Koldo
Outstanding Member
The act of imagining is caused by the brain. Which is me. So anything internal to the casual agent is not external causation. This includes memories, imaginations, feelings, desires. So as long as the causation comes internally from the brain, I consider it as being willed from the casual agent.
The problem I think is you limit the casual agent to only the part of the brain which is consciously aware. So if you are not casually aware/conscious of it then you are not being at cause. I think that is where most philosophers run into problems to is they limit the casual agent to only the "conscious self".
So while you may not be consciously under control the brain is. Which rightly should be taken in its entirety as being the casual agent.
The very act of limiting the casual agent to only the part of the brain which is consciously aware, which is only a small fraction of the brain, cuts off the actual causality the brain is capable of.
Your are looking for causality were it is not and say you see none.
Free will only requires that the brain can choose between alternate courses of action without the choice being made is influenced by and external, external from the brain, cause.
So unless you can show what cause, external to the brain, influenced my choice with what to do with my arm, you haven't yet countered my argument.
Let me see if I got this right: You would say that someone had the freedom to do otherwise (free will) because, rather than the conscious part of someone being under control of the outcome of a given choice, the other mental processes could have somehow worked differently at the moment a choice was taken, thus leading to a different alternative being picked. Is this correct?
If so, I don't actually think there is a significant disagreement between us then. It just comes down to you having a lower bar for what constitutes free will. You don't seem to be defending the traditional (philosophical) view of free will.