It seems you have lots of firm beliefs about "brain processes" creating "I"s and neurons having intentions. The only problem is you can't deduce your beliefs from facts. That seems like a fatal flaw in the whole business.
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What is the default position in the mind-body problem?
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No, that doesn't make freedom and determinism compatible. It's only a denial of the freedom to choose.
So, you would consider it to be freedom to desire one thing the most and yet actually do another?[/QUOTE]Yes. It happens all the time. The people who jumped from the WTC towers on 9/11 did not do it because it was the act that they most desired to do. They did it because anticipating what would happen if they didn't jump was a worse fate. It was the worst kind of Hobson's choice. None of them was compelled to jump by ignorant brain processes. Not everyone who had the opportunity did jump.
Similarly undoubtedly few of the men drafted in the Vietnam war truly wanted to go--that would have been about last on their list of things that they most desired to do.
Similarly undoubtedly few of the men drafted in the Vietnam war truly wanted to go--that would have been about last on their list of things that they most desired to do.
Again, the delusion of making a decision is not the same as making a decision. In fact, it's the opposite.
So you can't identify any brain processes that select among available options?
Yes. There isn't a shred of evidence by which to conclude that "small differences" in brains cause different decisions. Google "multiple realizability".
Yes, determinism requires realism. The pilot wave or quantum potential solves the problem of nonrealism. Of course, in Bohm's quantum potential theory, nonlocal determinism is not like determinism as we ordinarily think of it.
It's been a long time since I've looked at the topic, but I liked Bohm's ideas. I'm not sure that the realistic, deterministic QM theory does or will remain viable.
Yes. It happens all the time. The people who jumped from the WTC towers on 9/11 did not do it because it was the act that they most desired to do. They did it because anticipating what would happen if they didn't jump was a worse fate.[/QUOTE]
Exactly. Given the choices, they wanted to jump more than they wanted to burn.
Not all had the opportunity. Some felt they might still be saved in other ways.
But they preferred to go than to be put into jail or leave as deserters. That was a decision they made based on their values and their desires. As are ALL decisions.
And so, the issue is what it means to 'make a decision'. If it is a process in the brain, then we can have 'making a decision' be consistent with determinism.
No. No single process makes all decisions. But is ther any doubt that making a decision is a process in the brain? ALL the evidence points to this being the case. ALL the evidence points to our consciousness and all of our thoughts, emotions, memories, etc, being processes in the brain.
What Putnam and others have missed in this is that multiple realizability is NOT an issue at all in identifying various conscious states with brain states.
As an example, in thermodynamics we can talk about the temperature of a gas. That temperature is a real, measurable thing. But it is realized by a very large number of possible microscopic states, all of which have the exact same macroscopic temperature. But that doesn't negate saying that temperature is the result of such microscopic states.
In exactly the same way, it is possible for a thought to be realized by multiple brain states, perhaps a very large number of possible brain states while still being able to say that the thought is an overall property of any one of those microscopic states.
But even with this, fairly small changes, such as a neuron firing at a different time, can and do result in significantly different brain states which can be associated with different thoughts.
ALL of the current scientific evidence is that our thoughts, our memories, our emotions, and yes, our decisions, boil down to states of our brains.
You've done an excellent job here of illustrating why the compatibilist claims about free will--in which free will is the mere execution of one's desires--don't solve any problem regarding the ability to choose one's actions. One still has to choose between which desires one will act on.
And the decision is always based on desires and values. If those are determined, so is the decision.
Obviously you haven't been able to provide any evidence that any brain parts are able to be aware of and consciously select from available options.
If you could provide such evidence, you could probably also argue that the liver decides to excrete bile.
Multiple realizability demonstrates the error of the notions of mind-brain identity that you are extolling here. You're about 5 decades behind on the ideas on minds and brains.
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Which is just the denial of having the ability to choose.
The failure of the idea that all acts are involuntary acts has already been demonstrated on this thread. There is a difference between voluntary and involuntary bodily movements.
Correlation is not causation.
And again, I think that is a mistake. HOW does multiple realizability negate notions of mind-brain identity?
True. But how do we distinguish the two? By finding a common cause. No common cause has been found. So it is both simpler and more in keeping with the evidence to say it is a causal relationship.
Do you have *any* evidence that it is not?
Yes, of course there is. Voluntary movements are carried to voluntary muscles and originate in the parts of the brain for planning and higher thought. Involuntary movements do not link with the parts of the brain involving planning, but stay at lower levels of the brain. The point is that 'voluntary' simply means it is under conscious control. And that simply means it is under the control of the locations in the brain involved in planning and thought.
If my decision today to order a Teavana Oprah Chai Herbal Blend Brewed Tea at Starbucks correlates with different neurons or "brain states" than occurred with my neurons or "brain states" last week when I made the same decision, or with the "brain states" of someone else making the same decision, then the identity hypothesis is false. And there is no evidence of such identity.
There is all kinds of evidence by which to conclude that correlation is not causation. What sort of evidence do you need?
Whether or not a person performs a voluntary bodily movement is not controlled or determined by a deterministic brain process. Correct?
And people are unable to predict with any precise accurracy their non-regular involuntary muscle movements, such as muscle cramps or heart attacks. Right?
Voluntary bodily movements are often highly complex acts (such as those involved in writing a grammatically correct sentence of correctly spelled words). Involuntary bodily movements do not entail such complexity and prior knowledge. Right?
Why would it be false? The conscious states were not *identical*, so no paradox is produced. But even if the experience *was* the same, there is no issue from the 'identity hypothesis' any more than there would be for two different microscopic states to give the same temperature.