free will vs natural determinism

[Willamena]

This point can't be stressed enough. It is the "you" that gives will a definition to begin with. To deny that is to deny our abilities to predict and prefer outcomes ie. self determined.

Perhaps the piece of the puzzle that some are missing is that influences like desires and preferences are very much external to "you." They influence you in the same way as someone twisting your arm. As far as the "you" is concerned, it is the only internal.

It is not the body and it is not the mind--these are things it "owns": "my body," and "my mind." It is exempt from being the world, because the world stands in contrast to it. Everything that makes up the world are possible influences on "I." It is, in essence, the indescribable soul and the assailable spirit, or at least the image of them. In practicality, it is an idea, the idea of "I/me."

That is what gets lost when we paint the objective picture of determinism. When we've laid our brush down, there is no "I" anywhere in that literal picture (it resides only behind the scene, in the implication of an artist). It's all about how we paint that picture--to include the "I" or not--that is the dichotomy of the free will debate: a strictly objective description of the world, or one that includes the person as an agent.

If desires are making decisions, then "I" didn't. If circumstances are making decisions, then "I" didn't. But, taking into consideration all the desires and circumstances that provide me with options, if "I" make a decision, that's free will at work.

And there are always options.

 

[Nakosis]

True. But are desires determined aswell?

Determined by what?

Do you as an agent exist that can determine your desires?
Or are you a fancy computer that takes input only to regurgitate it as part of an unimaginably complex process.

We trust in the apparentcy of cause and effect?

We trust in the apparentcy of of existing as an agent capable of choosing our course through life?

Regardless we have to pretend to accept the later otherwise we can claim no responsibility for our actions.

 

[Skwim]

Or do differently,

?
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yes--casting it in past tense just allows us to speak in terms of possibilities at the time.

Yup.

In present tense, free will is the ability to do. Here. Now.

But just what is the nature of this ability? The determinist will tell you that doing it's not really an ability at all, but rather the reaction to whatever the preceding series of cause/effect dictates one does.

Determinism removes from the picture the agency of "you."

Not sure what the "agency of 'you' " is. Care to explain?

 

[idav]

?
​

Yup.

But just what is the nature of this ability? The determinist will tell you that doing it's not really an ability at all, but rather the reaction to whatever the preceding series of cause/effect dictates one does.

Not sure what the "agency of 'you' " is. Care to explain?

I will work with your definition. The ability to do otherwise. With an agent, a process that allows filtering of influences, is the ability to do otherwise. Otherwise the very first influence would get us every time. As it is influence is just that, a suggestion and doesn't necessarily mean it will manifest as an outcome.

 

[outhouse]

As best as you can make out, the answer is something you can no more define than "free will". What is the "point entirely?"

post #2 addresses this.

In context, in reality, unless someone can posit a credible source for said will that is not free, we all have it.

 

[Willamena]

But just what is the nature of this ability?

Whatever is described as having been done.

Description is its nature, be it a part of the internal dialogue that is consciousness or the external dialogue that is conversation.

The determinist will tell you that doing it's not really an ability at all, but rather the reaction to whatever the preceding series of cause/effect dictates one does.

That's nothing more than the ability to describe 'the ability to do' by another means.

Reductionism ensures us of alternate means of describing.

Not sure what the "agency of 'you' " is. Care to explain?

I did so in another post.

 

[Willamena]

Determinism is about causes, not a force.

So many make that error. Especially those who believe in inevitability implied by determinism.

Determinism is a description of the world.

To make it anything more is to reify it.

 

[Skwim]

Will has to use determinism in its favor. A determined nature is what would make a persons will worthwhile.

I think you're confusing the meanings of the word "determined"

I'm using it as a verb with an object, as in "He determined where the air conditioner should go."

Where as you seem to be using it as an adjective as in " She had a determined nature . . ." which in this case it modifies "nature."

I will work with your definition. The ability to do otherwise. With an agent, a process that allows filtering of influences, is the ability to do otherwise.

And what is the character of this process? I submit that it, like all other processes in nature, are a series of cause/effect events that ultimately lead to one and only one possible conclusion. But in as much as you don't see it this way, just how does your version work?

___________________________
___________________________

Whatever is described as having been done.

This is just the end result. I'm asking you to describe the nature of the ability, not its end result. How does this ability work?

Description is its nature, be it a part of the internal dialogue that is consciousness or the external dialogue that is conversation.

Sorry but this isn't making any sense.

That's nothing more than the ability to describe 'the ability to do' by another means.

Hardly.

Reductionism ensures us of alternate means of describing.

I think you've gone way off track.

I did so in another post.

Not in this thread; I checked all your posts. So, care to explain "agency of 'you' " or direct me to the thread where you already have ? If not, I'll assume you don't know what you're talking about.

 

[Willamena]

This is just the end result. I'm asking you to describe the nature of the ability, not its end result.

Nature is end result: description of the physical world.

How does this ability work?

Ostensibly, the ability to do something is the power possessed by an agent. But that's not properly descriptive, because an agent is described as the thing in possession of such powers (abilities).

Abilities come about because we employ consciousness, which is a process of rendering the world in langauge. We break down the world into things, useful things (nouns, verbs, adjectives, conjunctions, etc.) and understand the world in those terms. In turn, any theories of the world are bound to a being created in those terms. The world described is such a being (a word world).

When I type words on the keyboard and make thoughts appear on the screen for you to read, that is an "ability" that exists only in the word world. All its significant components are word-world components ("I," "type," "keyboard," "on the," "make," "thoughts," "appear," "screen," "for," "you.") They don't exist per se in reality.

Both free will and determinism belong to the word-world. The "ability" that "I" "have" to "do" things is no more or less real than the "ability" that "causes" have to "affect" "effects."

The world operates despite our descriptions.

Not in this thread; I checked all your posts. So, care to explain "agency of 'you' " or direct me to the thread where you already have ? If not, I'll assume you don't know what you're talking about.

I was referring to post #81.

 

[1robin]

Where as determinism is an out side force acting upon your ability to make decisions.

I think total natural determinism is actually disprovable. If some non-intentional and random chain of events led to my having the question occur in my mind what is the fundamental definition of a limit why would it ever also lead to the correct answer? It doe snot care about the question of the answer. It is just atoms in motion. It would more likely answer the question with pizza or some other random concept. It will never ever produce millions of questions and also answers to them. It also will not produce desires to do anything that it then actualizes. It might produce a desire to go to the store but it will just as likely then produce the action of jumping in the kitchen sink because it has no interest in actualizing anything. There are also a problems with sufficient causation but I will leave it here.

 

[Sleeppy]

I think total natural determinism is actually disprovable. If some non-intentional and random chain of events led to my having the question occur in my mind what is the fundamental definition of a limit why would it ever also lead to the correct answer? It doe snot care about the question of the answer. It is just atoms in motion. It would more likely answer the question with pizza or some other random concept. It will never ever produce millions of questions and also answers to them. It also will not produce desires to do anything that it then actualizes. It might produce a desire to go to the store but it will just as likely then produce the action of jumping in the kitchen sink because it has no interest in actualizing anything. There are also a problems with sufficient causation but I will leave it here.

Determinism is intentional, and is not random.

 

[Willamena]

I think total natural determinism is actually disprovable.

It would have to be provable before it could be disprovable.

 

[Nakosis]

Determinism is intentional, and is not random.

If there is true randomness then determinism is false.
Randomness however does nothing to support freewill.

From a compatibilist view determinism has no relationship to freewill.

It's difficult to keep in mind sometimes how determinism defines freewill.
The ability for a person to have acted other then they did.

I don't know if that is fair. You create a word which is defined by a question that can't be answered. This supports what?

How can I prove the actuality of being able to do otherwise when what is done is done. It's an impossible requirement to prove freewill as determinism defines it.

 

[Sleeppy]

If there is true randomness then determinism is false.
Randomness however does nothing to support freewill.

From a compatibilist view determinism has no relationship to freewill.

It's difficult to keep in mind sometimes how determinism defines freewill.
The ability for a person to have acted other then they did.

I don't know if that is fair. You create a word which is defined by a question that can't be answered. This supports what?

How can I prove the actuality of being able to do otherwise when what is done is done. It's an impossible requirement to prove freewill as determinism defines it.

It may not even matter how you define freewill.. I can't imagine any scenario where the definition would make sense, or be acceptable. How do you define freewill? -- And if it is free from determinism, how is it able to be understood, or examined? If it is free from determinism, there is literally no formula explaining how it works.

 

[idav]

It may not even matter how you define freewill.. I can't imagine any scenario where the definition would make sense, or be acceptable. How do you define freewill? -- And if it is free from determinism, how is it able to be understood, or examined? If it is free from determinism, there is literally no formula explaining how it works.

It shouldn't be the goal to be free from determinism. The will of a being would have to be part of what is determined. Randomness doesn't help will either, random is the opposite of anything willed at all. Both extremes don't cut it, the will has to be part of what is determined so it has to be some a form of freewill compatibility. Humans have awareness and an ability to think things through and make predictions. Nothing makes a being do anything, the most can be done is influence the being. As individuals we know very well we can't "make" anyone do anything short of pointing a loaded gun to their head. That it takes such coercion and even more for some really says something.

 

[1robin]

Determinism is intentional, and is not random.

Who is determining it then?

 

[1robin]

It would have to be provable before it could be disprovable.

Maybe but I don't see why it has that necessity, can you explain.

 

[Skwim]

If there is true randomness then determinism is false.

Well, some scientists have proposed that true randomness does occur at the quantum level, but then there are other scientists who say it doesn't. In either case, determinism would still operate at the non-quantum level. Quantum states decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing.
source

It's difficult to keep in mind sometimes how determinism defines freewill.
The ability for a person to have acted other then they did.

I don't think it's determinism that's doing any defining, but simply determinist who, lacking a decent definition from the freewillers, have been forced to come up with one. I have yet to see a decent definition of freewill from its supporters that doesn't resort to undefined terms that only obfuscate the issue.

I don't know if that is fair. You create a word which is defined by a question that can't be answered. This supports what?

Determinists didn't create the word "freewill." It was created by those who needed a word to describe the state of being responsible for one's actions. Without the concept the notions of sin and salvation ring hollow.

How can I prove the actuality of being able to do otherwise when what is done is done. It's an impossible requirement to prove freewill as determinism defines it.

Then come up with a better one. Freewill is:_______________fill in the blank________________. We determinist would be delighted to see one that doesn't tap dance around the idea. One that actually challenges determinism. So far, nada.


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Who is determining it [determinism]then?

It's nothing more than the result of considering how things happen. Either actions are caused or they're not. If you want to argue that actions (includes thoughts) are uncaused then prepare your defense carefully. If you concede that actions (includes thoughts) are caused, determined, then you're on your way to understanding why determinism is such a robust concept.

 

[Sleeppy]

Without the concept, the notions of sin and salvation ring hollow.

I don't go that far; I'm still Christian.. It's still useful to outline offenses, punishments/consequences, deterrents and solutions..

 

[Skwim]

I don't go that far;

You think that if people have absolutely no control over what they do they should still be held accountable for their their actions, including sins? If so, salvation becomes a mere fiat of god, a flip of the coin.