Nah. We're having a pretty productive conversation thus far. You even invited it.
We stopped doing that a while ago. Half of this post is you repeating questions I already answered, even in the very post you quoted. That you'd break up my post to pose a question to one paragraph that is answered immediately in the next and treat them as separate points is just baffling.
The only questions that make sense given the stage of the conversation are the following.
You can't just claim something with no evidence - not reasonably, anyway. How do you know that premise is true?
Are you asking how we can know about the historical bedrock or how we know this would provide context for divine vindication? If it's the latter, the question is strange. If there is a God and Jesus claimed to be his unique eschatologial agent among other things, then that God has a chance to confirm this or deny it and one way that can happen is resurrecting Jesus. I fail to see what in this statement doesn't follow to you.
Again, no. Bracketing our worldviews requires that we only look at what can be demonstrated outside of our worldview. The overlap of that Venn diagram between the naturalist and the supernaturalist is natural things. Again, this is why serious professional historians don't explain historical events with "God did it," or "Magic did it," or "Ghosts did it," even if they might privately believe those things.
Again, I explained why that's just a presumption of naturalism that doesn't consider all options. When Licona says that we should bracket our horizons he means by that that we should leave our worldviews at the door. That doesn't mean bowing down to the standards of the most reductive worldview. An argument against that is the fact that you miss out on possible explanations.
Your only response to this has been that other historians apply methodological naturalism but that's irrelevant since the point of Licona's book (and the entirety of Chapter 2) just is to challenge the claim that we must limit ourselves like that. That's why the book has "A New Historiographical Approach" in the title (one of the reasons anyway).
But that doesn't account for your potential ignorance of a natural explanation. Just because you can't think of something, doesn't mean it isn't there. So again I ask - how do you distinguish between a natural cause you don't understand, and a supernatural cause? At this point it seems you don't have a method. When you encounter something you don't know how to explain, you chalk it up by default to the supernatural.
You clearly don't appreciate arguments for the best explanation. They are a valid type of argument used in all sorts of other disciplines including history. In fact, no method can account for possible ignorance. There's always a chance we don't know something so by your logic we shouldn't ever conclude anything as it's always possible there's something else that we could eventually discover that proves us wrong. This, of course, isn't how you actually reason but it is an argument you're willing to use when the best explanation is one you don't like. That's why you're driven by your bias rather than the evidence.
@bold that is quite plainly not what I said. At this point if I said the sky is blue you'd ask me why I'm saying it's red...
One of the problems with supernatural explanations, and why they're not very useful or explanatory, is that they can be used to fit any evidence. What evidence could we possibly find that your version of God couldn't cause to happen? It's unfalsifiable. This is why I asked for your methods of discerning one type of cause from another.
If you're saying that it's possible to offer the supernatural as an explanation for anything, yes that's true but in most situations the relevant context isn't present to warrant that so the explanation loses to better natural alternatives. So it is falsifiable in the sense that it can be demonstrated to be an inferior explanation. Same would apply for the mysterious natural phenomena you'd rather rely on in that case from before as there is no case for which you couldn't posit an unknown natural phenomena as an explanation. Regardless, you don't just dismiss it before hand, you see if there's better explanations.