We stopped doing that a while ago. Half of this post is you repeating questions I already answered, even in the very post you quoted.
If I asked you a question again, it's for one reason: you didn't answer it.
Are you asking how we can know about the historical bedrock or how we know this would provide context for divine vindication?
I very explicitly asked you both questions.
If it's the latter, the question is strange. If there is a God and Jesus claimed to be his unique eschatologial agent among other things, then that God has a chance to confirm this or deny it and one way that can happen is resurrecting Jesus. I fail to see what in this statement doesn't follow to you.
Why would God need to resurrect Jesus to prove Jesus is his "unique eschatological agent?" And what does that term even mean? And, yet again, because you haven't answered, I'll ask yet again: how do you know any of those things (that there is a God, that Jesus is his unique eschatological agent, that we'd expect a resurrection as a result) are part of the "historical bedrock" of what's known in history about Jesus?
Again, I explained why that's just a presumption of naturalism that doesn't consider all options. When Licona says that we should bracket our horizons he means by that that we should leave our worldviews at the door. That doesn't mean bowing down to the standards of the most reductive worldview. An argument against that is the fact that you miss out on possible explanations.
The very fact of us leaving our worldviews at the door means we must exclude certain ideological possibilities that are predicated on a particular worldview. Supernatural events, by their nature, assume supernaturalism is true. Natural events, which both parties agree exist, do not assume naturalism is true. Again, this is why serious mainstream historians do not entertain magical ideas to explain history. Such notions are simply off the table, neither denied nor confirmed. I don't know how many different ways to explain this to you.
Your only response to this has been that other historians apply methodological naturalism but that's irrelevant since the point of Licona's book (and the entirety of Chapter 2) just is to challenge the claim that we must limit ourselves like that. That's why the book has "A New Historiographical Approach" in the title (one of the reasons anyway).
And thus far, you've provided ****-poor reasons why we ought to do so. So if you're reiterating Licona's view, I can see why it hasn't gained much traction in academic circles outside perhaps conservative Christian seminaries.
Moreover, if what you've said here is true, then you have to concede that you're arguing based on premises outside of what you're calling the "historical bedrock" about Jesus. If you recognize that your argument is completely at odds with how serious mainstream historians analyze history, then let's stop talking about this "historical bedrock" as though that's all that's needed, and admit that your view extends far, far beyond that to things most historians would never even entertain as serious ideas, let along assent to them as historical fact.
You clearly don't appreciate arguments for the best explanation. They are a valid type of argument used in all sorts of other disciplines including history. In fact, no method can account for possible ignorance. There's always a chance we don't know something so by your logic we shouldn't ever conclude anything as it's always possible there's something else that we could eventually discover that proves us wrong. This, of course, isn't how you actually reason but it is an argument you're willing to use when the best explanation is one you don't like. That's why you're driven by your bias rather than the evidence.
This is a painfully thin attempt at false equivalence, and I suspect on some level you know that. There is an obvious difference between having a margin of error in one's analysis, and having no systematic method by which one even knows how to start carrying out an analysis at all. Serious scientists and scholars have actual systematic methods by which they test and falsify various hypotheses and candidate explanations for phenomena to determine what best fits the evidence. You, on the other hand, don't.
If you're saying that it's possible to offer the supernatural as an explanation for anything, yes that's true
Then there's nothing else to say!
but in most situations the relevant context isn't present to warrant that so the explanation loses to better natural alternatives. So it is falsifiable in the sense that it can be demonstrated to be an inferior explanation.
Wait, how? Walk me through this. How can the supernatural ever be shown to be an inferior explanation? It can always perfectly fit the data. You're trying to have it both ways now, and it's not working.
Same would apply for the mysterious natural phenomena you'd rather rely on in that case from before as there is no case for which you couldn't posit an unknown natural phenomena as an explanation. Regardless, you don't just dismiss it before hand, you see if there's better explanations.
What we'd reasonably say in that case is...we don't know what caused the event. Because that's....the truth. I know that can be a hard pill to swallow, but sometimes until we have more information, we simply can't determine what caused something. But that doesn't allow us to just jump to our favorite conclusion. That is the point.