What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

[Nakosis]

Well, sometimes you can and other times you cannot. For example, if you are falling from a cliff, you cannot 'will' and negate gravity.

Or if you're in prison. Much of your free will is restricted. You have free will when you can do what you want to. You don't have free will when you can't.

But this also circumvents the issue that what you want may well be determined. So, even in those circumstances where you can 'do what you want', there is no problem if BOTH are determined.
So, I submit this is a bad definition of the term.

Ok, but it's the only definition that holds any reality. Other definitions make the assumption that it was possible to do other than what you did. While I understand these other definition do exist, they can't actually happen. Once you've done something you've done it. You can't actually have done anything other than what you did. You can only imagine that you could have done something else.

In a fantasy, yes anything can happen. You can even reverse time to go back and act differently than you actually did. So we create a fantasy and define what occurs there.

I'm just defining it in accordance with what can actually in reality happen. I have free will when I can do what I want to do. When I can't do what I want to do, like defying gravity, then I don't have free will. Whether I have free will or not depends on actual circumstances.

 

[Nakosis]

Free will is also the ability to not act on that urge. (That's how people go on diets, restrict the calories they consume and lose a pound or two.)

Ok, but you're acting on the urge to not act on a different urge. You are still acting on an urge. If you can act on the second urge to not act on the first. Then you have free will. If you can't, you don't.

Say you're in prison and can't choose what you can eat. You don't have free will in that regard. However you could choose not to eat at all, least for a little while.

 

[Polymath257]

Or if you're in prison. Much of your free will is restricted. You have free will when you can do what you want to. You don't have free will when you can't.



Ok, but it's the only definition that holds any reality. Other definitions make the assumption that it was possible to do other than what you did. While I understand these other definition do exist, they can't actually happen. Once you've done something you've done it. You can't actually have done anything other than what you did. You can only imagine that you could have done something else.

In a fantasy, yes anything can happen. You can even reverse time to go back and act differently than you actually did. So we create a fantasy and define what occurs there.

I'm just defining it in accordance with what can actually in reality happen. I have free will when I can do what I want to do. When I can't do what I want to do, like defying gravity, then I don't have free will. Whether I have free will or not depends on actual circumstances.

Yep. This is the usual way of getting determinism and free will to be compatible.

I have the feeling that most people require that it be possible for there to be more than one possible future and that an act of will, which they see as non-physical, determines which future will actually happen.

For me, the act of will is itself physical. The choice is a physical process in the brain. So *I* make the 'choice' based on *my* 'desires' even if all those are physical processes that may even be pre-determined.

 

[Nous]

Ok, but you're acting on the urge to not act on a different urge. You are still acting on an urge. If you can act on the second urge to not act on the first. Then you have free will. If you can't, you don't.

Say you're in prison and can't choose what you can eat. You don't have free will in that regard. However you could choose not to eat at all, least for a little while.

The idea that free will is merely doing what one wants to do does not seem to me to get to the heart of the ability to choose one acts. One can want two different things at the same time, two different things that will result in different futures. For instance, one can want to eat a whole pizza and one can want to stick to one's 1200-calorie/day diet. One has to choose. And free will is the ability to choose one act rather than the other.

 

[Polymath257]

The idea that free will is merely doing what one wants to do does not seem to me to get to the heart of the ability to choose one acts. One can want two different things at the same time, two different things that will result in different futures. For instance, one can want to eat a whole pizza and one can want to stick to one's 1200-calorie/day diet. One has to choose. And free will is the ability to choose one act rather than the other.

And how is that prevented by determinism? You choose and then do what you choose.

 

[Nous]

So *I* make the 'choice' based on *my* 'desires' even if all those are physical processes that may even be pre-determined.

Where and how does this "I" enter into these "pre-determined" physical processes?

 

[Nous]

The idea that free will is merely doing what one wants to do does not seem to me to get to the heart of the ability to choose one acts. One can want two different things at the same time, two different things that will result in different futures. For instance, one can want to eat a whole pizza and one can want to stick to one's 1200-calorie/day diet. One has to choose. And free will is the ability to choose one act rather than the other.

And how is that prevented by determinism?

Free will is the ability to choose between available options. In a world where the thesis of determinism is true, there are no multiple possible futures. In a world where the thesis of determinism is true, whether a person eats a whole pizza or not is already determined.

 

[Nous]

Anyone able to solve the riddle of compatibilism is invited to answer the questions in the OP here: Solve the Riddle of Compatibilism, Win Big Prize

 

[Polymath257]

Free will is the ability to choose between available options. In a world where the thesis of determinism is true, there are no multiple possible futures. In a world where the thesis of determinism is true, whether a person eats a whole pizza or not is already determined.

Yes, and they still choose to eat that pizza from the alternatives that they perceive. Even slight changes to what happens inside their head (different initial conditions) could lead to different behavior under the same physical laws. So the choice happens 'inside of them'.

 

[Polymath257]

The idea that free will is merely doing what one wants to do does not seem to me to get to the heart of the ability to choose one acts. One can want two different things at the same time, two different things that will result in different futures. For instance, one can want to eat a whole pizza and one can want to stick to one's 1200-calorie/day diet. One has to choose. And free will is the ability to choose one act rather than the other.

And how does that choice actually get made? By processes inside of your head. You perceive two possible courses of action and choose one of them based on how you are feeling/thinking at the time. Even very small changes to how you feel/think could lead to a different outcome. So that you think/feel is used in making your choice. Isn't that free will?

 

[Nous]

Yes, and they still choose to eat that pizza from the alternatives that they perceive. Even slight changes to what happens inside their head (different initial conditions) could lead to different behavior under the same physical laws. So the choice happens 'inside of them'.

I don't know what that is supposed to mean. To falsely believe that one is choosing is not to actually choose.

In any case, it doesn't matter since, in a world where the thesis of determinism is true, there are no alternatives from which to choose.

 

[Nous]

And how does that choice actually get made? By processes inside of your head.

Prove it.

Did you want to skip this question:

Where and how does this "I" enter into these "pre-determined" physical processes?

?

 

[Nous]

What is it in QM that does not allow for nonlocal signaling?

Still wondering about this, also.

 

[Polymath257]

I don't know what that is supposed to mean. To falsely believe that one is choosing is not to actually choose.

What does it mean to 'choose'? From what I can see, the process in the brain that corresponds to choosing still happens.

In any case, it doesn't matter since, in a world where the thesis of determinism is true, there are no alternatives from which to choose.

You choose from perceived alternatives. Even small differences in your brain state and you would have chosen differently.

 

[Polymath257]

Prove it.

Did you want to skip this question:?

The *I* is your consciousness, which is again a brain process. Or are you thinking that the consciousness is a non-physical thing?

 

[Polymath257]

Still wondering about this, also.

Ultimately, it is the nature of quantum causality. For causes to be in the past requires that there be no 'reverse time' signaling. But that implies that there is no non-local signaling.

 

[siti]

They detected the signals. They measured a violation of a Bell-type inequality.

The violation is 'measured' by statistical analysis of photon counts (in effect) - what is actually measured is an electrical signal. Anyway, its a side issue - you were arguing for nature being non-local and unrealistic (non-physical) but if it really was, how could we possibly hope to 'measure' it at all?

No, Bell's theorem and the Bell test experiments rule out local hidden variables as a way to account for the correlations. The de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory is a nonlocal hidden variable theory.

Indeed - and it is based on the assumption that the 'wave' is a physically real field. So if de Broglie-Bohm is the correct interpretation (and it does predict the same non-localities as Bell) then it is a physically real but non-local explanation - its really just the 'particles' that are not real (in the sense of being required to explain reality at the fundamental levels - which is what I said several posts back) - the properties of the 'particles' are encoded in the waveform but there is no superluminal signalling going on - in fact there is no 'signalling' at all as such. So if that is your preferred explanation of QM then that's fine (I think I am probably inclined to agree to an extent but with a definite twist of healthy agnosticism). But how, in the absence of signalling, could that possibly account for human volition - which is the question we were supposed to be discussing in relation to the current topic?

 

[Nakosis]

The idea that free will is merely doing what one wants to do does not seem to me to get to the heart of the ability to choose one acts. One can want two different things at the same time, two different things that will result in different futures. For instance, one can want to eat a whole pizza and one can want to stick to one's 1200-calorie/day diet. One has to choose. And free will is the ability to choose one act rather than the other.

First I want you to know, I appreciate the time you're taking to deal with my argument. I want you to know I'm not simply trying to be argumentative. I'm as curious as any to work out my understanding better.

So what you are saying is that free will is the ability to imagine two or more actions taken at a future time and the consequences which may occur if one or the other action is taken.

If this is all free will is, the ability to imagine making different doing different actions, then yes you can imagine away to your hearts content. Is there more to it?

Can what you imagine affect your actions. Sure, what you imagine can affect your urges.

So free will is the ability to alter your future urges by imagining the different actions you could take and the outcome/consequences of those actions?

So the way consciousness gains some control over future actions actually taken, is to alter the urges from what occurred in the past through the use of imagination, fantasy.

For your pizza example, you have the urge to eat pizza. Normally you'd act on this urge. What you consciously do is fat shame yourself? (you imagine how you would feel if you were fatter.) So when the action is actually taken, the urge you created, to be thin, controls that action.

 

[siti]

For causes to be in the past requires that there be no 'reverse time' signaling. But that implies that there is no non-local signaling.

That's not right - superluminal signalling is not the same as 'reverse time' signalling. Practically, we might not - even in principle, be able to tell the difference, but there is a difference. Non-locality is about the physical (relativity) limit of the speed of light. Superluminal signalling would be a violation of relativity and/or a violation of local realism, but not necessarily a violation of causality.

 

[Polymath257]

That's not right - superluminal signalling is not the same as 'reverse time' signalling. Practically, we might not - even in principle, be able to tell the difference, but there is a difference. Non-locality is about the physical (relativity) limit of the speed of light. Superluminal signalling would be a violation of relativity and/or a violation of local realism, but not necessarily a violation of causality.

Not correct. The problem is that any superluminal signaling would be time reversed signaling in some reference frame. So, causality in all reference frames implies no superluminal signaling.

Edit: the point is that two events that have a spacelike separation will be simultaneous or even time reversed in some inertial reference frame. This is a fact from special relativity.