I am not attempting to. Hitler used consistent evolutionary principles contained in On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. to justify racism. That is confirmed by the statement Dawkin's made that In evolution it can't really be stated whether what he did was in fact actually wrong. If Stalin had a belief in the sanctity of life that his atheism could not produce then he might have thought twice. Their actions are consistent with or at least nothing in their beliefs can be found to contradict their actions. Nature is red in tooth and claw.
When people jump right into numbered lists it seems condescending and snappy to me sometimes, so this is a sentence to preface a numbered list to avoid that appearance!
1) Evolutionary mechanisms aren't "principles" which can be "used" as some sort of worldview. Evolution, in general, is just a process involving changing frequencies of alleles in populations.
I don't understand your statement any more than I would understand it if someone said, "Newton used the principles of his theory of universal gravitation to justify shaking apples out of trees which weren't his -- so there must be something morally lacking about the theory of universal graviation!"
Now, that's not to say that I'm naïve about where you could be coming from; or that I'm new to this particular debate. I'm merely pointing out that
processes/mechanisms aren't
worldviews -- and that anyone who attempts to twist evolutionary mechanisms into a justification for genocide simply doesn't understand evolutionary mechanisms.
As for Dawkins, I'm not a huge fan of his forays into metaphysics (he's a bit sophomoric, though granted, his target audience were laypersons) -- he should stay in biology, where he is very knowledgeable and keen. If you considered his quote to be significant though, I'd like to see the direct quote to get an understanding of what Dawkins might have been talking about.
2) Atheism, again, isn't a worldview any more than bald is a hair color; asserting that the notion of being unconvinced by some position (in this case, theism) is in itself a worldview is sort of like calling not-playing-the-lottery a "lifestyle."
For instance, consider for the sake of argument that perhaps there may be extraterrestrial life elsewhere in the universe (and let's ignore the Drake Equation and Fermi Paradox for brevity).
Consider Erin (moi), who as a cosmology student is aware of the vast potential elsewhere in the cosmos; yet who is also aware of the staggering odds against the formation of life. Then consider that Erin neither affirms the proposition, "Extraterrestrial life exists" nor its negation, "Extraterrestrial life doesn't exist" -- is Erin's lack of commitment to the positive proposition and its negation constitute a
worldview?
Or is it the case that all that can be said about Erin, knowing this, is that she's skeptical concerning extraterrestrial life, and nothing more could be deduced reliably without further information?
Atheists do
have worldviews -- it's just important to recognize that skepticism qua atheism
is not a worldview in itself.
3) Atheists don't have any problem valuing the sanctity of life, nor do theists enjoy a metaphysical foundation for cherishing life with superior justification to atheists.
You hypothetically muse that perhaps Stalin might have stayed his hand if his worldview could "produce" a notion of sanctity of life (I interpret this to mean justify acting on the notion, correct me if I'm wrong). I agree with you -- if he had a different worldview, then perhaps he
would have stayed his hand!
However, I don't think theism or atheism have much to do with it. There are worldviews held by some atheists which appear to trivilialize life (e.g. extreme nihilism); but that's not any different from worldviews held by some theists which also trivialize life (dystheism,
*edited out an insensitive, unthinking example which was baseless*).
If Stalin were a humanist then I doubt anyone would have died or suffered if he could have helped it -- but his worldview had a less altruistic agenda; and people paid for it dearly.
1robin said:
If you kept reading this injuction was only for the Jews and only for a specific time. It was meant to make their example unique in the world to heighten the impact of Christ when he came. It also says that both parents must consent, it also adds that even then the issue must be taken to a priest. Only if all three agree was this done. It is easy to see that only the most desparate cases would have been folllowed through with. Considering that the stakes are millions of future souls saved or lost by Israel's actions it is not unreasonable. Either way it is no general injuction.
Perhaps that should tell me not to stick my nose where I'm mainly ignorant, or I'll get burned
I find the notion unpalatable, but fair enough -- I won't fallaciously engage in an argument against adverse consequences. I'll concede concerning the New Testament and violence.
1robin said:
The Jews were fiercly inclusive. They had long ago quit straying away from their religion. They did not adopt outside influences under any circumstances by this time. In fact they were so fiercly resistant that they killed Jesus because they mistakenly thought he was bringing something new. There is no evidence that any outside influence had any effect on Christianity. They especially resented Roman and resisted everything Roman. By the way there are no general injunctions to violence in the old testament either.
I wasn't arguing explicitly about external influences such as to say something like "Christianity stole its mythology from Mithraism!" (as I have seen argued; and then refuted). Really, it was almost a comment to myself; as the idea is from a perspective I doubt you'll agree with: I was noting that it was interesting how religions seem to turn out depending on the situation and the interests of the culture they spring out of at the time.
1robin said:
If you will look up progressive revelation you will understand hopefully. Just the same as a child has different rules as he grows so too mankind.
I vaguely grasp the general idea, but I'm afraid I don't understand it -- by that I don't mean that I don't understand what it's supposed to be, but rather that I don't understand why an omnipotent and omniscient being would use a means to an end.
1robin said:
Do you think that my admission that it happened and sober explenations are gymnastics?
Ha ha, which one of us is the girl again? You sound like the peeved girlfriend who incredulously retorts, "Did you just call me fat?!"
Just kidding! You're a wonderful debater, I wasn't accusing you of sophistry.
1robin said:
I will provide it but I need an area. How about general violence on unbelievers?
Sure! Anything you have some knowledge on. Hopefully some of our Muslim friends will chime in on it as well so I can maybe get both perspectives.
I've seen a few brow-raising lines in the Quran, for sure, but those were mostly outrageous due to inherent inequality between the sexes -- haven't really looked at any verses supposedly commanding violence in general.
1robin said:
Do you believe that anything qualifies as a bowling ball? Of course not. A tree is not a bowling ball. Some things are bowling balls and some things are not. This is no fallacy. It does have an application but not in Christianity.
Fair enough; but this implies an exhaustively defined line between x and ¬x; and I'm not sure that you would be able to elucidate that distinction without resolving Euthyphro's Dilemma.
1robin said:
So there has never been a suffecient reason to destroy a culture? If you can prove that then I will entertain your fallacy.
I didn't say that (boy am I glad Nazis are gone!) -- I was more making the epistemic argument that a claim like this:
i) Genocide is malevolent
ii) x commands genocide
iii) x is not malevolent because of x's ineffable nature
...doesn't work. The argument can't be presented, it's just a fallacy, even if it might seem
prima facie explanatory -- it's really not. There's a paper written by an interesting guy named Mark Vuletic about invoking the special pleading fallacy when it comes to God and especially as God relates to goodness that I'd love for you (and anyone) to read if you have the time:
this is the link.
The Cliff's Notes version:
consider that no matter what suffering God causes or commands (or allows), Tom always relies on special pleading to rescue his notion that God is good: "Normally x is bad, God did x, but God is good, therefore God doing x isn't bad even if it normally is." Bill always responds, "But how, if x is normally bad, is God still good for doing it?"
Tom says, "Because God is so inconceivably great! For instance, God might have knowledge that we don't have when we're evaluating the badness of x, such that if we did have God's infinite knowledge, we would see how God doing x was in fact good." (This is the special pleading fallacy)
Now, skip ahead to Tom's death. He's standing in front of God's throne, and say that God just gets up and starts beating the living (er, un-living?) snot out of him. "It's ok," he reasons, "God is good by definition, and is so ineffable that my mind can't process just exactly how beating me is good, but I have faith that it's in fact good for God to do so."
Can you see how literally
nothing can change Tom's mind once he has started adopting the fallacy of special pleading?
(Continued...)