Why are you bound and determined to misinterpret my argument? It gets very frustrating.
I'm neither trying to upset you nor misinterpret your argument. I am trying to introduce some ideas about word meanings that might be new to you, and that is why I mentioned prototype theory.
I'm perfectly fine with defining terms in terms of attributes: "a thing is a ____ if it has qualities A, B and C, or D and E." That's a perfectly valid approach.
I would call it a reasonable approach to word meanings that turns out not to be perfectly valid. Conjoined "flat" lists of properties have some serious weaknesses. For example, you could say that a property of dogs is that they have four legs, but what about a dog that has lost a leg or been born without one? It turns out that there are no "essential" properties of word meanings. All of them are more or less important. The idea of simply conjoining attributes is going to fail.
That doesn't get rid of a problem. Tell me what mental "prototype" one might have for "god" that puts a baby further from "atheist" than a Christian or Muslim who believes in Satan or angels is from "polytheist".
That's a very good question. We can deconstruct the "god" concept into lots of components that we associate with them. However, usage of the word may emphasize and de-emphasize some of those associations. Think of the "core meaning" as a collection of properties that can act like spokes in a wheel. (George Lakoff explores this "radial structure" of meaning in his landmark book
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things.) When you use the word in conversation, you can "extend" the meaning along one or more of these spokes. That can lead to metaphorical (non-literal) uses such as calling a person that you feel awe of a "god". Are saints and bodhisatvas "gods"? Well, some people treat them like gods. They pray to them, praise them, and sacrifice to them. Others, not so much. Is Satan a "god"? Zoroastrians said "yes" and Hebrews "no". The word "god" is no different from any other English noun in that its semantic boundaries are vague. Different common usages (or "sense") have been spawned, and those usage "hubs" can have their own attribute "spokes".
After all, I would say that even fewer people go around calling Muslims polytheists than call babies atheists.
So what you appear to be doing here is taking one attribute of the "atheist" core meaning--lack of belief--and extending (exaggerating) it at the expense of another--rejection of belief. That licenses calling babies "atheists," and there is certainly a community of speakers (mainly comprised of atheists) who want to promote that usage. My argument is that such usage is too marginal to be considered useful outside of very specialized contexts. Muslims do call Christians polytheists because of their concept of the "trinity," but their belief in "Satan" and other supernatural beings opens them up to the same criticism.
So again: by this "distance metric", a baby is further from "atheist" than a Muslim is from "polytheist"?
That depends on which aspects of the "atheist" prototype you tend to emphasize. You may have noticed that the theory allows for a sliding scale of judgments about how to categorize things. Penguins, which cannot fly, are less "birdlike" than crows, which can fly. Are bats more "birdlike" than penguins? No, because there are other aspects to the prototype that bats fail to have. You arrive at such judgments by treating the attribute
can fly as one component of the prototype "bird", but it doesn't hold true for all birds. Thus, we have a way of thinking about the process of "abstraction". What gives rise to higher level categories in human cognition?
So all atheists are unreasonable, then?
I'm not getting why you think this follows from my arguments.
The deistic god-concept is like Russell's Teapot or Sagan's invisible dragon in the garage: impossible to refute. It certainly has the earmarks (to me, anyhow) of being manufactured to be impossible to refute, but that doesn't change the fact that it is impossible to refute by any valid logical argument.
Russell made a very good argument for "burden of proof" with the teapot scenario, but there is a way to go about refuting the argument on experiential grounds. I would say that he made a case for rejecting some valid arguments on the grounds that they are based on groundless assumptions. That doesn't mean that we are unable to argue convincingly against an orbiting teapot. Quite the opposite. We can construct pretty good arguments to reject belief in that teapot, not to mention Santa Claus or God. The arguments just depend on consistency with other things we believe about the world. The standards for empirical proofs are different from purely logical ones.
Unpacking this a bit, I take this to mean that you reject them based on your understanding of that "conventional understanding".
How good does a person's understanding of that "conventional understanding" have to be before we can say their belief that no gods exists actually reflects it?
You usually ask very good questions, and this is one of them. It all comes down to trust in sources of information, which is ultimately a logical fallacy. I don't believe I'm an orphan, because I can produce lots of evidence and reasons to contradict that conclusion. How conclusive is my argument? I didn't observe my birth, and my birth certificate could have been manufactured in Kenya.
How good does my argument have to be to prove I'm not an orphan? Well, someone like you will not accept the argument. You'll tell me that, since both my parents are now dead, I am technically an orphan. I could counter that adults raised by their biological parents are ipso facto not "orphans," and appeal to the prototypical concept of what an orphan is. But, this being the internet, the argument could rage on for weeks, and even taking a poll wouldn't stop it.
But Dawkins doesn't reject all gods. He rates himself only a 6.9 out of 7: while he lives as if gods do not exist for all practical purposes, he is careful to note that he realizes that he can't reject all of them with certainty.
So do I, although I doubt Dawkins would quibble as much as you do about the possible existence of god concepts he hasn't yet encountered. That's the whole point. Rejection doesn't have to be absolute. Skepticism is a scalar concept. You probably won't find any single point on the scale that unambiguously separates all those who accept belief from all those who reject it. There will always be a certain amount of vagueness about where to draw the line. Dawkins, me, and (I think) you find ourselves pretty far away from the gray area.
It seems that your definition is rooted in monotheism and denies a number of "alternative" god-concepts.
I don't think I have ever said anything to warrant that conclusion. What I would say is that the Christian "God" is a large part of the "god" prototype that I carry around with me, however. All our concepts are grounded in experience, and I was raised a Christian.
I've had theists tell me things like "God isn't conscious himself; he is consciousness." I remember reading stories of the Greek gods constantly tricking and undermining each other, and undoing each other's actions. They certainly didn't have "absolute control" over anything.
Usually, lesser gods are thought of as having absolute control over some aspect of reality, although the "absoluteness" might be trumped by a higher god. Remember that I don't completely reject categorization that deviates from a prototype "sense" of a word. I explicitly allow for it.
But regardless, I said that for argument's sake, we could go with whatever definition of "god" you thought was reasonable for that question, so I'll let all that go. My main point is that even Richard Dawkins says he doesn't reject all gods, so if you do, then you're more of an atheist than he is.
I would not characterize what he says in that way. As I understand him, he says that the certainty with which he rejects belief can vary. He does not require 100% certainty to apply the label "atheist" to a person.