Is abortion homicide?

[Spiderman]

If life wasn't filled with so much agony for so many, I think more people would be pro-life. It is the cruelty of the creator that I see all around me that makes me less and less inclined to see life as a gift. I'm aware that some of you cherish your life and I'm happy for you. I just see misery everywhere and I live in an IRTS facility full of mentally ill people, so I see things through a bit more of a depressing lens.

 

[Nous]

No, not taught specific norms of morality, but my definition was able to act upon representations of moral law. If a being is able to understand any sort of moral concepts (whether they know it currently or not is irrelevant). This claim is not put forth by me, but by the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant. He claimed that if a being (whether they are human or alien) has the capacity to act upon representations of moral law (note capacity), then they are considered moral agents, and being moral agents, a great deal of rights (such as right of life, autonomy etc) apply to them. A moral agent cannot be ever used as a means to any any end. The act of abortion uses a moral agent (in a eventual sense) as a means to achieve an end therefore it is wrong.

Kant never even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are “persons,” “moral agents” or “rational beings,” the defining feature of which was the ability to exercise an autonomous will. Kant's hideous comments about Africans, in which he denigrated them in the worst possible ways and claimed that one can make them behave only by “thrashing” them, leads one to seriously doubt that he truly considered Africans to be “persons”.

Kant claimed that only a human being “can have [not necessarily has] the representation 'I'” which, he said, “raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ But this opinion was not formed on the basis of any empirical evidence about non-human animals. The extensive current scientific evidence relating to self-consciousness in non-human animals directly contradicts Kant's assertion that humans are the only beings on earth who can have a concept of the self.


So far, your only attempt at an argument that women should be denied the right to terminate their pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus has been premised on your claim that that such fetuses and even zygotes are “persons,” by which you mean that more likely than not some day in the future they will have the capacity to engage in reasoning on moral issues or somehow act morally. Yet the empirical evidence on miscarriage does not support your contention that most zygotes result in live births.

Moreover, the use of hormonal contraceptives normally results in the loss of fertilized eggs, possibly great numbers of them, given the number of women who use such contraceptives. Yet, inconsistently, you don't have the same objections to the loss of zygotes due to contraceptive use, and, further, you haven't been able to argue to it would be moral to ban such contraceptives, with the certainty of many, many more unwanted children born to a life of neglect and abuse.

Humans are the only species, I believe, that are capable of truly empathetic behavour and understanding of moral concepts. The cranial capacity of the lower hominids prevent them from doing so

(1) Homo is a genus, not a species. [2] Zygotes have no cranial capacity whatsoever, and fetuses are not "capable of truly emphathetic behavior [or] understanding of moral concepts."

. . . where you have elevated the intrinsic value of all human fertilized eggs over that of intelligent, loving, functional adult members of the same species, not on the basis of any fact that you can argue but merely because they are human cells.

I kindly request that you do not misrepresent my arguments.

Are you not claiming here that human zygotes should be recognized as having greater rights (namely, a "right to life") than the intelligent, loving, functional adult members of other hominid genera--chimps, gorillas, etc?

I would like to hear what you think about my coma patient scenario.

I'll have to go back and find your coma patient scenario. I say that whether someone in a coma retains the right to live depends on brain function. A person in a permanent vegetative state, who depends on a respirator, does not retain the right to live.

However, even unwanted and neglected children is not grounds to end their life, I think.

Abortion and contraceptive use does not entail killing children.

Acquired is measured after birth when the doctors ascertain that the head is not growing properly after delivery (in humans esp, there is a period of growth called compensatory growth where the child's head grows rapidly after birth).

Prenatal Diagnosis of Microcephaly: http://www.cdc.gov/zika/hc-providers/pregnant-women/prenatal-diagnosis-microcephaly.html

Again I think there is a difference between potential and eventuality. There is a nice example I like to give to illustrate this point. Imagine you buy a lotto ticket. Now this lotto ticket may or may not be the winning lotto ticket (a very very small chance that you will win), but you buy it for $2. Now someone comes along and steals that lotto ticket off you and gives you $2 in return. While it is still stealing, many would consider it to be a fair trade (since the chance of winning is so rare). It would be absurd to force the thief to be punished to stealing $10 billion dollars entirely, because the ticket only has the potential to yield that amount. Now lets say you still have the ticket and you find out that your ticket is the winning ticket (for 10 billion dollars). And someone now comes to you and steals your ticket and gives you $2, surely that trade would not be fair at all! The value of the ticket has now exponentially increased, because the ticket now no longer had the potential to be $10 billion dollars, but it will eventually become $10 billion dollars in the natural progression of things (you going and cashing it in).

Being born an unwanted child, into a life of neglect, abuse and crushing poverty is not even slightly analogous to winning $10 billion.

Let us switch this, to show the logical inconsistency in this position. If you argue that the fetus cannot be deprived of positive experiences, then nether can you argue the opposite (that fetus can be deprived from the negative consequences).

I haven't argued that fetuses can be "deprived" of negative experiences. I have argued that abortion and contraception prevents the needless suffering of children who will be unwanted, neglected and/or abused. Such prevention of easily predictable suffering is logically no different that preventing someone from getting a communicable disease by shielding them from contact with those who are contagious. .

 

[निताइ dasa]

Kant never even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are “persons,” “moral agents” or “rational beings,” the defining feature of which was the ability to exercise an autonomous will. Kant's hideous comments about Africans, in which he denigrated them in the worst possible ways and claimed that one can make them behave only by “thrashing” them, leads one to seriously doubt that he truly considered Africans to be “persons”.

Yes he does. If you read his critique of pure reason (which I did last year ) His definition of moral agents deals with all those beings who not only have the ability to act upon representations of moral law, but those who will also develop the capacity to. (for example when a person is unconscious, they for that period of time are not rational. however we do not deprive them of their rights for that moment, because eventually that person will wake and be rational again. Same for infants). Also can I have a source for the "African" bit Kant's definition of persons very well extends all humans.

Kant claimed that only a human being “can have [not necessarily has] the representation 'I'” which, he said, “raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ But this opinion was not formed on the basis of any empirical evidence about non-human animals. The extensive current scientific evidence relating to self-consciousness in non-human animals directly contradicts Kant's assertion that humans are the only beings on earth who can have a concept of the self.

What evidence is this might I ask? I ask you to point me to a study, or any form of evidence that shows that non-humans are capable of understanding, let alone acting upon moral laws.

So far, your only attempt at an argument that women should be denied the right to terminate their pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus has been premised on your claim that that such fetuses and even zygotes are “persons,” by which you mean that more likely than not some day in the future they will have the capacity to engage in reasoning on moral issues or somehow act morally. Yet the empirical evidence on miscarriage does not support your contention that most zygotes result in live births.

Moreover, the use of hormonal contraceptives normally results in the loss of fertilized eggs, possibly great numbers of them, given the number of women who use such contraceptives. Yet, inconsistently, you don't have the same objections to the loss of zygotes due to contraceptive use, and, further, you haven't been able to argue to it would be moral to ban such contraceptives, with the certainty of many, many more unwanted children born to a life of neglect and abuse.

Again please respond to my arguments (specifically my argument on the basis of the doctrine of double effect). The reason I don't object to contraceptives as strongly as abortion is the same reason I don't object to killing in self defense as strongly as murder. Did you read my paragraph on this? I'm not a fan of certain contraceptives, but it is a much better alternative then actively killing a growing human being in the womb.

1) Homo is a genus, not a species. [2] Zygotes have no cranial capacity whatsoever, and fetuses are not "capable of truly emphathetic behavior [or] understanding of moral concepts."

Again this is conflation of my arguments. I wasn't even talking about zygotes here, but rather the differences between Humans and the lower Hominids like the Chimps.

I was talking specifically about the differences between Homonids and Hominems..Hominems have a much much greater cranial capacity than Homonids, and this allows them to have certain features like culture, empathy, language, higher forms of intelligence, which are simply not possible in great apes. It is also the reason (apart from bipedalism of course) which separates humans from all other animals.

Are you not claiming here that human zygotes should be recognized as having greater rights (namely, a "right to life") than the intelligent, loving, functional adult members of other hominid genera--chimps, gorillas, etc?

Yes I am. Both of them have a right to life (to certain degrees), but the right to life of humans (no matter what stage of their development) is always greater then that of the hominid species. I have no problem with this claim, and many would not. If you could choose to save a human infant, or a adult gorilla, I would choose the human infant.

Abortion and contraceptive use does not entail killing children.

It does if if the unborn child has a right to life (which I believe they do). I ask you again, what is the definition that gives newborn infants the right of life, but not unborn children?

Being born an unwanted child, into a life of neglect, abuse and crushing poverty is not even slightly analogous to winning $10 billion.

That wasn't even the point I was making. I was making the distinction between potentiality and eventuality and how it makes sense to extend rights backwards to encompass those beings who have the eventuality to become human (c.f from potentiality). The principle at hand is entirely analogous. If you accept my premise that their is a greater violation in stealing the "winning" lotto ticket compared to stealing the "not sure" lotto ticket, then it lend support to my arguement of why I give the zygote certain rights but not gametes or other human cells.

I haven't argued that fetuses can be "deprived" of negative experiences. I have argued that abortion and contraception prevents the needless suffering of children who will be unwanted, neglected and/or abused. Such prevention of easily predictable suffering is logically no different that preventing someone from getting a communicable disease by shielding them from contact with those who are contagious. .

They are essentially the same. You are arguing from from the consequence of an action or non-action. I can also argue that the act of abortion prevents children from enjoying the positive experiences of life, hence it is wrong. Hopefully you can see, the double edged blade here. Either you argue from all the consequences of an action/in action (taking into account the negative and positive experiences) or you leave out the consequences all together.

Prenatal Diagnosis of Microcephaly: http://www.cdc.gov/zika/hc-providers/pregnant-women/prenatal-diagnosis-microcephaly.html

Okay, very well. I admit that if acquired microcephaly can be predicted before birth, and it is known that the child will die anyway shortly after, then abortion may be justified.

Yet the empirical evidence on miscarriage does not support your contention that most zygotes result in live births.

Did I ever make the claim that "most zygotes result in live births"? I don't think I did. I would also like to see the evidence that miscarriages are greater in number than successful births.

fetuses are not "capable of truly emphathetic behavior [or] understanding of moral concepts."

So can't infants. So why to we give them rights? Because they will eventually become empathetic adults. I see no reason to restrict this right from birth, and for the sake of consistency see it fit to extend it all the way back till conception (when their is a change in stage, from the gamete having the potential, to the zygote eventually becoming a person).


Look, I like this sort of debate, but I honestly feel like you either aren't responding to my arguments, or you don't understand them (I do apologize if I was being unclear). In either case, I don't feel like we can be more productive in this debate. Unless of course you had other questions I would be happy to call it quits here.

 

[Spiderman]

so far 12 vote yes 12 vote no let's leave it at that. 12 is the perfect number

 

[columbus]

so far 12 vote yes 12 vote no let's leave it at that. 12 is the perfect number

I had forgotten about voting. I didn't think it important, especially before Neo explained clearly what homicide actually means.
Now I have.
Tom

 

[Nous]

Look, I like this sort of debate, but I honestly feel like you either aren't responding to my arguments, or you don't understand them (I do apologize if I was being unclear).

Evidently I did correctly understand your one and only argument for denying a woman the right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus, your premise of which was that pre-viable fetuses and even zygotes are “persons” because, you claim, that more likely than not they will eventually develop the capacity to reason about moral issues or act morally (or immorally). I cited the evidence showing that among healthy women who are trying to get pregnant (e.g., are not taking contraceptives), 46.5% of conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted. This number is larger for women who are not healthy (e.g., smokers, drinkers, drug-takers, those with uncontrolled diabetes) or malnourished, and the non-implantation of zygotes is one of the three mechanisms by which hormonal contraceptives achieve their effect. Thus it is only reasonable to conclude that zygotes do not meet your probability definition of “eventuality” so as to qualify as “persons,” rendering your argument that zygotes are “persons” who should enjoy a “right to life” unsound.

But there are other inconsistencies in what you have said here. I wish to be clear about a couple of these:

(1) I will note again that I asked if you are as adamantly, or even more adamantly, opposed to women's use of hormonal contraceptives, given that such contraceptives cause the non-implantation of some number of eggs that become fertilized. You said you are “not as strongly opposed to hormonal contraceptives” on the basis of your analysis of the woman's intent--even though, as noted, it could well be that (e.g., in the US) more zygotes are miscarried every year due to contraceptive use than fetuses are intentionally aborted. In any case, contrary to your analysis of intent, presumably all women who take and know how hormonal contraceptives work precisely intend and hope that all eggs that become fertilized are not implanted. If women did not intend for the contraceptive to cause fertilized eggs to fail to implant, that is, if they didn't intend for hormonal contraceptives to work in the way they are known to work, then surely these women would not be taking such contraceptive.

If mothers and fathers were feeding their infants a type of baby food that was known to cause thousands, hundreds of thousands or millions of deaths of these children each year, it would hardly be a justification for continuing this practice by saying, “Oh, well, those parents don't intend kill their children.” There isn't a different degree of intent in taking a contraceptive pill every day and seeking an abortion. Your attempt to justify your overt condemnations of abortion while excusing the abortifacient aspect of contraceptives is nonsensical. (I seem to recall reading recently that almost half of abortions in the US last year occurred at home by chemical abortifacient.)

(2)

Abortions ideally should be restricted up to the point of marginal utility (where if I do not perform an abortion, then it would result in other greater or equal right being violated). In the case of abortion, it is acceptable when the mother's life is under genuine threat.

If the woman and her fetus have an equal right to life, then what justification is there for the abortion? Why not just let God decide who lives and who dies?

(3)

I admit that if acquired microcephaly can be predicted before birth, and it is known that the child will die anyway shortly after, then abortion may be justified.

May be justified? What justifies aborting a fetus that has microcephaly and for which imminent death “is known”? Argue your position against the staunch right-to-lifer who claims that all abortions, without exception, are wrong (if you are inclined to continue in this debate).

And when would an abortion not be justified in the case of a fetus with microcephaly for which imminent death “is known”?

 

[Nous]

Kant never even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are “persons,” “moral agents” or “rational beings,” the defining feature of which was the ability to exercise an autonomous will. Kant's hideous comments about Africans, in which he denigrated them in the worst possible ways and claimed that one can make them behave only by “thrashing” them, leads one to seriously doubt that he truly considered Africans to be “persons”.

Yes he does. If you read his critique of pure reason (which I did last year ) His definition of moral agents deals with all those beings who not only have the ability to act upon representations of moral law, but those who will also develop the capacity to. (for example when a person is unconscious, they for that period of time are not rational. however we do not deprive them of their rights for that moment, because eventually that person will wake and be rational again. Same for infants).

Quote where Kant even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are "persons," "moral agents" or "rational beings":
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1442/Kant_0330_EBk_v6.0.pdf

Also can I have a source for the "African" bit Kant's definition of persons very well extends all humans.

https://www.academia.edu/1802951/Kants_Racism at 2.

Kant claimed that only a human being “can have [not necessarily has] the representation 'I'” which, he said, “raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth.” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ But this opinion was not formed on the basis of any empirical evidence about non-human animals. The extensive current scientific evidence relating to self-consciousness in non-human animals directly contradicts Kant's assertion that humans are the only beings on earth who can have a concept of the self.

What evidence is this might I ask? I ask you to point me to a study, or any form of evidence that shows that non-humans are capable of understanding, let alone acting upon moral laws.

Please note what I said regarding the current scientific evidence relating to self-consciousness in non-human animals.

The following paper not only reviews some of the recent evidence on consciousness of self in non-human animals, the authors describe the series of experiments they conducted that provide probably the most definitive demonstration to date of recognition of volitional self-agency in chimpanzees, directly contradicting Kant's baseless claim that humans are the only creatures on earth who are self-aware:

The perception of self-agency in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Abstract

The ability to distinguish actions and effects caused by oneself from events occurring in the external environment is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. Underlying such distinctions, self-monitoring processes are often assumed, in which predicted events accompanied by one's own volitional action are compared with actual events observed in the external environment. Although many studies have examined the absence or presence of a certain type of self-recognition (i.e. mirror self-recognition) in non-human animals, the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain unclear. Here, we provide, to our knowledge, the first behavioural evidence that chimpanzees can perform self/other distinction for external events on the basis of self-monitoring processes. Three chimpanzees were presented with two cursors on a computer display. One cursor was manipulated by a chimpanzee using a trackball, while the other displayed motion that had been produced previously by the same chimpanzee. Chimpanzees successfully identified which cursor they were able to control. A follow-up experiment revealed that their performance could not be explained by simple associative responses. A further experiment with one chimpanzee showed that the monitoring process occurred in both temporal and spatial dimensions. These findings indicate that chimpanzees and humans share the fundamental cognitive processes underlying the sense of being an independent agent.

http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/278/1725/3694​

Human zygotes do not have the capacity for awareness, self-awareness or volition. The evidence indicates that chimpanzees do. If, as Kant claimed, those traits are what make a “person,” then chimpanzees are persons; zygotes are not.

Again this is conflation of my arguments. I wasn't even talking about zygotes here, but rather the differences between Humans and the lower Hominids like the Chimps.

Were your claims about cranial capacity supposed to relate in any way to your speciesist position that pre-viable fetuses and zygotes should be granted a "right to life" but not even the intelligent, loving, functional adult hominids of a different genus (namely, chimpanzees)?

I was talking specifically about the differences between Homonids and Hominems..Hominems have a much much greater cranial capacity than Homonids, and this allows them to have certain features like culture, empathy, language, higher forms of intelligence, which are simply not possible in great apes.

You haven't cited any evidence whatsoever that any "form of intelligence," culture or empathy "are simply not possible" for any hominid genus. (To the best of my knowledge, chimps do not have the complexity of spoken language such as humans do merely because the physiological structures of their mouth, throat or face, not because of any difference in cranial capacity.)

Are you not claiming here that human zygotes should be recognized as having greater rights (namely, a "right to life") than the intelligent, loving, functional adult members of other hominid genera--chimps, gorillas, etc?

Yes I am.

Obviously you haven't identified any characteristic of a human zygote or pre-viable fetus that makes them more deserving of a "right to life" than the intelligent, loving, functional adult members of other hominid genera. The mere fact that the human population is so grossly inflated that it threatens the very existence of the planet, while the other living hominids are critically endangered, argues for the recognition of a "right to life" of the latter over the pre-viable fetuses and zygotes of humans.

Abortion and contraceptive use does not entail killing children.

It does if if the unborn child has a right to life (which I believe they do).

Fetuses and zygotes are aborted or miscarried. Children have a birthday by which they are no longer encased in someone else's body.

I ask you again, what is the definition that gives newborn infants the right of life, but not unborn children?

fetuses are not "capable of truly emphathetic behavior [or] understanding of moral concepts."

So can't infants. So why to we give them rights? Because they will eventually become empathetic adults.

(1) In fact, there is a good deal of controversy in both ethics and philosophy of law regarding whether children have rights. See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-children/#CriChiRig Moreover, in both ethics and legal documents, all assertions of rights can be restated so as to eliminate any reference to a "right". I agree that in both ethics and legal documents, the purpose of "rights talk" is to secure moral and lawful behavior, and other than that, I take no position on the metaphysics of any "right".

(2) Even if you could coherently define the classification "empathetic adult," the fact that a child may or may not some day become one does not justify granting any child any right, just like the fact that a child may or may not become a responsible spouse and parent some day in the future does not justify granting a 4-year-old the right to marry.

Interestingly, the withholding from children or non-recognition for children of various rights that adults enjoy (e.g., the right to consent to medical procedures, or to enter into contracts) is done to protect children, and adults and society in general, not to deprive children of anything.

That wasn't even the point I was making. I was making the distinction between potentiality and eventuality and how it makes sense to extend rights backwards to encompass those beings who have the eventuality to become human (c.f from potentiality). The principle at hand is entirely analogous. If you accept my premise that their is a greater violation in stealing the "winning" lotto ticket compared to stealing the "not sure" lotto ticket, then it lend support to my arguement of why I give the zygote certain rights but not gametes or other human cells.

I do not accept that there is any analogy between causing an unwanted child to be born and a winning lottery ticket.

I can also argue that the act of abortion prevents children from enjoying the positive experiences of life

You can't argue that unless you can first deduce that an unwanted child will have “positive experiences”.

 

[निताइ dasa]

vidently I did correctly understand your one and only argument for denying a woman the right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus, your premise of which was that pre-viable fetuses and even zygotes are “persons” because, you claim, that more likely than not they will eventually develop the capacity to reason about moral issues or act morally (or immorally). I cited the evidence showing that among healthy women who are trying to get pregnant (e.g., are not taking contraceptives), 46.5% of conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted. This number is larger for women who are not healthy (e.g., smokers, drinkers, drug-takers, those with uncontrolled diabetes) or malnourished, and the non-implantation of zygotes is one of the three mechanisms by which hormonal contraceptives achieve their effect. Thus it is only reasonable to conclude that zygotes do not meet your probability definition of “eventuality” so as to qualify as “persons,” rendering your argument that zygotes are “persons” who should enjoy a “right to life” unsound.

Your argument is this:

P1: 46.5% of conceptions are miscarried
C: Therefore zygotes are not eventual persons, and hence do not have a right to life.

The first premise is in no way, shape or form related to the conclusion. The question of miscarriage is irrelevant to the moral status of persons. You asked me then, why do I oppose abortion, but not contraceptives. To this I replied as follows, in the act of using a contraceptive, the intent and means is not to end the life of the zygote. The ending of the life is an unintended consequence, and hence the women is not morally liable. In the act of abortion, the very intent and means why which that intent is achieved is by ending the fetus's life. In such a case, the women is morally liable.

To support this claim, I cited the doctrine of double effect, and showed this principle is also the reason why murder is wrong, but killing in self defense is not. When we murder someone, our intent and the means by which we attain that intent is wrong (it is a violation of the right to life) and hence the murderer is held morally liable. In the case of killing in self defense, the intent of such an action is preservation and the killing is an unintended consequence, and therefore the killer is not morally liable for her actions.

n any case, contrary to your analysis of intent, presumably all women who take and know how hormonal contraceptives work precisely intend and hope that all eggs that become fertilized are not implanted. If women did not intend for the contraceptive to cause fertilized eggs to fail to implant, that is, if they didn't intend for hormonal contraceptives to work in the way they are known to work, then surely these women would not be taking such contraceptive.

The primary end in the using of contraceptives is to avoid pregnancy (or rather implantation). The means by which this end is attained (usually by causing thinning of endometrium walls, or hormonal repression) is not innately wrong. The fact that the fetus' life is ended is an unintended consequence. The action of taking contraceptive pills does not intend directly to cause the death of the fetus. In abortion however the very intent of the action is to end the life of the fetus. There is a significant moral difference here (allowing harm vs doing harm). If you want a better explanation, I would advice reading the following philosophical paper by Phillipa Foot on this issue:

http://philpapers.org/archive/FOOTPO-2.pdf

If mothers and fathers were feeding their infants a type of baby food that was known to cause thousands, hundreds of thousands or millions of deaths of these children each year, it would hardly be a justification for continuing this practice by saying, “Oh, well, those parents don't intend kill their children.” There isn't a different degree of intent in taking a contraceptive pill every day and seeking an abortion. Your attempt to justify your overt condemnations of abortion while excusing the abortifacient aspect of contraceptives is nonsensical. (I seem to recall reading recently that almost half of abortions in the US last year occurred at home by chemical abortifacient.)

If parents give harmful food to their children, then the action (of giving food) directly harms the children. It is the means by which the children are harmed (the ends). If the parents are aware of this effect and continue anyway, such an action is wrong. This is analogous to abortion. This is not analogous to contraception. In the contraception, Quoting from the previously linked article:

He [moral agent] intends in the strictest sense both those things that he aims at as ends and those that he aims at as means to his ends.

Intent are those actions which are aimed at ends and which are a means such an end. In abortion, a means to an end (i.e the action itself) therefore the intent, is killing of a fetus. In contraception, the end is to prevent pregnancy, and the means to an end (prevention of implantation) which are the intents are not morally wrong. In such a case, the ending of the fetus' life is a unintended consequence.

Think of it like this. Abortion is like me shooting someone with a gun. Contraception is likened to me refusing to help someone who is about to get shot. The former is wrong, the latter is not.

If the woman and her fetus have an equal right to life, then what justification is there for the abortion? Why not just let God decide who lives and who dies?

When we are at the point of marginal utility (i.e right of the fetus conflict right of the mother), such an issue cannot be resolved on the basis of rights alone. Then we must turn to pragmatism. It is more practical here, to protect the right of life of a rational agent here then a eventual rational agent.

May be justified? What justifies aborting a fetus that has microcephaly and for which imminent death “is known”? Argue your position against the staunch right-to-lifer who claims that all abortions, without exception, are wrong (if you are inclined to continue in this debate).

This is an interesting dilemma, and something that I have to rely on my moral intuitions. The reason why I support "rationality" as a good definition for personhood is because I believe rationality and all its implications (such a empathy, relationship capabilities etc) are reason enough to explain the value of human life. We cannot end human life because of the potential we see in the future, and the ability to lead a meaningful life even if present situations are not favorable. It is on this basis that I think there may be some justification for abortion .

Let us say the a women is pregnant with a child that she knows will die a few days after birth. In this case, the child will have no, or every little meaning in life. The child will never form meaningful relationships, nor love, nor empathize, nor understand morality. To this degree, we can argue that this child's life will have very little meaning, and hence there is no huge moral loss in ending of such life.

Now let us extend this scenario to a women who is pregnant which a child who she knows will die when they reach the age of 20. Can we argue now that the child's life will have no meaning? That child will experience childhood, form meaningful relationships, learn to love, maybe get married? and understand morality. Here the meaning of the child's life is much greater then that of the previous case, and hence abortion, I believe, is not justified. What about if the child will die at the age of 30? 40? The question here lies at what point does someone's life have meaning? Staunch pro-lifers will admit that every second is precious. I am willing to be more flexible with this.

Intuitively I think abortion can be justified for the first case (when the child has not experiences even childhood, or has an awareness of self etc), but not for the latter cases. This is where I differ with the staunch prolifers on this issue.

 

[निताइ dasa]

Quote where Kant even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are "persons," "moral agents" or "rational beings":
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1442/Kant_0330_EBk_v6.0.pdf

Kantian personhood is defined by Kant himself as follows:

"Only a rational being has a will—which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle"

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf (pg 18)

However if taken at face value, this definition excludes many groups of people (infants, fetus's, comatose patients, sleeping humans etc). However Kant himself later clarifies that his definition extends all of humankind (i.e those who eventually will become rational, and those who once were rational, i.e comatose patients). Later Kant confirms this with is formula of universal law, which states:

"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law"

Universal Law here, extends to past, present and future, and hence encapsulates current rational agents, future rational agents, and past rational agents. I mean, heck if we directly apply the principle to abortion , it contradicts itself.

(Basically according to this law, if abortion is moral, then it is a universal law and must be moral for all past, present and future agents. However if this was a universal law, and everyone acted upon it, then your parent's would have aborted you, and hence you are unable to get an abortion since you would not exist. Therefore the principle cannot be acted upon and willed into a universal law at the same time. Therefore abortion is wrong in all cases).

Though I admit, this is only an interpretation of what a Kantian person is. Philosophers are arguing about this issue too. However, when I put forth my definition to my professor, he agreed that my definition was also his interpretation of Kant's work.

The following paper not only reviews some of the recent evidence on consciousness of self in non-human animals, the authors describe the series of experiments they conducted that provide probably the most definitive demonstration to date of recognition of volitional self-agency in chimpanzees, directly contradicting Kant's baseless claim that humans are the only creatures on earth who are self-aware:

Self-awareness not the same as being able to have will (act upon moral principles). In order to have an understanding of such principles, you need a to either develop a social culture (only possible in humans) or have complex emotions like empathy (again the data shows this is only possible in humans). The research paper you have quoted does not show this at all.

Were your claims about cranial capacity supposed to relate in any way to your speciesist position that pre-viable fetuses and zygotes should be granted a "right to life" but not even the intelligent, loving, functional adult hominids of a different genus (namely, chimpanzees)?

No. My claims about cranial capacity were relating to the fact their are certain behaviors found in hominems (such as culture, language, high order emotions such as empathy) which are not found in hominids. This was evidence for my claim that their is a fundamental difference between the human species and the hominid species
which grants the human species a greater right to life. Not only that right to life extends to all eventual subjects who will attain that morally valuable stage. I shall put it simply.

P1: Rational (Kantian definiton) Human beings have a right to life.
P2: This right to life extents to all those subjects who will eventually becomes rational agents (zygotes, infants).
P3: Sentient non-rational beings such as chimps also have a right to life.
P4 This right to life also extend to all those subjects who will eventually becomes sentient non-rational beings (baby chimps, zygote chimps).
P5: The right of life that is derived from rationality is greater than the right of life that is derived from sentient non-rationality
C: Therefore a human zygote or infant has a greater right to life than even an adult chimp.

You haven't cited any evidence whatsoever that any "form of intelligence," culture or empathy "are simply not possible" for any hominid genus. (To the best of my knowledge, chimps do not have the complexity of spoken language such as humans do merely because the physiological structures of their mouth, throat or face, not because of any difference in cranial capacity.)

It isn't possible in chimps. I am sure I can find evidence, but a quick google of cultural evolutionary data will show you that the huge increase in cranial capacity from hominids to hominems allowed human beings to do certain things (like form social groups, have altruistic behavior, develop language and complex emotions). The cranial capacity (and therefore increasing size of brain) was the the primary change that led to this. Its either that, or my anthropology professors were lying to me all semester

See the below article for more information

http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0038.xml

(1) In fact, there is a good deal of controversy in both ethics and philosophy of law regarding whether children have rights. See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-children/#CriChiRig Moreover, in both ethics and legal documents, all assertions of rights can be restated so as to eliminate any reference to a "right". I agree that in both ethics and legal documents, the purpose of "rights talk" is to secure moral and lawful behavior, and other than that, I take no position on the metaphysics of any "right".

(2) Even if you could coherently define the classification "empathetic adult," the fact that a child may or may not some day become one does not justify granting any child any right, just like the fact that a child may or may not become a responsible spouse and parent some day in the future does not justify granting a 4-year-old the right to marry.

Interestingly, the withholding from children or non-recognition for children of various rights that adults enjoy (e.g., the right to consent to medical procedures, or to enter into contracts) is done to protect children, and adults and society in general, not to deprive children of anything.

Marriage is not a fundamental right. Fundamental Rights are moral ought not principles that are assumed we have.

It is not a question of a child may or may not become an adult. Rather, in the natural state of order, the child will become an adult and thus the government has a mandate to protect their legal rights. See, the way rights work in government, is that the citizens of a state consent to be government by the state. They give some service to the state (like they pay taxes, or work to keep society functioning etc) and in return the state has a mandate and duty to protect certain rights of those citizens (i.e right to life, autonomy, etc). However, this protection of the state does not extend to only current citizens, but also future citizens (infants, children's, teenagers, those individuals who do not yet contribute to society) and past citizens (the elderly). In this way certain rights (esp the fundamental ones, in contrast with voting etc) are given to all citizens and eventual citizens. I have a strong reason to hold that fetus are eventual citizens/moral persons.
.

I do not accept that there is any analogy between causing an unwanted child to be born and a winning lottery ticket.

Again, the argument was illustrating the strong moral difference between potential and eventuality in order to refute your claim that gametes and zygotes are equal in terms of rights

You can't argue that unless you can first deduce that an unwanted child will have “positive experiences”.

I deduce the same way you deduce that the child will have negatives. Generally, existence itself is a positive experience. When are hungry and we eat nice food, that is a positive experiences. When we form relationships with others, that is a positive experiences. When we listen to music we like, and watch movies we like, that isa positive experiences. When we are educated and we have a passion for a career, that is a positive experiences. I would happily argue that there are more positive experiences in life compared to negative ones and these could apply easily to the future of an unborn child..

 

[Nous]

Evidently I did correctly understand your one and only argument for denying a woman the right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus, your premise of which was that pre-viable fetuses and even zygotes are “persons” because, you claim, that more likely than not they will eventually develop the capacity to reason about moral issues or act morally (or immorally). I cited the evidence showing that among healthy women who are trying to get pregnant (e.g., are not taking contraceptives), 46.5% of conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted. This number is larger for women who are not healthy (e.g., smokers, drinkers, drug-takers, those with uncontrolled diabetes) or malnourished, and the non-implantation of zygotes is one of the three mechanisms by which hormonal contraceptives achieve their effect. Thus it is only reasonable to conclude that zygotes do not meet your probability definition of “eventuality” so as to qualify as “persons,” rendering your argument that zygotes are “persons” who should enjoy a “right to life” unsound.

Your argument is this:

P1: 46.5% of conceptions are miscarried
C: Therefore zygotes are not eventual persons, and hence do not have a right to life.

False. Frankly it's getting difficult to believe that you have truly failed to understand what I've stated quite explicitly several times already.

Again: The evidence (noted again below) does not support the proposition that zygotes qualify as “persons” according to your probability definition of “eventuality” specified in #138:

". . . eventuality means at some point in time onwards, the individual will most likely than not develop a capacity for X. An infant will more likely than not develop into an adult (if her current state is left unhindered). That is why an infant has the eventuality to become an adult."

The evidence consists of 3 distinct items or factors: (1) Studies show that among healthy women seeking to get pregnant, 46.5% of all conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted. (2) This figure of 46.5% is undeniably increased by the miscarriages/spontaneous abortions of zygotes among women who are not healthy or have adverse lifestyle factors (e.g., smoke cigarettes; drink alcohol; take various drugs including prescriptions; have uncontrolled disease conditions; are malnourished). (Note that the average American woman has at least 2 of these health/lifestyle factors.) (3) This increased rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion is further increased by the incidence of miscarried fertilized eggs that occur as one of the normal mechanism by which hormonal contraceptives are effective at reducing pregnancy rates. The only reasonable conclusion is that these two additional factors increase the rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion of fertilized eggs to well beyond 50%. The evidence unequivocally does not support the proposition that zygotes meet your probability definition of "eventuality" so as to qualify as persons.

But even if it were true that zygotes met your definition of "eventuality" (as even pre-viable fetuses do), it still doesn't justify granting a "right to life" to such fetuses and fertilized eggs, which, as the Court argued in Roe v. Wade and Casey, are not and have never been "persons" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. There is simply no compelling governmental interest that justifies the state restricting a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus (much less a mere fertilized egg) . It furthers neither the state nor society to attempt to ensure that more unwanted children are born into adverse circumstances. It's a form of unnecessary cruelty to both the child and the mother. Moreover, because abortion can be accomplished even when restricted by the state (abortions have been happening for thousands of years), albeit with grave danger to the woman, attempts by the state to enact blanket prohibitions create moribund laws, Just the other day I came across citation of a statistic showing that the number of abortions that occur is basically unaffected by laws in the country prohibiting abortion. Moribund laws do nothing but illustrate the failure of a government.

In any case, contrary to your analysis of intent, presumably all women who take and know how hormonal contraceptives work precisely intend and hope that all eggs that become fertilized are not implanted. If women did not intend for the contraceptive to cause fertilized eggs to fail to implant, that is, if they didn't intend for hormonal contraceptives to work in the way they are known to work, then surely these women would not be taking such contraceptive.

The primary end in the using of contraceptives is to avoid pregnancy (or rather implantation). The means by which this end is attained (usually by causing thinning of endometrium walls, or hormonal repression) is not innately wrong. The fact that the fetus' life is ended is an unintended consequence. The action of taking contraceptive pills does not intend directly to cause the death of the fetus. In abortion however the very intent of the action is to end the life of the fetus. There is a significant moral difference here (allowing harm vs doing harm). If you want a better explanation, I would advice reading the following philosophical paper by Phillipa Foot on this issue:

http://philpapers.org/archive/FOOTPO-2.pdf


If parents give harmful food to their children, then the action (of giving food) directly harms the children. It is the means by which the children are harmed (the ends). If the parents are aware of this effect and continue anyway, such an action is wrong. This is analogous to abortion. This is not analogous to contraception. In the contraception, Quoting from the previously linked article:

He [moral agent] intends in the strictest sense both those things that he aims at as ends and those that he aims at as means to his ends.

Intent are those actions which are aimed at ends and which are a means such an end. In abortion, a means to an end (i.e the action itself) therefore the intent, is killing of a fetus. In contraception, the end is to prevent pregnancy, and the means to an end (prevention of implantation) which are the intents are not morally wrong. In such a case, the ending of the fetus' life is a unintended consequence.

Think of it like this. Abortion is like me shooting someone with a gun. Contraception is likened to me refusing to help someone who is about to get shot. The former is wrong, the latter is not.

Your claim that zygotes are "persons" deserving of a "right to life" and condemning abortion as violative of this right, while trying to justify the commonplace abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives are nonsensical.

When we are at the point of marginal utility (i.e right of the fetus conflict right of the mother), such an issue cannot be resolved on the basis of rights alone. Then we must turn to pragmatism. It is more practical here, to protect the right of life of a rational agent here then a eventual rational agent.

Again you are tied up in logical knots here. If it were true that both a pregnant woman and her fetus have a "right to life," then who are you to want to intervene in the matter?

This is an interesting dilemma, and something that I have to rely on my moral intuitions. The reason why I support "rationality" as a good definition for personhood is because I believe rationality and all its implications (such a empathy, relationship capabilities etc) are reason enough to explain the value of human life. We cannot end human life because of the potential we see in the future, and the ability to lead a meaningful life even if present situations are not favorable. It is on this basis that I think there may be some justification for abortion .

Let us say the a women is pregnant with a child that she knows will die a few days after birth. In this case, the child will have no, or every little meaning in life. The child will never form meaningful relationships, nor love, nor empathize, nor understand morality. To this degree, we can argue that this child's life will have very little meaning, and hence there is no huge moral loss in ending of such life.

The staunch right-to-lifer who is adamant that all abortions are wrong will just point to your logical inconsistency in trying to justify abortion because, according to you, it would amount to "no huge moral loss in ending such a life."

 

[Nous]

Quote where Kant even vaguely suggested that fetuses or zygotes are "persons," "moral agents" or "rational beings":

Kantian personhood is defined by Kant himself as follows:

"Only a rational being has a will—which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle"

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf (pg 18)

However if taken at face value, this definition excludes many groups of people (infants, fetus's, comatose patients, sleeping humans etc). However Kant himself later clarifies that his definition extends all of humankind (i.e those who eventually will become rational, and those who once were rational, i.e comatose patients).

So, again, Kant never even vaguely suggests that fetuses or zygotes are "persons," "moral agents," or "rational beings." You shouldn't put words in his mouth that he didn't say and didn't imply.

Self-awareness not the same as being able to have will (act upon moral principles). In order to have an understanding of such principles, you need a to either develop a social culture (only possible in humans) or have complex emotions like empathy (again the data shows this is only possible in humans). The research paper you have quoted does not show this at all.

The findings of the Kaneko and Tomonaga directly contradict Kant's claim that humans are the only beings on earth who are self-awareness. Moreover, the chimps demonstration of willful behavior and their awareness of themselves as independent agents qualify them (in contrast to fetuses and fertilized eggs) as "persons" according to Kant's definition.

Were your claims about cranial capacity supposed to relate in any way to your speciesist position that pre-viable fetuses and zygotes should be granted a "right to life" but not even the intelligent, loving, functional adult hominids of a different genus (namely, chimpanzees)?

No. My claims about cranial capacity were relating to the fact their are certain behaviors found in hominems (such as culture, language, high order emotions such as empathy) which are not found in hominids.

It's quite stunning that you seem to think that humans are not hominids. I don't find anything complimentary in that disconnect.

It isn't possible in chimps. I am sure I can find evidence, but a quick google of cultural evolutionary data will show you that the huge increase in cranial capacity from hominids to hominems allowed human beings to do certain things (like form social groups, have altruistic behavior, develop language and complex emotions).

Be sure to let me know when you find this evidence. I wonder what explains chimps outperforming humans on strategic thinking tests: http://www.nature.com/articles/srep05182

Marriage is not a fundamental right.

Sure it is. The Court explicitly stated so almost 20 times in last year's Obergefell v. Hodges, often quoting prior decisions:

Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996) ; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 640 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) .

[. . .]

The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

A first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see also Zablocki, supra, at 384 (observing Loving held "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals"). Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. Indeed, the Court has noted it would be contradictory "to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society." Zablocki, supra, at 386.

[. . . ]

A second principle in this Court's jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. This point was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at 485.

[. . .]

The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.

[. . .]

In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Court first declared the prohibition invalid because of its un-equal treatment of interracial couples. It stated: "There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 388 U. S., at 12. With this link to equal protection the Court proceeded to hold the prohibition offended central precepts of liberty: "To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Ibid. The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right became more clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of the hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial unions.

[. . .]

It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g., Zablocki, supra, at 383 388; Skinner, 316 U. S., at 541.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them.​

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-556/opinion3.html

 

[निताइ dasa]

False. Frankly it's getting difficult to believe that you have truly failed to understand what I've stated quite explicitly several times already.

Because I don't see the evidence you are presenting as any way relevant to my argument

The evidence consists of 3 distinct items or factors: (1) Studies show that among healthy women seeking to get pregnant, 46.5% of all conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted. (2) This figure of 46.5% is undeniably increased by the miscarriages/spontaneous abortions of zygotes among women who are not healthy or have adverse lifestyle factors (e.g., smoke cigarettes; drink alcohol; take various drugs including prescriptions; have uncontrolled disease conditions; are malnourished). (Note that the average American woman has at least 2 of these health/lifestyle factors.) (3) This increased rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion is further increased by the incidence of miscarried fertilized eggs that occur as one of the normal mechanism by which hormonal contraceptives are effective at reducing pregnancy rates. The only reasonable conclusion is that these two additional factors increase the rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion of fertilized eggs to well beyond 50%. The evidence unequivocally does not support the proposition that zygotes meet your probability definition of "eventuality" so as to qualify as persons.

Okay so you are arguing that miscarriage statistics means a zygote is less likely then not to become an eventual person and hence does not qualify as eventual personhood. There are several problems with this view. I will reply briefly to each:

(1) Studies show that among healthy women seeking to get pregnant, 46.5% of all conceptions are miscarried or spontaneously aborted.

Quoting from the study you presented:

"The conception rate per cycle was 40% over the first 12 months. Of the 618 detectable conceptions, 49 (7.9%) ended in clinical spontaneous abortion, and 152 (24.6%) in EPL. Early pregnancy loss was detected in 14% of all the cycles without clinically recognized pregnancy, but the frequencies were lower among women with delayed time to clinical pregnancy. Early pregnancy loss in the preceding cycle was associated with increased odds of conception (odds ratio [OR], 2.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.8-3.9), clinical pregnancy (OR, 2.0; 95% CI, 1.3-3.0), and EPL (OR, 2.4; 95% CI, 1.4-4.2) but was not associated with spontaneous abortion, low birth weight, or preterm birth in the subsequent cycle."

The chance of spontaneous miscarriage is not the 46.5% you claim but rather, from this data it seems to be 7.9% + 24.6%= 32.5%. More then that, this data doesn't actually when during the state of pregnancy the miscarriage occurred. I am guessing a large percentage of the miscarriages would have occurred due to incorrect implantation of the zygote. After correct implantation, the chances of survival increase many fold. This is another problem with your refutation. Because my definition would still hold, and actually grant the fetus a greater right to life as the pregnancy progressed (as the chances of survival increases as time goes on).Furthermore another error you make is you are confusing individual chances with overall chances. You are calculating the chances of survival by looking at the proportion of zygotes that survive out of all the possible zygotes. However, what my definition works on is the cases when abortion is needed. When a woman wants to abort a fetus/zygote then that fetus will most likely then survive (hence why abortion is desired in the first place). To this length I argue that those zygotes/fetus do qualify as eventual persons.

(2) This figure of 46.5% is undeniably increased by the miscarriages/spontaneous abortions of zygotes among women who are not healthy or have adverse lifestyle factors (e.g., smoke cigarettes; drink alcohol; take various drugs including prescriptions; have uncontrolled disease conditions; are malnourished). (Note that the average American woman has at least 2 of these health/lifestyle factors.)

To this, I reply, please give me evidence. If you are willing to base your previous refutation of scientific data, I also ask you to support this claim with data.

(3) This increased rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion is further increased by the incidence of miscarried fertilized eggs that occur as one of the normal mechanism by which hormonal contraceptives are effective at reducing pregnancy rates. The only reasonable conclusion is that these two additional factors increase the rate of miscarriage/spontaneous abortion of fertilized eggs to well beyond 50%. The evidence unequivocally does not support the proposition that zygotes meet your probability definition of "eventuality" so as to qualify as persons.

Again hormonal contraceptives work by blocking implantation. Once implantation occurs, that statistic becomes irrelevant as the survival chances of the zygote hasve increases drastically. Since abortions are done after implantation, this argument from hormonal contraceptives is irrelevant.

But even if it were true that zygotes met your definition of "eventuality" (as even pre-viable fetuses do), it still doesn't justify granting a "right to life" to such fetuses and fertilized eggs, which, as the Court argued in Roe v. Wade and Casey, are not and have never been "persons" here is simply no compelling governmental interest that justifies the state restricting a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy of a pre-viable fetus (much less a mere fertilized egg) . It furthers neither the state nor society to attempt to ensure that more unwanted children are born into adverse circumstances. It's a form of unnecessary cruelty to both the child and the mother

I would argue that eventuality is sufficient to grant right to life, for the same reason that infants are granted right to life. There is also considerable government interest to protect the rights of the unborn child, for two main reasons. 1) The government has a duty to preserve the rights of future citizens, like infants, children etc, and I think this protection can be extended very well to zygotes easily. Once could easily make a case on this basis 2) The government has a greater duty to protect violation of rights then to restore already violated ones. The act of abortion restores the autonomy of the woman, yet violates the rights of the zygote. Therefore the government has a greater mandate to restrict abortion then to allow it.

It furthers neither the state nor society to attempt to ensure that more unwanted children are born into adverse circumstances. It's a form of unnecessary cruelty to both the child and the mother.

Of course it does. Zygotes are eventual citizens, who will commit and provides services to society. Therefore it is in the interest of society and the state to preserve their existence. Further, I think it is more cruel to end the life of a fetus, denying her of all the joys of life then to prevent them from being born into adverse circumstances (which can always be changed quite easily).

Your claim that zygotes are "persons" deserving of a "right to life" and condemning abortion as violative of this right, while trying to justify the commonplace abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives are nonsensical.

I don't believe it is, and I have tried to give you the reasoning why. Do you think it is nonsensical that we punish a murderer, but not someone who kills in self defense? It is on this basis that I discriminate between the two actions.

ain you are tied up in logical knots here. If it were true that both a pregnant woman and her fetus have a "right to life," then who are you to want to intervene in the matter?

I'm not intervening, but rather I'm putting forth additional principles we can use when we are at such a dilemma. Let us say, we had to choose to kill 1 human out of 2 (both of which has the right to life). From the basis of rights, we cannot resolve this issue at all. However there may be a grounds for discrimination based upon additional non-moral elements (like, maybe one human is really old and the other is young. Maybe one human is healthy and the other had cancer and is bound to die anyway).

The staunch right-to-lifer who is adamant that all abortions are wrong will just point to your logical inconsistency in trying to justify abortion because, according to you, it would amount to "no huge moral loss in ending such a life."

I have also given the reason why. Life's value is derived from meaningfulness. This meaningfulness is derived from potential for human experiences (such as empathy, relationships etc). From this point I've come to a compromise why a child who will die days after birth may not have a meaningful life.

 

[निताइ dasa]

So, again, Kant never even vaguely suggests that fetuses or zygotes are "persons," "moral agents," or "rational beings." You shouldn't put words in his mouth that he didn't say and didn't imply.

I never said that Kant implied fetus' are rational beings. However, I later clarified that Kant's definition of personhood not only extends to rational agents, but past and future rational agents as well (due to the implication of his universal law). I don't mean to be condescending, but I strongly believe that this view is in accordance with Kant's own views.

The findings of the Kaneko and Tomonaga directly contradict Kant's claim that humans are the only beings on earth who are self-awareness. Moreover, the chimps demonstration of willful behavior and their awareness of themselves as independent agents qualify them (in contrast to fetuses and fertilized eggs) as "persons" according to Kant's definition.

Kant never claimed that humans are the only beings who are self-aware. He claimed that humans are the only beings who have will (the ability to understand and act upon principle i.e moral law). Your data that show the chimps are self-aware does not show they can understand or act upon principle. Furthermore according to the Kantian definition of personhood (see above) the fetus is a Kantian person, while Chimps are not.

Sure it is. The Court explicitly stated so almost 20 times in last year's Obergefell v. Hodges, often quoting prior decisions:

Ahahah. I personally could not care what the US court says. However, in response to this, marriage may be a contextual right, but it is not a fundamental right, especially I think in the moral sense. Fundamental rights are rights such as right to life, right to autonomy, right to food, water, shelter. These rights extend to all human beings regardless of context, while contextual rights such as the right to vote or the right to marry are depended on a specific situation (i.e in order to have a right to vote, you need to live in a democratic society). It may depend on how we, or the US court defines fundamental right (because definition draws from the constitution), but I don;t believe that marriage is fundamental.

 

[Nous]

Because I don't see the evidence you are presenting as any way relevant to my argument.

Willfulness blindness will get you nowhere and is an excuse for nothing. You defined “eventuality” as meaning that “at some point in time onwards, the individual will most likely than not develop a capacity for X.” The evidence I presented indicates that zygotes are not more likely than not to develop any capacity. What is more likely than not to happen to zygotes is that they will end up in the toilet.

Your attempt to argue that zygotes are “persons” because more likely than not they will eventually develop a capacity for X is unsound.

Okay so you are arguing that miscarriage statistics means a zygote is less likely then not to become an eventual person and hence does not qualify as eventual personhood. There are several problems with this view. I will reply briefly to each:


Quoting from the study you presented:

"The conception rate per cycle was 40% over the first 12 months. Of the 618 detectable conceptions, 49 (7.9%) ended in clinical spontaneous abortion, and 152 (24.6%) in EPL. Early pregnancy loss was detected in 14% of all the cycles without clinically recognized pregnancy, but the frequencies were lower among women with delayed time to clinical pregnancy. Early pregnancy loss in the preceding cycle was associated with increased odds of conception (odds ratio [OR], 2.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.8-3.9), clinical pregnancy (OR, 2.0; 95% CI, 1.3-3.0), and EPL (OR, 2.4; 95% CI, 1.4-4.2) but was not associated with spontaneous abortion, low birth weight, or preterm birth in the subsequent cycle."

The chance of spontaneous miscarriage is not the 46.5% you claim but rather, from this data it seems to be 7.9% + 24.6%= 32.5%.

No, 32.5% of all conceptions “of the 618 detectable conceptions” were spontaneously aborted. There is an additional 14% of early pregnancy loss in “all the cycles without clinically recognized pregnancy”.

However, what my definition works on is the cases when abortion is needed.

Your definition of "eventuality" entails that "at some point in time onwards, the individual will most likely than not develop a capacity for X.” The evidence does not support the proposition that zygotes are more likely than not to develop a capacity for X.

To this, I reply, please give me evidence.

Already done that, and specifically pointed your attention to Table 1 here: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.520.5458&rep=rep1&type=pdf . First Trimester. None of the “healthy women” who were trying to get pregnant, who made up the above study where 46.5% of zygotes were spontaneously aborted would have had any of these anatomic factors that are associated with pregnancy loss during first trimester:

Anatomic factors (e.g., intrauterine adhesions, leiomyomata, uterine septum): Endocrinopathy (e.g., Cushing’s syndrome, luteal phase defect, polycystic ovary syndrome, thyroid disease)

Immunologic factors (e.g., antiphospholipid antibody syndrome, systemic lupus erythematosus)

Infection (e.g., cytomegalovirus, herpes simplex virus, Listeria monocytogenes, parvovirus B19, rubella, Toxoplasma gondii)

Severe acute illness Thrombophilia (e.g., activated protein C, factor V Leiden, prothrombin G20210A mutation)

Uncontrolled chronic illness (e.g., diabetes, hypertension)​

None of the healthy women in the study in which 46.5% of zygotes were spontaneously aborted would have had the “Other” factors:

Drug use

Smoking

Teratogen exposure

Trauma (e.g., physical abuse)​

Yet, these factors are quite common among women who are having sex but who are not trying to get pregnant. Most Americans drink alcohol; most Americans take prescription drugs daily. Among the most common drugs that American women take daily are antidepressants, which are known to exert a variety of adverse effects on fetuses and undoubtedly increase spontaneous abortion of both zygotes and fetuses in early stages.

Again hormonal contraceptives work by blocking implantation.

Correct. One of the mechanisms by which hormonal contraceptives prevent pregnancy is to prevent implantation of fertilized eggs. You have claimed that fertilized eggs are “persons”. Hormonal contraceptives prevent these “persons” from eventually developing “the capacity for X.”

Thus, with these additional factors that increase the base rate of 46.5% spontaneously aborted conceptions among healthy women, the percentage of zygotes that do not meet your probability definition of “eventuality” is obviously well above 50%.

I would argue that eventuality is sufficient to grant right to life, for the same reason that infants are granted right to life.

Most infants in fact do eventually "develop the capacity for X". Most zygotes obviously do not.

There is also considerable government interest to protect the rights of the unborn child

There is no "compelling governmental interest" by which a woman's right to avail herself of the medical procedures of abortion or abortifacients can be constitutionally denied in the case of zygotes and pre-viable fetuses--according to the Court. In addition to what I noted in my previous post, the Court's holding of this was largely premised on the fact that there is a long recorded history demonstrating that pre-quickening fetuses have generally not been considered "persons". In the US, pre-quickening fetuses were generally not considered "persons" for criminal purposes before the advent the Fourteenth Amendment, nor after the passage of the Fourteenth (until about the early-mid-20th century).

Your claim that zygotes are "persons" deserving of a "right to life" and condemning abortion as violative of this right, while trying to justify the commonplace abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives are nonsensical.

I don't believe it is, and I have tried to give you the reasoning why. Do you think it is nonsensical that we punish a murderer, but not someone who kills in self defense?

There is no category or form of intent in the law whereby a person who knowingly takes the lives of other persons again and again and again, as a foreseen consequence in the course of performing some other act, is exonerated. To commit an act of homicide that one can foresee is not an example of any of sort of justifiable homicide (such as self-defense). Your overt condemnations of abortion, while trying to excuse the commonplace abortifacient effects of hormonal contraceptives (if zygotes did, in fact, meet your definition of "person") is nonsensical.

Let us say, we had to choose to kill 1 human out of 2 (both of which has the right to life). From the basis of rights, we cannot resolve this issue at all.

You still don't want to answer the question: why not just let God decide (rather than intervening by aborting a fetus, who, for all you know, will live a long, healthy and productive life)?

 

[निताइ dasa]

It seems that we are going in circles. I have put forth my conclusions and given sufficient explanation for them. I also have tried to reply to your refutation. I will briefly add a few closing comments, but this is prob me my final post in this matter.

Your attempt to argue that zygotes are “persons” because more likely than not they will eventually develop a capacity for X is unsound.

It is not unsound, you have simply rejected this premise of mine.

No, 32.5% of all conceptions “of the 618 detectable conceptions” were spontaneously aborted. There is an additional 14% of early pregnancy loss in “all the cycles without clinically recognized pregnancy”.

If the 14% were not detected as conceptions (i.e not clinically recognized) then that statistic is in actually irrelevant because conception did not occur ..

Your definition of "eventuality" entails that "at some point in time onwards, the individual will most likely than not develop a capacity for X.” The evidence does not support the proposition that zygotes are more likely than not to develop a capacity for X.

You are attempting to shift the goal posts in order to misrepresent my argument. You quote a figure of 46.5% yet you do not understand that this figure is taking into account when a fetus is miscarriage due to implantation. You are treating zygotes universally when my right to personhood definition is specific to each zygote (a particular zygote has a right to life if they are more likely than not be able to become adults.) You are confusing population chance with individual chance. I shall give you an example of this fallacy.. Let us say, I ask you to calculate the chance that you individual A will survive through this day. What you are doing is taking the sum of all individuals and seeing the proportion of those that survive and then claiming that this chance of survival is equal to the survival of individual A. This is a fallacious type of reasoning in my mind. When a women wants to abort a fetus, the fetus has already implanted and will most likely then not survive the pregnancy when we look at the individual survival (we weigh the potential dangers/possibilities etc).

Hormonal contraceptives prevent these “persons” from eventually developing “the capacity for X.”

Thus, with these additional factors that increase the base rate of 46.5% spontaneously aborted conceptions among healthy women, the percentage of zygotes that do not meet your probability definition of “eventuality” is obviously well above 50%.

Hormonal contraceptives statistics are irrelevant to the question of abortion because abortion is done specifically after implantation. It is already assumed that the fetus' in question have implanted correctly (and not been miscarried) and therefore this probability is irrelevant to the survival of those particular zygotes (whose personhood is in question here).

Most infants in fact do eventually "develop the capacity for X". Most zygotes obviously do not.

I again disagree. Please see above for my explanation of why I reject the particular arguement.

There is no "compelling governmental interest" by which a woman's right to avail herself of the medical procedures of abortion or abortifacients can be constitutionally denied in the case of zygotes and pre-viable fetuses--according to the Court

Again I could care less what the US court says. I live in Australia, so the US court has no jurisdiction in even my political context. However, I have presented an argument that yes the government has a interest in protecting and preserving the rights of zygotes, because they are future citizens (similar to infants) and thus the government acts in its self interest to preserve them.

There is no category or form of intent in the law whereby a person who knowingly takes the lives of other persons again and again and again, as a foreseen consequence in the course of performing some other act, is exonerated. To commit an act of homicide that one can foresee is not an example of any of sort of justifiable homicide (such as self-defense).

The reason you are objecting to this is because you do not understand the doctrine of double effect fully. I ask you again to read the philosophical paper that I linked by Phillipa Foot. Intent is understood as the ends as well as the means to the end, not simply what can be foreseen. When we perform an action that is not directly harmful, yet it has a set of consequences, only the intent consequences are taken into account when governing the morality of such an action, provided that the means to such an end it itself not wrong. This is the actually the reason why killing in self-defence is justifiable. It is also why contraceptives are justifiable yet abortions are not (if the fetus has a right to life). Further, when discussing this, we are now dealing with morality, not legality (as doctrine of double effect is a moral principle).

You still don't want to answer the question: why not just let God decide (rather than intervening by aborting a fetus, who, for all you know, will live a long, healthy and productive life)?

Because God does not have a hand in it. God doesn't sit in heaven and decide the consequence of every single action. Rather the consequences arise due to our previous Karma. That is what I believe as a Hindu. God operates detached from this world and its laws. When we are forced to choose between two individuals who both have a right to life, then both sides can make an argument to who should be killed. In the case of the life of the mother versus the life of the unborn child, I believe that here pragmatically, it is more justified to save the mother.

It was a nice debate. You have brought up good points which will allow me to refine my arguments on this matter. If you actually read my previous post (before the start of the debate) you will see that I have no problem with your position (that abortion should be allowed as fetus do not have a right to life). My original post was attacking those views who believe that even if the fetus has a right to life, the autonomy of the mother trumps it in all ways. This is specifically the stance I find illogical.That is why most of these debates I have are horribly illogical. You however have argued in a very beautiful and reasonable way and I thank you for that.

As a thanks offering, I offer you one of my favorite pieces of classical music, the famous liebestraum (love dream) by Franz Liszt, played by one of his direct pupils, Frederic Lamond.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Later Kant confirms this with is formula of universal law, which states:

"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law"

Universal Law here, extends to past, present and future, and hence encapsulates current rational agents, future rational agents, and past rational agents. I mean, heck if we directly apply the principle to abortion , it contradicts itself.

(Basically according to this law, if abortion is moral, then it is a universal law and must be moral for all past, present and future agents. However if this was a universal law, and everyone acted upon it, then your parent's would have aborted you, and hence you are unable to get an abortion since you would not exist. Therefore the principle cannot be acted upon and willed into a universal law at the same time. Therefore abortion is wrong in all cases).

Apply this reasoning to your own position: if you're willing to deny the bodily autonomy of a pregnant woman to save what you deem to be a life, should we turn this into a universal rule that applies to you as well?

Edit: does an actual child who needs, say, a kidney or bone marrow have any less of a right to life than a fetus? Do you - assuming you would be a matching donor - have any more right to refuse to go through what's needed to preserve someone else's life?

 

[निताइ dasa]

Apply this reasoning to your own position: if you're willing to deny the bodily autonomy of a pregnant woman to save what you deem to be a life, should we turn this into a universal rule that applies to you as well?

Edit: does an actual child who needs, say, a kidney or bone marrow have any less of a right to life than a fetus? Do you - assuming you would be a matching donor - have any more right to refuse to go through what's needed to preserve someone else's life?

I've replied answered this before. The two situations are not analogous. One involves doing harm (performance of action) the other position involves allowing harm (not performing an action). There is a huge moral difference and more so with Kantian ethics. When are universalize the maxim, it usually involves an action, and a principle upon which the action is based. Giving someone one's autonomy to restore their right of life is a very different principle (and action) compared to denying autonomy in order to prevent violation of a right. Rights are moral ought not principles not restorative principles. Right to life doesn't mean we are obligated to go out and safe everyone's life at the expense of our resources, it means we are obligated not to harm the intact right of life of any persons by any actions.

Infact with organ donation example, if the organ is non-essential (i.e kidneys, bone marrow etc) then Kant would actually argue that you have an imperfect duty to donate those organs to one who need them (because you would Will that someone gave organs to you, in your time of need). You have an imperfect duty to help others (i.e weaker obligations) but you have a perfect duty not to harm others (i.e a strong obligation).

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

I've replied answered this before. The two situations are not analogous. One involves doing harm (performance of action) the other position involves allowing harm (not performing an action). There is a huge moral difference and more so with Kantian ethics.

The difference is irrelevant to the argument you just made. You didn't make any right that you argue exists contingent on this distinction.

If you'd like to reconsider your previous argument and give a revised version, feel free. If you're going to stand by your previous argument in its current form, then you can deal with its implications.

 

[निताइ dasa]

he difference is irrelevant to the argument you just made. You didn't make any right that you argue exists contingent on this distinction.

Its relevant because the argument is a Kantian principle. It is Kant's formula of universal law. If you are going to apply this universal law, you ought to apply it in a way that is consistent with Kant's explanations of the law. This is because, in contrast with consequentialists (who see doing harm the same as allowing harm, because all they care about is the consequence) Kantian ethics questions the nature of the action/inaction itself. When we universalize the maxim, we are universalizing that action only. The maxim here that is universalized is "When I want an abortion, I should be free to get one". When this maxim is universalized for all agents, it leads to a logical contradiction (because if my parents aborted me, I would be unable to even get an abortion), and hence this action is immoral for all agents. It has nothing to do with rights explicitly, nor has it anything to do with organ donation.

If we have the maxim "When someone needs an organ I shall refuse to give it to them", and we universalize that for all rational agents (past, present and future) then such an action does not lead to a logical inconsistency (my ability to refuse donation is not dependent on everyone else not acting in such a way) and hence the action is not wrong. However the second maxim does lead to a contradiction of will (because we would will that when we are in need of an organ, someone donates to us). Hence there is a imperfect duty to give organs.

This distinction (between imperfect and perfect duties) explains why for example charity is morally good, but it is not obligatory (i.e we have to give charity or else we have acted wrongly), because charity is an imperfect duty. It also explains why we are obligated to not steal from people in all circumstances because not stealing is a perfect duty.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Its relevant because the argument is a Kantian principle. It is Kant's formula of universal law. If you are going to apply this universal law, you ought to apply it in a way that is consistent with Kant's explanations of the law.

I'm going to interpret your argument in a way that's consistent with what you say, not what you ought to have said if you were presenting Kant properly. If you want your argument to be more "Kantian", that's your problem to solve.

I'm not talking to Immanuel Kant; I'm talking to you. I'll respond to the arguments YOU make.