Lack of free will & morality

[Nous]

What is affirmed is that those choices ultimately emerge from numerous causes and conditions as expressions of physical laws

Who "affirmed" that claim? How do "physical laws" cause "choices" to "emerge"? What does that even mean?

I think you need to begin with definitions.

the definition of choice

1. an act or instance of choosing; selection:
Her choice of a computer was made after months of research. Hisparents were not happy with his choice of friends.
2. the right, power, or opportunity to choose; option:
The child had no choice about going to school.​

When "physical laws" (allegedly) cause "choices" to "emerge" (emerge from what?) what's doing the choosing? How does it have the ability or faculty to select one of the available options?

 

[Nous]

Your behavior emerges from a brain that is itself governed by physical processes. What alternative do you propose? That behavior is magical and separate from the natural realm

To prove a proposition does not mean to merely make further assertions. To prove a proposition, state the proposition, substantiate that the proposition is true (i.e., provide the link showing that the proposition is true), and state your deduction.

In this case, in order to "Prove that the belief of having free will is a 'manifestation of physical laws,'" you will, at the very least, need to identify the "physical laws" you are referring to.

 

[EverChanging]

To prove a proposition does not mean to merely make further assertions. To prove a proposition, state the proposition, substantiate that the proposition is true (i.e., provide the link showing that the proposition is true), and state your deduction.

In this case, in order to "Prove that the belief of having free will is a 'manifestation of physical laws,'" you will, at the very least, need to identify the "physical laws" you are referring to.

Ultimately it is all of them. The universe functions as a whole. You will choose to eat because you are hungry. That instinct is a result of biology and evolution. Your species affects the type of food you will prefer. The decisions available to you will depend on the constitution of the brain which is partly determined by genetics. Even gravity and the strong nuclear force affect your actions. Behavior does not occur in a vacuum.

I did not create this thread to debate this, but to discuss the moral ramifications of behavior being a natural phenomenon.

 

[Nous]

Ultimately it is all of them.

Name all of them.

You will choose to eat because you are hungry.

At times I've chosen to eat even when I wasn't hungry, and I've also chosen to not eat when I was hungry. I guess I'm above and beyond that "law" (which isn't a law, BTW).

I did not create this thread to debate this, but to discuss the moral ramifications of behavior being a natural phenomenon.

What are "the moral ramifications of behavior being a natural phenomenon"? (Do you know of someone who claims that "behavior" is not "natural"?)

 

[EverChanging]

Name all of them.

At times I've chosen to eat even when I wasn't hungry, and I've also chosen to not eat when I was hungry. I guess I'm above and beyond that "law" (which isn't a law, BTW).

What are "the moral ramifications of behavior being a natural phenomenon"? (Do you know of someone who claims that "behavior" is not "natural"?)

Ultimately everything influences a decision -- laws such as gravity, instincts such as hunger, genes, the environment, the constitution and interactions within the brain -- literally everything.

Do you believe you chose the brain state that leads to whether you eat or not? How would "you" do that? Is there a ghost in the machine pulling levers? Does the brain violate the laws of physics and biochemistry? Is it magical?

 

[Nous]

Ultimately everything influences a decision -- laws such as gravity, instincts such as hunger, genes, the environment, the constitution and interactions within the brain -- literally everything.

Influence is different from causation, is it not? A person can be influenced by a variety of factors in which pair of socks he chooses to wear, but that doesn't mean that those factors cause him to choose a particular pair of socks. Right?

Do you believe you chose the brain state that leads to whether you eat or not?

No one chooses what "state" their brain is in at any given moment. No one can even define what a "brain state" is with any particularity. I am not even absolutely sure that I have a brain. I assume I do, but I've never seen it. I definitely can't tell if there is more electricity going on at any particular time in some group of neurons than in some other group, and I definitely don't consciously direct neurons to "fire". I assume I am not different in this than most other people.

But what humans commonly choose are the voluntary bodily movements we will perform, as well as (sometimes) our mental states (such as, e.g., acceptance that one's beloved spouse is going to die soon). I don't know how people (or other animals) are able to decide to perform a bodily movement then perform it. But there is a provable difference between a voluntary bodily movement and an involuntary muscle spasm. The provable difference is that one can foretell what voluntary bodily movements one will perform--and even do so years in advance (such as writing a check for a certain amount to a certain mortgage company every month for the next 30 years)--whereas one cannot foretell non-autonomic involuntary bodily events with much, if any, accuracy, such as a muscle cramp, sneeze or heart attack.

In any case, I'd say that thesis of determinism has been sufficiently refuted by the findings and theories of modern physics, therefore we do not need to try to square free will with determinism.

 

[EverChanging]

Influence is different from causation, is it not? A person can be influenced by a variety of factors in which pair of socks he chooses to wear, but that doesn't mean that those factors cause him to choose a particular pair of socks. Right?

No one chooses what "state" their brain is in at any given moment. No one can even define what a "brain state" is with any particularity. I am not even absolutely sure that I have a brain. I assume I do, but I've never seen it. I definitely can't tell if there is more electricity going on at any particular time in some group of neurons than in some other group, and I definitely don't consciously direct neurons to "fire". I assume I am not different in this than most other people.

But what humans commonly choose are the voluntary bodily movements we will perform, as well as (sometimes) our mental states (such as, e.g., acceptance that one's beloved spouse is going to die soon). I don't know how people (or other animals) are able to decide to perform a bodily movement then perform it. But there is a provable difference between a voluntary bodily movement and an involuntary muscle spasm. The provable difference is that one can foretell what voluntary bodily movements one will perform--and even do so years in advance (such as writing a check for a certain amount to a certain mortgage company every month for the next 30 years)--whereas one cannot foretell non-autonomic involuntary bodily events with much, if any, accuracy, such as a muscle cramp, sneeze or heart attack.

In any case, I'd say that thesis of determinism has been sufficiently refuted by the findings and theories of modern physics, therefore we do not need to try to square free will with determinism.

Those influences are part of the causes and conditions that give rise to the behavior -- genes determine in part our behavior but there are environmental influences as well. A random or probabilistic components of causality are not anymore within our control.

 

[Nous]

Those influences are part of the causes and conditions that give rise to the behavior -- genes determine in part our behavior but there are environmental influences as well. A random or probabilistic components of causality are not anymore within our control.

Obviously you have lots of beliefs. But so far, when I've challenged you to prove your claims, you haven't been able to do so. Your beliefs do not seem to be deduced from propositions that you can substantiate to be true statements. And apparently, as your post quoted here indicates, you are dedicated to the thesis of determinism. The best empirical evidence refutes determinism. But, of course, people rarely abandon their religion just because it's proven false.

 

[Skwim]

If there is no free will then we are unable to do anything about what we're going to say, or how we are going to punish anyone. Nor, can we make any meaningful, independent judgments about morality. A lack of free will would apply to everyone, in every way.

Right on. Although under the concept of hard determinism I would know that a murderer could not do otherwise and thus is not morally culpable, I might also be compelled to hold him morally culpable because I could not do otherwise---I guess I would be putting out of mind his inability to do any differently. It ain't fair or even reasonable, but as a function of hard determinism it is logical.

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[Nous]

It ain't fair

How did you determine that something "ain't fair"?

but as a function of hard determinism it is logical..

Now the only question is: why hold on to a dead metaphysical thesis?

 

[Skwim]

How did you determine that something "ain't fair"?

It ain't fair in the sense that although they couldn't help what they did, I still couldn't help judging them culpable.

Now the only question is: why hold on to a dead metaphysical thesis?

Assuming you're referring to determinism on a super-atomic level, why do you consider it dead?

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[EverChanging]

Obviously you have lots of beliefs. But so far, when I've challenged you to prove your claims, you haven't been able to do so. Your beliefs do not seem to be deduced from propositions that you can substantiate to be true statements. And apparently, as your post quoted here indicates, you are dedicated to the thesis of determinism. The best empirical evidence refutes determinism. But, of course, people rarely abandon their religion just because it's proven false.

No, I am agnostic as to whether causality contains a probabilistic or random component.

The evidence is that behavior arises from environmental and genetic interactions. It arises from the brain as well.

I mean, one can treat behavior differently from everything else, exempt it from causes and conditioning and the laws of physics, call it magical, attribute it to a central controller or ghost in the machine or whatever, but then there is no sense in trying to predict or understand it.

In any case as I mentioned more than once my purpose was not to debate this issue, but explore the ramifications for morality if behavior is in the most fundamental sense not free. Do create another thread if you wish. This one has been derailed.

 

[Nous]

It ain't fair in the sense that although they couldn't help what they did, I still couldn't help judging them culpable.

Well, how did you determine that “ it ain't fair” to judge a person morally culpable for doing something that s/he “couldn't help” doing?

Apparently the only way your assertions could have come about is, first, if you somehow assessed the nature of the kinds of things that are fair and those things that are unfair, then concluded that this particular event (i.e., you judging someone morally culpable for doing something s/he couldn't avoid doing) is an example of (the universal) unfairness. Looking up the adjective “fair,” one finds “free from unjustice,” and the noun “justice” means “the quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, moral right.” Obviously, by “it ain't fair,” you are making a judgment about what is morally right and morally wrong. We can only assume that's what you believe--that holding someone morally culpable for doing something s/he could not avoid doing is morally wrong.

Then, miracle of miracles, your belief about this particular example of moral “unfairness” somehow produced an effect on your consciousness so as to move your fingers to type and post exactly what you believe, that “it ain't fair,” thereby demonstrating the contradiction of epiphenomenalism.

None of this would make sense happening in a world where there are no morally right or wrong acts, or where one's consciousness and beliefs are causally inert, incapable of affecting one's behavior.

Assuming you're referring to determinism on a super-atomic level, why do you consider it dead?

I think we've been over this ground before. Here's what the thesis of determinism is:

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.​

Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thus, in a world in which even a single random event has occurred, the thesis of determinism is false.

The postulates of locality and realism used in the tests of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and necessary for the thesis of determinism to be true, are refuted by the effects of photons on macroscopic polarizers and photon detectors. There are not two worlds--the quantum world and the non-quantum world. There is one world, and in it the thesis of determinism is false.

 

[Nous]

The evidence is that behavior arises from environmental and genetic interactions. It arises from the brain as well.

Cite all of that evidence that you are familiar with.

Have you ever known any identical (monozygote) twins? Their genes are identical, but they do different things, they say different things, they often get different grades in the same class. I know one set of identical twin guys: One is really rather masculine in his voice and demeanor and behavior--you'd never guess he's gay unless you saw him with his husband. The other is somewhat effeminate, sometimes likes to go out wearing a dress, high heels, make-up and a wig, is straight, has been married for 30 years and has two children.

In any case as I mentioned more than once my purpose was not to debate this issue, but explore the ramifications for morality if behavior is in the most fundamental sense not free.

I asked you what your beliefs are on that topic. You didn't say. I already noted that whether or not moral realism is true is irrelevant to the issue of humans having free will. Human's having or not having free will does not make an act moral or immoral.

 

[Skwim]

Well, how did you determine that “ it ain't fair” to judge a person morally culpable for doing something that s/he “couldn't help” doing?

Apparently the only way your assertions could have come about is, first, if you somehow assessed the nature of the kinds of things that are fair and those things that are unfair, then concluded that this particular event (i.e., you judging someone morally culpable for doing something s/he couldn't avoid doing) is an example of (the universal) unfairness. Looking up the adjective “fair,” one finds “free from unjustice,” and the noun “justice” means “the quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, moral right.” Obviously, by “it ain't fair,” you are making a judgment about what is morally right and morally wrong. We can only assume that's what you believe--that holding someone morally culpable for doing something s/he could not avoid doing is morally wrong.

Then, miracle of miracles, your belief about this particular example of moral “unfairness” somehow produced an effect on your consciousness so as to move your fingers to type and post exactly what you believe, that “it ain't fair,” thereby demonstrating the contradiction of epiphenomenalism.

None of this would make sense happening in a world where there are no morally right or wrong acts, or where one's consciousness and beliefs are causally inert, incapable of affecting one's behavior.

I think we've been over this ground before. Here's what the thesis of determinism is:

The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.​

Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thus, in a world in which even a single random event has occurred, the thesis of determinism is false.

The postulates of locality and realism used in the tests of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and necessary for the thesis of determinism to be true, are refuted by the effects of photons on macroscopic polarizers and photon detectors. There are not two worlds--the quantum world and the non-quantum world. There is one world, and in it the thesis of determinism is false.

Sorry, but I just can't bring myself to care about delving into your concerns here.

Have a nice day.

.

 

[Nous]

Sorry, but I just can't bring myself to care about delving into your concerns here.

Have a nice day.

.

Thanks for demonstrating that I'm right. People ultimately can't avoid revealing their moral realist assumptions or their beliefs in their freedom to choose between available options. To deny one's free will is, like espousing epiphenomenalism, a self-stultifying assertion.

 

[EverChanging]

Cite all of that evidence that you are familiar with.

Have you ever known any identical (monozygote) twins? Their genes are identical, but they do different things, they say different things, they often get different grades in the same class. I know one set of identical twin guys: One is really rather masculine in his voice and demeanor and behavior--you'd never guess he's gay unless you saw him with his husband. The other is somewhat effeminate, sometimes likes to go out wearing a dress, high heels, make-up and a wig, is straight, has been married for 30 years and has two children.

I asked you what your beliefs are on that topic. You didn't say. I already noted that whether or not moral realism is true is irrelevant to the issue of humans having free will. Human's having or not having free will does not make an act moral or immoral.

Study it for yourself. The Illusion of Conscious Will by Daniel Wegner is a good place to start. Sorry, I don't believe behavior is an unmoved mover.

 

[Nous]

Study it for yourself. The Illusion of Conscious Will by Daniel Wegner is a good place to start.

The you should read it. Wegner doesn't provide any evidence that genes determine human behavior. Genes do not determine what voluntary bodily movements or intentional thoughts of individuals. Identical twins have identical genes, yet they can and do perform different acts at different times, and can and do engage in different thoughts at different times.

 

[Ponder This]

Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

I don't see how a lack of belief in free will affects objective morality at all.

My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.

Hard incompatibilism by definition is the position that determinism is incompatible with both human freedom and moral responsibility. If Hard incompatibilism is true, then there is no moral responsibility. Simply believing Hard incompatibilism does not make it actually true.

Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?

No. IMO, lack of free will does not change objective morality in any way. The only thing that changes is how you assign guilt. This is not the same thing as moral objectivity. For example,many arguments against God go like this:

1. God has predetermined all actions
2. Immoral actions occur
3. Therefore, God is immoral​

If the argument is without error, then its clear that even though actions are predetermined, objective morality still exists and can be used to judge actions to be immoral. If objective morality did not still exist, then we would not be able to objectively judge any actions to be immoral.

Its like asking if a video game character is immoral for killing another video game character. Objective morality still exists, the question of who is morally responsible doesn't go away. Hard incompatibilism is simply false.

 

[EverChanging]

The you should read it. Wegner doesn't provide any evidence that genes determine human behavior. Genes do not determine what voluntary bodily movements or intentional thoughts of individuals. Identical twins have identical genes, yet they can and do perform different acts at different times, and can and do engage in different thoughts at different times.

I cited it as an introduction to volitional will *in general.* Contrary to your insinuation I am on my second reading through it. Furthermore, no one ever said genes are a sole cause -- obviously environment and other factors come into play.

To have a decision over which we had ultimate control one would need to have:

Control over the prior state of the universe

or

Control over how the universe transitions from one state to the next (its physical laws including any random or probabilistic component).

To separate behavior from prior conditions and causes is to make it magical. There is simply no reason to separate it from the web of conditions and causes (probabilistic or not) in which it is embedded and arises. It also implies a central self or controller which has its own problems.