My posiition is very simple:
If two brains are in the exact same physical state and subject to the exact same physical input, then they will have exactly the same desires and pursue them in the same exact way with the same exact success. This is what I mean with determinism and its relevance towards "free will". I set the initial conditions and check whether there are more solutions from it. If there are not, then determinism is not defeated. I am still waiting for annihiltion of this simple gedanken experiment.
That is not an experiment, it is a declaration. I don't even think anyone ever can make this experiment nor do I think we could ever know we had even if we did. How would anyone ever know that the causal inputs for two brains were identical?
This discussion has gone like this so far.
1. You said determinism is true.
2. I said it was not and could show it was not.
3. I gave one of billions of events that requires intent to explain apart from any causal chain alone.
4. Then the discussion ripped a worm hole in the fabric of the thread and you have asked my why I wanted to go to Wal-mart, addressed ever single thing I said plus a few I did not except for the problem that determinism would not care to actualize a desire, and the whole train wreck has come to rest of a declaration claimed to be an experiment.
5. Is my simplistic argument about causal chains having no intention of gratifying desires conflicting with the fact we gratify them billions of times a day ever going to be reckoned with?
Whether the initial conditions derive from a random past (whatever that is), is not relevant. We are not aware of any annihilating arguments that prevent random bouncing atoms (sic) from creating things like the eye of a hawk or the Ebola virus, either, for evolution by natural selection does not seem to be annihilated by feet stomping theists, currently
. Therefore, singling out desires and intentions from other characteristics of phenotypes (including the machine they have in their head) is wishful computing, question begging and not logically warranted.
Again I did not say the eye, evolution, or a virus was evidence against determinism. I can't make my actual argument any clearer. Determinism can explain why we have a desire, a plan, or a question, it cannot explain because it does not care if we ever gratified that desire, carried out that plan (plus the millions of other things that must be purposely actualized to complete the plan), or got an answer to any question. We live in a world full of intent and determinism does not have any. Since this is apparently not going to be acknowledged I will instead give some comic relief that at least mentions the subject.
And if great reasoners are often maniacal, it is equally true that maniacs are commonly great reasoners. When I was engaged in a controversy with the CLARION on the matter of free will, that able writer Mr. R.B.Suthers said that free will was lunacy, because it meant causeless actions, and the actions of a lunatic would be causeless. I do not dwell here upon the disastrous lapse in determinist logic. Obviously if any actions, even a lunatic's, can be causeless, determinism is done for. If the chain of causation can be broken for a madman, it can be broken for a man. But my purpose is to point out something more practical. It was natural, perhaps, that a modern Marxian Socialist should not know anything about free will. But it was certainly remarkable that a modern Marxian Socialist should not know anything about lunatics. Mr. Suthers evidently did not know anything about lunatics. The last thing that can be said of a lunatic is that his actions are causeless. If any human acts may loosely be called causeless, they are the minor acts of a healthy man; whistling as he walks; slashing the grass with a stick; kicking his heels or rubbing his hands. It is the happy man who does the useless things; the sick man is not strong enough to be idle. It is exactly such careless and causeless actions that the madman could never understand; for the madman (like the determinist) generally sees too much cause in everything. The madman would read a conspiratorial significance into those empty activities. He would think that the lopping of the grass was an attack on private property. He would think that the kicking of the heels was a signal to an accomplice.
If the madman could for an instant become careless, he would become sane. Every one who has had the misfortune to talk with people in the heart or on the edge of mental disorder, knows that their most sinister quality is a horrible clarity of detail; a connecting of one thing with another in a map more elaborate than a maze. If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker for not being delayed by the things that go with good judgment. He is not hampered by a sense of humor or by charity, or by the dumb certainties of experience. He is the more logical for losing certain sane affections. Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this respect a misleading one. The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.
Title: Orthodoxy
Author: G. K. Chesterton