If you believe in free will, respond to these two objections

[Nakosis]

This is a pretty poor argument against free will IMO. Although it might seem intuitive to think that all events have causes, quantum theory and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle show that this is not true, thus this is not a logical argument for the nonexistence of free will.

Also, scientists define the big bang as an event without cause as well for example(read a book about it, too hard for me to explain). So since current science shows that there IS and CAN be events without cause, then your argument is illogical.

None of these comments have anything to do with freewill.

Things happen in the universe which we can measure with only limited accuracy. What does that have to do with freewill?

Events happen without cause. What does that have to do with freewill?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

But that’s also all determinism requires, that it is determined, not that we could determine it.

Well at that point you are getting into semantics. Often, the term "deterministic system" is used to describe a system that changes in ways we are capable (in theory) of predicting if we know the initial conditions. But quantam mechanics limits us to probabilitic predictions, not because of an incomplete knowledge of physics, but because of the observation effect. However, that doesn't mean (as you point out) that in another sense the movement of particles, like everything else, isn't completely governed and determined by physical laws.

I’d argue that the self-ordering is a result of the laws of physics rather than something independent of them. I don’t really see any reason why large groups of neurons would act independently to the laws of physics purely because of the number involved.

It isn't that such systems are acting completely independently of the laws of physics. Rather, they are constrained instead of determined by these laws. Nor is it a simple manner of complexity. There are deterministic systems which are stochastic and impossible (at least currently) to model very accurately. I'm talking about a system of a qualitatively different type.

Take, for example, the classic example of a swinging pendulum. It's movement is governed by a 2-dimensional nonlinear equation- the second derivative of theta with respect to time added to the acceleration due to gravity over the length of the pendulum multiplied by the sin theta = 0. This is a relatively simple nonlinear equation, but over even a fairly short period of time perturbations make modeling the movement of the pendulum extremely difficult. However, it's movement is still deterministic, it is just our inability to solve the equation adequately enough to do more than approximate its movement under many conditions.

Essentially, (and please correct me if I am wrong) you are arguing that all complex systems are like this. We may not be able to mathematically represent the functions involved or solve the necessary differential equations, but this is simply due to our limits, not because the system isn't completely determined.

However, pendulums, waterwheels, population models of bacteria, etc., while chaotic, behave in complex ways because they are highly sensitive to a number of parameters.

What I'm suggesting (and I'm certainly not taking credit for this type of analysis; there is a lot of literature on the topic), is that the "mind" is more than just an extremely sensitive complex system. It is not completely governed a vast number of parameters. Unlike the pendulum, the internal and external forces acting on the "mind" (the external environment, chemical/electral signals sent to the brain, other signals sent from parts of the brain which are not usually considered as part of the "mind") do not determine how the packets of information will cause the "mind" to form new patterns and states. This isn't saying that the individual neurons underlying conscious choice/thought disobey physics. Rather, the behavior of individual neurons aren't governed solely by these laws because they are components of a system which organizes itself in a non-reductionist manner. A multi-level heirarchical network capable of recursive processes and downward causation. Of course, the very complexity of such a system makes even qualitative description, let alone quantitative description, extremely difficult. Nor do philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and others who believe that systems like this exist agree on what their nature may be.

But to simplify things a bit, let's go back to the individual neurons, subject to the laws of physics. If the "mind" is a determinisitc (albeit unpredictable) system, then each neuron is completely governed in some way by the laws of physics. However, if neural networks are only constrained by the laws of physics because they are capable of reorganization according to "laws" the network itself defines, then physics only constrains the system, it doesn't determine it.

Hence why simulators are important in that particular field, I recall reading a couple years ago about an IBM supercomputer they were using to simulate part of a cats brain.

I'll address the above in the moment but I wanted to use your computer example to illustrate (hopefully) what I wrote above in a clearer fashion. A typical computer, from an old, cheap laptop to a massive supercomputer, possesses hardware analogous to the brain. However, (ignoring things like equipment failure) the computer is completely determined by a series of explicit algorithms. What I am suggesting is that the brains "hardware" allows it to rewrite, develop, analyze, and alter its "software." The neurons have to obey physical laws, but beause of the way in which they are organized and the manner in which they exchange information, the patterns which emerge are largely the result of "laws" created by the system. Knowing the state of every neuron isn't enough to predict future states of the "mind" because as a whole the behavior of neurons cannot be reduced to the individual parts. Self-organization/government is subject to the laws of physics, but not determined by them.

Going back to your supercomputer example, it's true that A.I. has come a long way, and it is also true that cognitive models are heavily influenced by computer science. In fact, many cognitive scientists are mainly computer scientists who work on A.I. research. Interestingly enough, the classical approach to cognitive science and A.I. (which we can probably say began with Turing), in which congnitive scientists thought of the brain in terms of algorithms has become increasingly obsolete and replaced by simlulations of neural networks. Also interesting is that while even the most complex of these systems doesn't come remotely near the complexity of even a cat's brain, they do reach levels of complexity such that while the system will return the answer it is designed to (say, facial recognition), it is impossible for the programmers to know how the network reached that decision.

 

[punkdbass]

None of these comments have anything to do with freewill.

Things happen in the universe which we can measure with only limited accuracy. What does that have to do with freewill?

Events happen without cause. What does that have to do with freewill?

Everything. Because the OP is basing his argument on how he incorrectly thinks the universe works. He is trying to make the argument that since all events in the universe must have a cause then we dont have free will because all of the choices we make are "events" that are "caused" by genes and other factors outside of our control.

But since modern science shows that physics at a subatomic level can have events without causes, his argument is void.

Perhaps you dont understand the relationship between the 2 concepts: If the smallest building blocks of the universe are sub atomic particles, and if these particles are capable of having events without causes, then it is not illogical to think that larger objects consisting of these building blocks(human beings, or the brain for example) are also capable of doing things without cause - hence the logical possibility of free will - or at least the refutation of the argument he is trying to use to disprove it.

Im not an expert on quantum theory at all, but I think one of the main purposes of it, is that if we can understand the physics of the smallest things in the universe, then we can better understand the bigger things and how they work

 

[shawn001]

These are brand new from Neuroscience.

Neuroscience, free will and determinism: 'I'm just a machine'

Our bodies can be controlled by outside forces in the universe, discovers Tom Chivers. So where does that leave free will?


Neuroscience, free will and determinism: 'I'm just a machine' - Telegraph


Neuroscience Challenges Old Ideas about Free Will

Celebrated neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga explains the new science behind an ancient philosophical question

Neuroscience Challenges Old Ideas about Free Will: Scientific American


This is older but worth reading.

The Electric brain

NOVA | The Electric Brain


There is also this on some history

Free will: Facts, Discussion Forum, and Encyclopedia Article

Punkdbass, you should read the above articles.

The cause of the brain working is of course a fuel source that feeds the cells in order for them to function. Without neurons firing you wouldn't have any thoughts.

 

[shawn001]

These aren't really about free will, more about the brain and neurons.


Robot with a biological brain

Scientists at the University of Reading create a robot that is controlled by cultured neurons.

[youtube]wACltn9QpCc[/youtube]
Robot with a biological brain - YouTube

They can actually watch new neural networks forming as the robot bumps into walls and learns.

we have also worked out

Brain Control of a Robotic Hand

[youtube]oJ-HD4uIKdc[/youtube]
Brain Control of a Robotic Hand - YouTube


and even

Guy Plays Piano With His Brain

[youtube]o5If0H2wyTI[/youtube]
Guy Plays Piano With His Brain - YouTube

 

[Skwim]

This is a pretty poor argument against free will IMO. Although it might seem intuitive to think that all events have causes, quantum theory and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle show that this is not true, thus this is not a logical argument for the nonexistence of free will.

They do not. I suggest you familiarize yourself with both.

Also, scientists define the big bang as an event without cause as well for example(read a book about it, too hard for me to explain). So since current science shows that there IS and CAN be events without cause, then your argument is illogical.

Perhaps some scientists do, but it isn't a scientific definition, as in "recognized by mainstream science." At most, cosmology says it's a possibility. Saying that science defines the big bang as an event without a cause is no different than saying science defines evolution as an abiogenic event. Neither has any bearing on the concept itself. In the future, when more is known, perhaps it will, at which time the concept will then include, or exclude, the idea.

 

[shawn001]

They do not. I suggest you familiarize yourself with both.

Perhaps some scientists do, but it isn't a scientific definition, as in "recognized by mainstream science." At most, cosmology says it's a possibility. Saying that science defines the big bang as an event without a cause is no different than saying science defines evolution as an abiogenic event. Neither has any bearing on the concept itself. In the future, when more is known, perhaps it will, at which time the concept will then include, or exclude, the idea.

"At most, cosmology says it's a possibility"

Its a possiblity that doesn't break any laws of nature though.

Of course the big bang isn't about how it started, just that the universe was

"The Big Bang theory says that the universe was very hot and concentrated in the distant past and, ever since then, space has been stretching and cooling. This is the only theory that successfully explains the observations made by astronomers."

Of course most believe it was smaller then an atom when it started.

I am however still trying to figure out what the big bang or even QM has to do with human free will, but perhaps I am missing something here.

Opening up QM and free will could lead to a whole new set of questions. Even that there is more then one of you or you could be in two places at once. Or that every possiblity is being played out at once and it isn't until something is observed that it becomes what you see.

I think neuroscience is starting to answer the question of free will.

 

[Zoe Doidge]

Essentially, (and please correct me if I am wrong) you are arguing that all complex systems are like this. We may not be able to mathematically represent the functions involved or solve the necessary differential equations, but this is simply due to our limits, not because the system isn't completely determined.

This is exactly what I’m arguing.

However, pendulums, waterwheels, population models of bacteria, etc., while chaotic, behave in complex ways because they are highly sensitive to a number of parameters.

What I'm suggesting (and I'm certainly not taking credit for this type of analysis; there is a lot of literature on the topic), is that the "mind" is more than just an extremely sensitive complex system. It is not completely governed a vast number of parameters. Unlike the pendulum, the internal and external forces acting on the "mind" (the external environment, chemical/electral signals sent to the brain, other signals sent from parts of the brain which are not usually considered as part of the "mind") do not determine how the packets of information will cause the "mind" to form new patterns and states. This isn't saying that the individual neurons underlying conscious choice/thought disobey physics. Rather, the behavior of individual neurons aren't governed solely by these laws because they are components of a system which organizes itself in a non-reductionist manner. A multi-level heirarchical network capable of recursive processes and downward causation. Of course, the very complexity of such a system makes even qualitative description, let alone quantitative description, extremely difficult. Nor do philosophers, mathematicians, physicists, and others who believe that systems like this exist agree on what their nature may be.

But to simplify things a bit, let's go back to the individual neurons, subject to the laws of physics. If the "mind" is a determinisitc (albeit unpredictable) system, then each neuron is completely governed in some way by the laws of physics. However, if neural networks are only constrained by the laws of physics because they are capable of reorganization according to "laws" the network itself defines, then physics only constrains the system, it doesn't determine it.

I think the core of this matter is whether or not an emergent property can be something that is no longer completely defined by the fundamental forces of the universe. I don’t see how you can come to the conclusion that it is, not without observing it do something that those fundamental forces couldn’t explain. That’s not to say it’s not possible, just that there’s no particular reason to think it happens.

 

[Skwim]

I am however still trying to figure out what the big bang or even QM has to do with human free will, but perhaps I am missing something here.

Both are said to contain an example of an uncaused event, which is then said to nullify the deterministic argument that all events are caused---often taken to be the bedrock of hard determinism. Hence, determinism is a nonviable argument against free will. Ergo, free will does exist.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I don’t see how you can come to the conclusion that it is, not without observing it do something that those fundamental forces couldn’t explain.

One of the reasons behind the conclusion is that we can't even come close to explaining things like the "mind," nor do we have any idea how "fundamental forces" could result in things like consciousness. Again, however, the arguments involved in this debate are quite complex and range over a wide variety of fields (logic, physics, philosophy, mathematics, A.I., etc.). However, I think it might be worthwhile to quote even a small section of how this issue is defined and addressed, beginning with some definitions:​

On one side (the deterministic side):
(CoP) All physical events are determined, in so far as they are determined, by prior physical events and the physical laws that govern them. For any physical event e,if e has a cause at time t,then e has a wholly physical sufficient cause at t.
(PHY) All individuals are constituted by, or identical to, microphysical individuals, and all properties are realized by, or identical to, microphysical properties.
(CIP): If mental property M is instantiated on a given occasion by being realized by a basal property P, then the causal powers of this instance M are identical with, or determined by, the causal powers of P.​

On the other side:​

Ontological emergence and systemic causation are an outright rejection of CoP, PHY and CIP because:
(1) The causal capacities of mental properties are not reducible to either the intrinsic or relational physical properties that ‘underlie’ them, contra CIP.
(2) Mental properties are not synchronically realized by, composed of, determined by, etc. narrow or intrinsic physical realizer properties; therefore they are irreducibly relational or dispositional in nature, contra CoP.
(3) Mental properties are inherently diachronic and dynamical in that they result from both causal and non-causal (holistic) diachronic processes, and their determining influence is diachronic; for example, they form links in topologically complex causal chains.
(4) Systemic causation means admitting types of causation that go beyond eYcient causation to include causation as global constraints, teleological causation akin to Aristotle’s Wnal and formal causes, and the like.
-Michael Silberstein

So what reasons might we have to posit the existence of ontologically nondeterministic systems? Again, there are numerous arguments ranging from the logical issues of deterministic systems explaining recursive systems to arguments from quantam mechanics, but I find the most convincing arguments in dynamical systems theory and studies of cognition. For example, when it comes to certain types of dynamical systems, the system becomes (arguably) to complex to explain via the classical causal model:

"The stretching and folding operation of a chaotic attractor systematically removes the initial information and replaces it with new information: the stretch makes small-scale uncertainties larger, the fold brings widely separated trajectories together and erases large-scale information. Thus chaotic attractors act as a kind of pump bringing microscopic fluctuations up to a macroscopic expression. In this light it is clear that no exact solution, no short cut to tell the future, can exist. After a brief time interval the uncertainty specified by the initial measurement covers the entire attractor and all predictive power is lost: there is simply no causal connection between past and future."
James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw

As for the brain or "mind," even a book could only scratch the surface, but to give an example of how a proponent of nondeterministic systems might summarize this field as evidence:​

"A more dramatic example of mind– brain causation comes from the world of neurophysiology. Recent work by Max Bennett (Bennett and Barden, 2001) in Australia has determined that neurons continually put out little tendrils that can link up with others and effectively rewire the brain on a time scale of twenty minutes! This seems to serve the function of adapting the neuro-circuitry to operate more effectively in the light of various mental experiences (e.g. learning to play a video game). To the physicist this looks deeply puzzling. How can a higher-level phenomenon like ‘experience’, which is also a global concept, have causal control over microscopic regions at the sub-neuronal level? The tendrils will be pushed and pulled by local forces (presumably good old electromagnetic ones). So how does a force at a point in space (the end of a tendril) ‘know about’, say, the thrill of a game?"
Paul Davies

 

[punkdbass]

They do not. I suggest you familiarize yourself with both.

Care to elaborate at all? Because I'm pretty familiar with the concepts and your post has literally added nothing besides telling me that I'm wrong....

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

They do not. I suggest you familiarize yourself with both.

Your statement here might be a little too dismissive. To quote a few experts who actually deal with this topic:

"The first major challenge to determinism within the context of dynamical structures of physical systems came with quantum mechanics: here, the brilliant description of the behavior of a single quantum particle in terms of the linear Schrödinger differential equation is perfectly deterministic, but a special form of indeterminism emerges in the presence of measurement of the particle’s observables. When a measuring apparatus interacts with a quantum system, the system’s state jumps discontinuously and nondeterministically into one of its so-called eigenstates, which is completely different from, and not reducible to, the state prescribed by Schrödinger’s equation."
-Zoltan Domotor

“The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics implies that the world is nondetermistic…quantum causation is not so easy to square with popular philosophical theories of causation. Effects of quantam causes often have neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of their occurrence. On the Copenhagen Interpretation, a quantum cause may be connected to its effect by no spatiotemporally continuous process. Some cases perplex causal intuitions as well as theories of causation. Philosophers who wish to understand causation have much to learn from quantum mechanics."
-Richard Healey​

"Clearly, the strong dynamical coupling of macro-objects to their natural environment cannot simply be ignored. Because of the non-local properties of quantum states, a consistent description of some phenomenon in quantum terms must finally include the entire universe. Similar arguments can be put forward in classical physics, where it has been known for a long time that most systems are severely influenced by the rest of the world. However, the new holistic properties of entangled states require one to consider matters from another viewpoint, that of quantum physics. The properties of the ‘ordinary’ objects of our experience— precisely those that we call macroscopic— are now seen not to be inherent in these objects. Instead, they emerge from, or are created by, irreversible interactions with the environment. In this way the local classical properties with which we are so familiar have their origin in the nonlocality of (entangled) quantum states. The properties of the interaction decide which properties become classical. For example, objects appear localized in space, since these interactions typically depend on position. It should be evident by now that classical properties can be seen to emerge from the quantum world only after decoherence has properly been taken into account…
One other— and perhaps the most prevalent— method for sweeping the interpretive problems under the carpet is simply to assume, or rather postulate, that quantum theory is only a theory of micro-objects, whereas in the macroscopic realm per decree (or should I say wishful thinking?) a classical description has to be valid. Such an approach leads to the endlessly discussed paradoxes of quantum theory. These paradoxes arise only because this particular approach is conceptually inconsistent, and it remains inconsistent even when its advocates appeal to notions such as ‘dualism’ and ‘complementarity’ to help with the difficulties. In addition, micro and macro-objects are so strongly dynamically coupled that we do not even know where the boundary between the two supposed realms could possibly be found."
-Erich Joos​

​

 

[CarlinKnew]

I know you were addressing your post to idea, since you quoted her, but since I have the same beliefs, I'll post something from the Encyclopedia that may be of interest to you...

Intelligence, however defined, is not created or made; it is coeternal with God. Some LDS leaders have interpred this to mean that the intelligent beings -- called intelligences -- existed before and after they were given spirit bodies in the premortal existence. Others have interpred it to mean that intelligent beings were organized as spirits out of eternal intelligent matter, that they did not exist as individuals before they were organized as spirit beings in the premortal existence. The Church has taken no official position on this issue. (Emphasis is mine, and also reflects my personal opinion.)

One LDS leader, Spencer W. Kimball, put it this way... "Our spirit matter was eternal and co-existent with God, but it was organized into spirit bodies by our Heavenly Father."

The word "intelligences" has been translated as meaning "the light of truth."

Absolutely. This part is, according to LDS doctrine, non-debatable.

So we were eternal intelligent matter, then premortal spirits, then humans. It's a unique idea. The part that I find most relevant to the debate is that these premortal spirits had somewhat of a unique identity.

I am curious how "Idea" (the poster who brought up this concept of spirits in order to address the causality objection) would interpret that a spirit's decisions are not bound by causality. What I mean is that if a human needs to have a spirit in order to be free, what makes the spirit free? It seems to be just pushing the problem back a step. If the spirit is eternal, and it always had characteristics that made it unique, how is it any more responsible for those characteristics than a newborn is responsible for the characteristics that it was born with?

 

[CarlinKnew]

Perhaps we have an issue with terminology then. "Decision" implies agency. In other words, when I decide to X, I'm choosing to do so because I have a "mind" (in the cognitive science use of term, i.e. something like consciousness rather than just the entirety of the brain). However, under a different interpretation there is only the illusion of self-awareness, choice, and so forth.

I see no issues or illusions here. The mind is an action of the brain.

Only if we assume that my thoughts are completely determined by external stimuli.

External and internal. If there is to be a distinction between the two then you have to include them both. Your thoughts are determined by all the events that cause them.

In other words, if I was walking down the street, saw the purse/wallet, and decided to return it, it might be argued that there was no other possible outcome. However, if this argument is based on the notion that all events are caused by the conditions which preceded them, are wholly determined by these conditions, and my "decision" is simply the result of a long chain of previous events which were equally determined, ...

Yes

... then I'm not really making a decision at all.

Your mind still goes through the process of deciding, just as a wheel goes through the process of turning when it's been rolled down a hill. The action has been caused, and it is happening.

However, if the mind is a system (composed of neurons) which is self-organizing and capable of creating new initial conditions by, say, re-organizing itself in ways which are influenced, but not determined, by external stimuli, then initial conditions do not determine the outcome of agents with minds.

An initial condition, in the sense that we are using here, must be uncaused. Otherwise, if it is created by the mind, then the state of the mind determined it. And that state of the mind was determined by a previous state of mind and all the other causes involved. Now, if these initial conditions are uncaused, then the second objection in the original post applies.

 

[CarlinKnew]

Because consciousness doesn't have a uniform reaction and thus not pre-determined.

Theres stimulus and unpredictable reaction, but theres no cause and predetermined effect when talking about consciousness.

What makes it unpredictable? Is it that we humans can't possibly take into consideration every single causal factor, or is it that some aspect is uncaused? If it's the latter then the second objection in the original post applies.

Mood is not an external agent acting upon a person. Mood is part of that persons consciousness, their own self-determination.

1. You didnt address Alan Watts objections.

2. You concede that some things are not controlled by external forces. If so, you also concede that there are self-determined things. If there exist things that are self-determined, then they are free and thus have free will.


.

I like those quotes and they might be useful as inspiration, but I don't see the relevance here.

Self determined things are still subject to the first objection in the original post.

 

[CarlinKnew]

Sure:
(emphasis added)

Where's the paradox? Nowhere do I say that an event produces a cause. The cause produces the event.

A cause produces an effect. But nothing states that only one cause can produce a specific effect, and nothing states that an effect's cause must be one clear and unequivocal thing. And what is more, nothing states that, given a set of circumstances (X) that will produce effect A in person 1, the same circumstances (X) will absolutely produce effect A in person 2, also. There may be a likelihood-- even a great likelihood-- but that's different than a guarantee that the effect A is the sole and absolute result of cause X.

That's because you need to include the person himself as part of the conditions. If two different people are in otherwise identical circumstances, the conditions are still different, so the different causal factors produce different events.

If you're not seeing what I mean, then read again. I have consistently addressed objections and posted a valid argument that free will as I know it is not what is being defined in your original post.



Again, that's a gross oversimplification. What I said was that we are the cause of our choices, with potential influence (but not compulsion) from exterior social and philosophical sources, and without any compulsion from divine or other supernatural sources. I said that as a concept, free will is basically relevant only to the influence of the divine/supernatural. Any other apparent causal compulsion is either the result of human compulsion, mental incapacity, or is an illusory manifestation of the "nature/nurture" argument, being not actual compulsion but merely influence.

Once again, you said:

If we are the cause of our choices, that is still subject to the first objection in the original post.

And I specifically said that I didn't think that I agreed with the statement that "man will never choose contrary to his nature and desires," much less the statement that "man will always do what he desires most at any particular moment." In fact, I said:

(emphasis added)

The very essence of self-control, self-determinism, conscience, and responsible action is the idea that we have the power to want something with all our hearts and not do it if there is an overriding reason for doing so. That is "going against our own desires," and not "doing what we desire most at any given moment."

The problem with the definitions, both of free will, and of compatibilism that you posted is that they are both simplistic and unconsidering of human thought and behavior in reality.

For some reason, in our society, desires are largely considered to be weaknesses, urges to rise above. This view is plainly incorrect. The things you desire are simply the things that you want. Have you considered that most people desire to act according to their own set of morals? Therefore, in your example, the "overriding reason for not doing so" is simply the stronger desire.

 

[CarlinKnew]

sorry - yes, I believe that our spirits have no beginning which allows us to be our own cause. If there is a beginning to some chain of events, it is possible that the start lies within us and not from an outer cause. No beginning; not a robot whose actions can be traced back to how it was created, because it was never created.... I think that is the only way to escape the cause/effect net.

yes, I believe that our eternal spirit has defining characteristics that pre-date our birth. Take scriptures like:

John 9:2 And his disciples asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?
if you think about what it says, the apostles apparently believed "this man" had the ability to sin before he was born - they ask - was this spirit born into a blind body because he was a sinner before he was born? showing that the apostles believed that 1.) this man existed before his own birth, and 2.) the pre-birth life was one in which we could sin or not etc. etc.... Jesus explains that this was not the case - that this man was not born blind because he was an evil spirit before birth.... the belief that people are born into certain situations based on the past pre-mortal choices of their spirit is present within several theologies...

another scripture:
(Old Testament | Jeremiah 1:5)
5 Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations.
when God talks about those who are foreordained to certain callings - this is in reference to spiritual life before birth - before we were formed in the belly, we were given callings, and assignments, for where we would be, and what we would be doing on earth. (Mormons believe that everyone on earth is here because they chose to come here in their premortal existence.)

+ as a mom of three very different kids (who all have the same nature/nurture - all have the same parents/DNA, the same house/school/environment - and yet they have completely different personalities... and these personalities were present pretty much at birth... ) I think some of what we are does not come from nature or nurture - but from our eternal spirit. So many examples of people rising above (or below) what their DNA and environment dictate that they should be points towards a third influence. We are not just robots controlled by DNA/environment - nature/nurture - sure these can have some influence, but they do not account for all of our actions/personalities/choices.

Non-identical twin siblings share an average of only 50% of their DNA, and even if they were identical twins, it's impossible for any two people to share a lifetime of identical events.

Also, if the spirit is eternal, and it always had characteristics that made it unique, how is it any more responsible for those characteristics than a newborn is responsible for the characteristics that it was born with?

 

[CarlinKnew]

Prove that in every instance all previous conditions guarantee the event.

If, however, all previous conditions produce the possibility of more than one event, then free will is still fine.



This assumes that for any set of causes only one event is possible. This has not been proven.

If conditions do not seem to determine effects, makes the effects unpredictable? Is it that we humans can't possibly take into consideration every single causal factor, or is it that some aspect is uncaused? If it's the former then the first objection in the original post applies. If it's the latter then the second objection in the original post applies.

 

[CarlinKnew]

I think free will is an absurdly silly notion, but argument #1 here strikes me as weak. One could easily say, "Yes, choices in humans are determined. They are determined by an undetermined will. A free will."

Then the second objection in the original post applies.

 

[CarlinKnew]

Effects have more than one cause, and it's impossible to say if we've accounted for them all, or even that any particular one that is primarily responsible.

That's fine. For the sake of simplicity I consider the all the causal factors of an effect to be its cause.

It's even conceivable that every event is in some way responsible for each event.

That's an interesting idea.

It follows, then, that...
If P, then Q.
Q.
Then P.

...is a logical fallacy. P is the necessary condition, Q is the "guaranteed" effect. Q may be guaranteed by P, but could also have other causes.

Depending on how specific we get, that could be changed to "If and only if..."

If there is an intruder, the dog will bark.
The dog barked.
There is an intruder.

But there's also that pretty little lady dog next door. The dog is well trained, and will bark at every intruder, but the condition doesn't guarantee that that condition is the only thing that will cause the effect.

More specifically, the effect isn't just that the dog barking. He's either barking at (because of) the intruder, or he's barking at (because of) the dog next door. These are two different effects guaranteed by two different causes, regardless of how similar they appear to an observer who just hears the barking.

They are "our" choices simply because the thought arises that they are a possession, and that thought of possession is a necessary condition for free will. I've maintained this in other threads, and it is a valid take on the libertarian stance.

I haven't read the thread, so I apologize if these points have already been covered.

So our choices are ours because we've thought they're ours. That's an interesting perspective; does it work with anything else? Will Microsoft instantly become mine if the thought arises that Microsoft is a possession of mine?