Lack of free will & morality

[The Holy Bottom Burp]

Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?

These sort of discussions are always hampered by the lack of agreement on definitions, it really is a minefield, my head hurts a bit after reading this thread!
To answer your question, first, what do you mean by "morality is objective"? In the Sam Harris sense, that anything that harms the wellbeing of another human being is considered to be "objectively immoral", while anything that promotes wellbeing is "objectively moral"? I don't see how that changes even if we were to "prove" that we have no control over our actions.
Just to broaden the discussion in more colloquial terms, I don't believe life has any meaning in an objective sense, I'm an atheist. There is no "external" arbiter of what is moral and what is immoral, it is us who decide that, even if we have no ultimate control over what we do or what we decide. We are stuck with it, and I mean we are really stuck with it if what you outline in the OP is reality.
I can mentally absorb that the holocaust has no meaning, it was an event in time like everything else. That doesn't mean though, as a human being, I don't consider it to be appalling and "objectively immoral" in that it harmed the wellbeing of human beings on a massive scale. I can understand my love for a woman may be just down to evolution and chemistry, but that doesn't stop me from loving her. I recognise that it may be a glorious illusion, but it is a very nice illusion, and as a human I'm going to continue wallowing in that happy illusion. So I don't see how what you propose changes anything. Even if we recognise that the murderer had no control over his decision to murder his wife, what do we do? Say, oh well, sh*t happens, it wasn't his fault?

 

[Nous]

I cited it as an introduction to volitional will *in general.* Contrary to your insinuation I am on my second reading through it. Furthermore, no one ever said genes are a sole cause -- obviously environment and other factors come into play.

So you are saying that you did not and do not have control over the content of your posts here?

You're saying that you do not have the ability to choose to express a true statement and reject a false statement (such as about free will)?

To have a decision over which we had ultimate control one would need to have:

Control over the prior state of the universe

Nonsense.

or

Control over how the universe transitions from one state to the next (its physical laws including any random or probabilistic component).

More nonsense.

 

[EverChanging]

So you are saying that you did not and do not have control over the content of your posts here?

You're saying that you do not have the ability to choose to express a true statement and reject a false statement (such as about free will)?

Nonsense.

More nonsense.

No, I do not have control.

Call nonsense all you want, but you are not addressing the substance of the argument. Look, behavior is either:

Accountable

or not accountable.

If it is accountable it may be understood in terms of our nature, our dispositions, etc.

If it is unaccountable then it cannot be understood in any terms or even have causes in which case behavior is random.

Random behavior would not be of much use and cannot meaningfully be called free.

 

[Nous]

No, I do not have control.

Call nonsense all you want, but you are not addressing the substance of the argument.

(1) You haven't articulated any argument. Your OP is a confused jumble of assertions, from which you have not deduced any proposition.

(2) The "substance" of what you have posted here is merely the product of an automaton that is unable to choose to state a true proposition rather than a false one. That's why: Like Epiphenomenalism, Denial of Free Will is Self-Stultifying

 

[EverChanging]

(1) You haven't articulated any argument. Your OP is a confused jumble of assertions, from which you have not deduced any proposition.

(2) The "substance" of what you have posted here is merely the product of an automaton that is unable to choose to state a true proposition rather than a false one. That's why: Like Epiphenomenalism, Denial of Free Will is Self-Stultifying

(1) You haven't articulated any argument. Your OP is a confused jumble of assertions, from which you have not deduced any proposition.

(2) The "substance" of what you have posted here is merely the product of an automaton that is unable to choose to state a true proposition rather than a false one. That's why: Like Epiphenomenalism, Denial of Free Will is Self-Stultifying

Behavior is accountable or it is not. Neither option helps your case.

 

[Nous]

Behavior is accountable or it is not. Neither option helps your case.

This is another excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose to state true propositions rather than false ones.

I suspect you have already convinced everyone of your self-stultification.

 

[EverChanging]

This is another excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose to state true propositions rather than false ones.

I suspect you have already convinced everyone of your self-stultification.

This is another excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose to state true propositions rather than false ones.

I suspect you have already convinced everyone of your self-stultification.

Yeah, you let me know when you can will yourself to believe that you are a big purple elephant. Then let me know whether you think behavior is accountable or not accountable.

 

[Nous]

Yeah, you let me know when you can will yourself to believe that you are a big purple elephant.

An excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose to state a relevant proposition rather than an irrelevant one.

 

[sayak83]

Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

My thoughts are as follows: let us assume there is no free will in a libertarian sense and that hard incompatiblism is true.

On the one hand society can certainly tell a woman, "You ought not to do that or you will be punished!" Human behavior can be conditioned and reconditioned through rewards, punishments, promises of rewards, and threats of punishments.

But let us say that a man has committed murder already and that in the most fundamental, ultimate sense he is not morally responsible for the act because circumstances beyond his control gave rise to the murder.

We may say that he should not have committed the act, but in saying so we are actually saying that the universe should not operate the way that it does, that the impersonal laws of physics ought not to have manifested the way they did through a particular conglomeration of matter. We may as well be saying that lightning ought not to have struck that woman: we are imposing our preferences, our "should's" and "should not's" on the way matter behaves as described by impersonal physical laws.

Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective, that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?

Certain punitive measures, when applied are seen to deter crimes as well as revenge killings. Other measures help to reform past criminals. That's all there is to the legal system really.

 

[EverChanging]

An excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose to state a relevant proposition rather than an irrelevant one.

No, it's relevant.

And so is whether you think behavior is accountable or not.

It was never the point of this thread to debate this topic. You go believe in your magical unaccountable behavior or whatever free will is supposed to mean. I don't really care.

 

[Nous]

No, it's relevant.

Another excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose a true proposition over a false one.

 

[EverChanging]

Another excellent example of a statement made by an automaton that is unable to choose a true proposition over a false one.

And see the purple elephant comment.

Is behavior accountable or not?

 

[Nous]

And see the purple elephant comment.

Is behavior accountable or not?

My answer to the question you have asked will not benefit an automaton that is unable to choose to state or believe true propositions rather than false ones. A entity that spits out self-stultifying assertions will never convince an intelligent person that it has somehow hit upon a truth.

 

[LuisDantas]

Does a lack of belief in free will undercut a belief in objective morality, in objective "should's" and "should not's?"

Not really, for two main reasons.

One: "Free will" is a remarkably vague concept with dubious practical value.

Two: Objective morality does not have to be (and IMO is not) defined by right "thou shalt" rules, but rather by likely consequences.

The challenge is not in learning of rigid rules and keeping true to them, but rather of predicting likely consequences and how to direct them.

It is objective, but not at all static.

(...)
Do you think that a lack of belief in free will in this sense undermines the notion that morality is objective,

No, I do not.

We may believe in some form of freedom of will and action or we may not. Either way, that does not touch on the matter of morality itself, just on how much of a choice we have in adhering to it and on how accurate our perception of that choice is.

that our moral codes are somehow external from individual or societal preference?

Morality is unavoidably shaped both by environmental factors (such as biology, demographics, ecology, economics) and by the intellectual ability of the moral agent.

I would even define morality as "the duty of the individual towards global community".

 

[EverChanging]

Not really, for two main reasons.

One: "Free will" is a remarkably vague concept with dubious practical value.

Two: Objective morality does not have to be (and IMO is not) defined by right "thou shalt" rules, but rather by likely consequences.

The challenge is not in learning of rigid rules and keeping true to them, but rather of predicting likely consequences and how to direct them.

It is objective, but not at all static.


No, I do not.

We may believe in some form of freedom of will and action or we may not. Either way, that does not touch on the matter of morality itself, just on how much of a choice we have in adhering to it and on how accurate our perception of that choice is.


Morality is unavoidably shaped both by environmental factors (such as biology, demographics, ecology, economics) and by the intellectual ability of the moral agent.

I would even define morality as "the duty of the individual towards global community".

Not really, for two main reasons.

One: "Free will" is a remarkably vague concept with dubious practical value.

Two: Objective morality does not have to be (and IMO is not) defined by right "thou shalt" rules, but rather by likely consequences.

The challenge is not in learning of rigid rules and keeping true to them, but rather of predicting likely consequences and how to direct them.

It is objective, but not at all static.


No, I do not.

We may believe in some form of freedom of will and action or we may not. Either way, that does not touch on the matter of morality itself, just on how much of a choice we have in adhering to it and on how accurate our perception of that choice is.


Morality is unavoidably shaped both by environmental factors (such as biology, demographics, ecology, economics) and by the intellectual ability of the moral agent.

I would even define morality as "the duty of the individual towards global community".

How does one decide that some consequences are better than others? Doesn't that boil down to subjective preference? Even if those preferences are evolutionarily and socially influenced? I value X, therefore I should (not) do Y.

 

[LuisDantas]

How does one decide that some consequences are better than others?

Unavoidably. Moral decisions are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of rational and abstract thought.

The exact criteria will and must vary according to, among other factors, the available information and reasoning ability. And, of course, the moral decision process influences itself to some degree.

Still, the main yardsticks for those decisions, the moral values, are rooted in simple realizations that relief is better than suffering, sustainability is better than mindless extractivism, and similar applications of the basic idea that destruction is not morally desirable.

Doesn't that boil down to subjective preference?

Many people seem to think so. I am always somewhat surprised by that, because that is clearly not the case.

Morality IMO is actually quite objective, and in fact can't help but be objective, albeit somewhat difficult to predict due to its strong correlation to rational discernment, which by its turn is subject to a lot of circunstances.

It seems to me that the popularity of the idea that morality is "subjective" comes from unreasonable expectations of independence from specific moral agents, of uniformity of decision across many people and many circunstances.

Even if those preferences are evolutionarily and socially influenced?

No, if by subjective preference you mean that there is actual freedom of arbitrary choice. People can fail to notice, understand or act on aspects of moral significance, but that does not really change the morality itself, only its condition of implementation.

I value X, therefore I should (not) do Y.

Morality, if it is to have any meaning at all, must consider specific circunstances. That is one main reason why it is so sharply distinct from the application of any form of laws, of either human or alleged divine origin.

 

[EverChanging]

Still, the main yardsticks for those decisions, the moral values, are rooted in simple realizations that relief is better than suffering, sustainability is better than mindless extractivism, and similar applications of the basic idea that destruction is not morally desirable.

How does one conclude that some of these are objectively better than others?

 

[LuisDantas]

How does one conclude that some of these are objectively better than others?

In a nutshell, causing suffering and promoting unsustainable situations are to be avoided.

 

[PureX]

The problem with these kinds of discussions is that we have limited free will. Which means that we have some choices available to us, but those choices are limited, and beyond those limitations we no longer have a choice. This generates a lot of confusion. For example, is an unrecognized possibility really a possibility at all? See what I mean?

 

[EverChanging]

In a nutshell, causing suffering and promoting unsustainable situations are to be avoided.

But how did you come to that conclusion? It seems more like a preference than an objective truth to me.