If God created everything why didn't he create it perfect?

[Penumbra]

Happiness and fulfillment don't come from the environment.

So you're saying those two children should be equally fulfilled?

It's wise to cultivate a sense of self-control in regard to happiness, making as much of it internal as possible, like "taking happiness with you wherever you go" as some say, but basic environmental conditions are necessary, like not currently dying, not currently having loved ones being killed or tortured, not having chronic severe pain, etc.

 

[Willamena]

So you're saying those two children should be equally fulfilled?

It's wise to cultivate a sense of self-control in regard to happiness, making as much of it internal as possible, like "taking happiness with you wherever you go" as some say, but basic environmental conditions are necessary, like not currently dying, not currently having loved ones being killed or tortured, not having chronic severe pain, etc.

What does it mean to be happy and fulfilled in this instance? If it means needs fulfilled, then that's what we're really talking about.

What is happiness?

 

[PolyHedral]

What is happiness?

Neurochemistry.

 

[Willamena]

Neurochemistry.

Yum.

 

[Penumbra]

What does it mean to be happy and fulfilled in this instance? If it means needs fulfilled, then that's what we're really talking about.

What is happiness?

Usually I go with defining happiness as eudaiminoa, which seems to be among the most complete definitions. Subjective happiness coupled with objective well-being and centered around the concept of virtue.

Neurochemistry works as well.

 

[Koldo]

Happiness and fulfillment don't come from the environment.

They don't come from it, but they are affected by it.

 

[Willamena]

Usually I go with defining happiness as eudaiminoa, which seems to be among the most complete definitions. Subjective happiness coupled with objective well-being and centered around the concept of virtue.

Good. Greek philosophy looked at eudaimonia two ways: as a person fulfilled in being but still needing "external (physical) goods," and as a person fulfilled in being not needing anything else, "complete with god" so to speak. I lean with the Stoics (and, I believe, Confucius) when I promote that happiness can be found in any situation, because it is not dependent on "external goods". The former is happiness that is fleeting, that comes and goes with a thought --the happiness found in a mug of coffee. The latter is happiness when there is no thought bent on shaping the world, no need for concern. What is, is.

People find "fault" and "imperfection" in a world that's "not the way it should be." Their thoughts have shaped a world as it "should be" with it's corresponding "not the way it should be," usually at the expense of the world as it is. Both the child living in luxury and the child living in poverty have this ability, and both will find in the world something "not the way it should be," and things that are right just the way they are.

So yes, because both are human, both skilled at shaping the world, they will be equally fulfilled. Every human would be so, by "virtue."

 

[Penumbra]

Good. Greek philosophy looked at eudaimonia two ways: as a person fulfilled in being but still needing "external (physical) goods," and as a person fulfilled in being not needing anything else, "complete with god" so to speak. I lean with the Stoics (and, I believe, Confucius) when I promote that happiness can be found in any situation, because it is not dependent on "external goods". The former is happiness that is fleeting, that comes and goes with a thought --the happiness found in a mug of coffee. The latter is happiness when there is no thought bent on shaping the world, no need for concern. What is, is.

People find "fault" and "imperfection" in a world that's "not the way it should be." Their thoughts have shaped a world as it "should be" with it's corresponding "not the way it should be," usually at the expense of the world as it is. Both the child living in luxury and the child living in poverty have this ability, and both will find in the world something "not the way it should be," and things that are right just the way they are.

Stoics and some of the other philosophers in the "virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness" camp specifically based their idea of happiness-self-sufficiency on virtue. Virtue is something that is developed, whereas children that are severely hurt and mistreated before they even get a chance to develop don't have that option.

Aristotle's recognition of the importance of external "goods" is much more realistic. He found happiness to be possible in extremely adverse conditions, but at a lower level than if one has both virtue and positive fortune. He recognized that in really unfortunate circumstances, where an otherwise virtuous man is hit with several catastrophic misfortunes, he will indeed be sad, but at least something beautiful shines through if he handles it well due to his virtue. This is not as happy as the same man in more fortunate circumstances. And more modern understandings of psychology and neuroscience give even more support to Aristotle, because happiness is, as previously mentioned, neuroscience (and therefore partially "external").

So yes, because both are human, both skilled at shaping the world, they will be equally fulfilled. Every human would be so, by "virtue."

So do you take this to the logical conclusion that charities are completely unneeded because the people being helped are as happy and fulfilled as the ones in a position to help?

 

[Willamena]

Stoics and some of the other philosophers in the "virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness" camp specifically based their idea of happiness-self-sufficiency on virtue. Virtue is something that is developed, whereas children that are severely hurt and mistreated before they even get a chance to develop don't have that option.

Aristotle's recognition of the importance of external "goods" is much more realistic. He found happiness to be possible in extremely adverse conditions, but at a lower level than if one has both virtue and positive fortune. He recognized that in really unfortunate circumstances, where an otherwise virtuous man is hit with several catastrophic misfortunes, he will indeed be sad, but at least something beautiful shines through if he handles it well due to his virtue. This is not as happy as the same man in more fortunate circumstances. And more modern understandings of psychology and neuroscience give even more support to Aristotle, because happiness is, as previously mentioned, neuroscience (and therefore partially "external").

So do you take this to the logical conclusion that charities are completely unneeded because the people being helped are as happy and fulfilled as the ones in a position to help?

My understanding of virtue (apart from the expression of it) is that it is inherent, rather than developed. More so, it is the inherence of "good".

To be "man" is to be a thought-construct, and man in turn constructs other constructs (like charities, made to help those in "unfortunate" circumstances). Where we stray from virtue is where we subscribe to the world we have shaped at the expense of the world as it is. The world we shape is "external" to the world as it is. We shape "fortune" and "misfortune", we shape "not as it should be" and "he's been wronged," we shape "I can do better" and "I am better (than you)." Those are our constructs, not the world as it is. When we lose sight of that, we lose touch with virtue.

People in need are, and to help them without hesitation is virtuous. To help them for reasons, for our own reasons (like how unfortunate their circumstances are and how much better we can make their lives), would not be virtuous. It's an "external good."

 

[PolyHedral]

People in need are, and to help them without hesitation is virtuous. To help them for reasons, for our own reasons (like how unfortunate their circumstances are and how much better we can make their lives), would not be virtuous. It's an "external good."

I think you've got inconsistent logic here. Nobody's ever managed to solve the is-ought problem outside the context of a specific goal, and so the motivation behind helping people will necessarily be "our own" reason. No such imperative exists in reality.

 

[Willamena]

I think you've got inconsistent logic here. Nobody's ever managed to solve the is-ought problem outside the context of a specific goal, and so the motivation behind helping people will necessarily be "our own" reason. No such imperative exists in reality.

I said nothing about what one ought to do, just about what is virtuous and what is not virtuous.

 

[Penumbra]

My understanding of virtue (apart from the expression of it) is that it is inherent, rather than developed. More so, it is the inherence of "good".

Then you disagree with the aforementioned Stoics regarding the benefit of mental exercises for developing virtue? It's inherent in everyone, and everyone is happy and fulfilled?

To be "man" is to be a thought-construct, and man in turn constructs other constructs (like charities, made to help those in "unfortunate" circumstances). Where we stray from virtue is where we subscribe to the world we have shaped at the expense of the world as it is. The world we shape is "external" to the world as it is. We shape "fortune" and "misfortune", we shape "not as it should be" and "he's been wronged," we shape "I can do better" and "I am better (than you)." Those are our constructs, not the world as it is. When we lose sight of that, we lose touch with virtue.

People in need are, and to help them without hesitation is virtuous. To help them for reasons, for our own reasons (like how unfortunate their circumstances are and how much better we can make their lives), would not be virtuous. It's an "external good."

What are they in need of? This contrasts with what you've previously said, doesn't it?

 

[Willamena]

Then you disagree with the aforementioned Stoics regarding the benefit of mental exercises for developing virtue?

No, just as I don't disagree with Buddhists for practicing meditation.

It's inherent in everyone, and everyone is happy and fulfilled?

Virtue is inherent. Happiness is the recognition of it. Not everyone recognizes it.

What are they in need of? This contrasts with what you've previously said, doesn't it?

I don't see how.

 

[Penumbra]

No, just as I don't disagree with Buddhists for practicing meditation.

Virtue is inherent. Happiness is the recognition of it. Not everyone recognizes it.

What specifically do you mean when you say virtue is inherent? How, in your opinion, does one recognize it?

I don't see how.

You said happiness and fulfillment doesn't come from the environment.

What could a person be in need for?

 

[Paraprakrti]

Theists that argue that god is perfect but that the world is not are almost always coupling this assertion with a theodicy.

The majority of theodicies are scientifically inaccurate or otherwise able to be shown false, while a minority of theodices are more interesting and worth discussing, but usually phrased in non-falsifiable ways.

WIll you please provide examples of scientifically inaccurate and non-falsifiable theodicies? I am not sure what that criteria has to do with theodicy. I thought the purpose of a theodicy was to offer a possible explanation for why suffering exists given an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being.

 

[Penumbra]

WIll you please provide examples of scientifically inaccurate and non-falsifiable theodicies? I am not sure what that criteria has to do with theodicy. I thought the purpose of a theodicy was to offer a possible explanation for why suffering exists given an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being.

A theodicy is indeed what you say- a possible explanation for why suffering exists given an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being. But this doesn't mean that all explanations are equal in terms of scientific accuracy, logical consistency falsifiability, or intellectual rigor. Some of them end up being more interesting discussions than others.

-An example of scientifically inaccurate theodicy is the assertion that the universe was perfect, but that humans ruined it. Some assert, for instance, that the universe was perfect until humans ate from an apple. An understanding of how old life on this planet is, how the universe functions in general, and how humans are a fairly recent addition to the world refutes this explanation. Mass extinction events occurred before humans were ever around, suffering existed, and so forth.

-An example of a fairly non-falsifiable theodicy is that each human has a "higher self", which is a much more consciously aware and expanded version of what we currently perceive ourselves to be (individual descriptions vary). Some might go further to suggest that everyone's "higher self" is the same thing- a panentheistic god basically. In theodicies of this sort, our current lives are basically experiences that our higher self wishes to have.

There are a whole host of theodices that have varying levels of scientific accuracy, logical consistency, falsifiability, and intellectual rigor. A subset off I can quickly think of is:
-Life is a test.
-Free will.
-Maya/illusion.
-Infinite heaven compensating for finite suffering.
-Higher selves.
-Evil is necessary for good to exist.
-(and there are more)

 

[Quagmire]

This is mixing up knowledge with realization. Knowledge of other worlds is a tool to explain why some possible worlds are better than others, but knowledge doesn't have to directly play a role in why that world is better. It's only a tool for external philosophical beings to make the comparison. Beings in a hellish realm, and beings in a heavenly realm, would not have to know of each others existence for their levels of fulfillment and suffering to be different from each other (although adding the knowledge of the heavenly realm to the hellish realm would probably add insult to injury).

If, in a world where the worst thing that can happen is a stubbed toe, someone puts forth the PoE and suggests that a powerful and loving god wouldn't allow this to happen, they might have an initial point, but a proper response would be, "look, I can recover in 5 minutes from a stubbed toe. The highest pleasure is so much larger in magnitude than this suffering." and it would render the argument weak.

I disagree: if the worst thing that could happen to a person would be to stub their toe, then the person who stubs their toe is currently experiencing the worst thing that can happen to a person, therefore the argument wouldn't be weak at all by the standards of those beings. It would only be weak by our standards, and like I said: in that world, our standards wouldn't apply.

But in this world, where unbearable agony or lifelong illness are among the worst possible things, the same defense can't be said.

Of course they can: If we were to envision a world that was proportionally worse than this world (in the same proportion to ours compared to the toe stubbing world) then we could come up with a world where, say, every moment of existence involved feeling the sensation of being burned alive.

Compared to that world just about anything you can use as an example of suffering from our world would be a relatively weak example.

Adjusting to the environment is only a partial thing. People can adjust to an extent, and that's because our bodies are rather flexible due to our growing in this world. For instance, if someone joins a kickboxing club for the first time and I have to fight her, chances are, she'll be a pansy. But after a few months of rigorous training, she'll develop cardiovascular conditioning, muscular strength and endurance, and learn how to actually take a hit and hit back harder. This does not mean, however, that the scales between suffering and fulfillment are wholly relative (see example below).

Firstly, I didn't put forth the idea the argument that an omni-beneficent god is incompatible with a world that includes suffering. I specifically disclaim those sorts of positions.

Then what is your position?

To me, it seems like you're disclaiming the POE so that you can advocate the basic premise of the POE without having to defend it.

For the rest, consider two possible environments.

In one environment, there is a child that is raised by intelligent and loving parents in a fairly stable and safe area. The child is given affection, taught values, and educated. The child encounters some obstacles, like sport injuries or some mean other children, but they learn from these minor sufferings and are happy and fulfilled in general.

In another environment, there is a child that is initially raised by parents until they are both tortured and killed, possibly even in front of the child. The child lives in poverty, without education, faces starvation, and eventually dies due to an attack from millions of multiplying microscopic biological torture devices (a virus) which are present in nature.

Going by your logic, if these children never knew of each others existence, they should have roughly the same level of suffering and fulfillment and happiness since their sensibilities should match their environment. Would you say that they do? Is one of the children more fortunate than the other, or is it totally equal?

The problem with this comparison is that if you're talking about 2 children who occupy the same planet, then each would be at least roughly aware of the possibility of something worse or better in their own world.

What I mean is the child in your first example would be aware of children who are worse off then they are, the child in the second example would be aware of people who were better off.

On the other hand, if you're talking about 2 completely different worlds: one where everyone's life is on par with the child in your first example, then that child wouldn't feel particularly fortune, happy, or fulfilled.

By the same token if the child in your second example were living in a world where all the things you listed were happening to everyone, that child wouldn't feel particularly unfortunate.

The problem with your example is that it ignores all the grades of life-quality in between.

 

[Quagmire]

There are a finite number of human-imaginable worlds. Why didn't God create the best of those?

You're assuming he didn't.

 

[PolyHedral]

You're assuming he didn't.

He obviously didn't; I can imagine a better one.

 

[Bird123]

If life had a designer, and the designer was perfect, why isn't all life perfect?
Why is our trachea ventral (infront) of our oesophagus, (posing the risk of choking, meaning we have to have an epiglottis).
Why are our retinas inverted (i.e. the rods and cones point the wrong way round).

Why do biological proteins not always work efficient, e.g. RUBISCO has an oxygenase activity (an evolutionary accident).
And following from that, why are not all plants the more efficient C4 (or CAM) plants (most are C3).
Why didn't god just make them all the more efficient C4?

There are many more examples of imperfections in life...

All of the above can be explained by evolution, but why would a designer do this.

Isn't evolution part of the master design??? Can judgment calls really be made without having all the information. So much information is not known by mankind or science. Why isn't everything the same with the plants and such?? Isn't diversity an important piece of the puzzle. It gives us a much bigger view than if we only had one view to see. There is genius behind everything. One only has to look.