What is the default position in the mind-body problem?

[siti]

What is it in QM that does not allow for nonlocal signaling?...Still wondering about this, also.

Nothing - non-local signalling is not prohibited by anything in QM, it is prohibited by relativity.

 

[Polymath257]

Nothing - non-local signalling is not prohibited by anything in QM, it is prohibited by relativity.

But because quantum field theories are typically relativistic, non-local signaling is prohibited in all such.

 

[Nakosis]

Yep. This is the usual way of getting determinism and free will to be compatible.

I have the feeling that most people require that it be possible for there to be more than one possible future and that an act of will, which they see as non-physical, determines which future will actually happen.

For me, the act of will is itself physical. The choice is a physical process in the brain. So *I* make the 'choice' based on *my* 'desires' even if all those are physical processes that may even be pre-determined.

What we imagine can affect the future actions we take. I suppose that makes us feel we have some control. However is what we imagine pre-determined?

I feel I can control what I imagine. I certainly have a lot more control of what I can imagine than what I can "control" in reality.

I can imagine many things which affects my actions. I'm still left wondering if what I imagine is determined.

 

[siti]

Not correct. The problem is that any superluminal signaling would be time reversed signaling in some reference frame. So, causality in all reference frames implies no superluminal signaling.

Exactly, so it would be a violation of relativity - that's what I said. It is only a violation of causality in relativistic reference frames because the signal could not possibly have got there in time - the limit is the speed of light. But if we're dropping relativity then there is no issue with causality - causes (especially non-local, non-real, non-physical causes) could propagate at arbitrarily fast speeds approaching infinity without violating causality - as long as the cause happened at some arbitrarily small fraction of a Planck time 'before' the effect, causality per se is not violated - is it? Of course I know we are 'away with the faeries' in 'cloud cuckoo land' now - but we need to know how far the 'fundamental consciousness' idea goes in violating what we know about the real world.

 

[Nakosis]

So I guess what some define free will as is freedom from causation.

This is the definition for free will which I don't think has any reality.

 

[siti]

But because quantum field theories are typically relativistic, non-local signaling is prohibited in all such.

Correct. So either signalling is not involved or relativity is wrong? I know which of these I would go for - I am wondering which might be a basis for belief in a "fundamental consciousness".

 

[Nous]

What does it mean to 'choose'?

It means what dictionaries say it means.

the definition of choose

1. to select from a number of possibilities; pick by preference:

She chose Sunday for her departure.​

Obviously this definition implies consciously selecting from available possibilities.

From what I can see, the process in the brain that corresponds to choosing still happens.

What process? Prove it.

Even small differences in your brain state and you would have chosen differently.

What you apparently mean is: "Even small differences in your brain state determine that you would have chosen differently." In other words, you are merely denying the ability to choose one acts.

 

[Nous]

The *I* is your consciousness, which is again a brain process.

What process? Why do you need to name "I"?

 

[Nous]

Ultimately, it is the nature of quantum causality. For causes to be in the past requires that there be no 'reverse time' signaling. But that implies that there is no non-local signaling.

So nothing in QM that prevents non-local signaling?

 

[Nous]

The violation is 'measured' by statistical analysis of photon counts (in effect)

Yes, that's how a violation of Bell's inequality is measured.

the properties of the 'particles' are encoded in the waveform

No, Alice's particle does not have the property of spin-up in the absence of (prior to) her measurement. QM is nonlocal and nonrealistic.

 

[Nous]

First I want you to know, I appreciate the time you're taking to deal with my argument. I want you to know I'm not simply trying to be argumentative. I'm as curious as any to work out my understanding better.

Thank you for saying that and for taking that attitude.

So what you are saying is that free will is the ability to imagine two or more actions taken at a future time and the consequences which may occur if one or the other action is taken.

If this is all free will is, the ability to imagine making different doing different actions, then yes you can imagine away to your hearts content. Is there more to it?

Can what you imagine affect your actions. Sure, what you imagine can affect your urges.

So free will is the ability to alter your future urges by imagining the different actions you could take and the outcome/consequences of those actions?

So the way consciousness gains some control over future actions actually taken, is to alter the urges from what occurred in the past through the use of imagination, fantasy.

For your pizza example, you have the urge to eat pizza. Normally you'd act on this urge. What you consciously do is fat shame yourself? (you imagine how you would feel if you were fatter.) So when the action is actually taken, the urge you created, to be thin, controls that action.

My (primary) point is that what one chooses to do is not necessarily determined by a desire or by the strongest desire. That's a circular argument, because (just as in the case of pizza vs. diet) it is the individual who determines what is the strongest desire. The freedom to choose is really just that--freedom. There is no reason to water that freedom down a mere mechanical operation of helplessly following desires. It is this watered-down, not-really-freedom that is spoken of as supposedly a way to argue for compatibilism. But there's no reason that free will needs to be squared with determinism, since the thesis of determinism is false.[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]

 

[Nous]

So I guess what some define free will as is freedom from causation.

This is the definition for free will which I don't think has any reality.

No one here has defined "free will" as "freedom from causation," Indeed, one can think of free will as employing agent causation.

 

[Nous]

the properties of the 'particles' are encoded in the waveform but there is no superluminal signalling going on - in fact there is no 'signalling' at all as such.

Oh, I think you were representing the pilot wave theory here. If so, I don't have a problem with what you've said here. Bohm's theory adds an additional nonlocal mechanism to QM, making it deterministic.

 

[Polymath257]

So nothing in QM that prevents non-local signaling?

Depends on what you mean by QM. The Schrodinger equation is not a relativistic equation. However, the Dirac equation is. Quantum field theories all prohibit non-local signaling because they are relativistic.

 

[Polymath257]

What process? Why do you need to name "I"?

That is what self-consciousness is all about: modeling our own behavior as well as others.

 

[Polymath257]

No one here has defined "free will" as "freedom from causation," Indeed, one can think of free will as employing agent causation.

So the question is constitutes the 'agent'. If that agent is a brain process, then free will and determinism are consistent. if you think of the agent being an 'uncaused cause', then you have many other issues.

 

[Polymath257]

Thank you for saying that and for taking that attitude.

My (primary) point is that what one chooses to do is not necessarily determined by a desire or by the strongest desire. That's a circular argument, because (just as in the case of pizza vs. diet) it is the individual who determines what is the strongest desire. The freedom to choose is really just that--freedom. There is no reason to water that freedom down a mere mechanical operation of helplessly following desires. It is this watered-down, not-really-freedom that is spoken of as supposedly a way to argue for compatibilism. But there's no reason that free will needs to be squared with determinism, since the thesis of determinism is false.

[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]

So, you would consider it to be freedom to desire one thing the most and yet actually do another?

 

[Polymath257]

It means what dictionaries say it means.

the definition of choose

1. to select from a number of possibilities; pick by preference:

She chose Sunday for her departure.​

Obviously this definition implies consciously selecting from available possibilities.

At least, perceived possibilities.

What process? Prove it.

Well, the specifics depend on the choice being made. Much of it happens in the pre-frontal lobes of the brain where planning happens. But input from all over the brain is processed in most decisions.

What you apparently mean is: "Even small differences in your brain state determine that you would have chosen differently." In other words, you are merely denying the ability to choose one acts.

yes, even small differences in your thoughts/feelings (i.e, your brain state) would lead you to choose differently. Do you disagree?

 

[siti]

No, Alice's particle does not have the property of spin-up in the absence of (prior to) her measurement. QM is nonlocal and nonrealistic...Oh, I think you were representing the pilot wave theory here. If so, I don't have a problem with what you've said here. Bohm's theory adds an additional nonlocal mechanism to QM, making it deterministic.

OK - if by 'deterministic' you mean 'realistic' (in the senses of the words as you have used them so far in this discussion) so fundamentally non-local but still real...not really particles at all but still physically real...yes?

 

[Nous]

Depends on what you mean by QM. The Schrodinger equation is not a relativistic equation. However, the Dirac equation is. Quantum field theories all prohibit non-local signaling because they are relativistic.

Last night I noticed that, besides Peacock's ideas and Gisin's explanation, there are a couple of physicists who advocate the possible reality of "nonlocal signaling". Valentini is one; the ever-delightful Jack Scarfatti claims to have invented the idea.