If you believe in free will, respond to these two objections

[CarlinKnew]

I am all for brevity, but I do believe there were other crucial points within that post, including the idea that causes merely predispose, rather than fully determine,

Well a cause produces (determines) an effect by definition, so maybe you mean that events aren't completely caused, that some element of the event is uncaused.

and the concept that self-awareness changes the game. As for the part you responded to, let me try a different way to word this:

I believe that our choice is what determines which cause will create the effect.

I can choose either waffles or cereal. If I chose waffles, there will be causes that led to the waffles. If I chose cereal, there will be causes that led to the cereal. The cause, however, was not what determined the choice. It was the choice which determined the cause (which then produced the effect).

Was the choice caused? Objection 1 applies if so. Was it uncaused? Obj. 2 applies then.

 

[CarlinKnew]

Causality: We are all born with definite dispositions. Who we are as an entity, and what we are born into, influences our total being. Therefore, until our consciousness matures, we are unable to make decisions through 'free choice' because we remain locked into pre-disposition. When we are young, we are programmed through DNA, our environment, our parents and social surroundings, and through the teachings of the matrix we are born into. As a child, our choices are limited. As we mature into ourselves and come to experience our essence, we are left with one choice: DO WE CHANGE WHO WE ARE, OR DO WE REMAIN THE SAME? Most changes come about through pain and anguish and when we are faced with tremendous obstacles. We can never be free from ourselves, but we are free to choose "which possible self" we want to experience.

So, the first objecion in the original post applies to that "one choice".

 

[CarlinKnew]

This is a pretty poor argument against free will IMO. Although it might seem intuitive to think that all events have causes, quantum theory and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle show that this is not true, thus this is not a logical argument for the nonexistence of free will.

Also, scientists define the big bang as an event without cause as well for example(read a book about it, too hard for me to explain). So since current science shows that there IS and CAN be events without cause, then your argument is illogical.

Then the second objection in the original post applies.

 

[Willamena]

That's an interesting idea.

If the butterfly effect is true, then everything is uncertainty; then neither determinism nor free will, stand-alone, can retain certainty as theories that rely on prediction (the prediction of effect from a particular cause or causes, and the prediction of 'uncaused cause' from observed effect).

But as images of reality, they are still elephants.

So our choices are ours because we've thought they're ours.

That's all "ownership" is. Oh, sure, there's paperwork, but that comes after.

 

[PolyHedral]

If the butterfly effect is true, then everything is uncertainty; then neither determinism nor free will, stand-alone, can retain certainty as theories that rely on prediction (the prediction of effect from a particular cause or causes, and the prediction of 'uncaused cause' from observed effect).

Chaos and determinism are not related. Chaotic systems (i.e. butterfly effects) are still deterministic; they are just incredibly hard to predict without perfect information.

 

[Willamena]

Chaos and determinism are not related. Chaotic systems (i.e. butterfly effects) are still deterministic; they are just incredibly hard to predict without perfect information.

*ahem* In chaos, everything is related.

But that inability to predict was the point I made. As images, they are unaffected, but as theories of prediction, they aren't.

 

[PolyHedral]

*ahem* In chaos, everything is related.

But that inability to predict was the point I made. As images, they are unaffected, but as theories of prediction, they aren't.

But this isn't an engineering matter, it's philosophy! We can have deterministic but completely useless theories if we like.

 

[shawn001]

Both are said to contain an example of an uncaused event, which is then said to nullify the deterministic argument that all events are caused---often taken to be the bedrock of hard determinism. Hence, determinism is a nonviable argument against free will. Ergo, free will does exist.

"Ergo, free will does exist"

But its not looking like it does exist from modern neuroscience.

Take away the neurons and do you have free will?

These are brand new from Neuroscience.

Neuroscience, free will and determinism: 'I'm just a machine'

Our bodies can be controlled by outside forces in the universe, discovers Tom Chivers. So where does that leave free will?


Neuroscience, free will and determinism: 'I'm just a machine' - Telegraph


Neuroscience Challenges Old Ideas about Free Will

Celebrated neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga explains the new science behind an ancient philosophical question

Neuroscience Challenges Old Ideas about Free Will: Scientific American


This is older but worth reading.

The Electric brain

NOVA | The Electric Brain


There is also this on some history

Free will: Facts, Discussion Forum, and Encyclopedia Article

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

An initial condition, in the sense that we are using here, must be uncaused.

And that's what I'm arguing happens in (at least) the brain.

​

Ontological emergence and systemic causation are an outright rejection of CoP, PHY and CIP because:
(1) The causal capacities of mental properties are not reducible to either the intrinsic or relational physical properties that ‘underlie’ them, contra CIP.
(2) Mental properties are not synchronically realized by, composed of, determined by, etc. narrow or intrinsic physical realizer properties; therefore they are irreducibly relational or dispositional in nature, contra CoP.
(3) Mental properties are inherently diachronic and dynamical in that they result from both causal and non-causal (holistic) diachronic processes, and their determining influence is diachronic; for example, they form links in topologically complex causal chains.
(4) Systemic causation means admitting types of causation that go beyond eYcient causation to include causation as global constraints, teleological causation akin to Aristotle’s Wnal and formal causes, and the like.
-Michael Silberstein

So what reasons might we have to posit the existence of ontologically nondeterministic systems? Again, there are numerous arguments ranging from the logical issues of deterministic systems explaining recursive systems to arguments from quantam mechanics, but I find the most convincing arguments in dynamical systems theory and studies of cognition. For example, when it comes to certain types of dynamical systems, the system becomes (arguably) to complex to explain via the classical causal model:

"The stretching and folding operation of a chaotic attractor systematically removes the initial information and replaces it with new information: the stretch makes small-scale uncertainties larger, the fold brings widely separated trajectories together and erases large-scale information. Thus chaotic attractors act as a kind of pump bringing microscopic fluctuations up to a macroscopic expression. In this light it is clear that no exact solution, no short cut to tell the future, can exist. After a brief time interval the uncertainty specified by the initial measurement covers the entire attractor and all predictive power is lost: there is simply no causal connection between past and future."
James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw

As for the brain or "mind," even a book could only scratch the surface, but to give an example of how a proponent of nondeterministic systems might summarize this field as evidence:​

"A more dramatic example of mind– brain causation comes from the world of neurophysiology. Recent work by Max Bennett (Bennett and Barden, 2001) in Australia has determined that neurons continually put out little tendrils that can link up with others and effectively rewire the brain on a time scale of twenty minutes! This seems to serve the function of adapting the neuro-circuitry to operate more effectively in the light of various mental experiences (e.g. learning to play a video game). To the physicist this looks deeply puzzling. How can a higher-level phenomenon like ‘experience’, which is also a global concept, have causal control over microscopic regions at the sub-neuronal level? The tendrils will be pushed and pulled by local forces (presumably good old electromagnetic ones). So how does a force at a point in space (the end of a tendril) ‘know about’, say, the thrill of a game?"
Paul Davies

"The first major challenge to determinism within the context of dynamical structures of physical systems came with quantum mechanics: here, the brilliant description of the behavior of a single quantum particle in terms of the linear Schrödinger differential equation is perfectly deterministic, but a special form of indeterminism emerges in the presence of measurement of the particle’s observables. When a measuring apparatus interacts with a quantum system, the system’s state jumps discontinuously and nondeterministically into one of its so-called eigenstates, which is completely different from, and not reducible to, the state prescribed by Schrödinger’s equation."

-Zoltan Domotor

“The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics implies that the world is nondetermistic…quantum causation is not so easy to square with popular philosophical theories of causation. Effects of quantam causes often have neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of their occurrence. On the Copenhagen Interpretation, a quantum cause may be connected to its effect by no spatiotemporally continuous process. Some cases perplex causal intuitions as well as theories of causation. Philosophers who wish to understand causation have much to learn from quantum mechanics."
-Richard Healey​

 

[Skwim]

Care to elaborate at all? Because I'm pretty familiar with the concepts and your post has literally added nothing besides telling me that I'm wrong....

Your statement here might be a little too dismissive. To quote a few experts who actually deal with this topic:

My apologies punkdbass, for posting advice without telling you why I thought it necessary. My problem, and it's mine alone, is that I've been through this so many times that all I can muster is a dismissive (LegionOnomaMoi is correct here) "You're wrong." This is neither fair nor thoughtful---you deserve better---and does the discussion itself a disservice. So, although I'm letting my post stand so as not create a gap in the flow of the thread, I withdraw my advice and wish you the best in your debate.

 

[Thief]

Thanks for the laugh. No, seriously though, are you able to specifically respond to the two objections in the original post? Is anyone? For once let's hear some free will supporters defending against the real objections to free will. For once let's bring some clarity to this issue. Or will the concept of free will crumble under attempts to understand it clearly?

So you are incapable of self-denial?

Understanding is all fine and good, but many things operate without any self understanding.

Train a dog to salivate at the ring of a bell....and he will.
Is he responding to a choice he made?....or did you do it to him?

Did you use your own freewill..... doing so unto the dog?
Or did Someone do that to you?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Chaos and determinism are not related. Chaotic systems (i.e. butterfly effects) are still deterministic; they are just incredibly hard to predict without perfect information.

Not necessarily. In general dynamical systems are (as you say) just very sensitive to initial conditions. However, some may be so chaotic that causality no longer applies: "In a deterministic setting this fixes a particular trajectory (more generally, a particular behavior), and it is this unique “cause to effect” relationship that constitutes the expression of causality and is ordinarily interpreted as a dynamical law. But suppose that one is dealing with a complex system displaying sensitivity to the initial conditions as it occurs in deterministic chaos, or sensitivity to the parameters as it occurs in the vicinity of a bifurcation. Minute changes in the causes produce now effects that look completely different from a deterministic standpoint, thereby raising the question of predictability of the system at hand. Clearly, under these circumstances the causes acquire a new status."

Factoring the view of some, that quantam indeterminacy affects already chaotic systems, these systems are not deterministic. Then there is the issue of dynamical system that are self-ordering, and cannot be determined because they are self-determining.

 

[CarlinKnew]

If the butterfly effect is true, then everything is uncertainty; then neither determinism nor free will, stand-alone, can retain certainty as theories that rely on prediction (the prediction of effect from a particular cause or causes, and the prediction of 'uncaused cause' from observed effect).

But as images of reality, they are still elephants.


That's all "ownership" is. Oh, sure, there's paperwork, but that comes after.

Your arguments are mostly logical but you dress them up in a way that can seem a bit wacky. I don't know whether that's intentional or not, but in any case I don't think we have a substantial disagreement on this debate.

 

[CarlinKnew]

And that's what I'm arguing happens in (at least) the brain.

Then the second objection in the original post applies.

 

[CarlinKnew]

So you are incapable of self-denial?

Self denial is merely an act of supplanting one desire with another. This is still subject to the first objection in the original post.

Understanding is all fine and good, but many things operate without any self understanding.

Train a dog to salivate at the ring of a bell....and he will.
Is he responding to a choice he made?....or did you do it to him?

Did you use your own freewill..... doing so unto the dog?
Or did Someone do that to you?

A choice can be conscious, but it needn't be. It is merely the act of selecting from a number of things. It is subject to the first objection in the original post.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Then the second objection in the original post applies.

How? Your second objection in the OP is:

\2) Responsibility —Rather than salvage human responsibility, some maintain that libertarian freedom destroys it. If our choices have no causes, in what sense are they our choices? Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause than to hold them responsible for choices that were caused and thus determined?"

The problem here is the connection between cause and choice. Specifically, let's look at the question "Is it any more agreeable to reason to hold humans responsible for choices they didn’t cause...?" The logical problem here is the connection between cause and choice. Let's say an free agent (or an entity capable of volition/free will/agency) is confronted with a situation which has been brought about at leatst to some extent by determined causes. These causes are initial conditions, or the the conditions which encapsulate the totality of circumastances the agent must rely on to come to a decision or choice. However, if these conditions do not determine or completely determine the "choice" the agent makes, then the agent is informed by, and influenced by, the causes which necessitate the choice, but is still responsible for the choice. In other words, it isn't that choices have no causes, but rather that these causes do not completely determince the choices. Given a particular set of conditions, I can evaluatie them and, by virtue of free will, determine for myself a particular course of action. My choice of actions is based upon causations or the events which preceeded my choice, but it is not determined by them.

There is no logical incongruity between causes which require free agents to make choices and the ability of these agents to make choices they are responsible for.

 

[PolyHedral]

Not necessarily. In general dynamical systems are (as you say) just very sensitive to initial conditions. However, some may be so chaotic that causality no longer applies: "In a deterministic setting this fixes a particular trajectory (more generally, a particular behavior), and it is this unique “cause to effect” relationship that constitutes the expression of causality and is ordinarily interpreted as a dynamical law. But suppose that one is dealing with a complex system displaying sensitivity to the initial conditions as it occurs in deterministic chaos, or sensitivity to the parameters as it occurs in the vicinity of a bifurcation. Minute changes in the causes produce now effects that look completely different from a deterministic standpoint, thereby raising the question of predictability of the system at hand. Clearly, under these circumstances the causes acquire a new status."

Factoring the view of some, that quantam indeterminacy affects already chaotic systems, these systems are not deterministic. Then there is the issue of dynamical system that are self-ordering, and cannot be determined because they are self-determining.

It is not possible for a system to become unpredictable-in-principle through sheer complexity. Systems running on classical physics will never be random; only extremely chaotic.

Quantum systems, meanwhile, will be entirely random. However, the tree of possibilities that they will go through is determined by the initial conditions, in the same way as the classical system. Unfortunately, that's not free will either.

 

[CarlinKnew]

These causes are initial conditions, or the the conditions which encapsulate the totality of circumastances the agent must rely on to come to a decision or choice. However, if these conditions do not determine or completely determine the "choice" the agent makes, then the agent is informed by, and influenced by, the causes which necessitate the choice, but is still responsible for the choice.

You need to include the agent himself as one of the conditions; then the conditions (cause) produce the choice (effect), and the first objection in the original post applies. Unless you're proposing Libertarian free will, in which case the second objection in the original post applies.

In other words, it isn't that choices have no causes, but rather that these causes do not completely determince the choices.

Well a cause produces (determines) an effect by definition, so maybe you mean that choices aren't completely caused, that some element of the choice is uncaused. In that case the second objectection in the original post applies.

 

[Thief]

"\1) Causality —If causes are understood as conditions prior to an effect that guarantee an effect, and all events have causes, then it follows that all events were preceded by conditions that guaranteed those events. But this is the same as saying all events are determined. Since the choices of humans are events, it follows that the choices of humans are determined.

Qualifications to control the retort....and that qualification begins with...'if'...

A debate to be won?

Or a debate that lacks decision making because of an opening qualification?

 

[CarlinKnew]

Qualifications to control the retort....and that qualification begins with...'if'...

A debate to be won?

Or a debate that lacks decision making because of an opening qualification?

Ah, I'm glad you finally got around to peaking at the objections; too bad you didn't finish reading them. If you respond to the first objection by denying causality, then the second objection applies.