I did. Your source is incorrect, and for the same reason you are: he's a Christian creationist with a stake in preserving the possibility of omniscience and free will. despite the incoherence of the claim. So he simply decrees that what he believes is possible. He might as well claim any other impossible thing. It doesn't make it possible, such as one being in two different countries at once. If somebody claimed that that was possible, what would your response be? Hopefully, you'd reject the claim because YOU KNOW IT'S IMPOSSIBLE.
This was the first sentence you quoted: "If some future action/choice is known prior to its occurrence, that event does not thereby become “necessary”, “compelled”, “forced”, or what have you." That's simply incorrect. Using words like modal and contingent doesn't help him, but it does snow readers eager to believe him.
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Water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. What if someone says, "Well, that's not how I choose to think about water."? All we can do is appeal to scientific values. And if he doesn't share those values, the conversation is over. If someone doesn't value evidence, what evidence are you going to provide to prove that they should value it? If someone doesn't value logic, what logical argument could you provide to show the importance of logic?” - Sam Harris
Is there a reason you didn't provide a
link or your source? I found it anyway. Here's who wrote that:
View attachment 92975
It's all been done repeatedly. Would it help to do it again? If I know how a given sporting event ends, it means that the athletes involved have no choice. There was a time that they might have had a choice if libertarian free will exists, but when the time comes that I can tell you how every play turns out because I have seen the game, those characters no longer have free will. When they had free will, the outcome was uncertain. When the outcome was certain following the game, there was no more free will. Omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive.
Just because B and C are possibilities that others might choose in similar circumstance doesn't mean that they were possible for the person who chose A, and if we know in advance that A will be chosen, then it isn't a choice even if it superficially resembles one.