No one can serve two masters

[Windwalker]

I understand them, except for the gibberish.

My words are not gibberish. You're understanding is lacking, and you cast insults to hide that fact out of embarrassment or something. I'm not going to waste my time with you anymore.

 

[RestlessSoul]

Yes, I would prefer to free myself. Which I suppose means to seek to be neither master nor slave.

Free yourself from what?

 

[Nakosis]

Free yourself from what?

Fear and pain mostly. Anything that obstructs me from doing what I want to do.

 

[RestlessSoul]

Fear and pain mostly. Anything that obstructs me from doing what I want to do.

Yeah, fear is a particularly debilitating emotion. And if you suffer from chronic pain, you have my sympathies. As for doing what I want to do, I find doing what I don't want to do can be very liberating.

 

[Nakosis]

As for doing what I want to do, I find doing what I don't want to do can be very liberating.

True but sometimes it is fear that makes it something you don't want to do.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Okay! Sounds good.

As is currently, I'm limited to that Wikipedia article (which might not be 100% accurate).

So I found a free online translation describing what I was speaking about before: the concept of self-mastery in the Republic. Forgive me for just firing off passages here:

"And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words ‘temperance’ and ‘self-mastery’ truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Very true.

These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals."

***

"But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance."

There is a LOT of context and explanation that I need to add to explain to fully support the claims I made in my previous posts. The main point of confusion is that in one instance Plato talks about the state and in the other he speaks of the individual. The nutshell answer to this conundrum is that the first half of the Republic has a sustained analogy about the various parts of the human soul and the various parts of the state.

I can get into further depth if you want me to explain myself, but that is the general idea, and I did promise to quote the passages and explain myself. So this is the first work I'm doing toward that end.

 

[vulcanlogician]

I note that you are engaged in two conversations here, but perhaps later if you have time, you’ll address my observation that there appears no way to fully describe our experience of reality without reference to God (even if only as metaphor).

My engagement in two conversations is not happening any more. Would you like to kind of wipe the slate and begin your argument about Godel again?

 

[PoetPhilosopher]

So I found a free online translation describing what I was speaking about before: the concept of self-mastery in the Republic. Forgive me for just firing off passages here:

"And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words ‘temperance’ and ‘self-mastery’ truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.

Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Very true.

These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Certainly, he replied.

It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals."

***

"But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others,—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance."

There is a LOT of context and explanation that I need to add to explain to fully support the claims I made in my previous posts. The main point of confusion is that in one instance Plato talks about the state and in the other he speaks of the individual. The nutshell answer to this conundrum is that the first half of the Republic has a sustained analogy about the various parts of the human soul and the various parts of the state.

I can get into further depth if you want me to explain myself, but that is the general idea, and I did promise to quote the passages and explain myself. So this is the first work I'm doing toward that end.

Thank you for sharing these passages from Plato's Republic. From an existentialist perspective, I have some reservations about Plato's view of human nature and morality. I've also had some more time to think about this subject, as well as study a bit.

First of all, one thing I remembered is that Plato assumes that there is a fixed and objective order of reality, which he calls the forms, that determines what is good, just, and beautiful. He also assumes that human beings have a rational part of their soul that can access and conform to this order, and that this is the source of their virtue and happiness. However, existentialists reject this. They argue that there is no pre-existing essence or meaning to existence, and that human beings are free to create their own values and purposes through their choices and actions.

Second, Plato's ideal state is based on a rigid hierarchy of classes and functions, if you will, which he claims is natural and harmonious. He argues that each person has a specific role to play in the state, according to their natural abilities and inclinations, and that they should not interfere with or aspire to the roles of others. He also advocates for a strict censorship of art, education, and religion, in order to prevent corruption and deviation from the ideal:

Professing Faith: Why censorship made sense to Plato

However, existentialists challenge this view of politics and society. They contend that human beings are not defined by their social roles or functions, but by their existential situation and choices. They also defend the freedom of expression, creativity, and diversity, which (I feel) is essential for humans flourishing.

Third, Plato's concept of self-mastery is based on a view of the soul, which he divides into three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite. He claims that reason is the highest and noblest part of the soul, which should rule over the other parts, while spirit is the intermediate part, which should assist reason in controlling appetite. He also asserts that self-mastery is achieved when the soul is in harmony with itself and with the forms, which he equates with justice. However, I question this psychological and ethical view of the self. I suggest that human beings are not composed of separate parts, but are integrated wholes who experience themselves as embodied beings in the world.

I think that Plato's vision of reality, human nature, morality, politics, and art is too abstract, idealistic, dogmatic, and oppressive for my taste. I prefer to embrace the concrete, subjective, and creative aspects of existence. I hope you understand my point of view and do not take offense at my criticism of Plato.

That being said, I still say that there is some merit to some of the ideas expressed by Plato, but that they are a bit rudimentary as is. I actually felt I saw some better ideas in the humbling responses of this thread I created on a slightly different subject, but that I feel relates a bit to the subject we are talking now:

Rationalism

Such as:

Reasoning done properly involves a discovered set of rules of inference, that is, rules that tell us that if it this is true then that must be true as well. It has two applications - discovering what is necessarily true using pure reason as with the Pythagorean theorem, and what is contingently true about the world beginning with evidence and yielding facts, laws, and theories that facilitate accurately predicting outcomes.

But our goal is not just to know what's true. It is to achieve happiness as we understand it using that knowledge. Reasoning can't provide this directly, but it is a means to obtaining that end. In a common metaphor, reason is the rider and the passions are the horse. Neither gets very far without the other. Pure reason without passion is boring. Purse passion without reason is dangerous.

Managing the register of affective experiences to minimize the dysphoric ones while facilitating the pleasant ones is what reason can do for one, but it's that palette of colors (feelings, emotions, desires) that make life worth living, not the rules for managing them alone. By this metaphor, the pigments are the passions and the brush the reasoning faculty. The brush determines which colors go on the canvas, and for some eyes, that's more teal and fuchsia, and less orange and brown. It's the painting that has intrinsic value, not the brush.

This is a source of misunderstanding between the empiricists and those who see themselves as spiritualists. They spiritualists object to the empiricist's epistemology, which rejects the claims that such ideas about gods and spirits are spiritual truth, and mistakenly understand that as the rejection or absence of passion. That's wrong. The philosophical empiricist can be an expert at managing the passions, but he doesn't use them to decide what's true about reality. That would be a mistake. He uses his cognitive skills to do that, to arrange his life so that he can have a good experience of it.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Professing Faith: Why censorship made sense to Plato

This is its own thread.

Rationalism

So is this it's own thread too but you've already started it. I'll give it a read and see if there is anything worthwhile I have to contribute.

 

[chinu]

View attachment 80544​

“No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon [money, possessions, fame, status, or whatever is valued more than the Lord]

Is it possible to serve no master?

One always serves no-master, there's no other option.

The only option one have: is to serve own mind.
Somebody/something which is suggested by own mind is = serving own mind, nothing else.
And, serving own mind = serving no master.

Yes, it is possible that with God's-grace/destiny someone may come in contact of a true master.
God's grace/destiny is God's grace/destiny, its never an option.

 

[Nakosis]

How bout serve god and appreciate your possessions?

Don't know what God wants.

 

[RestlessSoul]

My engagement in two conversations is not happening any more. Would you like to kind of wipe the slate and begin your argument about Godel again?

Kurt Godel (apologies for the missing umlaut) was a mathematician, philosopher, and student of logic, one of whose achievements was to prove mathematically that no set axioms could prove their own consistency; and that in any reasonable system, there will always be true statements that cannot be proved. He came to mind with your Plato reference, and the observation that a man cannot by definition master himself (any more than an eye can see itself). But now I write it out again, it seems the connection is rather tenuous.

In any case, whatever conclusions we may draw from recognising that any mode of understanding based on reason is necessarily predicated on a tautology, is open to question. Do you have any thoughts on this?

 

[Jimmy]

Don't know what God wants.

That’s your choice

 

[ppp]

That’s your choice

That statement is trivially false.

 

[Jimmy]

That statement is trivially false.

People can choose to ignore god imo. If he truly doesn’t know then I wish him luck

 

[ppp]

People can choose to ignore god imo. If he truly doesn’t know then I wish him luck

I don't know why you are shifting from not knowing to ignoring. Not knowing and ignoring aren't even on the same continuum of actions.

In order to ignore what a god wants, he would first have to know that god exists. Then once he knew that, he would have to know that the god wants something. Then upon knowing that, he would have to know what it is that the god wants. Then, and only then, could he ignore what god wants.

 

[Jimmy]

I don't know why you are shifting from not knowing to ignoring. Not knowing and ignoring aren't even on the same continuum of actions.

In order to ignore what a god wants, he would first have to know that god exists. Then once he knew that, he would have to know that the god wants something. Then upon knowing that, he would have to know what it is that the god wants. Then, and only then, could he ignore what god wants.

You’re making this to deep for my taste

 

[ppp]

You’re making this to deep for my taste

Not my doing.

I like the new Avatar.

 

[RestlessSoul]

I don't know why you are shifting from not knowing to ignoring. Not knowing and ignoring aren't even on the same continuum of actions.

In order to ignore what a god wants, he would first have to know that god exists. Then once he knew that, he would have to know that the god wants something. Then upon knowing that, he would have to know what it is that the god wants. Then, and only then, could he ignore what god wants.

I think you should consider the relationship between knowledge and ignorance, and the etymology of the latter..

 

[ppp]

I think you should consider the relationship between knowledge and ignorance, and the etymology of the latter..

I think that you are making vague motions at etymology in an attempt to imply a point of substance where there is none. I would be unsurprised if you try to get me to do your homework for you.