How do you exactly define 'free will'?

[ImaTroll]

And do you think that we're entitled for such privilege (whatever)?

a simple example of free will is when you're driving your car.

you choose several times whether to turn right or left, whether to accelerate or break. you choose the path to your destination according to the options available to you.

these choices are an exercise of the will. our will is associated with our actions.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Ahh. if only repeating your assertion could make it become true...

Luckily, I quoted you saying that a description of a computer in terms of it programming, hardware, and software was "like the brain". This is the computer-brain metaphor (a generic name for thinking about the brain as a kind of input/output, computing machine). The fact that you didn't know such a comparison is called this doesn't change the fact that it is. You also stated that:

My personal belief is that your brain operates exactly like the biological machine it is. It's actions are determined by input and programming.

Again, the computer brain metaphor. Also demonstrably false.

I looked for some time to find research paper that was a) open access or freely accessible to those who don’t have my access to databases (i.e., people who have real jobs outside of research and academia) and that is pretty simple, and I did find something relatively useful (if not what I wanted) in

Maye, A., Hsieh, C. H., Sugihara, G., & Brembs, B. (2007). Order in spontaneous behavior. PloS one, 2(5), e443.

Some noteworthy quotes, given e.g., your “input-output” claims and the choice between random or determined:
“Even fly brains are more than just input/output systems” (heading for a section).
“Spontaneous behavior is not simply random” (caption under figure 3)

"Because theoretical work suggests a range of competitive advantages for indeterminate behavior in virtually all animals [19], [61]–[65], [71], the structure of the indeterminacy should be incorporated explicitly into models of general brain function and autonomous agents. What would such future models of brain (or agent) function look like? Nonlinear models displaying probabilistic behavior patterns can in principle be fairly simple [55]."

You recall that option I've repeatedly said exists that is neither determined or random but probabilistic? There you go.

That depends on the definition of "choice" and "decision". Under the definition the earlier poster was using, they most certainly can.

Hence my posts on the metaphor weren't directed solely at you, and the long explanation about the differences between living systems and computers was a reply to another.

Any definition of "free"...

Look up "free will" (as before) and realize that as a noun it is not a combination of "free" and "will" but a phrasal noun/construction/prefab/whatever. Again, were this not so, I could qualify free and replace it with other adjectives in a way that wouldn't change the basic meaning of a clause containing the term "free will" (e.g., "Everybody has some free will", "Older people tend to have more free will than young adults", "to have freer will may seem better than having less will, but those with freer will than others tend to be happier", etc.). Free will refers to a singular concept.

So back to the topic. Any definition of "free" which requires "non-deterministic" is incompatible with any definition of "choice" or "will" which asserts non-randomness.

How about a definition of free will which is founded on empirically-based studies of numerous phenomena and is relies on probabilistic outcomes that are in part self-determined? For example, the capacity of the emergent functional property we might call the "mind" or "consciousness" to be part of a circular causal mechanism of the brain. To formulate this in terms of biology, the "mind" is a function of the brain that is closed to efficient causation and thus future states are neither determined by initial nor are they random.

 

[JerryL]

Luckily, I quoted you saying that a description of a computer in terms of it programming, hardware, and software was "like the brain".

An original point and later metaconversation are not the same thing.

Again, the computer brain metaphor. Also demonstrably false.

Not the one I made.

“Even fly brains are more than just input/output systems” (heading for a section).

“Spontaneous behavior is not simply random” (caption under figure 3)

I have no disagreement with either quote; though they don't interact with anything I've said.

"Because theoretical work suggests a range of competitive advantages for indeterminate behavior in virtually all animals [19], [61]–[65], [71], the structure of the indeterminacy should be incorporated explicitly into models of general brain function and autonomous agents. What would such future models of brain (or agent) function look like? Nonlinear models displaying probabilistic behavior patterns can in principle be fairly simple [55]."

A "probabiliy" is a fact you don't have enough information or a correct model for (in which case it's not "free").

Unless it involves randomness... in which case it's not "choice"

You recall that option I've repeatedly said exists that is neither determined or random but probabilistic? There you go.

Yes. Your turtle stands on another turtle.

"probabilistic" is either the result of the condition of everything, or it is not.
If it is, it is deterministic. If it is not, then there's a random element that is not "choice"

I like turtles.

For fun:
"Probability theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with probability, the analysis of random phenomena."

Random... where have I used that word before? Ah yes...

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

An original point and later metaconversation are not the same thing.

It was that interaction and the posts that followed which I responded to. Hence not only was my series of quotations not meant only for you, but the lengthy explanation on the problems with the computer-brain metaphor was made in response to another.

Not the one I made.
I have no disagreement with either quote; though they don't interact with anything I've said.

You state:

My personal belief is that your brain operates exactly like the biological machine it is. It's actions are determined by input and programming.

I give you a study on the brain which shows that this isn't just false for the brain, it doesn't hold true for a fly's "brain". How does that not "interact" with what you said?

A "probabiliy" is a fact you don't have enough information or a correct model for (in which case it's not "free").

1) Your continued insistence that "free will" should be treated contrary to your own citation of a dictionary is as pointless as it is patently absurd.
2) There are many definitions of probability (even among mathematicians there are long-held and highly contentious debates such as the Bayesian vs. Frequentist interpretation). Here, probabilistic refers to emergent properties/processes within complex systems that are ontologically indeterministic, but are not random either. There are several ways for this to be so:
a) The ways in which e.g., granular media can exhibit self-organized criticality and hysteresis. The final state is governed my multiple constraining possible or meta-stable configurations out of which one will emerge. This is a weak form of indeterministic non-random outcomes.
b) There's the entirety of quantum mechanics and most extensions thereof. Here, the systems the ways in which the systems are indeterministic but not random have different interpretations. One involves the capacity of the observer or "mind" to determine the result. This isn't a very popular theory as it involves consciousness to describe the basic constituents of reality. Another interpretation is that quantum systems exist in multiple (even infinite) distinct states at the same time, meaning that they aren't just indeterministic nor random but ontologically "vague" (they exist as more than one thing at the same time yet do so as one thing). Another is that they represent potentials that are realized by interaction.
c) Functional emergence and self-organization/self-determination. Living systems, unlike other complex systems, consist of more than just constituent parts. Ultimately, from sandpiles to fluid dynamics, kinematics can explain just about everything in such systems (in theory) apart from subatomic mechanics, because such systems can be idealized as "closed" systems. Living systems are fundamentally "open", far from thermodynamic equilibrium, and the configurations of a single sell are determined by functional processes like metabolic-repair which are being caused by those things it is causing (closed causation/circular causality). Brains, naturally, are far more complicated than cells (they are up of billions of these after all). However, the functional process "consciousness" or "awareness" is unique in its ability to not simply react to its environment the way flies or plants do (re-organizing dynamically to represent information about the environment as part of their physical make-up). It can represent abstractions that allow information about the environment to be processed conceptually, i.e., filtering sensory/perceptual information via a semantic network, episodic memories, and most importantly an abstract emergent sense of singular agency (the irreducible "I/me" concept). It is conceptual processing that allows things like choices or decisions, as only via the encoding, processing, and recall of semantic content which includes a concept of "self-as-agent" ("I/me") can a system do more than reflexively react. Feeding information into a computer is like using a sowing machine. It doesn't actually "process" anything, it simply mechanically carries out procedures. Living systems like plants do process information but syntactically or reflexively because the stimuli cannot be represented abstractly. The ability to represent two alternate choices requires the ability to represent conceptual (abstract) information and the change of state we might call the "choice" is the application of this emergent function "mind" interpreting the semantic information and determining the state of the system (the brain) which it is a product of.

Yes. Your turtle stands on another turtle.

That pesky little thing called scientific evidence. Absolutely a “turtle” compared to your idiomatic definitions and personalized form of “logic”, misuse of language, etc. But we should take on faith that determinism means what you say and the only other alternative is randomness because you’ve yet to produce on iota of evidence for anything you say while writing off evidence from multiple fields. Oh wait. That’s because you’re the one stacking turtles upon one another. I’m the one citing evidence, explaining how it works, relying on those things you so dislike (logic, empirical evidence, the sciences, etc.).

"probabilistic" is either the result of the condition of everything, or it is not.

According to your deep understanding of causality, metaphysics, physics, and philosophy. None of which you’ve demonstrated, of course, but you do like to repeat ad nauseum the same claims as if they were not just your personal definition upon which your argument stands or falls (FYI- it falls).

Hm…What could this volume and the papers within be about?

Dowe, P., & Noordhof, P. (Eds.) (2004). Cause and chance: Causation in an indeterministic world. Routledge.
Well, we can’t go over all the submissions but can quote some:
“The world is indeterministic if some actual event might have failed to occur without violation of any actual laws; likewise, it is indeterministic if some event that did not in fact occur might have occurred without violation of any laws. One might also make the point in terms of chance: in a deterministic world the chance of an event’s occurring, given the prior history of the world, is either 0 or 1, whereas in an indeterministic world the chance may bestrictly between 0 and 1.
If we want to allow that there is causation even in indeterministic worlds, there is little alternative but to take causation as involving chance-raising. In the most basic case, one event, C, is a cause of another, E, because the chance of E’s occurring is higher as a result of C’s occurrence. There are, however, different ways of cashing out the idea of chance-raising. David Lewis (1986) does so by appeal to counterfactual chances, for example, whereas Igal Kvart (1986, see also the chapter in this volume) appeals to actual conditional chances.”
Ramachandran, M. "Indeterministic causation and varieties of chance-raising"

Or from another:

“In general, for A to be causally relevant to C, A must be probabilistically relevant to C. A strong conviction to this effect lies at the heart of a full-blooded probabilistic approach to causal relevance. A is probabilistically relevant to C just in case there is either an increaser or a decreaser for A and C. Increasers and decreasers may, as noted, be null or not.”
Kvart, I. "Probabilistic cause, edge conditions, late preemption and discrete cases."

There’s a lot of literature on this, but you might try Probability and Causality (Synthese Library Vol. 192), and in particular the review of theories in the contributing paper by Davis: “Probabilistic theories of causation”.

I like turtles.

I notice. They’re so much easier than evidence or doing a little research to familiarize yourself with something relevant here.

For fun

How about actually reading literature on causality, probability, determinism, and the relevant fields (from physics to neurosciences)? I’ll tell you what. I’ll see if I can scan some chapters or find some elementary papers for you so that you need not rely on a combination of ignorance and quote-mining the results of google searches.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Attached is a scan of the paper from the volume I mentioned. It's a start.

Edit: added another general reference

 

[JerryL]

I give you a study on the brain which shows that this isn't just false for the brain, it doesn't hold true for a fly's "brain". How does that not "interact" with what you said?

Because I've said something somewhere doesn't mean you are responsive to what I'm saying somewhere else.

You'll find your answer in post: 4033022

How about actually reading literature on causality, probability, determinism, and the relevant fields (from physics to neurosciences)? I’ll tell you what. I’ll see if I can scan some chapters or find some elementary papers for you so that you need not rely on a combination of ignorance and quote-mining the results of google searches.

TL; DR

Get back to me when you want to address my claim. I'm not really interested in your straw-men.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Because I've said something somewhere doesn't mean you are responsive to what I'm saying somewhere else.

This is a debate forum on a discussion board. If I or anybody else says something any member disagrees with they have a right to address it and are encouraged to do so (there are forums here where this is not so- DIRs and other non-debate forums).

You'll find your answer in post: 4033022

How? The portions of your post I objected to were made long before that post. Here's what you said:

My personal belief is that your brain operates exactly like the biological machine it is. It's actions are determined by input and programming.

Here's what I quoted from the study:
“Even fly brains are more than just input/output systems” (heading for a section).

Your opinion is that the brain's actions are determined by input and programming. The article quoted stated even a fly's "brain" is more than just input/output, negating half of what you claim determines the brain's states.

You also said:

So I program the computer. I don't make the choice for the computer. The computer does that. The computer meaning the hardware and software working together.

Like your brain.

Long before your assertion that by another member's definition, calculators have free-will, you stated quite specifically that you think of the brain as an input/output machine and that a computer, "meaning the hardware and software working together" are in your own words "like the brain." There is nothing here about calculators, no fallacy you're addressing, simply you comparing the brain to a computer as you have repeatedly denied and have continually stated that my attempts to show otherwise were a "straw-man".

Only, as is quite clear, you explicitly made the very comparison I then refuted in my so-called "straw-man" posts. Are you still denying that you compared the brain to a computer?

Get back to me when you want to address my claim. I'm not really interested in your straw-men.

By "address my claim" which "claim" do you refer to? You clearly made the claim that the brain is like a computer, and did so long before you argued another's definition said something about the capacity of calculators to make decisions. You don't seem interested in debating the claims you made comparing the brain to a computer. More central to your argument has involved a bifurcation/false dichotomy fallacy in which we either have determinism or randomness. I've spent much time explaining and finally providing basic sources scanned by hand so that we can address this claim. Then there is the treatment of free will as an adjective plus a noun. You've simply ignored all evidence to the contrary and even any indication that an objection to this claim existed. So what am I supposed to address such that it would not be an alleged straw-man argument?

Much of your arguments have rested on claims about necessity and similar notions from possible world semantics and modal logics (i.e., something that happened either happened that way necessarily or it was random). You equate this with determinism but, as I tried to argue using (informal) modal logic to argue something happens necessarily is to deny it is determined. The following textbook includes all the relevant logics (from modal to conditional; it also covers fuzzy logic and other irrelevant logics) required for constructive dialogue about possible outcomes and their various natures: An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. I have also attached two "tutorial" appendices for briefer treatments on formal logic (the first one) and more importantly possible worlds, modal logic, derivations/proofs, etc. from Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God intended to help the reader unfamiliar with the formal notation and nature of these topics understand the main content.

I've now provided you with resources to address determinism, causality, possible outcomes (and whether they are necessary outcomes and what this means). You have the tools to understand many of the points I've tried to make and look anew at your own. If you choose not to, so be it (it's not like you had the free will to do otherwise).

 

[JerryL]

How? The portions of your post I objected to were made long before that post. Here's what you said:

It's right there. All I can do is repeat it to you.

Only, as is quite clear, you explicitly made the very comparison I then refuted in my so-called "straw-man" posts. Are you still denying that you compared the brain to a computer?

I'm still telling you that you hacked at a straw man of other people's analogies rather than addressing mine. (or at best: you failed to identify *which* you were referring to and I got bored reading).

But since none are important to my contribution to the thread topic; I consider them trivial and so not worth explaining/rehashing (hence: got bored reading). It's a red-herring distracting from the trail of the point. Which is why you continue to get succinct responses. I can be quite verbose if I feel I'm on-topic (or amused).

By "address my claim" which "claim" do you refer to?

Free will is impossible.

I've now provided you with resources to address determinism, causality, possible outcomes (and whether they are necessary outcomes and what this means). You have the tools to understand many of the points I've tried to make and look anew at your own. If you choose not to, so be it (it's not like you had the free will to do otherwise).

It's strange that you continue to think that the mechanics matter. You do have difficulty with abstractions.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Actually, there is one area I haven't supplied the tools/information: how to treat prefabs/constructions like "free will".

The spoiler below contains my own, short account on the realization that there are combinations of words which can't be understood in terms of the individual words themselves. I have attached a chapter which is much more comprehensive and clearer, but longer.

Spoiler: From idioms to constructions

Not that long ago, most of modern linguistics was concerned with generating grammatically correct sentences by discovering the rules of a language's grammar and relegating to the "lexicon" whether or not a particular rule could apply (e.g., certain words can take an object, others both object and indirect object, and the "grammar" can't tell you this, but the "lexicon" was supposed to be able to do so). Only it turned out that there were too many exceptions because "idioms" (thought to be those rare and unimportant parts of language that could be ignored) pervaded language and were of different kinds. A foundational paper on this was "Idioms". Its worth reading both for its historical significance and the examples. It was this paper (among other things) that prompted the great linguist Charles Fillmore (with his collaborators) to develop Construction Grammar. The idea was simple but radical: instead of trying to find out the rules and worry about the exceptions as exceptions, start with the exceptions. Doing this, they found that there was no strict divide between grammar and lexicon (two of the founding papers being "Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: The case of let alone" & Grammatical constructions and linguistic generalizations: the What's X doing Y.).

.

Not all linguists subscribe to a form of construction grammar, but luckily a comparable (for our purposes) realization is universal: that certain combinations of words variously called idioms, collocations, prefabs, etc. can't be "decomposed" into the words that make them up (examples are given in the links hidden by the spoiler as well as the attached chapter). "Free will" is one of many "prefabricated word combinations that constitute about 55% of both spoken and written discourse." The quote comes from an excellent paper explaining how combinations like "pull strings" or "free will" come to be "units" ("From usage to grammar: The mind's response to repetition").

It is a mistake, as has long been realized, to try to analyze a construction/prefab like "free will" in terms of the adjective "free" and the noun "will". So much is this recognized that dictionaries list both words together as a single noun.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

It's right there. All I can do is repeat it to you.

There are lots of different things spread across different posts and I think even different threads (was this the thread that you quoted something I'd written months ago and responded by using incorrect notation in an attempt to express a mathematical statement you borrowed from an obscure physics article?) . If I simply try to peruse them all and make my best guess as to what your argument really is by ignoring certain terms you may or may not be using technically and trying to reconstruct from various claims phrased variously (and exclude claims that apparently aren't important, like whether the brain analogous to a computer), I'll end up with more claims that I'm my arguments are all straw-man arguments.

For example, you have continually stated in one way or another that there are only two possible explanations for a hypothetical event (sometimes this event you describe in terms of e.g., someone making a choice that, if they were to make it again, making either the same choice or not), namely, determinism and randomness. However, you haven't given any evidence to support that this is anything other than a false dichotomy/bifurcation fallacy. Moreover, you've repeatedly stated that the mechanisms don't matter. Only they are absolutely essential for determinism to be true. In fact, without the mechanisms an outcome that is necessarily so isn't determined; such necessity is fatalism, not determinism. Then there's your decomposing "free will" into "free" & "will", the arguments you make by this decomposition, and so on.

I've tried to address them all, but most of my posts you ignore and simply seem to pick a line or two and call it a straw-man, for reasons it turns out were not entirely justified. I think they were entirely justified, you think:

I'm still telling you that you hacked at a straw man of other people's analogies rather than addressing mine. (or at best: you failed to identify *which* you were referring to and I got bored reading).

But whatever. The point is most of my arguments haven't been addressed, have been addressed because you thought I was saying something I wasn't, have been addressed by simply repeating your definitions and claims to support themselves, etc. Perhaps much of this was simply because you "got bored" or a basic breakdown in communication over why and what I was addressing regarding the brain computer metaphor. The point is I'd rather not reinvent the wheel.

It's strange that you continue to think that the mechanics matter. You do have difficulty with abstractions.

1) I provided you with abstractions, namely those that seek to explicate notions like determinism, probability, etc. They just do so in ways that are consistent with another abstraction we call "logic". The links I've provided as tools are not arguments I'm making (I don't even agree with much of some of them), but so that we need not rely on e.g., your false dichotomy or the way you conflate determinism and fatalism.
2) I wrote at length about abstractions and their relevance to choices. This was one of those posts you ignored because you thought I was referring to your rebuttal to another member's claim with a statement about calculators. It is because I deal so much with abstractions that I very much appreciate the kind of nuances involved.
3) The issues I'd like to address are causality, determinism, probability, reductionism, and similar highly abstract concepts. I would just like to do so without relying on your various conflations, imprecisions, or assertions that X must be the case because you say so.

 

[JerryL]

1) I provided you with abstractions, namely those that seek to explicate notions like determinism, probability, etc. They just do so in ways that are consistent with another abstraction we call "logic". The links I've provided as tools are not arguments I'm making (I don't even agree with much of some of them), but so that we need not rely on e.g., your false dichotomy or the way you conflate determinism and fatalism.

You can respond to the words I have used as I have meant them, or you can engage in an equivocation logical fallacy. It's your choice.

If you want to have a discussion about what you mean with those words; have fun. Just don't quote me and my uses when doing so or you get responses like these.

3) The issues I'd like to address are causality, determinism, probability, reductionism, and similar highly abstract concepts. I would just like to do so without relying on your various conflations, imprecisions, or assertions that X must be the case because you say so

Have fun with that. If they appear to fall in line with what I said, I'll likely interact. If I find them amusing, interesting, or silly, I'll likely interact. If they are directed at me and not one of the two things I just mentioned; you'll likely see me respond like this.

 

[JerryL]

Moreover, you've repeatedly stated that the mechanisms don't matter. Only they are absolutely essential for determinism to be true. In fact, without the mechanisms an outcome that is necessarily so isn't determined; such necessity is fatalism, not determinism. Then there's your decomposing "free will" into "free" & "will", the arguments you make by this decomposition, and so on.

This is a really good example of the problem. Even when it's absolutely clear that the way I am using the words and the way you understand them don't align; you insist on equivocating (or straw-manning: perspective which) me.

You've just stated that you understand that when I say "free" & "will", I mean something other than you do ("free will"). But rather than accept that as my premise and discuss with me what *I* am saying: you argue the semantics.

Then you do the same thing with "deterministic".

And when I try parsing out my meanings: by example, by metaphor, by changing the vocabulary: you run off on some tangent about the example, the metaphor, or the new word rather than "oh! I understand what you were trying to say".

And you wonder why I show no interest in defending those tangents?

And while I certainly understand the concern of a false dichotomy, or for that matter a complex question fallacy; Claiming it is one doesn't make it so either. By all means: present a third option; but do it without moving away from what I've said in the first place (see: every time I've mentioned turtles), or by redefining what I've said (equivocation).

And finally no: the mechanisms are not important to asserting that everything either happens because of conditions or does not happen because of conditions (or some mix therein). Which has been my claim no matter how often you start a semantic beef with it.

 

[LuisDantas]

a simple example of free will is when you're driving your car.

you choose several times whether to turn right or left, whether to accelerate or break. you choose the path to your destination according to the options available to you.

these choices are an exercise of the will. our will is associated with our actions.

But that example does not involve either freedom nor will. Why call it free will?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

You can respond to the words I have used as I have meant them, or you can engage in an equivocation logical fallacy. It's your choice.

As your words are spread over two threads, I hope you don’t mind if I try to understand what you’ve argued and communicate my argument by using some of what you said elsewhere, which somewhat defined our dialogue here. After all, you started your responses to me here with this:

1) This is so well-known and so fundamental it makes up most of modern physics.

Except:

3) That the exact same conditions produce different outcomes is required for QM, QFT, particle physics, QED, QCD, and so on. Your little simplistic formulations of informal logic in which cause and effect are both ill-defined and forced to be linear aren't just naïve and over a century outdated- they're simply ridiculous.

So random. Either works.

The erroneously copied and meaningless mathematics aside, your conclusion doesn’t follow from what I said (it isn’t even logically connected at all except by assuming your premises to be true). Combining at least 3 different fallacies, you assume that if the same conditions can produce to different outcomes then it is random and you use the word “either” (which means only one of two things, and bifurcation and bogus/false dilemma fallacies on as well). It isn’t random. Of course, I said that, and you responded:

OK. Determined by random. That' works as well. No "will".

“Determined by random”. This is seemingly nonsense, but you could salvage it by making it clear that your use of “by” doesn’t indicate agency but is a (rather odd) way of saying that the outcome is random and as the outcome happened you’re calling it determined. But we have a problem then:

I define it as a form of oximoron.

Freedom must be from something. We are not free of our programming and stimuli. The choices we make are the inevitable outcome of the conditions of the universe at that moment.

To be free of such conditions would require that the choices be dependent on a random element.

Everything, including your will, is either determined, random, or a combination of both.

The issue of it being an oxymoron the claim that “freedom must be from something" I'll address later.

For now, let’s look at these 2 quotes. In the 1st quote, everything is an outcome of the conditions of the universe, unless it is “dependent on a random element”. There are only two possibilities.

In the second, we have three possibilities. We’ve gone from speaking of an outcome determined by random to outcomes that are both determined and random. Notice the equivocation: “determined by random” & “dependent on a random element” use random as a determining factor, while “either determined, random, or a combination” refers to the causal nature of outcomes (i.e., they might be random and determined, but not determined by random as this isn’t a combination but a description of determined in terms of “random”).

One central issue is that quite apart from talking about free will as if it were decomposable (your analysis in terms of "free" & "will"), you are playing fast and loose with terms. But you have elsewhere stated far more precisely your argument:

If I rewind time and play it forward over and over watching the same scene one of two things will happen.
1) It will play the same every time.
2) It won't play the same every time.
If #1: then every choice is fixed... it is the outcome of the conditions at the time.
If #2: then there is a non-fixed portion of choice which, by definition, is random (since non-random things are "conditions")
Either way, the inevitable outcome of conditions or the result of random variables, there's no "free choice"

Now we are dealing with something much clearer.
In case #1, everything is fixed by conditions, in case #2, there exists randomness defined as non-fixed and “non-random things” as by definition “conditions”.

This is why I gave you sources on possible world semantics and modal logics. In reality, there is no difference between the cases. You could say that every choice is fixed unless it is a random condition, or every choice is a random condition unless it is a determined condition, etc. This is because you are dividing in 2 a single proposition: that which happens, happens.

The problem is that this is says nothing about free will, determinism, or anything else relevant. Your conclusion is your assumption.

To see why, let us change the thought experiment around and use the real definition of determinism. Let’s say you are deciding whether or not to respond to this post.

If it would be possible to know whether you would respond given Laplace’s Intellect (an entity capable of predicting exactly every outcome arbitrarily into the future providing that intellect had perfect information about initial conditions and the laws of physics), then it would be possible to know now or a million years ago whether you would. If even knowing all conditions and all the laws of physics, with the ability to calculate perfectly, Laplace's Intellect couldn't determine whether you'd respond, determinism is dead. But now comes the more interesting part: what about randomness?

Let’s posit that somehow “randomness” entered in here: The outcome (your non-response or your response) was unpredictable because it was truly random. How, then, did you come to the point at which you could make this choice? After all, you had to do millions of things just such that you became a member, let alone read this thread, let alone respond as you have, let alone respond to this post. If such decisions, choices, actions, are random (truly random), then you are just as likely to smash your face into the computer as to type. In fact, for any given act, we could probably find a possible outcome (generally many, many such outcomes) in which you seriously injured or killed yourself or others (and of course this would be true for me and for us all). But we clearly do not act randomly. This post, for example, is not a random distribution of letters but corresponds (probably with too many typos and grammatical errors) to a very specific ordering; namely, the English language and certain typographical conventions. There exists no measure of randomness (despite the fact that many measures exist) which will indicate that this post was the result of random keystrokes (still less random acts which could include smashing my computer with a hammer or trying to eat it and yet resulted in this post.

Let’s go back to your “thought experiment”. You posit that either something happens because of conditions (determinism, although you don’t use this word in the quote), or is random. Your argument for this is that given any outcome, there was that outcome. This merely proves that outcomes are outcomes. It says nothing about determinism, nothing about free will, nothing about anything other than a failure to recognize conditionals are assumptions, distinguish between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions as well as necessary outcomes vs. contingent outcomes.

To put this into logical terms, we could use possible world semantics, but I’m going to use a logic required in physics: counterfactual causation.

The famous example of counterfactual (in)definiteness is Einstein’s “Is the moon still there when you don’t look at it”? The causal formulation is not much different: instead of “given X choice there is Y outcome” counterfactual causation is “if I hadn’t made X choice, there wouldn’t be Y outcome”. But notice that the causal connection here: imagine I knock over a glass of milk and it breaks on the floor, spilling milk. Counterfactual causation shows that I caused the spilt milk because if I hadn’t knocked over the glass, the milk wouldn’t have spilt. This is a fairly strong causal model and it is absolutely compatible with determinism.

It is not, however, compatible with modern physics. Because in quantum physics, particle physics, etc., your actions literally shape reality (to some extent). It is literally true that things aren’t there if you don’t look but are if you do (and what they are depend on how you look). But this isn’t random. It’s also not particularly relevant except as an illustration of the ways one can look at outcomes. More importantly, it is an illustration of the importance of causality.

You have repeatedly argued that the mechanisms are unimportant. This is only true because you have made the argument “given an outcome, the outcome happened.” The problem is that such an argument rests upon the “given”. That’s a premise. Regardless of the definitions of determinism or whether “freedom” has to come from somewhere or why you decompose “free will” into “free” and “will”, you are still left with a premise that you assume to be true and having done so, use to prove it is true.
Given an outcome, there is something that happened such that there was that outcome, and the only relevant arguments related to free will have to address what is before the “given”. You don’t.
If you want to have a discussion about what you mean with those words; have fun. Just don't quote me and my uses when doing so or you get responses like these.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

So we have shown the problems with this argument:

If I rewind time and play it forward over and over watching the same scene one of two things will happen.
1) It will play the same every time.
2) It won't play the same every time.
If #1: then every choice is fixed... it is the outcome of the conditions at the time.
If #2: then there is a non-fixed portion of choice which, by definition, is random (since non-random things are "conditions")
Either way, the inevitable outcome of conditions or the result of random variables, there's no "free choice"

Your argument rests upon a hidden assumption or premise that it uses to reach its conclusion. It’s right there in the “if”. Students new to logic (it’s worse with mathematicians, but this is just a hazard of the way math is taught), trying to derive (or prove) something given a conditional- “if X then Y”- are confused by the ways they can prove this. For example:

Premise: The moon is made of green cheese.
Premise: If the moon is made of green cheese, than only RF members have free will.
Conclusion: only RF members have free will.

This is a perfectly valid argument. It’s not sound, of course (I’m pretty sure the moon isn’t made of green cheese) but it is valid. Every single premise that starts with “if” means “assume this as given”. As a consequence, if I don’t assume it as given then there is no argument. You have “If I rewind…”, “If #1…”, & “If #2…” As I said above, we can conflate the above to, or distill it into, what it really says: if something plays out, then it does. Here again, though, we find “if”. All I need to is deny that it plays out. You can of course respond that you are talking about any given choice, event, act, etc., but for each one you require me to grant your assumption.

This is why logicians, scientists, and philosophers do not rely such models of causation (or notions for how things “play out”). Instead, philosophies like determinism, reductionism, fatalism, free will, counterfactual causation, and so on are well-defined (they aren’t tautologies that are capable only of asserting that if they are true then they are).

However, there’s another problem:

Remember. That's an adjective and a noun. That's not one thing. By treating it as one thing you are committing an assuming the consequent fallacy.

Actually it isn’t. This I have covered in great detail here and elsewhere. It need only be shown that
1) The presence of more than one lexeme does enable one to analyze them in terms of the individual lexemes
&
2) That this is the case here.

The first part is easy: take the saying “birds of a feather flock together.” It is incorrect even to say “birds of a feather flocked together”. But let’s see a few doublets that likewise can’t be decomposed:
“right away”
“United States”
“either way”
“come along”
“give up”
“work out”
“discussion board”
Etc.
As for whether or not “free will” is really an “adjective and a noun”, you yourself gave evidence to the contrary when you thought you were showing me to be wrong:

You suck at quoting. Here's Oxford:

I didn’t quote any meaning because I was only interested in the fact that the OED (not “the Oxford” you found online) and a few online dictionaries I checked all listed “free will” as a noun. However, there are other ways to check. If “free will” were really a combination of the adjective “free” and “will” then it would make sense to say things like “having freer will isn’t all it’s cracked up to be” or “peasants have the freest will of all” or “Usually I have mostly free will, but today I have all free will”. And, in fact, if it is really just two words then why not “free and clear will” or “enslaved will wanting to be free” or any number of infinite combinations?

Because what you have continually referred to as a fallacy, that I am assuming the “will” is “free”, is not an equivocation on my part (I never said it any other way), but it is a fallacy on yours (that goes by several names, as usual, from extensional pruning to merely “definition fallacy”). The common use of the term is as one “unit”. It refers to the capacity or property that e.g., humans may or may not have. Like many other such constructions/prefabs, we can see how the two words together are joined to give this particular meaning, but if you spoke English and had never come across the term “free will” but had come across “free” in all its senses and “will” in all its senses, there’s no reason that you wouldn’t think “free will” meant a legal document (a "will") that you get for free.

Which brings us to:

I define it as a form of oxymoron.

Freedom must be from something. We are not free of our programming and stimuli. The choices we make are the inevitable outcome of the conditions of the universe at that moment.

It cannot, by definition, be an oxymoron unless we consider it to really be two separate words. However, if it is an oxymoron, then you are using particular sense of “free” and “will” (it isn’t an oxymoron because the legal document called a “will” is opposite or contrary to the meaning of “free”). So you are implicitly treating it as singular while insisting it be considered as two words.
Granting, however, that “freedom” is at all relevant here, why is it that “freedom must be from something. We are not free of our programming and stimuli.” First, this last sentence shows us how far away from the notion of “free will” we can get by assuming it is an adjective and a noun: “we are not free of our will, but rather forced to live with it.” Second, why must it be from something? Third, what programming?

Certainly, I am not absolutely free to do anything I wish in part because that would entail omnipotence (I cannot fly or grant wishes and so forth). However, you would be hard-pressed to find literature even of old in which it is argued that free will means absolute freedom or free from stimuli (“man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains”). It would be foolish indeed to suppose that, because I am startled by a loud noise whether I will or no, I therefore must lack “free will”.

This, then, is where all my arguments about complex systems, emergence, closure to efficient causation, circular causality, living systems, functional properties/processes, etc., come in. Likewise all my arguments against the notion that because many people conceive of things in terms of a causal chain that this has any bearing on reality. It doesn’t. The fact that I can always linguistically express a cause for an effect just means I can use language. I can say that “free will” determines my actions. Unless you possess empirical evidence that we are so “programmed” as you say, then you have no argument.

 

[Chetan_C]

Free will is an illusion as we are bound and chained to the two things that influence our every decision: the desire to get away from pain and the desire to feel more pleasure. But we are small in comparison to all that surrounds us. If we were to feel our self in connection to all that is outside of us and incorporate all this as our own, then our desires would include all of this. The efforts and means one makes for others benefit and fulfillment as more important than our sensation of pleasure and pain can only be done in connection with others who feel the same. It is the ultimate freedom and the ultimate fulfillment.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Free will is an illusion as we are bound and chained to the two things that influence our every decision: the desire to get away from pain and the desire to feel more pleasure.

And here I thought this nonsense died with Behaviorism and the "blank slate" view that everything could be explained in terms of pseudo-scientific ramblings concerning ill-defined terms and models that failed from the start as they were based on simplifications of extrapolations of experiments with rats and emerging but still proto-psychological sciences.

If we were to feel our self in connection to all that is outside of us and incorporate all this as our own, then our desires would include all of this.

So, infinitely many mutually inconsistent and incompatible desires? How is it that it is meaningful to refer to "all that is outside of us and incorporate all this" yet "free will" is an illusion because of a philosophical bent begat over a century ago and banished as flawed science roughly half a century ago?

The efforts and means one makes for others benefit and fulfillment as more important than our sensation of pleasure and pain

However, according to you we cannot do more than whatever it means to increase personal pleasure and reduce personal pain, so no matter the import of some alternative your claim asserts it is impossible.

 

[Nakosis]

and you now suppose an example of poor performance in judgment is a rebuttal to my post?!
THAT is a line of reasoning NOT to be trusted!

Do you think there is good reason to trust your fellowman?

 

[Nakosis]

That "choice" to "set conditions" is, itself, the result of conditions. So you merely move the goalposts (turtles all the way down).

That remains your assumption. Freewill the ability to?

A computer can "chose" which section of code to run. Until it chooses that, the results of the code are not determined.

Look at it this way. A decision is an internal process. Each human has a uniquely developed process. Each mind is unique. Whatever external conditions exist prior to any decisions made does not determine the decision. The human, the agent takes all of the external conditions and runs them through an internal process. This internal process makes a choice which is not determine by external causes. Since the this decision process is internal to the agent, it the agent making a choice.

Either there's randomness (which is not will), or there is not randomness (which means you could determine output if you had an accurate model and enough information). Now "enough information" may be beyond the realm of realism; but that's not really the point.

You can't prove this so it remains your belief.

Internally the agent makes a choice, even if part of the process is random, it is contained within the internal processes that makes the agent unique and capable of being independent of external causality.

Like your brain can chose to ignore getting hit on the knee with a hammer?

Don't confuse "complex" with "fundamentally different". That would, again, be pushing the metaphor too far.

Don't confuse physiological reaction with the internal process of making a decision.

 

[Thief]

Do you think there is good reason to trust your fellowman?

What you trust may be indication to what you are given to.

I would like to trust all at face value.
But life deals lessons none of us can deny.

I suspect we cannot hide what we really are when the flesh no longer hides what we think and feel...
on the inside.