It's the element that allows precisely the same set of circumstances to occur more than once.Not sure where time travel was implied.
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It's the element that allows precisely the same set of circumstances to occur more than once.Not sure where time travel was implied.
There are two premises:It's the element that allows precisely the same set of circumstances to occur more than once.
Clones did you say?
Such as the twin sister of Adam given to him for a bride?
Eve had no navel. She was cloned from Adam's rib.
Identical environment?....like the Garden?
But did they partake of the knowledge for the same cause?
Did they do so freely?...or did that clever snake twist someone's arm?
Just a side note.....not really wanting to digress to your analogy....
Ape's make a practice of rape.
By choice?
Man as a species ......Day Six.
Day Seven...no more will be created.
THEN Chapter Two.... a story of manipulation.
A story of freewill?
Self-awareness cannot produce premise 2, since it has only access to information from the past; i.e. it is the same as memory as far as outcomes are concerned.There are two premises:
1) A specific set of causes can produce only one specific effect.
2) A specific set of causes can possibly produce more than one effect.
The deterministic argument requires premise 1 to be true. The free will argument requires premise 2 to be true. Unfortunately for both, both premises are assumptions-- they are not proven to be true. Yet, the determinists act as if premise 1 has been proven.
My hypothesis is that self-awareness is a way in which premise 2 can be brought about.
Nothing about time travel.
That is an assumption. You don't know this for sure. Of course, we draw on all our life experiences, and our genetic makeup predisposes us towards various decisions, but you don't know whether it is constrained by all that. I believe that self-awareness allows us to "rise above" by basically allowing us to be aware that a choice can be made.Self-awareness cannot produce premise 2, since it has only access to information from the past; i.e. it is the same as memory as far as outcomes are concerned.
Well, you said it in your post: Whether or not the universe is deterministic is still not very well established. So why argue as if it has been? The human mind is still incredibly far from being understood, and I think it a mistake to assume that it is.POlyHedral said:Incidnetally, under deterministic laws of physics, premise 1 is true. That's what "deterministic" means. Whether or not the universe is deterministic is still not very well established, but even if premise 2 is true, that isn't enough to say anything about free will.
The assumption is the reverse; making it anything other than just another facet of a deterministic process assigns it "magic" status. We know how deterministic decision-makers work, and it seems silly to assume that the brain doesn't fall under that label.That is an assumption. You don't know this for sure.
But that would just be another decision, and so subject to the same argument... Besides, it's been demonstrated that concious awareness of decisions follows after the decision has been made. "Conciousness" seems to be more like modelling oneself as another; it does not appear to be true reflection, in the computing sense.Of course, we draw on all our life experiences, and our genetic makeup predisposes us towards various decisions, but you don't know whether it is constrained by all that. I believe that self-awareness allows us to "rise above" by basically allowing us to be aware that a choice can be made.
Because quantum mechanics is &£$@! weird!Well, you said it in your post: Whether or not the universe is deterministic is still not very well established. So why argue as if it has been?
It is not a coherent concept, IMO.Please elaborate what else you think is necessary for free will.
"Determinism" is treated as (usually) one of two things:Well, you said it in your post: Whether or not the universe is deterministic is still not very well established. So why argue as if it has been?
Not necessarily true.Self-awareness cannot produce premise 2, since it has only access to information from the past; i.e. it is the same as memory as far as outcomes are concerned.
I think I understand and agree but could you translate that in english in case I missed something.Not necessarily true.
As I quoted earlier: "Under [strong downward causation], it is supposed that upper-level phenomena can act as efficient causal agents in the dynamics of lower levels. In other words, upper-level organisms can modify the physical and chemical laws governing their molecular constituents."
From Scott's paper in Evolution and Emergence (Oxford University Press, 2007)
There are several more counters to your assertion in that post, but I will add another here:
From Arecchi's paper in Complexity and Emergence: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the International Academy of the Philosophy of Science (World Scientific, 2002):
"Even though we believe that humans are made of atoms, the affections that we measure in atomic physics are insufficient to make predictions of human behavior...Trying to build a structured system out of its elementary components does not provide a univocal outcome....The number of equivalent outcomes increases exponentially with the order of the bifurcation...Hence, a reductionistic program based on the dynamical description of the components does not provide a unique outcome.
"Determinism" is treated as (usually) one of two things:
1. A proposition about how the universe works.
2. A true picture of the universe.
As a proposition, it is well established. As a true picture of the universe it is not.
It concerns a theory of a particular type of dynamical system (chaotic system). Normally, such systems are nonlinear and difficult when it comes to prediction because they are sensitive to intial conditions. Strogatz, in a paper on teaching nonlinear dynamics and in his book on the subject uses the example of two lovers. Using simplistic equations, it is possible to mathematically represent (or model) that relationship. Certain parameters or "influences" can radically alter the outcome of the relationship. For example, it may be that Juliet becomes less interested in Romeo as Romeo becomes more attached to Juliet. Also, it may be that as Juliet's interest decreases, so does Romeo's. This in turn causes Juliet to become more interested. Depending upon the starting conditions of how interested each lover is, and how strongly their interest changes based on the interest of the other, and how their interests relate, the system (the relationship) can evolve in a vast number of ways. However, if we knew all the starting conditions (how interested Romeo and Juliet were at the beginning, how much each lovers' interest changed based on the interest of the other, etc.) we could predict the outcome of the relationship.I think I understand and agree but could you translate that in english in case I missed something.
Yes, thanks for the clarification.It concerns a theory of a particular type of dynamical system (chaotic system). Normally, such systems are nonlinear and difficult when it comes to prediction because they are sensitive to intial conditions. Strogatz, in a paper on teaching nonlinear dynamics and in his book on the subject uses the example of two lovers. Using simplistic equations, it is possible to mathematically represent (or model) that relationship. Certain parameters or "influences" can radically alter the outcome of the relationship. For example, it may be that Juliet becomes less interested in Romeo as Romeo becomes more attached to Juliet. Also, it may be that as Juliet's interest decreases, so does Romeo's. This in turn causes Juliet to become more interested. Depending upon the starting conditions of how interested each lover is, and how strongly their interest changes based on the interest of the other, and how their interests relate, the system (the relationship) can evolve in a vast number of ways. However, if we knew all the starting conditions (how interested Romeo and Juliet were at the beginning, how much each lovers' interest changed based on the interest of the other, etc.) we could predict the outcome of the relationship.
Most dynamical (chaotic) systems are extremely difficult to predict because they are so sensitive to small changes and to initial conditions. However, there are many specialists in various field who believe that some systems are not just difficult to predict, or impossible to predict in principle (but could be predicted theoretically), but are ontologically nondeterministic. That is, even knowing all the laws of the universe and all the initial conditions, one still could not know how the system would evolve.
For those who work in neurobiology/neurophysiology and who hold this view, the complexity of neural interactions is such that individual neurons are not just subject to the laws of physics. Nor can the brain be broken down into its component parts (all the neurons). Rather, the "mind" is more than the sum of its parts.
What argument do you think supports that, though? In other words, why does libertarian free will, as a logical theory, think and argue this way? That's what gets at the heart of the matter.Libertarian freewill argues that it would have been possible for a person to have made a choice different then the one they made.
What argument do you think supports that, though? In other words, why does libertarian free will, as a logical theory, think and argue this way? That's what gets at the heart of the matter.
But where do they get these crazy ideas from ?LFW argues for a type of freewill that is incompatible with determinism. That freewill is contra-causal. So there is nothing that causes one to make one choice over another choice. One is equally likely to choose between alternate actions. However a supernatural/metaphysical agent, the self, can make a random, uncaused selection.
But I've heard libertrian free-willers also claim reason. They say they do things with reason, but it's their doing. They make choices, but they are their choices.Determinism implies an cause and effect universe. That an individual has a reason for their selection. That reason causes the resultant choice. That reason being a desire or influence which ultimately causes the choice made.
Do you think that's so? Should we release all the criminals because they couldn't help it?The thing people don't like about determinism is that it implies that if a person commits murder, they couldn't have chosen other then to commit murder. IOW they were unable to prevent themselves from killing.
If they had no alternate choice then why punish them for and crime in which they had no "alternate" choice except to commit the crime?
Determinism says they had no alternate choices.
LFW says they could have chosen not to commit murder. An alternate choice.
The whole problem is that we can't make a machine that can do beyond it's programming the way a person does but from that example we can see that there is choice coming from somewhere within us and the real question is to what extent.
That is where people are quick to say that cognition is a mystery but we certainly know more than the basics for how it works. It is very easy to show that we have more choice than a rock or fish, at least I think it is easy.Actually we can program machines to do things they were never programmed to. Research in A.I. and cognitive science (not that the two are distinct) began to rapidly shift from the algorithmic approach to artificial cognition to one which imitates biological mechanisms.
But where do they get these crazy ideas from ?
But I've heard libertrian free-willers also claim reason. They say they do things with reason, but it's their doing. They make choices, but they are their choices.
Do you think that's so? Should we release all the criminals because they couldn't help it?
"Even though we believe that humans are made of atoms, the affections that we measure in atomic physics are insufficient to make predictions of human behavior...
Yes, and the author's point, whom I quoted, was that this can't be the case. The local changes haven't already taken place. Rather, the global effect causes local changes globally, which is why Davies states "To the physicist this looks deeply puzzling."
And I expanded on this point in the rest of my post, but you signled out that one bit. Why? The rest also deals with local effects uncaused by physical laws but by global network structure and behavior.