What's wrong with "cherry picking?"

[Rick O'Shez]

You seem to think cherry picking entails no more than choosing on the basis of what makes someone feel good or bad.

I have come across people who do that.

 

[Sunstone]

I have come across people who do that.

I think we all have come across such people. But I don't think cherry picking necessarily requires us to be that shallow.

 

[Vinayaka]

You seem to think cherry picking entails no more than choosing on the basis of what makes someone feel good or bad.

Oh no, not at all. I said ..."One problem..." That's not the norm or general reason people cherry pick, but it does happen because I've seen it.

 

[Thief]

I see no harm in choosing the best and leaving what you don't need.

(rogue theologian here!......what else would I be doing!!!!!)

 

[sun rise]

Allah promised to send the Mahdi. People say he has already come (and gone). New situations may make Allah revise his instructions as it happened in Mohammad's time. "All change and power is to Allah, compared to whom nothing is greater" ('Lal hawla wala kuwatah illah billah hu wal aliel azim')

The Mahdi is one of those areas where Muslims differ wildly - some saying that is "weak Hadith", some saying "strong", some that he's come and gone, some that he's yet to come.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

I see no harm in choosing the best and leaving what you don't need.

Sure, but for me it does raise some questions, like: How do we know what is best? How do we distinguish essential from superfluous? How do we know we're not throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

 

[sun rise]

Sure, but for me it does raise some questions, like: How do we know what is best? How do we distinguish essential from superfluous? How do we know we're not throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

Very true since that's the tendency of the mind - to choose what one likes and discard what one does not like. Since this is a thread on Islam, I once read a book which analyzed how the Quran speaks of women, not just by looking at one reference but considering all of them. Then when the verses were revealed was put into historical context to try to reconcile the contradictions because to understand the historical context helps.

But it's also possible to get totally wound up in a theological tangle. Read Naskh (tafsir) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia if you want to see what can happen when scholars start tearing apart the Quran and coming up with theological "cherry picking".

 

[Kirran]

I would disagree. If cannot cause them pain meant "no hitting" is a clever turn of phrase (which I highly doubt), then there should be no need to qualify the face is off limit. The fact that was added, says hitting is ok and no causing pain, probably means serious injury or something like this. Then to single out "leave no mark", that is of course the classic practice of systematic abusers on their victims.

So all of these together, no serious injury, no bruising of the face, and no visible marks on the body, sounds like good instructions for a classic systematic abuser to follow. Ask a social worker sometime.

I think to say it doesn't mean what it sure sounds like it is saying is itself cherry picking, rationalizing it away. Why not just say that was the custom of the time of a male-dominant society, and say you just find it repulsive by today's standards. That would not be cherry picking then.

You know, I hadn't thought of that angle at all. I suppose we could try and figure out the situation in which it was put forward, and see which way it seems it's going. Of course, we'll never be able to know for sure which he meant, so why not accept the friendly one? This seems more in line with Allah being all-caring.

Agree with you.
I hope you found your path now .
Aslong you are at peace with your decision.

I am happy on my current path. Thankyou. I hope you are as happy with yours, and in yourself.

".. and (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them; .."
"And take in your hand a green branch and beat her with it, .."
Allah's words. That should remove all doubts.

Well these can be interpreted in a variety of ways, as I raised previously. The green branch one is a bit more damning. Any Muslims or non-Muslims well-versed in Islam care to comment?

 

[lovemuffin]

It is a matter of consistency. If a given reasoning is proper to dismiss something of a certain kind, then it should always be used to dismiss that kind of thing when it presents itself. Logical reasoning shouldn't be twisted according to convenience.

You are looking at a conclusion, disliking it and then rejecting the method to reach it.

You are oversimplifying the argument, and also mischaracterizing my process of thought. The relevance of cultural/historical factors to religious belief isn't the kind of thing that can be reduced to a simple syllogism. The existence of those factors in religious belief is not a deductively valid argument against the truth of religious claims. It is at best something that could lead to an abductive conclusion against the truth of religious claims. Nor am I applying the understanding that those factors exist selectively. I think they exist equally whether we're discussing genocide in the Bible, belief in the resurrection of Christ, or anything else.

I am also not reasoning backwards. If anything, my moral beliefs are properly premises. What is happening is the observation that my moral beliefs about genocide are incompatible with a particular understanding of the Hebrew scriptures, i.e the belief that they are the inerrant Word of God, and that the exposition in numbers 31 represents a command from God. There is nothing nefarious about this process of reasoning. The incompatibility necessitates that I reject one of the premises. I reject the second one, and not the first. In so doing, I am perhaps firmly choosing one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma (more on that in response to the penguin also), but it's not working backwards from a conclusion.

 

[lovemuffin]

So you're doing what you said you shouldn't: rejecting the claim that God is just.

When someone claims "God is just", it's implied that they mean "just by my understanding of justice", not "just by your understanding of justice." It's obvious that the Biblical writers who spoke in praise of genocide considered the acts they were describing to be positive, regardless of whether they're literal historical events.

When we're talking about the God of the Bible, particularly the God of the Old Testament, we're talking about a God who considers genocide to be the right act when done in its proper time and place. If you want to talk about a God who considers genocide to always be immoral, you're talking about a different God.

Your argument here begs the question by presupposing that I'm limited to either accepting or rejecting "the God of the Bible" as an almost literary character represented by the text. If "God" were a character in a novel, it wouldn't make sense to say that the presentation of the character in some chapter was wrong, because it presents the character as being "unjust" and the character is really "just". It wouldn't make sense simply because the character is entirely defined by the text. But I believe that God is real regardless of the accuracy of the Bible, and the reality and nature of the Divine is independent of the claims of the text. So in a sense, yes I'm talking about "a different God" than the author of Numbers. Or understanding "the same God", differently. The only difference between the two phrases is whether or not we're talking about the concept of God (two different concepts of God; or really two different moral judgements) or the referent of the concept, taking that referent to actually exist.

Secondly, when you characterize the moral judgement in terms of whether or not God considers genocide immoral, you are implicitly selecting some Divine Command theory of morality, that the Good is Good because it is loved by God, as opposed to the Good being loved by God because it is Good. Without attempting to elaborate a full theology related to that dilemma, I have rejected the Divine Command theory of morality. I do not believe that even God could make genocide good by declaring it to be so.

Given these two assumptions, I am not rejecting the claim that God is just, only rejecting the claim that it is necessarily true that God commanded genocide. "God" can be separated from the presentation of Numbers, and the moral status of commanding genocide is not reduced to a question of whether or not God commands it. If I accepted the passages in Numbers while retaining a moral judgement that commanding genocide is immoral, then I would be rejecting the claim that God is just.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

If we're talking about cherry-picking from a particular faith, does there come a point where we end up rejecting so much that it becomes untenable? If we find ourselves rejecting a lot, might it suggest we should look elsewhere?

 

[Koldo]

You are oversimplifying the argument, and also mischaracterizing my process of thought. The relevance of cultural/historical factors to religious belief isn't the kind of thing that can be reduced to a simple syllogism. The existence of those factors in religious belief is not a deductively valid argument against the truth of religious claims. It is at best something that could lead to an abductive conclusion against the truth of religious claims. Nor am I applying the understanding that those factors exist selectively. I think they exist equally whether we're discussing genocide in the Bible, belief in the resurrection of Christ, or anything else.

You most certainly are applying those factors selectively. Otherwise you would dismiss the entire bible.

I am also not reasoning backwards. If anything, my moral beliefs are properly premises. What is happening is the observation that my moral beliefs about genocide are incompatible with a particular understanding of the Hebrew scriptures, i.e the belief that they are the inerrant Word of God, and that the exposition in numbers 31 represents a command from God. There is nothing nefarious about this process of reasoning. The incompatibility necessitates that I reject one of the premises. I reject the second one, and not the first. In so doing, I am perhaps firmly choosing one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma (more on that in response to the penguin also), but it's not working backwards from a conclusion.

But it is as I have said. It is entirely possible to reconcile both premises, therefore there is no incompatibility.
I maintain that, given what you have told me, you reject reconciliation merely because you dislike the consequences.

 

[Koldo]

Secondly, when you characterize the moral judgement in terms of whether or not God considers genocide immoral, you are implicitly selecting some Divine Command theory of morality, that the Good is Good because it is loved by God, as opposed to the Good being loved by God because it is Good. Without attempting to elaborate a full theology related to that dilemma, I have rejected the Divine Command theory of morality. I do not believe that even God could make genocide good by declaring it to be so.

I am going to barge in for a moment.
That still leaves open the possibility that god loves genocide ( on certain occasions ) because it is good.

 

[muhammad_isa]

Well these can be interpreted in a variety of ways, as I raised previously. The green branch one is a bit more damning. Any Muslims or non-Muslims well-versed in Islam care to comment?

I'd rather not interfere in 'domestic arguments' .. who might 'wear the trousers' is none of my business.

Naturally, any partner who goes beyond what is reasonable is liable to prosecution

 

[lovemuffin]

You most certainly are applying those factors selectively. Otherwise you would dismiss the entire bible.

I think this whole line of argument ends up in the weeds, since it's true that my rejecting of the truth of the proposition that God commanded genocide is not a matter of empirical evidence against the claim, or logical impossibility. Taking into account the difficulties inherent in presenting an objective basis for a moral judgement, it's certainly true that as a matter of morality it's something like a matter of taste. I said before that I accept that this is true, but originally I believed it was a question of the difference between a mere whim and a considered judgement. So I think this is all a bit tangential, but purely as a matter of reason, it's not true that accepting the validity of an abductive argument about the development of religious belief logically entails accepting that the argument explains everything about religious belief, or entails rejecting the Bible either in whole or in part. It's not true as a matter of logic. If, in an abductive way, we deal with the probability of various beliefs being true, then I think you have an argument, but you haven't been making that argument exactly (or, I've been misunderstanding)

It is entirely possible to reconcile both premises, therefore there is no incompatibility.

I think our most fundamental disagreement is in this idea that the merest logical possibility of reconciling two seemingly contradictory propositions entails the necessity that one accept a reconciliation. Logical possibility is not the only criterion for belief, and certainly is not justification for belief. To use an example, it is logically possible to reconcile life on earth with a distant alien civilization having seeded the planet. Regardless of whether or not that is true, I doubt that you believe that the logical possibility of it entails that you must believe it.

I admit the logical possibility of reconciling the genocide in Numbers with a Just God, but I posit that the conjunction of all the propositions required to make that state of affairs obtain is far less likely than the other logical possibilities, and also less aesthetically pleasing (to go back to matters of taste), which is why I adopt another conclusion: namely the conclusion that God is Just and Numbers does not reflect an actual command of God. It is a matter of taste but it's also reasonable to prefer my explanation over the alternative as a matter of probability. If you are suggesting that a conclusion that it's all made up is even more likely than the conclusion that God exists, is Just, and that Numbers is wrong (rather than arguing that it is logically necessary that this is true, given the argument from cultural factors) then that's a reasonable suggestion, but I haven't actually been trying to address a reasonable basis for belief in God in general in this conversation, and if we were assigning probabilities to that proposition there would be other things to take into account

 

[Kirran]

I'd rather not interfere in 'domestic arguments' .. who might 'wear the trousers' is none of my business.

Naturally, any partner who goes beyond what is reasonable is liable to prosecution

What do Islamic teachings merit as 'acceptable' in your understanding as regards domestic violence? Nothing? Verbal but not physical? Retaliatory? Full on beatings? If anything is acceptable, do you understand it to be acceptable for both men and women, or just in one direction?

I'm just trying to see how these teachings are interpreted, because while it seems they could be interpreted in many ways, I prefer the idea of Muhammad preaching compassion.

 

[Koldo]

I think this whole line of argument ends up in the weeds, since it's true that my rejecting of the truth of the proposition that God commanded genocide is not a matter of empirical evidence against the claim, or logical impossibility. Taking into account the difficulties inherent in presenting an objective basis for a moral judgement, it's certainly true that as a matter of morality it's something like a matter of taste. I said before that I accept that this is true, but originally I believed it was a question of the difference between a mere whim and a considered judgement.

My reasoning is directed towards both whim and considered judgments if they end up being the result of your taste. My criticism is the same.

So I think this is all a bit tangential, but purely as a matter of reason, it's not true that accepting the validity of an abductive argument about the development of religious belief logically entails accepting that the argument explains everything about religious belief, or entails rejecting the Bible either in whole or in part. It's not true as a matter of logic. If, in an abductive way, we deal with the probability of various beliefs being true, then I think you have an argument, but you haven't been making that argument exactly (or, I've been misunderstanding)

The entire bible can be explained as being merely a mirror created by humanity at a certain time. It is completely arbitrary to dismiss something merely applying this reasoning without applying to all other scriptures. There is a difference between justification and explanation. You can hold this as an explanation after figuring out a justification that led you to dismiss a particular interpretation. This is fairly more specific, and doesn't entail the consequence I am talking about. However, to offer this as a justification does entail the dismissal of the bible itself or any interpretation that arises from reading it. Certainly this doesn't apply to all religious beliefs since some of them are formed by religious experiences. But I am talking about scripture.

I think our most fundamental disagreement is in this idea that the merest logical possibility of reconciling two seemingly contradictory propositions entails the necessity that one accept a reconciliation. Logical possibility is not the only criterion for belief, and certainly is not justification for belief. To use an example, it is logically possible to reconcile life on earth with a distant alien civilization having seeded the planet. Regardless of whether or not that is true, I doubt that you believe that the logical possibility of it entails that you must believe it.

I admit the logical possibility of reconciling the genocide in Numbers with a Just God, but I posit that the conjunction of all the propositions required to make that state of affairs obtain is far less likely than the other logical possibilities, and also less aesthetically pleasing (to go back to matters of taste), which is why I adopt another conclusion: namely the conclusion that God is Just and Numbers does not reflect an actual command of God. It is a matter of taste but it's also reasonable to prefer my explanation over the alternative as a matter of probability. If you are suggesting that a conclusion that it's all made up is even more likely than the conclusion that God exists, is Just, and that Numbers is wrong (rather than arguing that it is logically necessary that this is true, given the argument from cultural factors) then that's a reasonable suggestion, but I haven't actually been trying to address a reasonable basis for belief in God in general in this conversation, and if we were assigning probabilities to that proposition there would be other things to take into account

If you have a justification for not accepting a particular part of the scripture, regardless of your personal taste, then I see no problem at all. Case in point, if you see no compelling evidence for the existence of aliens, then you can easily reject directed panspermia. From what you have said though so far though, it does appear that it is your "liking" that is being used to measure how likely a given interpretation is to be true.

 

[Deidre]

No one has a copyright on God. Religions only think they do but if you find something spiritually edifying from a particular faith, why not honor it? This doesn't mean you need to buy into all aspects of that religion.

 

[lovemuffin]

From what you have said though so far though, it does appear that it is your "liking" that is being used to measure how likely a given interpretation is to be true.

I think my choice of a moral disagreement with a passage has made this conversation more difficult than it would have been otherwise, because of the nebulousness of morality in general. I thought however that the immorality of genocide is so obvious, or at least practically universal, that it would pass muster. I mean, I don't consider my opposition to genocide to really reduce to merely a question of what I like or dislike.

 

[Windwalker]

You know, I hadn't thought of that angle at all. I suppose we could try and figure out the situation in which it was put forward, and see which way it seems it's going. Of course, we'll never be able to know for sure which he meant, so why not accept the friendly one? This seems more in line with Allah being all-caring.

What's wrong with saying God is all-caring, but God doesn't make these sorts of human pronouncements about how to treat your wife, and that these are the words and views of man who was a part of his culture of the time and it reflects his opinions as a man of that culture?

The reason I won't accept the "friendlier" interpretation of this is because it flies into the face of reason, and plus what I illustrated fits the "facts" of the role of cultural values entering into these "revelations", these words of God, so to speak. To say cultural artifacts do not exist in any religion's scriptures is intellectual suicide, and dangerous as well for that matter.