free will vs natural determinism

[Willamena]

This is a very compatibilist view, which is fine.

However I think the question is whether we have any control over our will?

Can we choose what we desire? Our desire controls our will. Can we control our desire?

We cannot make wants real, but then, if we could they wouldn't be wants.

Edit: On second thought, it's a complete contradiction. To immediately realize wants means there are no wants--it describes the world as it presently is with things simply happening.

 

[Nakosis]

We cannot make wants real, but then, if we could they wouldn't be wants.

Edit: On second thought, it's a complete contradiction. To immediately realize wants means there are no wants--it describes the world as it presently is with things simply happening.

That kind of supports determinism doesn't it?

I'm thinking more along the lines that I prefer/desire tea over coffee. So I go make a cup of tea instead of coffee. My actions are determine by my desires. I end up drinking tea and could not having chosen to drink coffee.

Can I alter what I desire. Can I choose to prefer coffee over tea?
Can I choose to like chocolate over vanilla?
Can I choose to like boys over girls?

To control our will it seems to me we have to be able to arbitrarily create what we desire.

Freewill, meaning the ability to determine what we desire without any outside influence.

Today I will cause myself to prefer chocolate. Tomorrow I will cause myself to prefer vanilla just for the heck of it.

If even possible it seems it would be difficult.

 

[Estro Felino]

well...people have never felt guilty.
That's because they have never believed that man is endowed with free will. If they had, there would have been much less troubles on this Earth. Less wars, less conflicts, less abuses, less prevarications, less corruption, less money-hunger, etc etc...

so...I guess that sense of guilt is a positive feeling.

 

[Skwim]

It is essentially the idea that "me" is capable of "doing," and particularly of what "me," the objective case of the first person pronoun, is capable of doing. "I" doesn't objectively exist, but "me" does a whole lot of interacting with the world anyway, and that makes it real.


By conscious observation. "I did X."


If I bend your arm to cause you to eat your green beans, that action is technically against your will, not by your will.

Sorry that you're missing the whole issue.

 

[Willamena]

Sorry that you're missing the whole issue.

My bad, I thought you were asking for what I thought.

 

[Willamena]

That kind of supports determinism doesn't it?

It might be seen that way, if it were the case that wants immediately resolve, but it isn't. To have a want or a desire is to have something unresolved.

I'm thinking more along the lines that I prefer/desire tea over coffee. So I go make a cup of tea instead of coffee. My actions are determine by my desires. I end up drinking tea and could not having chosen to drink coffee.

Can I alter what I desire. Can I choose to prefer coffee over tea?
Can I choose to like chocolate over vanilla?
Can I choose to like boys over girls?

To control our will it seems to me we have to be able to arbitrarily create what we desire.

Freewill, meaning the ability to determine what we desire without any outside influence.

Today I will cause myself to prefer chocolate. Tomorrow I will cause myself to prefer vanilla just for the heck of it.

If even possible it seems it would be difficult.

"Free will" is not being influenced by other agents; desire isn't an agent. We take into consideration all variables, including wants, in making a decision or action. What distinguishes your will from determinism is the inclusion of that "you," the agent of "your" decisions and actions.

You cannot go back and change the decision for tea to a decision for coffee, simply because it's in the past.

Controlling will is mu (misspoken): will is you controlling.

You can change your preferences in the usual ways, through practice and conditioning, if you're willing. Change takes time and effort.

 

[Skwim]

My bad, I thought you were asking for what I thought.

I was, and am sorry that you're missing the whole issue.

In a nutshell, the freewill v. determinism issue can be said to come down to a very simple contention held by freewillers: they say they could have done differently. Determinists say they couldn't.

 

[Thruve]

That kind of supports determinism doesn't it?

I'm thinking more along the lines that I prefer/desire tea over coffee. So I go make a cup of tea instead of coffee. My actions are determine by my desires. I end up drinking tea and could not having chosen to drink coffee.

Can I alter what I desire. Can I choose to prefer coffee over tea?
Can I choose to like chocolate over vanilla?
Can I choose to like boys over girls?

To control our will it seems to me we have to be able to arbitrarily create what we desire.

Freewill, meaning the ability to determine what we desire without any outside influence.

Today I will cause myself to prefer chocolate. Tomorrow I will cause myself to prefer vanilla just for the heck of it.

If even possible it seems it would be difficult.

True. But are desires determined aswell?

 

[idav]

I was, and am sorry that you're missing the whole issue.

In a nutshell, the freewill v. determinism issue can be said to come down to a very simple contention held by freewillers: they say they could have done differently. Determinists say they couldn't.

Which leaves nobody correct. If it is willed it is also at the same time determined. So what is this "free" we are supposed to be looking for?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Determinists say they couldn't.

Determinists don't rely on flawed conceptions of determinism, randomness, and causality (well, not those who actually espouse determinism rather than what they equate their beliefs to). The point is that external factors determine an agent's actions absolutely and completely, not that by somehow defining "will" as causal or framing it deterministically you demonstrate anything.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Which leaves nobody correct. If it is willed it is also at the same time determined. So what is this "free" we are supposed to be looking for?

One would think that the "free" would correspond to some property or nature of agents to exercise "free will". However, the OP has defined "will" so as to make determinism meaningless.

 

[Skwim]

Which leaves nobody correct. If it is willed it is also at the same time determined.

Don't know why this leaves no one correct. In any case it's a problem for the freewiller; explain exactly how the will operates in the face of its determined nature.

So what is this "free" we are supposed to be looking for?

As best as I can make out, causation. Of course some think it's merely being free from outside coercion, but such notions miss the point entirely and are dismissible.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Don't know why this leaves no one correct. In any case it's a problem for the freewiller; explain exactly how the will operates in the face of its determined nature.

If it is determined, then there exists a set of external forces that completely determine it. This contradicts the definition of "will", and is therefore meaningless.

 

[Estro Felino]

If it is determined, then there are a set of external forces that completely determine it. This contradicts the definition of "will", and is therefore meaningless.

I don't understand why you keep universalizing your personal experience (which I deeply respect)
But people do use their free will and are proud of themselves because they are aware their conscience is clean, because they have used their free will to avoid doing things they could regret.

so the presence of these people is the evidence that your point is wrong

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I don't understand why you keep universalizing your personal experience

How does giving the definition of "determinism" according to its use both in the most definitive dictionary for non-specialists (the OED) and specialists' dictionaries, encyclopedias, and reference sources amount to "universalizing [my] personal experience"?

so the presence of these people is the evidence that your point is wrong

My point was that the OP mischaracterized "free will" and determinism and that there is absolutely no reason to suppose that our "will" is determined because of physics or determinism itself (excepting any evidence for a deterministic cosmos which currently is absent in modern physics and thus irrelevant).

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

As best as I can make out, causation. Of course some think it's merely being free from outside coercion, but such notions miss the point entirely and are dismissible.

As best as you can make out, the answer is something you can no more define than "free will". What is the "point entirely?"

 

[Willamena]

In a nutshell, the freewill v. determinism issue can be said to come down to a very esimple contention held by freewillers: they say they could have done differently. Determinists say they couldn't.

Or do differently, yes--casting it in past tense just allows us to speak in terms of possibilities at the time. In present tense, free will is the ability to do. Here. Now.

Determinism removes from the picture the agency of "you."

 

[Sleeppy]

(excepting any evidence for a deterministic cosmos which currently is absent in modern physics and thus irrelevant).

False. There are still physical laws; they haven't gone anywhere.

 

[idav]

Determinism removes from the picture the agency of "you."

This point can't be stressed enough. It is the "you" that gives will a definition to begin with. To deny that is to deny our abilities to predict and prefer outcomes ie. self determined.

 

[idav]

Don't know why this leaves no one correct. In any case it's a problem for the freewiller; explain exactly how the will operates in the face of its determined nature.

Will has to use determinism in its favor. A determined nature is what would make a persons will worthwhile.