The Problem of Foreknowledge

[Heathen Hammer]

. Does the knowledge of that scientist in any way coerce the individual? Accepting that the two had no interaction, no communication what so ever.

Science depends on a determine universe. Without it science could not make predictions. Whether any being has foreknowledge of "what will happen next" is irrelevant.

Actually if the being with foreknowledge is God it does make all the difference, because his prediction has no inherent uncertainty. The foreknowledge of any mortal character does not possess the same inerrancy as that of God. Essentially, God's various demonstration of prophecy are a 'practical proof' that his influence over future events is present.

having a nice little knock-down about this in another thread

 

[Willamena]

Actually if the being with foreknowledge is God it does make all the difference, because his prediction has no inherent uncertainty. The foreknowledge of any mortal character does not possess the same inerrancy as that of God. Essentially, God's various demonstration of prophecy are a 'practical proof' that his influence over future events is present.

having a nice little knock-down about this in another thread

The uncertainty that's inherent can't be done away with. It contributes to definition --without it, there is no "prediction." Just knowledge.

 

[Willamena]

The opportunity to do Y is nonexistent. The sequence of causes/effects leading up to the 8:17 PM moment can only result in doing X.

Not in this argument. In this argument, Y is nonexistent simply because X is a done deed.

 

[The Sparda]

Knowing what someone will do before they do it does not necessarily absolve them from guilt. A black man can go to apply for a job in the deep south and 'know' that the white folks won't hire him. Does that mean that they are innocent and no longer "all racial" just because he knew beforehand how they were?

If a regular man made of dust can know how people are, how much more can the Creator who was before the world began?

 

[Skwim]

Not in this argument. In this argument, Y is nonexistent simply because X is a done deed.

if you note, I was responding to Falviun's claim that "This does not pose a problem to free-will." only because he, like you, are not addressing the real problem of free will, No one who denies free will would argue that "You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it." It's a non-issue. So, in an attempt to get Falviun back on track to the real issue, I presented the real issue that addresses the act as future action: what can one do. NOT what could have one done. That perspective is only useful in stating the free will argument in the past tense. to wit: Could you have done differently if you wanted to? "could have done" being the key distinction.

"You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it."

VERSUS

"Could you have done differently if you wanted to?"
​

The "could have" places the perspective before the action. To reiterate; no one would argue "You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it."

 

[Nakosis]

Actually if the being with foreknowledge is God it does make all the difference, because his prediction has no inherent uncertainty. The foreknowledge of any mortal character does not possess the same inerrancy as that of God. Essentially, God's various demonstration of prophecy are a 'practical proof' that his influence over future events is present.

having a nice little knock-down about this in another thread

Ok so God has foreknowledge. Is man capable of acting in any other then God knows he is going to act?

Do any Heathen Gods have foreknowledge? I suppose it saves a lot of argument assuming they don't.

 

[muhammad_isa]

Ok so God has foreknowledge. Is man capable of acting in any other then God knows he is going to act?

No! .. but as you don't know your destiny, it makes little difference .. you still have to make a choice

Remember .. God is omniscient .. He is the owner of time .. He created space-time, and doesn't share our perception of "the past & future"

It's clearly hard to grasp, as until Einstein came along, we imagined 'time' to be absolute

 

[Nakosis]

No! .. but as you don't know your destiny, it makes little difference .. you still have to make a choice

Remember .. God is omniscient .. He is the owner of time .. He created space-time, and doesn't share our perception of "the past & future"

It's clearly hard to grasp, as until Einstein came along, we imagined 'time' to be absolute

Actually it works out. God seems then compatible with the compatibilist view of things.

 

[1137]

(a.k.a. Beating a Dead Horse)

The problem of God's foreknowledge vs. Man's free will was dealt with by past philosophers by specifying the distinction between knowledge and prediction in regards to truth, and holding that foreknowledge, even God's, is prediction.


Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

Actually foreknowledge is absolutely no threat to Free Will. You see, there is a huge difference between predestination and foreknowledge. I haven't read the whole thread so I do not know what has been covered, apologies for repeat info. But look at it this way:

Foreknowledge: You feel like eating some chicken nuggets. But, being the rebellious philosopher you are, you decide to mess with god. So, you think about having chicken nuggets all day, but when you get home you make a ham sandwich instead! Take that god! No, that is not how it works. God has always known that you would eat the sandwich. He also knows about your whole sinister plot.

Predestination: God is going to make you eat a sandwich. Being the sneeky philosopher you are, you try and trick god. All day you think about eating chicken nuggets, but then you eat a ham sandwich. You think that you have tricked god, but the joke is on you as god forced you to eat the sandwich.

Forcing you to do something and knowing you will do something is completely different. God is outside of time, it can see all of time at once. That does not mean that god controls what happens.

 

[Skwim]

Actually foreknowledge is absolutely no threat to Free Will. You see, there is a huge difference between predestination and foreknowledge. I haven't read the whole thread so I do not know what has been covered, apologies for repeat info. But look at it this way:

Foreknowledge: You feel like eating some chicken nuggets. But, being the rebellious philosopher you are, you decide to mess with god. So, you think about having chicken nuggets all day, but when you get home you make a ham sandwich instead! Take that god! No, that is not how it works. God has always known that you would eat the sandwich. He also knows about your whole sinister plot.

Predestination: God is going to make you eat a sandwich. Being the sneeky philosopher you are, you try and trick god. All day you think about eating chicken nuggets, but then you eat a ham sandwich. You think that you have tricked god, but the joke is on you as god forced you to eat the sandwich.

Forcing you to do something and knowing you will do something is completely different. God is outside of time, it can see all of time at once. That does not mean that god controls what happens.

The issue isn't god forcing anyone to do anything, or because god knowledge has some casual effect on the future. All his foreknowledge does is ratify the fact that X and not Y will take place. X will happen regardless if god knows it or not; however, because he does know X will happen there is the surety within the present that it will.

 

[idav]

The issue isn't god forcing anyone to do anything, or because god knowledge has some casual effect on the future. All his foreknowledge does is ratify the fact that X and not Y will take place. X will happen regardless if god knows it or not; however, because he does know X will happen there is the surety within the present that it will.

I go with the idea that god knows multiple possibilities that could occur. He would also know all the changes that would take place if he flicked his finger. An omniscient being should know the answer to 'what ifs'. One would know the answer to x producing y as well as what y.1 would be like if x.1 had occurred instead.

 

[Heathen Hammer]

Ok so God has foreknowledge. Is man capable of acting in any other then God knows he is going to act?

As-read no, man is unable to act otherwise. Hence my statement.

Do any Heathen Gods have foreknowledge? I suppose it saves a lot of argument assuming they don't.

Mm, not really in terms of day-to-day operations, though prophecy does happen. The end of the world and the manner in which a number of the Gods will die, is known though.

In what way does it save a lot of argument, since we're talking about the Christian God? :no:

 

[Nakosis]

In what way does it save a lot of argument, since we're talking about the Christian God? :no:

I though the thread was about foreknowledge.
Anyway, I'd suspect Heathens to have less need of apologetics.

 

[Willamena]

if you note, I was responding to Falviun's claim that "This does not pose a problem to free-will." only because he, like you, are not addressing the real problem of free will, No one who denies free will would argue that "You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it." It's a non-issue. So, in an attempt to get Falviun back on track to the real issue, I presented the real issue that addresses the act as future action: what can one do. NOT what could have one done. That perspective is only useful in stating the free will argument in the past tense. to wit: Could you have done differently if you wanted to? "could have done" being the key distinction.

"You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it."

VERSUS

"Could you have done differently if you wanted to?"
​

The "could have" places the perspective before the action. To reiterate; no one would argue "You can't choose to do something differently after you have already done it."

You can address the act to come in the present tense. "Could you do differently, if you want to?" That's where will is meaningful (per the OP), here and now.

 

[Nakosis]

You can address the act to come in the present tense. "Could you do differently, if you want to?" That's where will is meaningful (per the OP), here and now.

One is free to act according to their will. However their will is determined by everything leading up to the moment of choosing.

A God who knows everything that happens in an individuals life would know their will and know what choices they will make through out their life.

With some beliefs, God decrees destiny. By his will I suppose. Being omnipotent. God can force reality according to his will.

I don't think for a compatibilist foreknowledge is an issue. God takes the place of Laplace's Demon. A matter of predicting the future while man is still free to act according to man's will.

Omnipotence could be that God could force the outcome if he chooses but chooses not to. God could force his will on man, choosing for us.

 

[Falvlun]

Consider: In 1936 god sees you doing X at 8:17 PM on January 18, 2012. 8:15 PM on January 18, 2012 rolls around and in two minutes you have two "options": doing X or doing Y. Which will you do? Why? Could you have really chosen to do Y?

But God only sees you doing X on January 18th because that is what you did. That's the beauty of God being outside of time. We get to do what we want to do according to our forward-moving timescale, and God gets to see the whole thing as its happening.

The opportunity to do Y is nonexistent. The sequence of causes/effects leading up to the 8:17 PM moment can only result in doing X. For Y to happen the causes/effects sequence would necessarily have to be different. But it wasn't, so there is no way Y could happen.

in the sense that both X and Y have an equal chance of occurring there is no true choice, Y was never in the running.

This argument is irrelevant to the foreknowledge problem, because it rests on your belief that freewill can't exist regardless of whether God is omniscient or not.

Assuming that determinism isn't true, would omniscience eliminate the possibility of free-will?

 

[Skwim]

You can address the act to come in the present tense. "Could you do differently, if you want to?" That's where will is meaningful (per the OP), here and now.

Per the OP, I see god as being purported to be the determining factor, which I don't go along with. As I said in post 29, "It really doesn't make any difference if god really sees you do X rather than Y, His knowledge is nothing but a confirmation that X, and not Y, will happen."
And from post 90, "All his foreknowledge does is ratify the fact that X and not Y will take place. X will happen regardless if god knows it or not; however, because he does know X will happen there is the surety within the present that it will."

Moreover, to "address the act to come in the present tense" you can't phrase it as, "Could you do differently, if you want to?" because your "to come" puts the act in the future, so it would have to be "Can you do differently, if you want to?" to which we don't have a clue. It depends on the "want." The wanting is now the nexus of the issue. Why do you want to do X rather than want to do Y? Whatever it was that caused the" X wanting" to outweigh the "Y wanting" becomes the determiner that prevented Y from happening. There was no "choosing" X over Y because there was the causal element behind the" X wanting," which eclipsed the "Y wanting."

 

[Skwim]

But God only sees you doing X on January 18th because that is what you did.

We're talking about god's foreknowledge: what he knows of the future; therefore, it isn't a matter of "what you did," but of what you're going to do." The question then being, does this foreknowledge of god's determine whether or X and not Y happens? I say No.

That's the beauty of God being outside of time. We get to do what we want to do according to our forward-moving timescale, and God gets to see the whole thing as its happening.

Sorry, but no. As I've said elsewhere, you only get to do what you do because of all the causal determinants that led up to that doing.

This argument is irrelevant to the foreknowledge problem, because it rests on your belief that freewill can't exist regardless of whether God is omniscient or not.

The only problem I see with foreknowledge is regarding it as the determinant of the future. But you are correct in that I believe freewill can't exist regardless of whether God is omniscient or not.

Assuming that determinism isn't true, would omniscience eliminate the possibility of free-will?

You mean if what we do is completely and utterly random in nature? No. Free will would be a bankrupt notion because the will (whatever it may be) would be at the mercy of random processes.

 

[muhammad_isa]

But you are correct in that I believe freewill can't exist regardless of whether God is omniscient or not.

I hope you don't drive .. you don't sound safe to me .. if it's not you making the choice when to brake, who is?

 

[Skwim]

I hope you don't drive .. you don't sound safe to me .. if it's not you making the choice when to brake, who is?

It is me braking, but not because I choose to do so. There's no such a thing as choosing. It's an illusion. I do what I do because of the number of cause/effects that lead up to specific moments in time. Just like you do.