Objective in this context means beyond influence of opinion of it's subjects.
Which is almost
exactly what I said.
The above fails. No matter what technical language you use everything you say will equal opinion for the foundation of morality without God.
Including when what I say
explicitly excludes "opinion"? You're hiding behind this "technical language" objection; when what I describe as objective morality appears to be
exactly what you have in mind (i.e. as not dependent upon any person's view or opinion), the only reason "everything I say will equal opinion" is because you're going to
pretend as much for the sake of dogmatically maintaining your unsubstantiated and patently false position.
Then for the at least 12th time of asked, pray tell what are their objective foundations? At this point you could say yogurt, aliens, or even fruit bats but please simply state something.
I've already told you; deontological moral realism holds that certain actions are morally right/wrong good/bad
in themselves- that is,
irrespective of their consequences, or
of the opinions or conventions or the moral agents themselves. For some deontologists the "foundation" is a concept of natural rights, which are
objective facts discoverable by reason (Hobbes, Locke), for others it is a concept of duty and a rational principle (Kant), and for yet others such as yourself, the foundation is the will of a deity.
On the other hand, consequentialists found their moral realism on the objective consequences of actions; that actions are morally right/wrong good/bad on the basis of their tendency to cause pleasure or pain (again, something that is NOT CONTINGENT or SUBJECT TO the opinions of anyone)- the good objectively consists in what maximizes happiness or pleasure and minimizes pain or suffering.
That is redefining morality as happiness or minimizing pain which is NOT the basis for actual morality. The desire al societies have to defend even bad cultures from obviously superior ones is an example of something universal that opposes your principle.
While I would agree that utilitarianism (i.e. the variety of consequentialism which defines the good as maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering) is not entirely correct, I have no idea what this particular example has to do with it. You're suggesting that defending "bad cultures" is an act universally deemed morally good which does not maximize happiness or minimize suffering? Care to explain?
Another would be that human happiness at least for recorded history has made necessary the unhappiness of many other beings and species.
This alone, of all you've wrote on the subject, is a valid and pertinent criticism of consequentialism; i.e. the interconnectedness of happiness and suffering.
Why is cow happiness not the standard? The only reason to believe human happiness is the standard is because someone said it is.
I don't know that these are mutually exclusive; the consequentialist may just say that he includes happiness by ANYTHING able to feel happiness- so the right action is the one that maximizes happiness, whether of man, cow, bird or anything else that can experience happiness, and minimize suffering across the board as well. And needless to say, this is not the
only reason.
You have no other option than opinion. Terminology will never ever help. The more educated I became the more I disdained intellectualism and academia for this reason.
Then I have to suspect that you haven't entirely grasped all the relevant terminology. This whole line of argument reeks of anti-intellectualism and a false dilemma, and carries absolutely zero force as a counter-argument. You can't dismiss an argument by saying how much you disdain "all dem fancy words and stuff".
Please fill in the blank. Killing every form of life on the planet would actually be objectively wrong even without God because of __________________________.
As I've tried to explain, it depends on what form of moral realism- and I don't myself endorse any form of moral realism. But that you're assuming non-divine command moral realists have no good answer to this question just shows that you've never bothered to actually acquaint yourself with any of them, to any degree whatsoever, and that includes what little I've summarized for you has basically gone in one ear and out the other.
So, if I was a consequentialist, I would say that killing all life on the planet would be wrong because it would cause alot of suffering and net no happiness- and the morally wrong is
defined as that which causes a net amount of suffering.
If I was a natural rights deontologist, I would say that all humans are moral agents, and have the natural right to life and self-determination, and since killing all life would violate all these rights, it would be wrong. The Kantian would say that it is wrong because it cannot be performed out of duty, and cannot be universalized without being self-contradictory.
Similarly for any other form of moral realism- they all have an answer to this question; that's no problem. The real question is whether any of these answers are tenable- and in this regard, your preferred answer "Because
God wills X or not X" doesn't appear any better than any other moral realist answer, and in many respects looks less plausible.