Who here believes in "Scientism"?

[MikeF]

If 'scientism' is an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of science, what is the -ism for an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of philosophy?

 

[Augustus]

What I do take issue with any notion that the *scope* of science should be limited in some way. I would ask whether you are arguing that since scientific inquiry is struggling to exhibit reliability in some fields that we are to conclude that scientific inquiry is therefore *not applicable* in those fields.

No, in those cases it means not reliable. Scope can relate to areas where it becomes less reliable or those where it can’t say much at all.

This goes back to your insistence that the only reason people could want to be philosophers rather than scientists is that they want to pretend to be infallible and hide themselves from scrutiny.

You seem to think “limited” means something akin to censor or prevent.

Scope just means there are some areas where science is less reliable and others where it can’t really answer the questions being asked.

You have accepted this multiple times in this thread like when you agreed science can’t say utilitarianism is better than virtue ethics. You also accept it is less reliable in certain areas too.

That’s it. No nefarious agenda. Just stuff you basically agree with but are getting caught up in semantic traps because of your presumptions.

Science can’t state which ethical systems are best, it can’t demarcate science from not science, it can’t tell us which ideology is the best for our long term future prosperity.

There are limitations to what science can meaningfully tell us, that’s all scope is. Unless you think science can answer every question we could have, you accept its scope is limited.

As long as you accept that it’s just about where you draw the line.

 

[Augustus]

If 'scientism' is an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of science, what is the -ism for an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of philosophy?

If you create such a word, I doubt you’d find many people who would passionately want to argue that such a thing couldn’t possibly exist and that it was all just a big anti-philosophy conspiracy invented by mendacious actors

 

[PureX]

If you create such a word, I doubt you’d find many people who would passionately want to argue that such a thing couldn’t possibly exist and that it was all just a big anti-philosophy conspiracy invented by mendacious actors

Well, to be fair, philosophy has not created the plethora of fanciful whizbangs and goo-gaws that sing and dance flash colors and lights at us that occupy our every waking moment. So it just doesn't inspire our blind worship quite the way science does.

 

[Augustus]

What then of “non-scientific” errors in Philosophy or Theology for example? Are there not the same real world consequences and long-term ramifications?

If we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t, isn't it preferable to take the path that at least makes the effort to recognize mistakes in a reliable way and take action to fix them, and thus facilitate incremental and measurable improvements?

Errors can appear in any aspect of knowledge acquisition, as I’ve acknowledged many times.

The specific problem with scientific errors is that, due to the success of the natural sciences, science has developed a special status in the modern world so many people become overconfident in the accuracy of the less reliable sciences.

In addition, when you believe your idea is “objective” this can make your actions worse than if a degree of subjectivity is accepted.

Akin to the idea that religion can make “good people do bad things”, scientific racialism and eugenics we’re widely accepted as scientific facts by highly educated, well meaning and progressive people and this led to “good people doing bad things”. After all they were just acting in accordance with the “facts” which is what rational people do.

When we cannot be confident in knowledge the best path is to take all available information and ability and try to make the least bad decision.

Simply saying “we know the science isn’t reliable but because it might self correct in a decade or 2 so we will act as if it were correct and this will lead to incremental improvement.”

Scientific racialism was not an incremental improvement, it was a catastrophic error that still impacts us to this day.

Saying science, in general, improves incrementally does not mean actions based on specific scientific theories must therefore lead to melioristic improvement.

This is why I find treating science as a normative concept is problematic.

Your thought experiment does not highlight a weakness or failing of science, it simply highlights the disparity in the potential for any particular human being to *do* a particular thing. The *doer* will be all the better at the *doing* if using the best and most up to date information in their effort to *do*, don’t you think?

Going back to what I said earlier, I highlighted 2 kinds of knowledge technical and practical. You misunderstood it as being a description of science, which it is not. A good scientist would have both.

Do you accept both kinds exist?

If you can’t remember:

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be
learned in a correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be
learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically: the
logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. Technical knowledge,
in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest meanings
of these words.

On the other hand, practical knowledge can
neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It
exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship
to a master - not because the master can teach it (he cannot),
but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one
who is perpetually practising it. In the arts and in natural science what
normally happens is that the pupil, in being taught and in learning
the technique from his master, discovers himself to have acquired
also another sort of knowledge than merely technical knowledge,
without it ever having been precisely imparted and often without
being able to say precisely what it is. Thus a pianist acquires artistry
as well as technique, a chess-player style and insight into the
game as well as a knowledge of the moves, and a scientist acquires
(among other things) the sort of judgement which tells him when
his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which
enables him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable
directions to explore.

Now, as I understand it, Rationalism is the assertion that what I
have called practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion
that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical
knowledge. The Rationalist holds that the only element of
knowledge involved in any human activity is technical knowledge,
and that what I have called practical knowledge is really only a sort
of nescience which would be negligible if it were not positively mischievous.
The sovereignty of 'reason', for the Rationalist, means the
sovereignty of technique.

 

[MikeF]

If you know anything about me, man, I hope you realize that I dislike debates that get tripped up on definitions. But there is a simple way around this. We can define "science"... "scientism".... "empiricism" any way we we'd like-- so long as we both agree on the definitions at the outset.

That doesn't mean my definitions are to be preferred over yours. We need to BOTH agree on the definitions. I'm cool with going with the Wikipedia definition of each term, if you are. But if you aren't... and since definitions seems to be a sticking point with you, I'm open to reviewing whatever definition you propose. So long as it's reasonable, I'll surely agree to adopt a definition that you propose for the purposes of our discussion.

EDIT:

As an aside, I decided to go look up "scientism" on wikipedia to see how it was defined.

Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.

Interestingly enough, I think you and I AGREE on "the best" part of that definition. Where I think we (may) disagree is on the "only" part. Thoughts on that?

Perfect. We are of a like mind here. My intent is not to be silly or to get bogged down in unreasonable definitions. Since we are starting with Wikipedia as a baseline, I thought I’d look up some of words we are using:

Just to keep them together, I’ve included scientism.

Definition of Scientism: is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.​

​

Definition of Philosophy: is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions. Historically, many of the individual sciences, such as physics and psychology, formed part of philosophy. However, they are considered separate academic disciplines in the modern sense of the term. ​

​

Definition of History: is the systematic study and documentation of the human past. ​

​

Definition of Science: is a rigorous, systematic endeavor that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the world. Modern science is typically divided into three major branches: the natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, and biology), which study the physical world; the social sciences (e.g., economics, psychology, and sociology), which study individuals and societies; and the formal sciences (e.g., logic, mathematics, and theoretical computer science), which study formal systems, governed by axioms and rules.​

​

Definition of Knowledge: is an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often characterized as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification. ​

​

Definition of Truth or verity: is the property of being in accord with fact or reality.​

The definition of science fits in with my concept of what science is. Of note, while history, philosophy, and science are characterized as systematic in their efforts, added emphasis is given to science by describing it as rigorous also. This echo’s back to your description of History not being rigorous. Is science more rigorous than philosophy and history in your view? If so, how should that inform our understanding of, and attitude toward, the work product of these "non-rigorous" disciplines?

The purpose or function of science, per definition, is to build and organize knowledge of the world, knowledge being facts and/or true belief. As the scientism references “the world and reality”, are you amenable to extending science’s sphere of inquiry to include reality (the use of ‘world’ seems antiquated and limited in this day and age)?

Philosophy is defined as studying much of what is studied in science but there is no explicit claim of building or obtaining knowledge (or rendering truth). Is that intentional? What are your thoughts? My assumption (possibly misguided and erroneous) would be that any effort to study and understand something would be in an effort to gain an objective, factual understanding or to effect true beliefs about the subject. If philosophy shares the same goal of knowledge acquisition and covers the same ground as science, why then the distinction between the two?

As to History, described as a systematic study, is it wrong to assume that the purpose and goal of such study is to build (document) knowledge (truth) of the subject matter? What are your thoughts in this regard?

Now to finish up with scientism and your last question. Based on this definition of scientism, to declare science “as the best means to render truth” you are guilty of scientism. At this point, to include the criteria of declaring it the only method becomes redundant, doesn’t it? Perhaps the added criteria speaks to the degree or severity of one’s scientism. In other words, not all scientismist are bad to the same degree.

For scientism to be a thing then, it seems science can’t be the best means to render truth. That, it seems, is the case that proponents of the concept of ‘scientism’ need to make.

If you are of the opinion that science *is* the best means to render truth, but do not see that as an unreasonable position and therefore do not see yourself qualifying as advocating scientism or being a scientismist, an option to consider would be to drop the “best means” criteria and say scientism occurs when one declares science as the *only* means to render truth.

Here is the sticky wicket in all of this. How do we *know* when truth has been rendered? What establishes that this truth criteria has been met such that we can then evaluate any and all approaches to “rendering truth” and make a fair determination as to which actually *do* render truth (and perhaps do it better)?

This, to me, is what it all boils down to. It is not a debate about *approach* nor about subject matter. It is a debate about how we judge whether the “truth” has been rendered and “knowledge” achieved whatever the approach or subject. Your thoughts?

I could make the case that philosophy has and does give us genuine knowledge. But, man. It's a long story. And it might be more of a diversion from this topic than an aid to a discussion of scientism. But, yeah, I'm down to show how philosophy gives us knowledge. But that might be its own thread.

In any case, I wanna hear your responses to the other things I said first.

If you can make the case that philosophy can render truth and that we know that the truth has been rendered by some other means than those that are found within a scientific framework, then you will have established that there is more than one framework that can render truth and thus establishing the validity of at least one of the criteria that defines ‘scientism’. You may have other frameworks in mind beyond philosophy, so I don’t want to make any assumptions in that regard. Once it is established that there are other viable frameworks in which to render truth, we can then see if it is reasonable to declare whether one or more are better than the others, and thus evaluate the first criteria of scientism as defined.

We can certainly pursue this in a separate thread when and if you feel the time has arrived to do that.

 

[MikeF]

Because it [history] often relies on second-hand accounts and assumptions rather than pure sense data. The only purely empirical aspect of history is archeology. An archeologist says, "We found a half a dozen clay vases in our excavation of the site. They date to 230 BCE."

A historian says, "Such clay vases were likely used to carry water to the city from a nearby river." Another historian may have a different hypothesis. They may think that, due to some of the inscriptions on the vases, that they were used in religious ceremonies and probably contained wine for the festival celebration of a local god."

Different historians will write different papers each arguing one thesis or the other. (Let's assume that these two theories are the most prominent ones.) This is NOT how science tries to get to the bottom of things. While the archeological papers are purely empirical, the history papers may refer to written manuscripts at the time... some manuscripts which hint at vases being used for religious purposes... vases that may or may not resemble the vases found at the site. Different academics advance competing theories. Each theory is open to criticism from other academics. A lot of it is based on conjecture.

Empirical science does not work that way. An empirical scientist would want to test the vases for remnants of wine. If nothing could be determined as to whether the vases ever contained wine, the empirical scientist would just shrug and say, "we'll never know." But not a historian. A historian has no problem referencing written sources and trying to make her best guess as to the true nature of the vases. Science doesn't operate that way. And while I DO find science's methodology to be superior to history, I think history can lead us to genuine information that (possibly) science can't. Why can't science do as well as history sometimes? Because we don't always have access to empirical data needed to form good conclusions. But, as the academic discipline of history shows, we can learn a great deal sometimes without direct empirical data.

I’m neither a Historian nor an Archeologist, so what I am about to say should be taken in that light, but to my mind, an archeologist is going to work to determine the meaning and purpose behind the artifacts that they uncover. In fact, I think they would work rather hard to discern potential relationships between all the artifacts within a particular site including any discernible structures etc. I would also think that they would try to see if the artifact matches in form, function, and ornamentation to artifacts found at different sites and see what was also found at other sites related to this type of artifact. In addition, I see the archeologist using sources of stored information, be it in symbolic or written language form, to find references to the objects and materials uncovered in order to help further establish a firm understanding as to the meaning and purpose of those objects for those that used them.

I see the archeologist doing residue testing on pot shards and while many shards may come up negative, two sites might have a shard showing wine, or there may be shards of the same type with 10 different residues showing the pot to be multipurpose. In any case, the response to a negative result would simply be, “the result was negative for wine”. It didn’t mean it never had wine, nor that we will never know if wine was used in these types of pots. It is just known that that pot or shard did not have measurable wine residue when tested.

So where does the historian fit in? I see the archeologist building the most detailed picture possible of each site and placing it within some time span. I see the historian speaking more to historical events, human interactions, and their consequences. The archeological detail is used by the historian to set the scene and establish the conditions in which historical events play out over some time period.

If no exact purpose of a vase or pot can be determined within context of site or others, I feel any hypothesis as to uses would be clearly stated as speculative hypotheses and supported in some extended way, and more than one possible explanation suggested if applicable.

It's the "indirectness" of the data that makes history different from science. Historians rely on second-hand accounts. (They don't take the WORD of second hand accounts... much debate can occur over the validity of a written account.) Again, this is NOT how the sciences operate.

I really do not see this as a defining factor. Science has to deal with insufficient information and is left with competing hypotheses all the time. We still haven’t gotten a handle on gravity for example. Aren’t there competing quantum gravity theories? String theory, M-theory, loop quantum gravity? What is Dark Matter and Dark Energy other than placeholder labels? Biologists may be stymied by some vestigial structure in an organism for which there is no discernable purpose. With insufficient information, all that may be left to them is to posit possible hypotheses, at present untestable, as a means of explaining why the vestigial structure is there.

Uncertainty and incomplete information is *the whole point* of engaging in these activities of asking questions and seeking objectively true answers to those questions. What is at issue in all these efforts is how objectivity is maintained throughout the process and how to verify and certify that the knowledge obtained is actually true.

I am not saying that dealing with the actions and motivations of human beings is not hard. As with all problems that need to be solved, it requires means and methods specific to the problems presented, in this case, human beings and their actions, the motivations of which are in no way completely transparent, neither to those observing from the outside nor to the actors themselves. Despite that, I still think the discipline of History can strive for objectivity (in the discipline itself), veracity, and fidelity, in the same way that science strives for objectivity, veracity, and fidelity.

 

[MikeF]

No, in those cases it means not reliable. Scope can relate to areas where it becomes less reliable or those where it can’t say much at all.

Scope just means there are some areas where science is less reliable and others where it can’t really answer the questions being asked.

You have accepted this multiple times in this thread like when you agreed science can’t say utilitarianism is better than virtue ethics. You also accept it is less reliable in certain areas too.

Science can’t state which ethical systems are best, it can’t demarcate science from not science, it can’t tell us which ideology is the best for our long term future prosperity.

There are limitations to what science can meaningfully tell us, that’s all scope is. Unless you think science can answer every question we could have, you accept its scope is limited.

As long as you accept that it’s just about where you draw the line.

Just to be clear, I hope I said, or tried to convey, that science could not say whether utilitarianism was better than virtue ethics without there being some set of criteria created by which to compare and contrast the two ethical systems. I also stressed that the creation of that set of criteria would be decided politically as ethical systems are founded in subjective preference.

We seem to agree that science can’t make ethical choices, but is it your opinion that philosophy can?

How about this as a description of scope for science: The scope of science is to answer questions requiring an objectively true answer.

 

[Augustus]

Just to be clear, I hope I said, or tried to convey, that science could not say whether utilitarianism was better than virtue ethics without there being some set of criteria created by which to compare and contrast the two ethical systems. I also stressed that the creation of that set of criteria would be decided politically as ethical systems are founded in subjective preference.

We seem to agree that science can’t make ethical choices, but is it your opinion that philosophy can?

How about this as a description of scope for science: The scope of science is to answer questions requiring an objectively true answer.

I'm saying the discussion of ethical systems is philosophy, not that it can provide 'objective' answers.

I'm happy to work with that definition of science for the sake of discussion (although I think science sometimes simply provides useful information rather than objectively true information). I'm not sure how that definition chimes with your previously stated view that the only reason people could want to engage in philosophy rather than science was to avoid scrutiny, but that's by the by.

If you think the scope of science is to "answer questions requiring an objectively true answer", how do social sciences fit into this though?

The natural sciences (generally) study things that exist independently of human observation and conceptualisation.

The social sciences study the relationships between people, often in terms of concepts and ideas that themselves are the product of the human imagination. In addition, the process of studying is usually contrived and operates in a manner that changes the behaviour of the subjects as putting a visible tv camera in a room to observe 'natural' behaviour ensures people will never behave naturally. The results are also often given in terms of subjective human values rather than objective data.

Also, the values and expectations of the scientist often play a key role in experimental design, and often in the analysis of the results.

Human society is a complex system full of emergent properties, non-linear dynamic feedback loops, unintended consequences and cultural contingencies. Even if, say, we could accurately study the 5 year impact of ethical principles on individual perceptions of happiness (and this is quite a big ask), this would say little about the long term utility of these principles on a societal level, a study that is certainly impossible at present, and likely always will be imo.

But when you can't really study the key question scientifically, so you study a much more limited aspect of it and then use this as a proxy for the bigger question (as often happens), this creates exactly the problem you seek to avoid - error presented as objective knowledge.

It is very debatable the degree to which we can get objectively true answers by studying these with short-ish term, significantly limited studies that can't remotely isolate the variables being studied from a much larger system.

Even in the natural sciences, there is a view that theory ladenness limits our ability to study objective truth, but if we focus solely on social sciences, this theory ladenness is exponentially greater.

How many axioms, contingencies and assumptions are we allowed before we can't really consider results objective (especially of these are built on other axioms, contingencies and assumptions)?

 

[MikeF]

Errors can appear in any aspect of knowledge acquisition, as I’ve acknowledged many times.

Great. We are in agreement that people make mistakes regardless of discipline. The question then is whether all disciplines address this in an equally effective manner, if at all.

The specific problem with scientific errors is that, due to the success of the natural sciences, science has developed a special status in the modern world so many people become overconfident in the accuracy of the less reliable sciences.

In addition, when you believe your idea is “objective” this can make your actions worse than if a degree of subjectivity is accepted.

Akin to the idea that religion can make “good people do bad things”, scientific racialism and eugenics we’re widely accepted as scientific facts by highly educated, well meaning and progressive people and this led to “good people doing bad things”. After all they were just acting in accordance with the “facts” which is what rational people do.

These problems are the same for anything that folks have high confidence in or give special status to. These are also problems of religion (as you note) as well as political and social philosophies. These are inherent in Homo sapiens and therefore continually present and continually a risk. How, then, are these inherent problems effectively addressed and mitigated?

When we cannot be confident in knowledge the best path is to take all available information and ability and try to make the least bad decision.

We take all available *knowledge* and make the best decisions or choices that fall within our tolerance for potential risk.

Hearsay, speculation, and unfounded conjecture could be seen as information.

Simply saying “we know the science isn’t reliable but because it might self correct in a decade or 2 so we will act as if it were correct and this will lead to incremental improvement.”

It is not that science is unreliable, it is that human beings are fallible and many problems are hard. There are lots of questions in science where we are currently making little progress on, theoretical physics comes to mind, but we can’t simply snap our fingers and solve difficult problems. This constant plugging away with failures and little progress can’t be helped until some breakthrough occurs, in technology, or the right person comes of age and has the capacity to find the solution that gets us to the next level.

Scientific racialism was not an incremental improvement, it was a catastrophic error that still impacts us to this day.

Now you are simply making an emotional appeal. First of all, racism is instinctual. It is part of our DNA programming. Socialization can either counter it or exacerbate it, but the us vs other instinct is always with us. As most of the killing going on today is not the result of scientific ideology, and for most of history killing and atrocities were not the result of scientific ideologies, I think you are playing this “errors in science lead to catastrophe” card rather hard.

Of the research that failed replication that you reference, how many of those have led to catastrophe?

Saying science, in general, improves incrementally does not mean actions based on specific scientific theories must therefore lead to melioristic improvement.

This is why I find treating science as a normative concept is problematic.

And now we get to your real concern. It isn’t about limits in the ability of science to get answers, your real concern is what we do with our increased scientific understanding. Which is fine. But now we have slipped into the realm of subjective preference.

Going back to what I said earlier, I highlighted 2 kinds of knowledge technical and practical. You misunderstood it as being a description of science, which it is not. A good scientist would have both.

Do you accept both kinds exist?

If you can’t remember:

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be
learned in a correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be
learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically: the
logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. Technical knowledge,
in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest meanings
of these words.

On the other hand, practical knowledge can
neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It
exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship
to a master - not because the master can teach it (he cannot),
but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one
who is perpetually practising it. In the arts and in natural science what
normally happens is that the pupil, in being taught and in learning
the technique from his master, discovers himself to have acquired
also another sort of knowledge than merely technical knowledge,
without it ever having been precisely imparted and often without
being able to say precisely what it is. Thus a pianist acquires artistry
as well as technique, a chess-player style and insight into the
game as well as a knowledge of the moves, and a scientist acquires
(among other things) the sort of judgement which tells him when
his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which
enables him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable
directions to explore.

Now, as I understand it, Rationalism is the assertion that what I
have called practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion
that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical
knowledge. The Rationalist holds that the only element of
knowledge involved in any human activity is technical knowledge,
and that what I have called practical knowledge is really only a sort
of nescience which would be negligible if it were not positively mischievous.
The sovereignty of 'reason', for the Rationalist, means the
sovereignty of technique.

It looks like what the author is calling “Practical Knowledge” is referred to as “Procedural Knowledge” and is distinguished from “Descriptive Knowledge” in Wikipedia:

Procedural knowledge (also known as know-how, knowing-how, and sometimes referred to as practical knowledge, imperative knowledge, or performative knowledge) is the knowledge exercised in the performance of some task. Unlike descriptive knowledge (also known as declarative knowledge, propositional knowledge or "knowing-that"), which involves knowledge of specific facts or propositions (e.g. "I know that snow is white"), procedural knowledge involves one's ability to do something (e.g. "I know how to change a flat tire"). A person doesn't need to be able to verbally articulate their procedural knowledge in order for it to count as knowledge, since procedural knowledge requires only knowing how to correctly perform an action or exercise a skill.​

There is a lot less emotional content in the Wikipedia definition, don’t you think? Beyond that, yes, I agree that we can recognize both descriptive and procedural knowledge. This seems to fit in with the distinction I was making between understanding the *how and why* of a thing and that of being able to *do* a thing. Many might be able to understand the *how and why* but not have the ability to *do* equally well, regardless of the effort put into trying to acquire the skill.

 

[MikeF]

I'm saying the discussion of ethical systems is philosophy, not that it can provide 'objective' answers.

I see. Well, what then does it mean to merely discuss ethical systems? My take would be that it would consist of advocating a subjective preference by rationalizing it on any grounds, real or imagined, as there is no requirement for objectivity.

We agree then that neither science nor philosophy can set moral and ethical criteria. I would argue however, once those criteria are set, one can objectively evaluate and determine both the effects those criteria will have on individuals and society as well as determine which actions, policies, or systems can achieve or meet the set criteria. In other words, once the criteria have been set, evaluations to achieve and meet those criteria are done within a scientific framework. Unlike rigid and fixed solutions found in esoteric pursuits, a scientific framework would also include real-time monitoring of policies that are put in place, data to be used to adjust or re-evaluate as necessary, to include reassessments of the original criteria set.

I'm happy to work with that definition of science for the sake of discussion (although I think science sometimes simply provides useful information rather than objectively true information). I'm not sure how that definition chimes with your previously stated view that the only reason people could want to engage in philosophy rather than science was to avoid scrutiny, but that's by the by.

My previous view was founded upon an apparent misunderstanding of what philosophy is as has been revealed to me at the top of your post. I had the misconceived notion that philosophy was in the business of acquiring knowledge, that is, “an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill.”

If you think the scope of science is to "answer questions requiring an objectively true answer", how do social sciences fit into this though?

The natural sciences (generally) study things that exist independently of human observation and conceptualisation.

The social sciences study the relationships between people, often in terms of concepts and ideas that themselves are the product of the human imagination. In addition, the process of studying is usually contrived and operates in a manner that changes the behaviour of the subjects as putting a visible tv camera in a room to observe 'natural' behaviour ensures people will never behave naturally. The results are also often given in terms of subjective human values rather than objective data.

Also, the values and expectations of the scientist often play a key role in experimental design, and often in the analysis of the results.

Human society is a complex system full of emergent properties, non-linear dynamic feedback loops, unintended consequences and cultural contingencies. Even if, say, we could accurately study the 5 year impact of ethical principles on individual perceptions of happiness (and this is quite a big ask), this would say little about the long term utility of these principles on a societal level, a study that is certainly impossible at present, and likely always will be imo.

But when you can't really study the key question scientifically, so you study a much more limited aspect of it and then use this as a proxy for the bigger question (as often happens), this creates exactly the problem you seek to avoid - error presented as objective knowledge.

It is very debatable the degree to which we can get objectively true answers by studying these with short-ish term, significantly limited studies that can't remotely isolate the variables being studied from a much larger system.

Even in the natural sciences, there is a view that theory ladenness limits our ability to study objective truth, but if we focus solely on social sciences, this theory ladenness is exponentially greater.

How many axioms, contingencies and assumptions are we allowed before we can't really consider results objective (especially of these are built on other axioms, contingencies and assumptions)?

I fully appreciate and acknowledge all the difficulties that face scientific inquiry in trying to understand the how and why of both individual and group behavior of Homo sapiens. It can seem daunting. Historically, though, have we not been faced with seemingly equally daunting problems to solve that eventually, in time, were solved?

I found this to be relevant in illustrating this point:

1903: New York Times makes a bold prediction​

The New York Times predicted manned flight would take between 1 and 10 million years to achieve, in an article titled “Flying Machines Which Do Not Fly.” The piece ended: “To the ordinary man, it would seem as if effort might be employed more profitably.”​

https://bigthink.com/pessimists-archive/air-space-flight-impossible/​

 

[Augustus]

It looks like what the author is calling “Practical Knowledge” is referred to as “Procedural Knowledge” and is distinguished from “Descriptive Knowledge” in Wikipedia:

More like tacit knowledge (linked to in that article) Tacit knowledge - Wikipedia

Tacit knowledge or implicit knowledge—as opposed to formalized, codified or explicit knowledge—is knowledge that is difficult to express or extract; therefore it is more difficult to transfer to others by means of writing it down or verbalizing it. This can include motor skills, personal wisdom, experience, insight, and intuition.[1]

…

Although it is possible to distinguish conceptually between explicit and tacit knowledge, they are not separate and discrete in practice.[9] The interaction between these two modes of knowing is vital for the creation of new knowledge.[13]

Tacit knowledge can be distinguished from explicit knowledge in three major areas:[2]

• Codifiability and mechanism of transferring knowledge: Explicit knowledge can be codified (for example, 'can you write it down' or 'put it into words' or 'draw a picture'), and easily transferred without the knowing subject. In contrast, tacit knowledge is intuitive and unarticulated knowledge that cannot be communicated, understood or used without the 'knowing subject'. Unlike the transfer of explicit knowledge, the transfer of tacit knowledge requires close interaction and the buildup of shared understanding and trust among them.
• Main methods for the acquisition and accumulation: Explicit knowledge can be generated through logical deduction and acquired through practical experience in the relevant context. In contrast, tacit knowledge can only be acquired through practical experience in the relevant context.
• Potential of aggregation and modes of appropriation: Explicit knowledge can be aggregated at a single location, stored in objective forms, and appropriated without the participation of the knowing subject. Tacit knowledge, in contrast, is personal and contextual; it is distributed across knowing subjects, and cannot easily be aggregated. The realization of its full potential requires the close involvement and cooperation of the knowing subject.

The process of transforming tacit knowledge into explicit or specifiable knowledge is known as codification, articulation, or specification. The tacit aspects of knowledge are those that cannot be codified, but can only be transmitted via training or gained through personal experience

This seems to fit in with the distinction I was making between understanding the *how and why* of a thing and that of being able to *do* a thing. Many might be able to understand the *how and why* but not have the ability to *do* equally well, regardless of the effort put into trying to acquire the skill.

More what differentiates the ability to do certain things to a higher standard than others relies on possibly intangible aspects of knowledge acquired directly that are not necessarily able to be verbally expressed or directly shared.

 

[vulcanlogician]

If 'scientism' is an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of science, what is the -ism for an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of philosophy?

I'll have to get to your larger posts later, when I can give them the necessary time and attention they deserve. The scope of philosophy is immense. It quite literally deals with (or can deal with) everything we know about or care about. Anything you can ask questions about.

As for the supposed "accuracy" of philosophy? I wouldn't advise anyone ever accept a philosophical claim based on the consensus of philosophers. (I would do that with science, but not with philosophy.)

With philosophy, I'd recommend a person examine a particular claim and then scrutinize it... try to show it false... or propose other claims to challenge it. IMO, you've done philosophy properly if you feel LESS informed after having engaged in it (despite the fact that you may have clarified many parts of the issue during your investigation.)

But the funny thing is... I think it's okay to feel LESS informed after you do philosophy. Life-long philosophers learn to appreciate those sensations, because it indicates that they actually thought they had more knowledge than they actually did.

We all make faulty assumptions about life and the things that comprise it. It's valuable to have a discipline devoted to removing the chaff (philosophy) as it is to have a discipline (physics) that is more geared toward improving the yield of grain (aka knowledge as I'm using to mean in my extended metaphor).

Ethical questions are a fine example of how philosophy can help us explore certain dimensions of things that matter in our lives. I used to be an ethical relativist. But one day I discovered that some of the arguments I'd used to reach that conclusions were bad. They were demonstrably invalid arguments. Does that make moral realism true? No. But it does mean that I held beliefs for bad reasons. Even if ethical relativism turns out to be true, I ought to believe it such for good reasons! But that wasn't the case for my 20-year-old self.

Whether that counts as knowledge to you depends on your standards for knowledge. But for me personally, I think questioning things in such a manner is important. Maybe even indispensable.

 

[Augustus]

These problems are the same for anything that folks have high confidence in or give special status to. These are also problems of religion (as you note) as well as political and social philosophies. These are inherent in Homo sapiens and therefore continually present and continually a risk. How, then, are these inherent problems effectively addressed and mitigated?

You are still focusing on how science works normatively, whereas scientism relates to the attitudes of individuals towards science, especially as regards overestimating the accuracy of scientific findings outside the natural sciences.

The normative expectations of what science is compared to the positive reality of the less reliable sciences contribute to this.

Errors in the less reliable sciences are not being sufficiently mitigated or effectively addressed at present or we wouldn't have the problem of so many false studies being published in the first place. Saying we may fix these problems in the future is irrelevant to current attitudes towards the reliability of such information. Saying that many of these errors will eventually be self-corrected says nothing about how the information is used up until that point.

Let's, for the sake of discussion, assume social psychology studies can be replicated 50% of the time (a fairly generous estimate), what does that say about the utility of anything produced in that field? Can we even say that the field produces knowledge? Should we just treat the field as an ongoing attempt to develop reliable methods that may yield future benefits, but at present its outputs are unfit for consumption, like a medicine in the research phase.

The current position of many people is that this fields is a relatively reliable sources of knowledge, do you agree with that?

What would your attitude be towards a newspaper that was known to contain 50% fake news and 50% real news but you couldn't tell which is which?

Would you recommend people read that newspaper? Should we teach students "the facts" based on that newspaper? Would you advise people to base their actions on information from such a newspaper? Would you advise making funding or prioritising decisions based on things reported?

Let's say that this newspaper hired a team of fact checkers who published low-profile corrections of 10% of the fake news stories (that most readers wouldn't see) somewhere between 1 and 10 years after publication, would that make much of a difference to how you viewed the reliability of the source? Would it make any real difference to those who originally read the stories believing they were accurate?

Even if we did read it with full knowledge of its flaws, most people wouldn't do so assuming each story had a 50% chance of being true as they would judge them according to their presumptions and biases. Those they were 'neutral' on, they would be biased towards remembering information as true (our mind seems to be naturally biased towards perceiving inputs as true for evolutionary reasons). We would overestimate our ability to sort the wheat from the chaff.

Given you accept humans have a tendency towards being overconfident in certain sources of information, that natural sciences are often highly reliable but social sciences are not, and that they are often lumped together into a concept "science" where the rigour of the former clouds our judgement of the weaknesses of the latter, why would you not expect scientism (overconfidence in the accuracy and scope of science) to be a problem to some extent?

 

[vulcanlogician]

Perfect. We are of a like mind here. My intent is not to be silly or to get bogged down in unreasonable definitions. Since we are starting with Wikipedia as a baseline, I thought I’d look up some of words we are using:

Just to keep them together, I’ve included scientism.

Awesome.

Definition of Scientism: is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.Definition of Philosophy: is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions. Historically, many of the individual sciences, such as physics and psychology, formed part of philosophy. However, they are considered separate academic disciplines in the modern sense of the term. Definition of History: is the systematic study and documentation of the human past. Definition of Science: is a rigorous, systematic endeavor that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the world. Modern science is typically divided into three major branches: the natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, and biology), which study the physical world; the social sciences (e.g., economics, psychology, and sociology), which study individuals and societies; and the formal sciences (e.g., logic, mathematics, and theoretical computer science), which study formal systems, governed by axioms and rules.Definition of Knowledge: is an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often characterized as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification. Definition of Truth or verity: is the property of being in accord with fact or reality.

I like the definition for scientism. I don't like the definition of scientism that includes the word "excessive" in the definition, because, by circular reasoning, it would imply that scientism is automatically false. But I would amend the definition to say that "science is the ONLY" way. As I said before, you and I already agree that science is the best (in my view that means the most reliable).

I don't take issue with science being considered the best way to render truth about the world and reality. So, for sake of a substantive argument, I say we focus on the "ONLY" part of the claim. I fully grant you that it's the best and most reliable source of knowledge we have at our disposal.

Definition of Philosophy: Historically, many of the individual sciences, such as physics and psychology, formed part of philosophy. However, they are considered separate academic disciplines in the modern sense of the term.

We don't need to bring up the role of philosophy in the formation of the sciences. Sure, it happened that way. But that was historical accident as much as it was anything. "Philosophy is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions."

That seems like a good definition that we can both agree to for purposes of our conversation.

Definition of History: is the systematic study and documentation of the human past.

Agreed.

Definition of Science: is a rigorous, systematic endeavor that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the world. Modern science is typically divided into three major branches: the natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, and biology), which study the physical world; the social sciences (e.g., economics, psychology, and sociology), which study individuals and societies; and the formal sciences (e.g., logic, mathematics, and theoretical computer science), which study formal systems, governed by axioms and rules.

I like this definition, but I have some issues with it. There are different kinds of sciences. Some are heavily empirical, and others are not. If we were to accept that definition wholesale, then you'd pretty much win the debate. What many propose when they advance scientism is the ability of the natural sciences to explain the world. Even if the social sciences do a good job of explaining a great many things, a proponent of scientism would say something like "all knowledge is reducible to the kind of statements that the physical sciences make."

I''m not trying to be unfair here. Nor do I want to adjust definitions to give my position an unfair advantage. But there are several philosophical assumptions in that definition that I would want to clarify before agreeing with it. For example, economics understands the world in an entirely different way than physics. And that should be accounted for. It IS relevant to our discussion to discuss those differences. But I DO agree with most of what that definition says. But I would like to iron out some kinks.

Definition of Knowledge: is an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often characterized as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification. Definition of Truth or verity: is the property of being in accord with fact or reality.

These are the only two definitions that I say are insufficient for the purposes of our debate. They are great as wikipedia definitions. But they are unclear for our specific purposes here. There are several competing theories of knowledge, each with its own strengths and weaknesses.

And truth? Nah. No wikipedia definition is going to cut the mustard. Nor does it need to. We just need to deal with knowledge (and if things like science and philosophy can provide us with such things). I say we can just use our intuitive concepts of truth to work our way through the debate. "Truth describes something that IS the case. Falsities or errors describe things that are NOT the case." That's the definition I propose that we work with for purposes of our debate.

Feel free to amend and or criticize any of my revised definitions. I think we will arrive at agreement on these definitions sooner rather than later.

If you can make the case that philosophy can render truth and that we know that the truth has been rendered by some other means than those that are found within a scientific framework, then you will have established that there is more than one framework that can render truth and thus establishing the validity of at least one of the criteria that defines ‘scientism’.

I would prefer to do this in a separate thread. Or, at least, I think it is too massive of a question... such that it would constantly pull our attention away from the subject we are discussing now: scientism. I AM DOWN to discuss it. But I don't think it will help us clarify any possible problems with scientism... which is what we are trying to do here.

I'm working on your other post now. Gimmie some time. But let's work on agreement of definitions if that's still an issue until I get a response to that completed.

 

[vulcanlogician]

I just gotta say, @Augustus is doing some serious work in this thread. I'm sure Mike and I both appreciate your arguments.

 

[Augustus]

Now you are simply making an emotional appeal. First of all, racism is instinctual. It is part of our DNA programming. Socialization can either counter it or exacerbate it, but the us vs other instinct is always with us. As most of the killing going on today is not the result of scientific ideology, and for most of history killing and atrocities were not the result of scientific ideologies, I think you are playing this “errors in science lead to catastrophe” card rather hard.

Giving specific, factual examples is not an "emotional appeal". Confusing specific, factual examples for an "emotional appeal" is a common psychological defence against information one does not want to accept on its own terms. So it is better to just focus on the point being made, rather than trying to mind-read as it works both ways.

My point was that there is a difference between 'racism as prejudice' and 'racialism as a consequence of a (purportedly) objective search and a factually accurate description of reality'.

Do you agree this difference matters?

The first is an example of irrational prejudice, the second requires you to be irrational to not accept it.

What is your attitude towards accepting emotionally comforting fictions, over trying to understand the reality of things as best as possible? From our interactions, I'd say you are generally against accepting emotionally comforting fictions to the best of our abilities.

Is this correct?

It can be a good thought experiment to look back in time and think what false beliefs there is a good chance you would have held by applying this principle without the benefit of hindsight we get today.

Of the research that failed replication that you reference, how many of those have led to catastrophe?

When I presented examples that lead to major problems you rejected it as an "emotional appeal".

Most errors are fairly inconsequential, some cause minor problems, a few significant problems and occasionally major problems. The same is true for errors in any field.

The outputs of these fields are consequential though and the more errors we have and the greater our overconfidence the more likely problems are to occur.

Your general attitude towards error correction though is not that "errors are ok unless they lead to catastrophe" though, is it?

I fully appreciate and acknowledge all the difficulties that face scientific inquiry in trying to understand the how and why of both individual and group behavior of Homo sapiens. It can seem daunting. Historically, though, have we not been faced with seemingly equally daunting problems to solve that eventually, in time, were solved?

Whether we will get there or not says very little about how we should view the fields at present.

Our views on genetics and mental health have advanced significantly, that doesn't change the fact that our past actions, based on the best scientific understandings of their day, caused many harms

 

[MikeF]

Given you accept humans have a tendency towards being overconfident in certain sources of information, that natural sciences are often highly reliable but social sciences are not, and that they are often lumped together into a concept "science" where the rigour of the former clouds our judgement of the weaknesses of the latter, why would you not expect scientism (overconfidence in the accuracy and scope of science) to be a problem to some extent?

To start, I don't think in terms of "natural sciences". That is an anachronistic concept in my view. The purview of science is understanding Reality, with Homo sapiens being a part of Reality.

I do not see one sub-specialty of science as more or less reliable than any other. I see things in terms of difficulty. Some problems are harder than others for many reasons. And now that I think of it, I also have an issue with the term "accuracy". Not everything is understood in terms of exactness. Sometimes it is about probabilities. I have accepted your use of the term, but in my view, the problem is just *overconfidence* in a particular study or finding, which means not assigning the appropriate level of confidence to the finding, or perhaps better put, not viewing the results with sufficient skepticism. A first run study with positive results should not be held with a high degree of confidence. Confidence and surety come with repeatability over time as well as the ability to provide predictability that can inform new hypotheses that also hold up, and so on and so forth.

In terms of overconfidence, primarily with the ley community, I think media outlets are the big driver in overconfidence or uncritically accepting the results of published studies. They have reporters on the science beat scanning science journals for a juicy story, one that may be controversial, or especially any related to health in any way. Some lab publishes initial findings (not yet corroborated by follow-up studies) and if it has enough wow-factor, news outlets will run with it, or give it a catchy headline to use as click-bait.

Touching on the quoted 50% failure of repeatability, I do not see that as a problem, per se. That is the whole dang point of science to begin with. It is the repeatability that provides confidence in the findings. When a study can't be reproduced, that is what signals to us there may be problems with the original finding, and there will be problems because science is hard, the problems can be tough to get a handle on, and it is fallible human beings engaged in this activity. We in society, should not be making life choices on studies conducted at the cutting edge of discovery. We should probably confine our confidence to things that fall within the realm of undergrad studies in a particular field.

What should be of more concern is if repeat studies by researchers other than the original are never done. The issue here may be related to funding and tight budgets, as one possible reason. As the federal government is a major source of research funding, I think they have some responsibility in setting study requirements, including follow-up studies. Solving these issues, though, is a different topic.

So while I agree there is insufficient skepticism in cutting edge research (among the public), I don't know what the solution to that would be. By no means however, would that solution be to not engage in scientific discovery. My complaint regarding your definition and use of the term 'scientism' mainly revolves around this notion of limiting the scope of science. If, as is my contention, that a scientific approach, or working within a scientific framework, is simply approaching questions and problems from a position of rational skepticism, and that every effort is made to maintain objectivity and mitigate human fallibility in the investigative process, why would we not want to approach our pursuit of knowledge in this way regardless the subject in which knowledge is sought?

 

[MikeF]

Giving specific, factual examples is not an "emotional appeal". Confusing specific, factual examples for an "emotional appeal" is a common psychological defence against information one does not want to accept on its own terms. So it is better to just focus on the point being made, rather than trying to mind-read as it works both ways.

Let’s set aside what is being discussed for a moment and speak of cases generally.

Is it your position that a set of factual statement *cannot* be presented in an emotional way? Can a fact or set of facts elicit an emotional response?

Is it your position that one cannot take a limited subset of facts from a larger set of interrelated facts in order to engender an emotional response that may not occur when viewing all the relevant facts as a whole?

Can one attach emotionally laden adjectives to facts to facilitate a desired emotional response?

If the answer to these questions is yes, then a set of presented facts can and should be evaluated for an appeal to emotion, or any other type of bias or potential to introduce bias.

My point was that there is a difference between 'racism as prejudice' and 'racialism as a consequence of a (purportedly) objective search and a factually accurate description of reality'.

Do you agree this difference matters?

The first is an example of irrational prejudice, the second requires you to be irrational to not accept it.

What is your attitude towards accepting emotionally comforting fictions, over trying to understand the reality of things as best as possible? From our interactions, I'd say you are generally against accepting emotionally comforting fictions to the best of our abilities.

Is this correct?

My preference is to have the abstractions we use not conflict with or contradict reality. Beyond that it becomes a matter of what is deemed acceptably useful (ie it would not be acceptable if great for a few but terrible for most kind of thing).

As to your point that an institution can make it irrational not to accept some concept or belief, my counter-point was that I agree, but it is not limited to your example in science, but elsewhere, including religion which might be said to have an even stronger effect in this regard than science does. The difference between science and other institutions is that science permits challenges to these concepts as a principle and pathways and mechanisms to make such challenges. This is not universally true outside of a scientific framework. We human beings go astray at times (often?), whatever the sphere of human endeavor. Science has institutional mechanisms to help steer us back on track, so to speak.

It can be a good thought experiment to look back in time and think what false beliefs there is a good chance you would have held by applying this principle without the benefit of hindsight we get today.

Sure.

When I presented examples that lead to major problems you rejected it as an "emotional appeal".

Most errors are fairly inconsequential, some cause minor problems, a few significant problems and occasionally major problems. The same is true for errors in any field.

The outputs of these fields are consequential though and the more errors we have and the greater our overconfidence the more likely problems are to occur.

Your general attitude towards error correction though is not that "errors are ok unless they lead to catastrophe" though, is it?

Nope. My attitude is that, as you acknowledge above, human fallibility manifests itself in *every* field, and consequently, *every* field should have mechanisms by which to both identify and mitigate fallibility and errors which that fallibility manifests. We can and should make distinctions between fields and identify those that 1) do exactly this, and 2) do it well.

Whether we will get there or not says very little about how we should view the fields at present.

Our views on genetics and mental health have advanced significantly, that doesn't change the fact that our past actions, based on the best scientific understandings of their day, caused many harms

We must *always* maintain a skeptical eye universally towards any explanations of how, or why, or purpose, or to prescriptions and proscriptions. How, then, is this best accomplished? To date, it is my view that it is best accomplished within a scientific framework.

 

[MikeF]

I'll have to get to your larger posts later, when I can give them the necessary time and attention they deserve. The scope of philosophy is immense. It quite literally deals with (or can deal with) everything we know about or care about. Anything you can ask questions about.

As for the supposed "accuracy" of philosophy? I wouldn't advise anyone ever accept a philosophical claim based on the consensus of philosophers. (I would do that with science, but not with philosophy.)

With philosophy, I'd recommend a person examine a particular claim and then scrutinize it... try to show it false... or propose other claims to challenge it. IMO, you've done philosophy properly if you feel LESS informed after having engaged in it (despite the fact that you may have clarified many parts of the issue during your investigation.)

But the funny thing is... I think it's okay to feel LESS informed after you do philosophy. Life-long philosophers learn to appreciate those sensations, because it indicates that they actually thought they had more knowledge than they actually did.

We all make faulty assumptions about life and the things that comprise it. It's valuable to have a discipline devoted to removing the chaff (philosophy) as it is to have a discipline (physics) that is more geared toward improving the yield of grain (aka knowledge as I'm using to mean in my extended metaphor).

Let me start by saying that I am all on board with imaginatively exploring any and all possibilities. I’m all for formulating detailed thought experiments as well as just spit-balling or trying to formalize a hunch into a hypothesis. In fact, I assert that it is quite necessary.

What I do not find useful is simply arguing between one subjective ideation and another subjective ideation ( or multiple as the case may be). Once the idea is put forth, effort is required to *demonstrate* and establish the validity of the idea. Simply arguing one intuition over another without any hard data to back up either position seems like a pointless exercise to me.

Using your wheat metaphor, I would see philosophical ideation as the wheat crop in the field. It must then be harvested and put through a thresher, the thresher being the framework of scientific inquiry, and it is that threshing process that effectively, if not perfectly, separates the wheat from the chaff.

Ethical questions are a fine example of how philosophy can help us explore certain dimensions of things that matter in our lives. I used to be an ethical relativist. But one day I discovered that some of the arguments I'd used to reach that conclusions were bad. They were demonstrably invalid arguments. Does that make moral realism true? No. But it does mean that I held beliefs for bad reasons. Even if ethical relativism turns out to be true, I ought to believe it such for good reasons! But that wasn't the case for my 20-year-old self.

Whatever ethical system we might imagine, it still requires testing in “in the wild”, if you will. It is only in that way that one can really get a handle on the full impact and demonstrate its ability to achieve desired results as well as expose foreseeable or unforeseeable negative consequences.

What makes all this more complicated is that there is never universal agreement on what constitutes a desired result and what a negative one. There is never universal agreement on how best to chose between competing systems with both positive and negative aspect of differing degrees. Some may want to prioritize one right or benefit at the expense of another, while others may prefer the reverse.

This is why I maintain that moral and ethical criteria are a political issue. Once a set of criteria or goals are establish, we can begin to evaluate various approaches to meeting those criteria or goals, all the while keeping in mind that in that evaluation process we may see the need to continually adjust that set of criteria or goals, or at the very least our expectations, to reach an overall desired outcome.

Whether that counts as knowledge to you depends on your standards for knowledge. But for me personally, I think questioning things in such a manner is important. Maybe even indispensable.

Hmmm. Seems we may need to pin down what we mean by the word ‘knowledge’. I do not see it as a relative thing, mutable to suit the subjective preference of each individual. The concept would lose utility in my view if that were the case.