That is one of the basic questions in theories of lexical semantics, and it
doesn't have a simple answer. You seemed to take the "denotational" approach to word meanings. That is, you can never know precisely what any nominal expression means until you find every instance of what it denotes. So you can't really know what "god" means, because someone might have a concept of "god" that you have yet to encounter. Word meanings don't work that way.
Why are you bound and determined to misinterpret my argument? It gets very frustrating.
I'm perfectly fine with defining terms in terms of attributes: "a thing is a ____ if it has qualities A, B and C, or D and E." That's a perfectly valid approach.
The issue here, though, is that to take that approach, we need to come up with the qualities that qualify something as the type of thing we're concerned with.
From a psychological perspective, Eleanor Rosch did some seminal work on
prototype theory in the 1970s that seems to work best. We develop "prototypes" of word meanings based on interactions with the world. In her approach, Mercury, Gabriel, Angra Mainyu, and Satan would all qualify
more or less as gods, depending on their similarity to the prototype. From a computational perspective, word meanings are assigned on the basis of some kind of distance metric. In much the same way, a person is more or less an atheist, depending on similarity with a mental "prototype" that each of us has for the concept
atheist.
That doesn't get rid of a problem. Tell me what mental "prototype" one might have for "god" that puts a baby further from "atheist" than a Christian or Muslim who believes in Satan or angels is from "polytheist".
After all, I would say that even fewer people go around calling Muslims polytheists than call babies atheists.
I don't want to get into the various nuances of deism (or Korzybski's misleading
General Semantics metaphor about "maps" and "territories"), but I am very much in agreement with you that word concepts have fuzzy boundaries. That is why I pointed you to Rosch's prototype theory here. I think it sets one in the right direction to think about how we categorize things with words. The so-called "function" I referred to is better thought of as a distance metric relating an object to a prototype.
So again: by this "distance metric", a baby is further from "atheist" than a Muslim is from "polytheist"?
So all atheists are unreasonable, then?
The deistic god-concept is like Russell's Teapot or Sagan's invisible dragon in the garage: impossible to refute. It certainly has the earmarks (to me, anyhow) of being
manufactured to be impossible to refute, but that doesn't change the fact that it is impossible to refute by any valid logical argument.
But it is my belief that no gods, as they are conventionally understood, exist. I could be wrong, but my degree of certainty is high enough to merit the label "atheist".
Unpacking this a bit, I take this to mean that you reject them based on
your understanding of that "conventional understanding".
How good does a person's understanding of that "conventional understanding" have to be before we can say their belief that no gods exists actually reflects it?
Well, there's me, but a more famous personality would be Richard Dawkins. I'd like to say that you qualify, as well, but that begs the question.
But Dawkins doesn't reject all gods. He rates himself only a 6.9 out of 7: while he lives as if gods do not exist for all practical purposes, he is careful to note that he realizes that he can't reject all of them with certainty.
We've been in a lengthy discussion about what "god" means before, so I am loathe to trod that same path again, because we probably won't end up in a very different place. I define gods as personal beings that think like people (i.e. have sense, memory, volition, emotions, etc.) but have some absolute control over an aspect of reality. The monotheistic "God" controls all aspects of reality. Gods can alter reality merely by exercising volition.
It seems that your definition is rooted in monotheism and denies a number of "alternative" god-concepts.
I've had theists tell me things like "God isn't conscious himself; he
is consciousness." I remember reading stories of the Greek gods constantly tricking and undermining each other, and undoing each other's actions. They certainly didn't have "absolute control" over anything.
But regardless, I said that for argument's sake, we could go with whatever definition of "god" you thought was reasonable for that question, so I'll let all that go. My main point is that even Richard Dawkins says he doesn't reject all gods, so if you do, then you're more of an atheist than he is.