The great thing about statements of the form that some person "doesn't believe in X" is that, for any term X (e.g., "god"), there exists no entity, thing, process, etc., that is X and that this person believes in.
Baloney. "X" is merely a placeholder. We might just as easily agree to leave a blank space. Let's try it:
"The great thing about statements of the form that some person "doesn't believe in ___ is that, for any _____, there exists no entity, thing, process, etc., that is ____ and that this person believes in."
Are we now free to move along with our lives, or is there anything else regarding this (non-) issue that you'd like to hammer out?
Even less formally, to not believe god exist simply requires that I believe nothing exists which I would say is god
And exactly how does one arrive at a belief like that? Does one simply pull it out thin air for the sake of argument?
... and anything that I would say is god or a god is something I don't believe exists.
It's a
Are you saying that you simply define god(s) out of existence? Isn't that what theists do when they offer up all manner of bizarre arguments for the existence of god(s)? Aren't they simply defining (and redefining) god(s) into existence?
It strikes me as a rather circular argument. You're invited to keep it.
There are lots of descriptions of elves in various languages. To assert elves don't exist, you need not know of the Teleri or Noldor.
That's a king-sized red herring if ever there was one. Plus, it's a whole 'nuther discussion in and of itself. Still, wouldn't Tolkien basically have said that in translating the original source material that he was working with to arrive at his Middle Earth stories that he'd merely
opted to use the word "elf" as the closest linguistic approximation?
Meanwhile, all anyone who wishes to make assertions one way or the other concerning the existence of elves
really needs to know is that there's no evidence.
I don't. If one doesn't believe god exists but it is not true of this person to say that they believe god doesn't exist, they are not atheists (they are most likely agnostic).
Again, agnosticism concerns what is known and atheism concerns what is believed.
You can remain unconvinced about the ontological status of god, the Loch Ness monster, big foot, etc., and yet believe that none of these exists as opposed to the agnostic position in which you assert merely that you don't know
Are there not people out there seeking to prove that the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, and God exist because ... while they
believe it ... they don't know it?
if there exists enough evidence for you to conclude that you can say more that "I don't know", even if you don't actually know the truth based upon the evidence you need only evaluate it as sufficient to warrant a verdict
If that's your chosen metaphor, I'm going to assume that it follows that theists are finding god
guilty of existence and I am finding him
not guilty of existence. That doesn't mean I feel God is innocent of existence, correct? Courts don't issue verdicts of innocence, right?
in this sense we might compare belief to a verdict or, as is done often in epistemology, the philosophy of probability, etc., to bets- juries don't actually know guilty parties but are asked to render a verdict in criminal trials based on whether the evidence is reasonably sufficient to "prove" guilt, while a rational gambler will not place a bet on the truth of the statement for which she has little cause to think is either true or false).
Almost the entire point of mental state predicates like "believe", and epistemic modality more generally, is to enable claims/assertions about what "is" or what is "true" without requiring that such statements be correct.
So you'd view "I don't believe" as
a counter claim instead of a reaction to a claim?
Thus I can say that "I believe that whatever doesn't kill you simply makes you stranger" if in fact this is a position I support or regard as truth even though I can simultaneously state (truthfully) that I don't "know for a fact" that my position is true.
Stranger?
I agree that belief doesn't require any degree of certainty regarding truth. In fact, beliefs often fly in the face of the facts.
Belief that god exists isn't the same as knowing god exists
I believe that has been a point I've reiterated rather explicitly on this thread and these forums. Anyone who claimed to know beyond any doubt that a god existed wouldn't be exercising faith ... would they?
but because any belief claim is a claim to have knowledge
Seriously? Any belief claim is a claim to have knowledge?
...
Test Scenario:
I've never looked in the box below, but I've been told that there's a cabbage in it. Let's assume for the sake of argument that merely being told that this was the case is enough for me to be convinced that there is indeed a cabbage in the box. Being convinced, I believe that there is a cabbage in the box.
Do I in fact possess
any knowledge whatsoever regarding the actual contents of the box, or not? Feel free to shoehorn this scenario into your belief = knowledge equivocation.
we demarcate those whose belief claim is that god exists from those whose belief claim is that no god exists, and both from the position that one can only say they don't believe god exists, not that they believe god doesn't.
That strikes me as a convoluted, word-salad version of the following:
Gnostic theism: One who is convinced that at least one divine being exists and claims to know this beyond any reasonable doubts.
Agnostic theism: One who is convinced that at least one divine being exists, but doesn't claim to know this beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gnostic atheism: One who is not convinced that at least one divine being exists, and claims to know this beyond any reasonable doubt.
Agnostic atheism: One who is not convinced that at least one divine being exists, but doesn't claim to know this beyond a reasonable doubt.
Meanwhile, we
also demarcate those who claim
to know that
only their god exists from those who're claiming that some other god or gods exist. And within those demarcations, we demarcate between those who
believe any given proposition regarding the alleged qualities that the god or gods in question may or may not actually possess from those who aren't convinced that the god or gods in question possess these alleged qualities.
Still with me? That's the theistic quagmire as I see it from the atheistic side of the fence ... where all we have to say is "None of that stuff is the least bit convincing."