Free will deniers

[Koldo]

Of course there is volition. If there is no volition then there is no action.

Are you defining 'action' as requiring volition?

He can decide to act on what he imagine he can decide to act on his emotions or can decide to not act at all.
Each requires volition. For it to be free it just means that nothing external forced him into one decision or another.

How doesn't this lead to infinite regress?

 

[We Never Know]

I had a mentor in the past whom I met again after 10 years. A philosophy professor. He told me something about free will: there are several kinds of people. Those with enormous volition that use their willpower to do either good things or bad things; and there are people with scarce volition who are too scared to use their own free will, for they don't want to commit mistakes. There are so many shades of individualistic cases inbetween.
He also told me that free will deniers are usually people with a big volition who use their prepotency to destroy other people's lives.
They deny free will exists because admitting it does exist would make them feel guilty of all that they have done unto others.
It's a self-defense mechanism not to feel guilty.
What do you think, guys?

"They deny free will exists because admitting it does exist would make them feel guilty of all that they have done unto others."

Even if they deny free will,,,,,
Didn't they choose to do what they did to others?
Or where they forced?

 

[Estro Felino]

"They deny free will exists because admitting it does exist would make them feel guilty of all that they have done unto others."

Even if they deny free will,,,,,
Didn't they choose to do what they did to others?
Or where they forced?

You should ask them, I guess.

 

[Left Coast]

But this is just a subjective value judgment on your part and not a point worthy of debate.

It's only subjective if you regard all of morality and its very definition as subjective. If you don't care about morality, then okay. But if you care about morality, then you're bound to understand that humans have moral responsibilities. You can't have a coherent morality without that.

In your opinion, because you have distinct standards for what is required to have moral responsibility.

I don't think my standard is terribly distinct. You want to hold people morally accountable for things over which they exert zero control. That's nuts. If I were to go out and take a survey of the general population, I'm willing to bet most folks would be on my team here.

But it is not mind control if you wouldn't have a mind in the first place.

That makes no sense.

My argument of choice is to demonstrate that there is no room for free will. More or less what I have done on post #230.

Your argument collapses on the first premise, unfortunately. Motivation isn't sufficient to make a choice. Ability is also necessary. And when pressed, you have to concede that your position denies our ability to make actual choices.

 

[Koldo]

It's only subjective if you regard all of morality and its very definition as subjective. If you don't care about morality, then okay. But if you care about morality, then you're bound to understand that humans have moral responsibilities. You can't have a coherent morality without that.

It is subjective because I can easily say: The point is that morality is relevant regardless of whether we understand that humans possess moral responsibility for what they do or don't do.

That's a personal judgment.

I don't think my standard is terribly distinct. You want to hold people morally accountable for things over which they exert zero control. That's nuts. If I were to go out and take a survey of the general population, I'm willing to bet most folks would be on my team here.

And how would it even be possible to have this kind of control?

That makes no sense.

That one would have no mind in the first place?

Your argument collapses on the first premise, unfortunately. Motivation isn't sufficient to make a choice. Ability is also necessary. And when pressed, you have to concede that your position denies our ability to make actual choices.

I was talking about the mental process of making a choice. Not the actualization of a choice in the material world. Choosing X doesn't entail necessarily achieving/acquiring X.

If you think this doesn't properly answer this part of your post, I am going to need you to clarify what you mean by ability.

 

[Left Coast]

It is subjective because I can easily say: The point is that morality is relevant regardless of whether we understand that humans possess moral responsibility for what they do or don't do.

Well no, you can't do so rationally (that I've seen thus far). How in the world is morality relevant, or even meaningful, if no one has any moral responsibilities?

And how would it even be possible to have this kind of control?

How? I don't know the biomechanics of it, if that's what you're asking for. It's possible if we have the ability to make a genuine choice to do A or B and we choose either A or B.

That one would have no mind in the first place?

No, that simply because natural processes produce minds that controlling said minds is not mind control? It makes no sense.

I was talking about the mental process of making a choice. Not the actualization of a choice in the material world. Choosing X doesn't entail necessarily achieving/acquiring X.

This, again, is a weird and idiosyncratic meaning of "choice." If one does not have the actual ability to make more than one competing decision, even in their head, then it is not a choice in the genuine sense of the word.

Moreover, your argument ignores the fact that people, at any given moment, possess multiple motivations. These multiple motivations enable multiple actions. Also, a single motivation can enable multiple actions. Thirdly, I would question if motivation alone is genuinely sufficient to even make a mental decision to carry out some action. Cognitive ability is required, for example.

ETA - I'm also fascinated that you, being an atheist as I understand (correct me if I'm wrong), are invoking the impossibility of infinite causal chains. That's a premise that atheists typically balk at.

 

[Nakosis]

Are you defining 'action' as requiring volition?



How doesn't this lead to infinite regress?

Let me provide an example.

Say I want to prove my point about free will.

The motivation for the exercise.

So I can freely raise my arm, lower my arm, or not move my arm at all.
While I have an over all motivation to prove a point. I have now 3 options to select from.

I've no motivation to pick any one of these options over the other. The pick is random. So there is no regression of cause.

I pick whatever. Having picked an option with no motivation behind which one, I now need to use my volition to carry out the action I chose.

There is no infinite regress as there was no motivation behind which option I did pick. Still after choosing a random action I needed to will my arm to do whichever action I picked.

 

[Koldo]

Let me provide an example.

Say I want to prove my point about free will.

The motivation for the exercise.

So I can freely raise my arm, lower my arm, or not move my arm at all.
While I have an over all motivation to prove a point. I have now 3 options to select from.

I've no motivation to pick any one of these options over the other. The pick is random. So there is no regression of cause.

If we assume that truly random choices can exist. Because the fact that there is no apparent motivation doesn't mean there is none. But let's presume it is indeed the case that truly random choices exist and take place.

I pick whatever. Having picked an option with no motivation behind which one, I now need to use my volition to carry out the action I chose.

There is no infinite regress as there was no motivation behind which option I did pick. Still after choosing a random action I needed to will my arm to do whichever action I picked.

Let me see if I understood you correctly:

Step 1 - You pick a random alternative.
Step 2 - You use your volition to carry out your alternative of choice.

I was grouping those up, but that's ok.
At step 2, you either chose to use your volition to carry out your action or you didn't. If you didn't choose to use your volition, then you had no input on it, it just happened naturally and automatically, which is not free will. If you did choose to use your volition, we go back to infinite regress.

 

[Koldo]

Well no, you can't do so rationally (that I've seen thus far). How in the world is morality relevant, or even meaningful, if no one has any moral responsibilities?

Because it is a personal value judgment. I, for example, value truth even if it has no practical application.

How? I don't know the biomechanics of it, if that's what you're asking for. It's possible if we have the ability to make a genuine choice to do A or B and we choose either A or B.

I am arguing it is incoherent to speak of "genuine" choices when we thorougly look at it.

No, that simply because natural processes produce minds that controlling said minds is not mind control? It makes no sense.

But the mind itself wouldn't and couldn't exist without this "control".

This, again, is a weird and idiosyncratic meaning of "choice." If one does not have the actual ability to make more than one competing decision, even in their head, then it is not a choice in the genuine sense of the word.

Different term usage doesn't matter as long as we don't talk past each other.

Moreover, your argument ignores the fact that people, at any given moment, possess multiple motivations. These multiple motivations enable multiple actions. Also, a single motivation can enable multiple actions.

This is a good point that must be addressed. As a matter of fact, that is typical of making choices: To have at least two different motivations involved. But what I am saying is there is one motivation that is bigger/more prevalent than the rest, at the given moment the choice is taken. If that was not the case, how would one ever be able to make a choice?

Thirdly, I would question if motivation alone is genuinely sufficient to even make a mental decision to carry out some action. Cognitive ability is required, for example.

I have mentioned in P1 there are other mental faculties involved and required. However, none of them have anything to do with free will per se.

ETA - I'm also fascinated that you, being an atheist as I understand (correct me if I'm wrong), are invoking the impossibility of infinite causal chains. That's a premise that atheists typically balk at.

Yes, I am an atheist, and I don't think I have ever seen any unified group of people defending infinite regress. But I am not omniscient so... Maybe it does exist.

 

[Nakosis]

If we assume that truly random choices can exist. Because the fact that there is no apparent motivation doesn't mean there is none. But let's presume it is indeed the case that truly random choices exist and take place.



Let me see if I understood you correctly:

Step 1 - You pick a random alternative.
Step 2 - You use your volition to carry out your alternative of choice.

I was grouping those up, but that's ok.
At step 2, you either chose to use your volition to carry out your action or you didn't. If you didn't choose to use your volition, then you had no input on it, it just happened naturally and automatically, which is not free will. If you did choose to use your volition, we go back to infinite regress.

Not an infinite regression, just a regression to step one. My motivation for picking an option had nothing to do with which I picked.

 

[Koldo]

Not an infinite regression, just a regression to step one. My motivation for picking an option had nothing to do with which I picked.

Can you elaborate?

 

[Nakosis]

Can you elaborate?

Volition: the faculty or power of using one's will.
In order to cause my arm to move to a specific position I need to will it to move to that position.

So I have 3 choices. I can will my arm to raise, lower or remain still.
I have no desire for any one option over the other. I have no motivation to make any of these motions over the other.
I have a desire to make a motion but any of the three option will equally fulfill this desire.

So you can trace me willing my arm to act to that specific desire but nothing before that was casual in which movement I chose to make.

 

[Koldo]

Volition: the faculty or power of using one's will.
In order to cause my arm to move to a specific position I need to will it to move to that position.

So I have 3 choices. I can will my arm to raise, lower or remain still.
I have no desire for any one option over the other. I have no motivation to make any of these motions over the other.
I have a desire to make a motion but any of the three option will equally fulfill this desire.

So you can trace me willing my arm to act to that specific desire but nothing before that was casual in which movement I chose to make.

Ok, but where/when does free will enter the picture?

 

[Left Coast]

Because it is a personal value judgment. I, for example, value truth even if it has no practical application.

This isn't an explanation, it's just a bald claim. Saying it's a personal value doesn't explain how morality without any moral responsibilities is relevant or what it even means. What is it that you're personally valuing? And what does that mean?

I am arguing it is incoherent to speak of "genuine" choices when we thorougly look at it.

Yes, I know. And I'm saying that without genuine choice you have no coherent morality other than just baldly asserting it as such. It's not even internally consistent.

But the mind itself wouldn't and couldn't exist without this "control".

A) You don't actually know that.
B) How does that change anything? All it does is push the fundamental moral problem back a step.

Different term usage doesn't matter as long as we don't talk past each other.

They matter when you use them to build your argument but smuggle in meanings that are idiosyncratic. You talk about choice while talking about something that actually isn't a choice. You talk about moral agents who actually have no agency. Again: this is incoherent.

This is a good point that must be addressed. As a matter of fact, that is typical of making choices: To have at least two different motivations involved. But what I am saying is there is one motivation that is bigger/more prevalent than the rest, at the given moment the choice is taken. If that was not the case, how would one ever be able to make a choice?

One can make a choice by opting between actions that have multiple motivations. Motivations create the possibility of an action being taken, but they don't guarantee it will be taken. The action that is ultimately taken is not necessarily the function of greater motivation, but a choice between different motivations that have both made different actions possible.

I have mentioned in P1 there are other mental faculties involved and required. However, none of them have anything to do with free will per se.

I disagree. Someone with severe cognitive impairment is going to have less agency, for example, than someone with full mental capacity.

Yes, I am an atheist, and I don't think I have ever seen any unified group of people defending infinite regress. But I am not omniscient so... Maybe it does exist.

Defenses of infinite regress typically come from those rebutting arguments for God, since God is often defined as an ultimate cause for the universe that avoids an infinite regress of causes. It's just interesting that you don't think infinite regresses are possible; I'm fascinated to know how that plays out in other applications in your worldview. Perhaps for another thread.

 

[Nakosis]

Ok, but where/when does free will enter the picture?

To move your arm you need volition/will.
If your arm is not restrained, then you are free to move it.
And there is no external cause forcing you to pick any one option over any other.

 

[Debater Slayer]

Determinism is the position that all actions are caused by events external to human agency/"free will." So your concession that there's some uncontrollable randomness in the universe still puts you in the determinist camp.

There's a caveat there: when we talk about "events external to human agency/'free will'," that, in my view, also includes human actions, since I don't believe in free will. What this entails is that it is entirely possible for our own actions to be part of the causal chain that affects our lives and many other things even though those actions were not the product of free will.

We are.

This ties into my next point, so I'll respond to both at the same time:

This, again, speaks to an assumption you're making that I don't see a reason for. You're assuming that agency would not be a natural process. Why? Our selves can be products of nature and we can still have agency. What's the contradiction there? Why isn't that possible?

This is the very core of my position, so I'll try to explain it in greater detail using an example.

Suppose that while I'm sitting here right now, I think of raising my hand to grab my phone and scroll through a few pages. Another thought occurs to me to continue what I'm already doing, which is posting from a PC. I then decide to stay on the PC and leave my phone alone for now.

Is it possible for someone to know what they will think in the next few minutes? Hours? Days? They may anticipate some of the thoughts based on previous events (e.g., something that happened at work or with a friend), but some of the thoughts occur without any anticipation whatsoever. They then result in one action or another on our part.

Even my decision to continue on the PC was a thought that arose moments after it had occurred to me to pick up my phone. Our longer-term plans are based on a lot of past input as well as knowledge of various things. Our immediate actions, which may seem entirely free, are still an expression of the electric pulses and neural activity in our brains.

This is where the very notion of agency seems to me an unwarranted assumption: first, it assumes a duality or dichotomous distinction between our thoughts and our "selves." If the experience of the self is merely a facet of biological and natural processes, where is the distinction between it and thoughts that also arise from those very same processes, or at least from the very same source (the brain), such that we can say that one has agency over the other?

Second, segueing from the above point, in order for agency to hold, I think there needs to be some evidence that the brain's activity results in an emergent property of self-control whereby the very processes arising from and within the brain feed into our consciousness in a way that allows us to manipulate our brain and its processes in ways that can't be sufficiently attributed to the unfolding of said processes without the "interference" from our agency.

In other words, if our actions can be explained as a result of natural processes that are devoid of agency or free will, then the assumption of agency becomes superfluous at best unless there's demonstrable evidence for it or necessity thereof.

Let's say there's a self-driving car that can navigate traffic with a high degree of precision and safety. We know that this self-driving car has software designed by humans, and so is its hardware. It has no agency and no will of its own. If it were to ever have a "self," that would merely be an emergent property of its software and hardware.

Further, let's now say that the technology of this self-driving car has become so remarkably advanced over time that it has started displaying some behaviors associated with conscious actors. It decides to make a left turn just because it "wants" to. It speeds and breaks rules because it is now acting on an ostensible desire rather than strictly rule-abiding algorithms.

But then one thing still remains unchanged: even the supposed "agency" of the car is a property of its software and hardware. The electrical pulses within its circuits and motors feed into its desires and thoughts. The decisions it makes arise within that system and, despite feeling entirely free, are still the result of a combination of different physical processes therein.

Make no mistake: it is an astonishingly advanced piece of technology and artificial intelligence, but nowhere is there a reason to assume agency as necessary instead of natural processes that don't result in agency but still result in extremely advanced and sophisticated actions and behaviors.

We are agents. Actors who have the ability to make conscious decisions between multiple options. I see no incoherence there.

My response above addresses this part.

Again, the fact that our choices in life aren't infinite (I can't choose to speak Arabic right now) doesn't therefore mean we have no agency whatsoever.

I don't see a reason to assume agency in the first place, but I will concede that I think agency as an emergent property of the brain, as I detailed above, isn't an impossibility if and only if we limit it to very specific scenarios in life (e.g., which movie to watch tonight, or whether to have coffee or tea); just an unnecessary assumption.

On the other hand, I absolutely think it is both impossible and completely incoherent as well as demonstrably unsound when we talk about certain other scenarios, such as whether someone can freely "choose" which religion to believe in or what beliefs they find convincing. I can't just will myself into believing in Lord Xenu, and I suspect you might agree that you can't either. I also couldn't will myself into believing that drinking coffee will give me superpowers even if I wanted to and even if my life depended on doing so.

Do you agree or disagree with the above—that is, my assertion that agency simply doesn't exist in the "bigger" scenarios I outlined? In which scenarios do you think it doesn't exist, since you stated that our choices (per your perspective) in life are limited?

This is much easier said than done, unfortunately. We all represent some level of threat, and accurate prediction of our future threat level is a tough nut. But the more fundamental point here is that reckless drivers intend less harm, and that's morally relevant to the assessment of their actions.

I wouldn't use that as the primary basis for a legal system, and I think that some rehabilitative systems already focus on cause and effect without bringing much moral philosophy into play. That has worked out quite well in terms of reducing crime rates and recidivism.

Furthermore, morality is a highly subjective field to begin with. There are consequentialists who will tell you that intention simply doesn't matter if the outcomes of an ill-intentioned act and those of a well-intentioned one are the exact same (and I've talked to and disagreed with a few of them). There are fundamentalist believers who will tell you that any action not devoted to one and only one deity is morally inferior to one done for the sake of said deity, so much so that they believe Osama bin Laden can go to Heaven just for being a believer but an atheist is doomed to go to Hell for eternity even if the atheist lives their whole life in service of others.

Absent an objective measure of morality independent of our beliefs as humans, I don't think we can treat morality as an absolute basis for legal systems, much less when it comes to punishment or rehabilitation of criminals. Theocratic systems are built upon the foundation of treating morality as such, and we can see how well that has worked out compared to rehabilitative systems focused on cause and effect as well as prevention of harm to others.

There's certainly something to be said about the benefits of rehabilitating criminals, when it can be done (it can't always). But that's a different thread.

Agreed, on both counts.

If you have the capacity to do something, and also the capacity not to do it, and you chose to do it...that's agency.

I don't see capacity as synonymous with agency. A robot theoretically has the capacity to pick up a pen and write a novel, but it won't. However, it will "choose" to perform the actions that its software and hardware allow for. It has capacity; just not agency.

Again, we seem to be repeating ourselves. This is inly relevant if you assume that "biology and natural law" = determinism. Which is not a case that's been successfully made, IMO.

See above.

If "mental constitution and techniques" are essentially other whims over which we exercise no control...then unfortunately, we are still slaves.

I don't see "we" as separate from the experience of "control" we feel. I also don't see these things as whims; they're typically much more elaborate than that.

Either way, I don't think there's any necessity to attribute them to agency or free will.

You still arrive at a decision point wherein you could engage in the behaviors or not.

Yes, and the decision is, in my opinion, not determined by free will either.

I think my example above covers a lot of these points, so I'll refer to it when I believe it does.

I'm not claiming we choose every single thing. Just some things. Those who deny any human agency have to demonstrate that we never chose anything whatsoever.

See my point above about the unnecessity of agency as well as the questions about which situations you believe we have agency over.

A lot, yes. All?

I would say all, but as I also said above, I believe it's not impossible for there to be agency over very specific situations. I just don't see any reason to conclude that at the moment.

Their assessment would be ignorant if they believed we had no agency, not just less than them. (To be clear, I'm agnostic on the question of whether anything in the universe actually has greater agency than we do.)

Their belief that we had no agency would be no different from the belief of humans who find free will to be an incoherent or unnecessary notion, so I don't think it would be ignorant. (I realize you disagree with me on this point, of course.)

Indeed, perhaps a difference. But not a reason to assume we have none at all. Incidentally, crocodiles may have some agency - I don't pretend to be an expert in crocodile psychology.

See above.

Side note: I don't like using the imperative in any of my posts because I find it gentler not to, so I'm just saying "see above" for convenience and because I trust that you know I don't mean it in a rude or passive-aggressive way here. I'm not trying to be bossy or anything!

 

[Exaltist Ethan]

Free will is not an illusion, but it's also not very apparent in society. I believe to some degree of both free will and determinism, but I would argue that determinism is slowly becoming more free over time. For example, in the past, to listen to music, you'd have to go to the record store or turn on the radio, and now we have Spotify and almost an infinite amount of music to listen to. However, the amount of music that there is compared to how much that could exist, especially that of popular music, is very tiny, and determinism is still more apparent in society than free will. We would all like to be able to fly like the birds, swim like the dolphins, and still have the wisdom of a human being, and perhaps with the right technology it might literally become possible to do this, but there are several severe restrictions to free will and for the most part we still live in a deterministic reality.

 

[Koldo]

To move your arm you need volition/will.
If your arm is not restrained, then you are free to move it.
And there is no external cause forcing you to pick any one option over any other.

Sure, but how is that free will?
I am asking because as we were talking, you don't want merely to say that doing what you want is free will, you want to say that you had the freedom to do otherwise. How did you have the freedom to do otherwise?

 

[Nakosis]

Sure, but how is that free will?
I am asking because as we were talking, you don't want merely to say that doing what you want is free will, you want to say that you had the freedom to do otherwise. How did you have the freedom to do otherwise?

Well to make sure I understand what you mean by that, the freedom to do otherwise, can you give me an example of what that would entail.
To me it seems obvious that I had 3 options to choose from. So since you don't seem to understand this, I must be missing something.

 

[Shadow Wolf]

I had a mentor in the past whom I met again after 10 years. A philosophy professor. He told me something about free will: there are several kinds of people. Those with enormous volition that use their willpower to do either good things or bad things; and there are people with scarce volition who are too scared to use their own free will, for they don't want to commit mistakes. There are so many shades of individualistic cases inbetween.
He also told me that free will deniers are usually people with a big volition who use their prepotency to destroy other people's lives.
They deny free will exists because admitting it does exist would make them feel guilty of all that they have done unto others.
It's a self-defense mechanism not to feel guilty.
What do you think, guys?

So demonstrate to us that free will even exists at all.