How do you exactly define 'free will'?

[Nakosis]

So you have two agents(people) they are faced with the choice, turning left or right. One turns left, the other right.

So given the same external circumstances, the agent makes the difference in the outcome. The choice was made independent of external circumstances and was determined by the agent.

The ability of an agent to act independently of external circumstances is freewill.

Where an agent is not able to make a choice independent of external circumstances, this is a restriction and prevents the agent from being able to exercise their freewill in that particular case.

 

[Willamena]

So you have two agents(people) they are faced with the choice, turning left or right. One turns left, the other right.

So given the same external circumstances, the agent makes the difference in the outcome. The choice was made independent of external circumstances and was determined by the agent.

The ability of an agent to act independently of external circumstances is freewill.

Where an agent is not able to make a choice independent of external circumstances, this is a restriction and prevents the agent from being able to exercise their freewill in that particular case.

While I agree with your definition, the argument is inadequate if they both turn left.

 

[Nakosis]

What you trust may be indication to what you are given to.

I would like to trust all at face value.
But life deals lessons none of us can deny.

I suspect we cannot hide what we really are when the flesh no longer hides what we think and feel...
on the inside.

Until then we have our fellowman to contend with. Who I trust depends on what I know about the person. People I don't know I've no reason to trust or distrust. So better to keep a watchful eye. Give trust in small measure and test the results.

No idea why we are talking about this here but, whatever.

 

[Nakosis]

While I agree with your definition, the argument is inadequate if they both turn left.

Yes, I thought about that too.

But you understand the idea yes? An agent is capable of acting independent of external circumstances.

I'd still would really like those that claim there is no freewill to define what they mean by freewill.

I don't want to be accused of attacking a strawman. I looked it up but there seems various concepts among the determinist crowd so I'd like to know what exactly is being claimed that doesn't exist.

I don't know, maybe I'd agree if I knew what it was I'm agreeing to.

 

[Willamena]

But you understand the idea yes? An agent is capable of acting independent of external circumstances.

I do, but the significant difference that I see lies not in the decisions that they make, which are arbitrary, but in their being some "they" (agent) there to make the decision. In the picture of causes and effects tumbling over each other, that is what is missing.

 

[Thief]

Until then we have our fellowman to contend with. Who I trust depends on what I know about the person. People I don't know I've no reason to trust or distrust. So better to keep a watchful eye. Give trust in small measure and test the results.

No idea why we are talking about this here but, whatever.

Trust is but one facet of freewill.
What?....you are compelled?....trust in spite of suspicion?
Or compelled to suspect and test on every occasion?

 

[Skwim]

I'd still would really like those that claim there is no freewill to define what they mean by freewill.

Sure: The ability to have done differently. Now what?

 

[Nakosis]

Sure: The ability to have done differently. Now what?

Freewill means the ability to change the past?

Before I make a decision I have the option to turn left or right for example as long as nothing is preventing that action. After I've made a decision and acted obviously I can't undone what I did.

If a choice of one or more actions is before me, again obviously I would have to have the ability to make those choices else there wouldn't be a choice to be made.

Freewill is about imaging an alternate past? And I suppose since one can't make this imagined alternate past a actuality, freewill doesn't exist?

Hopefully there is more to it then that.

 

[Skwim]

Freewill means the ability to change the past?

No. It means that at the point of doing you can do differently than you do.

Before I make a decision I have the option to turn left or right for example as long as nothing is preventing that action. After I've made a decision and acted obviously I can't undone what I did.

Option here is only relevant as an availability. As in either road X or road Y, both open to whatever you do. But the option does not refer to possible action, as in "I can do X just as well as I can do Y." The fact of the matter is that because what we do is what we have to do, no such freedom ever exists. You "decide" to take road X because . . . . . .and the "cause" in "because" is very telling. It indicates the mechanism by which you take road X. You have been caused to do so because all the relevant series of causes and effects lead to do so, and not take Y. To take Y something in this series would have had to be different, but because they weren't you were destined to take road X.

If a choice of one or more actions is before me, again obviously I would have to have the ability to make those choices else there wouldn't be a choice to be made.

Thing is, because we only do what we're destined to do there is no such thing as true choice or choosing. Of course there's the illusion that that's what is happening, we 're choosing, but that all it really is, an illusion.

Freewill is about imaging an alternate past? .

No, freewill is about makeing an illusion feel real.

 

[JerryL]

That remains your assumption. Freewill the ability to?

Well. It either is [the result of conditions] or it's not.
If it's not, then its irrespective of conditions (random).

Or it could be some combination of the two.

Look at it this way. A decision is an internal process. Each human has a uniquely developed process. Each mind is unique. Whatever external conditions exist prior to any decisions made does not determine the decision. The human, the agent takes all of the external conditions and runs them through an internal process. This internal process makes a choice which is not determine by external causes. Since the this decision process is internal to the agent, it the agent making a choice.

You've tacked on "external". That's an entirely different discussion that I am having.

You can't prove this so it remains your belief.

And not a single person here has been able to imagine an alternative.

 

[JerryL]

As your words are spread over two threads, I hope you don’t mind if I try to understand what you’ve argued and communicate my argument by using some of what you said elsewhere, which somewhat defined our dialogue here. After all, you started your responses to me here with this:

Not at all. My only issue is the TL;DR tangents.

In the second, we have three possibilities. We’ve gone from speaking of an outcome determined by random to outcomes that are both determined and random. Notice the equivocation: “determined by random” & “dependent on a random element” use random as a determining factor, while “either determined, random, or a combination” refers to the causal nature of outcomes (i.e., they might be random and determined, but not determined by random as this isn’t a combination but a description of determined in terms of “random”).

Did that make sense in your head? Cause it doesn't make sense in text.

Other than your false framing of clarification as "equivocation".

One central issue is that quite apart from talking about free will as if it were decomposable (your analysis in terms of "free" & "will"), you are playing fast and loose with terms. But you have elsewhere stated far more precisely your argument:

Funny thing. Usually, when there's a space between two words, it indicates that they are two words.

This is because you are dividing in 2 a single proposition: that which happens, happens.

That's your quote. Not mine. It sounds like the same thing, but it really isn't.

To see why, let us change the thought experiment around and use the real definition of determinism. If it would be possible to know whether you would respond given Laplace’s Intellect (an entity capable of predicting exactly every outcome arbitrarily into the future providing that intellect had perfect information about initial conditions and the laws of physics), then it would be possible to know now or a million years ago whether you would. If even knowing all conditions and all the laws of physics, with the ability to calculate perfectly, Laplace's Intellect couldn't determine whether you'd respond, determinism is dead. But now comes the more interesting part: what about randomness?

Let’s posit that somehow “randomness” entered in here: The outcome (your non-response or your response) was unpredictable because it was truly random. How, then, did you come to the point at which you could make this choice? After all, you had to do millions of things just such that you became a member, let alone read this thread, let alone respond as you have, let alone respond to this post. If such decisions, choices, actions, are random (truly random), then you are just as likely to smash your face into the computer as to type. In fact, for any given act, we could probably find a possible outcome (generally many, many such outcomes) in which you seriously injured or killed yourself or others (and of course this would be true for me and for us all). But we clearly do not act randomly. This post, for example, is not a random distribution of letters but corresponds (probably with too many typos and grammatical errors) to a very specific ordering; namely, the English language and certain typographical conventions. There exists no measure of randomness (despite the fact that many measures exist) which will indicate that this post was the result of random keystrokes (still less random acts which could include smashing my computer with a hammer or trying to eat it and yet resulted in this post.

In trying not to; you seem to have proven my case (although you have assumed certain things in that proof which I have not and which may or may not be true; and it's rather full of tangents and trivialities).

Thanks.

 

[Nakosis]

No. It means that at the point of doing you can do differently than you do.

At the point of doing the decision has been made. So yes when a decision has been made you act on that decision. Prior to that decision that resultant action has not yet been determined. Sometimes the decision takes a minute, hours, days to make. There numerous internal process that occur while the decision is made. These process have to occur before a decision is made. These are all internal to the agent which makes the agent the determining factor of the resultant action.

The freewill happens prior to the point of doing, in the decision process. Like tomorrow I can decide to go to work or not go to work. At this point that choice has not yet been decided. I as an agent will make that determination at some point in the future. Right now, until the decision is made I have freewill to make either. Freewill occurs prior to the event. When you talk about what occurred in the past and what is occurring now it's too late to talk of freewill for that instance.

This definition of freewill is simply out of sync with events.

Option here is only relevant as an availability. As in either road X or road Y, both open to whatever you do. But the option does not refer to possible action, as in "I can do X just as well as I can do Y." The fact of the matter is that because what we do is what we have to do, no such freedom ever exists. You "decide" to take road X because . . . . . .and the "cause" in "because" is very telling. It indicates the mechanism by which you take road X. You have been caused to do so because all the relevant series of causes and effects lead to do so, and not take Y. To take Y something in this series would have had to be different, but because they weren't you were destined to take road X.

Except that there is a unique agent involved that is capable of determining the outcome. Put 100 different agents in the same circumstances and you'll get dozens of different results. Obviously the agent themselves determines to outcome.

Thing is, because we only do what we're destined to do there is no such thing as true choice or choosing. Of course there's the illusion that that's what is happening, we 're choosing, but that all it really is, an illusion.

No, freewill is about makeing an illusion feel real.

No we do what we determine for ourselves to do. It seems an illusion because you can't really capture and examine that moment when it actually occurs.

 

[Willamena]

Freewill means the ability to change the past?

Before I make a decision I have the option to turn left or right for example as long as nothing is preventing that action. After I've made a decision and acted obviously I can't undone what I did.

I tried to explain once that that's what that phrasing means.

 

[Nakosis]

Well. It either is [the result of conditions] or it's not.
If it's not, then its irrespective of conditions (random).
Or it could be some combination of the two.

Freewill, having a choice occurs prior to the conditions being set. You're just looking at the moment of decision, which is not the point that freewill exists.

You've tacked on "external". That's an entirely different discussion that I am having.

I'm making a point that you exist. That you make a determination that affects the outcomes in your life. You act as an agent to make decisions which alters destiny.

And not a single person here has been able to imagine an alternative.

Actually there are many different ideas brought forth. It 's is easy to imagine alternates. The problem I'm seeing is that you're accepting a definition of freewill that is out of sync with the process.

You want to say freewill must exist where it can't possibly exists from what I see.

 

[Nakosis]

I tried to explain once that that's what that phrasing means.

I'm sure the intent is to mean something else. I hate acting dense but I'm hoping someone comes up with something a little more precise.

Freewill means... all the conditions that were set to make a decision can't be altered when a decision is made...

Ok how about before all those conditions are set. Especially when the individual as an agent does some of the setting. I can change my mind before acting on a decision right? Decide instead to do something else. However yes the decision which affects the outcome I can't alter. The time to alter those conditions was previous to that point.

So the freewill doesn't exist where they are looking for it. It exists elsewhere.

"After jumping off a cliff you can't choose not to jump, therefore you don't have freewill."

Can't say the logic is wrong so I'll just have to disagree with or not really disagree but just say I don't see much value to anything defining freewill that way.

 

[JerryL]

Freewill, having a choice occurs prior to the conditions being set.

Maybe. Maybe not. I make no claim about order.

I'm making a point that you exist. That you make a determination that affects the outcomes in your life. You act as an agent to make decisions which alters destiny.

Except that my decisions are either the result of conditions, the result of randomness, or a combination of both.

Actually there are many different ideas brought forth. It 's is easy to imagine alternates.

A single example being?

The problem I'm seeing is that you're accepting a definition of freewill that is out of sync with the process.

I'd suggest you not worry about the semantics too much. What I have claimed is impossible is impossible. If you have some other definition you personally use for "free will" (I notice you conjoined that to "freewill"), feel free to discuss it. I'm perfectly happy to have a discussion about your ideas about your definition of "freewill"; but don't imagine it has an effect on the way *I* was using it.

 

[Skwim]

At the point of doing the decision has been made. So yes when a decision has been made you act on that decision.

Perhaps I mislead you with "the point of doing." What I meant to convey was the point at which you seemingly "decided" to do X rather than Y, you could not have "decided" to do differently. Even the event of seemingly "deciding" to do something was predetermined by the cause/effect events leading up to that moment.

Prior to that decision that resultant action has not yet been determined.

But it was. Consider: if what you do was not caused then the only other way it could arise is utterly randomly, and I don't believe you want to claim that what you do is utterly ransom in nature. So, going back to the moment of "deciding"---where one would say one's will kicks into action---- there had to be something that caused you to do X rather than Y. What was it? Propose whatever engine of conception you wish: mind, judgement, instinct, intellect, thinking, mentality, etc., there has to be some kind of operation that brings you to do X rather than Y. Exactly what caused your mind to arrive at the "decision" it did, and no other? [Saying it's one's will is simply going back to the "deciding" point, which we've gotten past. (In effect, we're now looking at how the will works.) ] Going on, the mechanism of "deciding" has to rely on causation (randomness having been excluded), so the act of deciding was caused, but what created this cause? Well, again having dismissed randomness, this creating must have been caused, in turn making it's effect the cause of your "deciding." And this series of causes/effects goes on back to a whole lot of prior causes and effects. So your "deciding " to do X instead of Y was determined by all these prior causes and effects. A led to B, which lead to C, which lead to D, which lead to E, which to led your so called "decision." It was an inevitable out come, just like taking a particular set of roads to get from A to B. To get form A to K would necessitate taking another particular set of roads; however, because you took the first set of roads you had to arrive at B and not K. Your "decision" has to be what it is and nothing else..

A simplified illustration:

 

[Willamena]

Freewill means... all the conditions that were set to make a decision can't be altered when a decision is made...

Ok how about before all those conditions are set. Especially when the individual as an agent does some of the setting. I can change my mind before acting on a decision right? Decide instead to do something else. However yes the decision which affects the outcome I can't alter. The time to alter those conditions was previous to that point.

So the freewill doesn't exist where they are looking for it. It exists elsewhere.

"After jumping off a cliff you can't choose not to jump, therefore you don't have freewill."

Can't say the logic is wrong so I'll just have to disagree with or not really disagree but just say I don't see much value to anything defining freewill that way.

Someone made an interesting argument once that decision happens before we become aware of it. He tried to play that as a strike against free will, but really it supports it. The world is, properly, in place before we become aware of it. Decision, as such, cannot be said to be described by determinism, which depends upon observation. It stresses that all the connections we make between things in relation, including between a cause and its effect, are drawn after the fact of observation (a point David Hume made centuries ago).

We become aware of having made a decision after its happened, so to declare anything causal of it is in retrospect, essentially arbitrary.

 

[Willamena]

Well. It either is [the result of conditions] or it's not.
If it's not, then its irrespective of conditions (random).

Or it could be some combination of the two.

The alternative is that it is a result of something you do.

 

[JerryL]

The alternative is that it is a result of something you do.

That just makes "something you do" part of the state of the universe... so deterministic.

Skwim seems to have actually just addressed this.