say "you're right, beef sounds great" or "forget that, I'll eat what I want". The question is not about what effect God's knowledge will have on my choice, but rather what effect my choice will have on God's knowledge.

Exactly, so if God said you were going to eat beef but you ate chicken. God would have already known that you were going to eat chicken in the first place. Even before He told you you were going to eat beef. Because your actions dictate what God can know. God's knowledge is based on what choices you make, whether you've made them yet or not.

 

[camanintx]

Exactly, so if God said you were going to eat beef but you ate chicken. God would have already known that you were going to eat chicken in the first place. Even before He told you you were going to eat beef. Because your actions dictate what God can know. God's knowledge is based on what choices you make, whether you've made them yet or not.

So either God was lying or God can't really know if I will choose chicken or beef. Since my original scenario assumed that God does not lie, then isn't the only logical answer to my question is the latter?

 

[Wandered Off]

To my mind, only if you throw omnipotence into the Godly mix. If God knows our choices but cannot contol them, we still have free will.

The way I see it, it's not about divine control, but if our choices already "exist" such that they can be known, then that means we cannot deviate from the known outcome. This seems incompatible with free will to me. Since we don't know the outcome, to ourselves we appear to have free will, but in this scenario it's only an illusion created by our limited perspective.

 

[Storm]

All you are doing is changing the initial conditions to eliminate the paradox. In my example, I specifically said God knows I am going to have beef, irrespective of what I might have planned to have before God tells me. If my changing my mind changes God's knowledge of my choice, then how can God know anything before I do?

I'm not changing anything, from my perspective. If God is all-knowing it follows He knows the future. You don't seem to have a problem with that part, am I right?

If God knows the future, your changing your mind is part of that future. It's just another thing God knows.

You agree that we operate in a universe ruled by causality, where causes must precede their effects. You would also agree that the knowledge of what I have for lunch is an effect of my choosing what to eat. If I have free will, then until I actually eat my lunch, I am able to choose what to eat, so any knowledge of what I had for lunch cannot exist until I have eaten. Are you still following this?

Yes, thank you for restating. I would agree with your premise, but I don't actually believe in an omnimax or even omniscient God. I'm just playing.

I can see your argument as being against the possibility of omniscience itself, but the free will part seems superfluous.

So how can God, regardless of it's omniscience or omnipotence, pass that knowledge back to me before I make the choice that created it?

Who said anything about God passing the knowledge back to you?

 

[Storm]

The way I see it, it's not about divine control, but if our choices already "exist" such that they can be known, then that means we cannot deviate from the known outcome. This seems incompatible with free will to me. Since we don't know the outcome, to ourselves we appear to have free will, but in this scenario it's only an illusion created by our limited perspective.

Oh, don't get me wrong, I find omniscience troublesome when combined with free will, just not incompatible. A "merely" omniscient God could be a passive observer, with no control over our choices.

 

[Wandered Off]

Oh, don't get me wrong, I find omniscience troublesome when combined with free will, just not incompatible.

Is being unable to deviate from a pre-existent (because it can be known) outcome compatible with free will?

A "merely" omniscient God could be a passive observer, with no control over our choices.

Why, though, would such a God observe what that God already knew in every detail? Wouldn't that be redundant?

 

[camanintx]

I'm not changing anything, from my perspective. If God is all-knowing it follows He knows the future. You don't seem to have a problem with that part, am I right?

If God knows the future, your changing your mind is part of that future. It's just another thing God knows.


Yes, thank you for restating. I would agree with your premise, but I don't actually believe in an omnimax or even omniscient God. I'm just playing.

I can see your argument as being against the possibility of omniscience itself, but the free will part seems superfluous.


Who said anything about God passing the knowledge back to you?

If God tells me that I will have beef for lunch tomorrow, isn't that passing along his knowledge? Actually, whether or not God shares this information with me is irrelevant to the actual argument. How can Information about an event exist prior to the event?

The original scenario said God knows I will have beef, not that I will choose beef and then change my mind. Regardless of how or why I make the choice, it takes it as a FACT that I have beef, so then how can I change my mind and have chicken? Unless you can explain away the paradox without changing the assumed conditions, this example illustrates why knowledge of the future (by anyone) is incompatible with free will.

 

[Storm]

Is being unable to deviate from a pre-existent (because it can be known) outcome compatible with free will?

Not if the outcomes are a product of our choosing. Allow me to provide an example. Offer my son a choice of a red, yellow, or purple flower, and I know he'll pick purple, because I know that's his favorite color. Is purple still his choice? Of course.

Why, though, would such a God observe what that God already knew in every detail? Wouldn't that be redundant?

OK, you stumped me.

 

[Storm]

If God tells me that I will have beef for lunch tomorrow, isn't that passing along his knowledge? Actually, whether or not God shares this information with me is irrelevant to the actual argument. How can Information about an event exist prior to the event?

I think it's a given that we don't know how omniscience works. Do you really expect me to find an answer to that question? Especially given that I don't believe it myself?

The original scenario said God knows I will have beef, not that I will choose beef and then change my mind. Regardless of how or why I make the choice, it takes it as a FACT that I have beef, so then how can I change my mind and have chicken? Unless you can explain away the paradox without changing the assumed conditions, this example illustrates why knowledge of the future (by anyone) is incompatible with free will.

But you're creating a paradox where there isn't one by changing the assumed conditions of omniscience.

I think your argument works fine as opposing omniscience itself, but the free will bit is nonsensical and serves only to confuse things.

I dunno, maybe I'm being dense, maybe not. But the answer to your question is obvious to me.

 

[Wandered Off]

Not if the outcomes are a product of our choosing. Allow me to provide an example. Offer my son a choice of a red, yellow, or purple flower, and I know he'll pick purple, because I know that's his favorite color. Is purple still his choice? Of course.

Well that's not the same as foreknowledge. That's deductive reasoning. It's "foreguessing" with a high degree of confidence, and that is not incompatible with free will.

If God (or anyone) knew with complete certainty what you would do, then you could not choose to do anything other than the certainty. This is not free will. The fact that you don't know the certainty gives you the illusion that you had free will.

 

[Willamena]

Well that's not the same as foreknowledge. That's deductive reasoning. It's "foreguessing" with a high degree of confidence, and that is not incompatible with free will.

Just so. That's not "foreknowledge" but prediction based on current knowledge.

 

[camanintx]

Well that's not the same as foreknowledge. That's deductive reasoning. It's "foreguessing" with a high degree of confidence, and that is not incompatible with free will.

If God (or anyone) knew with complete certainty what you would do, then you could not choose to do anything other than the certainty. This is not free will. The fact that you don't know the certainty gives you the illusion that you had free will.

That's exactly the response I was going to make. I may think I know what my children will choose but they constantly surprise me.