Who here believes in "Scientism"?

[MikeF]

Science is not philosophy. It is a method of enquiry that ascribes to a couple philosophical axioms.

Forgive me, but I'm not going to take your word for it.

 

[PureX]

Forgive me, but I'm not going to take your word for it.

Science is to philosophy what religion is to theology.

Science is the practice of a few specific philosophical axioms just as religions are the practice of a few specific theological axioms.

Philosophy explores and debates the various proposed axioms, themselves. But science NEVER does that. Which is why the scientism crowd cannot countenance the validity of any other proposed axioms but their own.

 

[Nakosis]

Absurdly so. Yes.

Well then I guess that puts me in the category.

 

[Nakosis]

Here is an interesting argument about scientism.

Some philosophers have derived philosophical consequences from that view. (I have in mind particularly David Hull and Michael Ruse.[3]) The following is a case Hull has produced. Suppose we are aboard the first Earthian space ship to arrive at a distant planet, call it Bucephalus. Once there, we encounter some native creatures who greatly resemble what back on Earth are horses. They are of similar size, eat (the equivalent of) hay, love our sugar cubes, whinny when scratched behind the ears, can be broken to be ridden, etc. etc. (Perhaps they also have, say some odd tufts of hair that our horses never have.)

Assuming that there is no possibility of previous contact between Earth and Buchephalus, the philosopher impressed with the biological definition of species (as Hull is) claims that the Buchephalean creatures cannot be horses. For they are not, given the stipulations, individuals within the Earthian lineage that constitutes the horse species. And despite the very extensive morphological and behavioral similarities, the failure to be of that lineage means that they cannot be horses.

What ought to be said about that view? First, to declare that those creatures on Bucephalus are not horses and to do so on the grounds that contemporary biology would not classify them as belonging to the same species as Earthian horses, is to indulge in scientism. That is, the charge is that to deny horsehood of those creatures on Bucephalus because they are not of the Earthian lineage is to privilege a claim for no other reason than it is taken to be a consequence of an accepted scientific theory.
Scientism - Department of Philosophy | CSUF

Myself, I have a problem with the premise of this argument but I'll it leave for the moment to see what others think.

 

[PureX]

Science can’t tell us what a thing is. It can only tell us some of the physical mechanisms involved in generating it. When we presume that our knowing some of these mechanisms means we know what the thing is, we have engaged in scientism. And we have deceived ourselves.

 

[MikeF]

Strictly for my benefit in trying to respond to the argument you present below, I’m going to combine elements of the argument that seem to address the same point as a way for me to clearly identify and address the points being made. If this has distorted your argument in any way, let me know.

Woah. Woah. Woah. I never said historians' work was in no way rigorous. It is very rigorous.
…
There is a lot of hard work, archaeology, and debate that goes in to formulating a historical hypothesis and then supporting it.
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I have mad respect for historians.
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History is one of my favorite academic disciplines.

Ok, so rigor in the discipline of History is not at issue.

But it [history] is different in nature to the purely empirical mode that science insists upon.
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But historical conclusions are a bit softer than scientific ones.
…
But there is a reason it is categorized as one of the "humanities" (the same as philosophy) rather than regarded as a science. There is a lot of conjecture involved (and historians admit as much, as do philosophers).

Here the distinction between “Science”(Science placed in quotes as we do not agree definition or scope of the term) and History seems to boil down to an assertion that History is not purely empirical and that the conclusions of history are “a bit softer” and contain a lot of conjecture.

What then is empiricism so that we may evaluate the claim. Here is a truncated definition from Wikipedia that fits with my broad impression:

Empiricism holds that true knowledge or justification comes only or primarily from sensory experience. ... Empiricism emphasizes the central role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas, rather than innate ideas or traditions.... that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the world rather than resting solely on a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation. … Empiricism believes that "knowledge is based on experience" and that "knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification".​

If the objective of History as a discipline is to acquire as many objective facts about historical events as is practicable, and that such facts should be relayed with fidelity and completeness, how then is that not empirical?

As to conjecture, what exactly is meant by that? Does it mean that theories are proposed to explain events based on accurate yet incomplete information? How is that any different than hypotheses and theories presented in “science” which are also based on incomplete information? Are historical theories based on incomplete information presented with inappropriately high levels of confidence? If not, how is that any different than what is done in “science”?

Can we not say that all speculation in science that is beyond our firm understanding constitutes some form of “conjecture”?
If the discipline of History clearly assigns some indication of confidence in their conclusions, I fail to see how this differs from “science”. Both often must work from a position of incomplete information and understanding.

This puts them [Historians] in a sphere of study that gathers genuine knowledge and facts about the past that is noticeably distinct from purely empirical disciplines.

Isn’t the “genuine knowledge and facts” pertaining to *any* discipline often unique to that discipline? We create these abstract discipline categories for our own convenience, grouping similar things in a way that is convenient to us. That the facts involved are different facts is quite immaterial. What is at issue here is how do we *know* that the facts are actually facts, and that the “knowledge” is actually *genuine*. We have confidence in the work product of any discipline by producing that work product within a framework that mitigates the fallibilities of the Homo sapiens participating in those disciplines. In other words, working within a scientific framework.

As such, proponents of "scientism" would be prone to reject historical knowledge because, a proponent of science thinks we can only get knowledge from the sciences... of which history is not. My use of the example of history was not to bash historians. Not in the slightest. I think it *is* a reliable (but unavoidably vague) way to understand the world.

A “proponent of science” thinks that knowledge “‘is based on experience’ and that ‘knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification’” and thus held with degrees of confidence. A “proponent of science” has greater confidence in work product produced within a framework that actively mitigates human fallibilities. Work product produced outside such a framework must then be evaluated within such a framework of rational skepticism and human fallibility mitigation in order to assign an appropriate level of confidence to that work product.

So no, the “proponent of science” does not reject historical ‘knowledge’, the “proponent of science” simply *does not take historical ‘knowledge’ produced outside of a fallibility mitigating framework at face value*.

You seem to be arguing that, as currently practiced, History and Philosophy are not conducted within a scientific framework. If that is your sole point, then that’s fine, I have no problem with it. If, on the other hand, it is your argument that History and Philosophy *can’t* be conducted within a scientific framework, then I completely disagree.

You know I love philosophy. I think philosophy is also unavoidably vague -- except in those cases where it works with pure logical deduction. Obviously I think philosophy is a worthwhile discipline that can and does lead us to genuine knowledge sometimes. But that doesn't make it scientific.

In those few times Philosophy leads us to “genuine knowledge”, how is that genuineness established?

And if there are disciplines that aren't scientifically rigorous (meaning empirical from top to bottom)... if these disciplines can at least sometimes deliver to us valid facts about anything, that counts as a strike against scientism, doesn't it?

No, I don’t think it does, for how has it been determined that the few valid facts these non-scientific disciplines have delivered are actually valid facts except by scientific appraisal or, is it that they are not facts at all but simply subjective positions that resonate with one’s subjective preferences?

 

[MikeF]

Here is an interesting argument about scientism.

Some philosophers have derived philosophical consequences from that view. (I have in mind particularly David Hull and Michael Ruse.[3]) The following is a case Hull has produced. Suppose we are aboard the first Earthian space ship to arrive at a distant planet, call it Bucephalus. Once there, we encounter some native creatures who greatly resemble what back on Earth are horses. They are of similar size, eat (the equivalent of) hay, love our sugar cubes, whinny when scratched behind the ears, can be broken to be ridden, etc. etc. (Perhaps they also have, say some odd tufts of hair that our horses never have.)

Assuming that there is no possibility of previous contact between Earth and Buchephalus, the philosopher impressed with the biological definition of species (as Hull is) claims that the Buchephalean creatures cannot be horses. For they are not, given the stipulations, individuals within the Earthian lineage that constitutes the horse species. And despite the very extensive morphological and behavioral similarities, the failure to be of that lineage means that they cannot be horses.

What ought to be said about that view? First, to declare that those creatures on Bucephalus are not horses and to do so on the grounds that contemporary biology would not classify them as belonging to the same species as Earthian horses, is to indulge in scientism. That is, the charge is that to deny horsehood of those creatures on Bucephalus because they are not of the Earthian lineage is to privilege a claim for no other reason than it is taken to be a consequence of an accepted scientific theory.
Scientism - Department of Philosophy | CSUF

Myself, I have a problem with the premise of this argument but I'll it leave for the moment to see what others think.

I too am interested to see what proponents of Scientism (as opposed to alleged scientismist) think of this argument.

 

[MikeF]

Here is an interesting argument about scientism.

Some philosophers have derived philosophical consequences from that view. (I have in mind particularly David Hull and Michael Ruse.[3]) The following is a case Hull has produced. Suppose we are aboard the first Earthian space ship to arrive at a distant planet, call it Bucephalus. Once there, we encounter some native creatures who greatly resemble what back on Earth are horses. They are of similar size, eat (the equivalent of) hay, love our sugar cubes, whinny when scratched behind the ears, can be broken to be ridden, etc. etc. (Perhaps they also have, say some odd tufts of hair that our horses never have.)

Assuming that there is no possibility of previous contact between Earth and Buchephalus, the philosopher impressed with the biological definition of species (as Hull is) claims that the Buchephalean creatures cannot be horses. For they are not, given the stipulations, individuals within the Earthian lineage that constitutes the horse species. And despite the very extensive morphological and behavioral similarities, the failure to be of that lineage means that they cannot be horses.

What ought to be said about that view? First, to declare that those creatures on Bucephalus are not horses and to do so on the grounds that contemporary biology would not classify them as belonging to the same species as Earthian horses, is to indulge in scientism. That is, the charge is that to deny horsehood of those creatures on Bucephalus because they are not of the Earthian lineage is to privilege a claim for no other reason than it is taken to be a consequence of an accepted scientific theory.
Scientism - Department of Philosophy | CSUF

Myself, I have a problem with the premise of this argument but I'll it leave for the moment to see what others think.

I thought this quote at the beginning of the essay you link to was interesting and relates specifically to points that have been made in this thread:

"Scientism is the idea that all forms of intellectual inquiry must conform to the model(s) of science in order to be rational.[1] However, the name 'scientism' is a pejorative: no one who holds the view in question will refer to it as scientism. Thus to claim that some view is scientistic is to both describe it and criticize it."

Professor Ring seems to hold the view that the term 'scientism' is indeed a pejorative.

Based on the professor's definition of 'scientism', what non-scientific forms of intellectual inquiry are also rational such that an accusation of 'scientism' is a valid one, and what does it mean to be a form of "rational" inquiry? What criteria must be met to qualify as "rational inquiry"?

I guess I'll have to finish the essay and find out.

 

[Augustus]

I would also like to stress that the problem of fallibility recognized by Sir Francis is inherent in the philosopher, and hence, *whatever* question the philosopher sets before themselves in *whatever* field or category of inquiry will require mitigation of that inherent fallibility.

Your entire argument seems to be based on a completely flawed premise though, that outside of the formal sciences, everyone thinks they are infallible and takes no steps to correct any errors. The idea of human fallibility and error correction didn't suddenly appear prior to the "scientific revolution", a specific kind of error correction, experimentation, was applied consistently to the natural sciences.

Logic, public discourse, reasoned argumentation etc. are attempts to mitigate fallibility. Ideas have always been up for scrutiny, and even those who, historically, placed a very high value on human reason alone to answer questions, this wasn't analogous to accepting the idea that the reason of any individual human was infallible.

But seeing as we can't design an experiment to demarcate science from not science, it is the best there is. Not because of some churlish and recalcitrant bent in philosophers of science (many of whom are scientists), but simply because that's the best we can do for certain questions as the experimental method is not applicable.

Pretty weak. Mitigating human fallibility goes well beyond test tubes and telescopes. As stated above the second change was not “experimentation”, the second change was recognizing the need to mitigate human fallibility, which would be in whatever form required by the problem at hand.

Experimentation was the major change, evolving from the idea that the human senses and cognitive capacities were unreliable. It was a specific form of error mitigation, it was not the first kind of error mitigation.

For some reason you seem to believe that error mitigation in general began with people like Bacon in the 17th C, and everyone else operated outside that paradigm until modern science was born.

Human fallibility has always been recognised, and steps to mitigate this have always been taken in all areas of life. People weren't quite as stupid as you seem to imagine they were and could obviously see humans were fallible.

Christians taught original sin, Greeks warned against the human tendency towards hubris. Romans divided the powers in their political system because they understood humans would game the system for their benefit.

Who was preaching this human infallibility you seem to believe was everywhere?

There is no Philosophy, whether it is classic and traditional Philosophy or Science, that can tell us whether virtue ethics are superior to utilitarianism, period. The metric for measuring such superiority is based solely on subjective preference, which becomes clear when such questions are addressed with a scientific framework of fallibility mitigation. That set of metrics, if it is to be applied across society as a whole, is decided politically and justified through negotiation and compromise, or simply by imposition from those with sufficient power to do so. Once the metric is determined, *then* experimentation (using that term in the broadest sense) can begin to evaluate which of the two approaches, virtue ethics or utilitarianism best meet the politically derived set of metrics, or whether some entirely different abstract ethical system would be best.

I agree that no method can tell which is best, and I even doubt it is possible to conduct some generic experiment to see which best meets politically derived set of metrics as there is no control group, and you would need far too long a time scale before you got any meaningful data. 100 years of 'progress' can be wiped out in an instant and long term stability would take centuries to evaluate.

So with ethics we accept there are no scientific answers, and muddle through the best we can. Pretending we can in any way make ethics "scientific" would be an example of scientism for me, and would be more likely to cause harm than benefit (as previous attempts to create a "scientific" morality tend to have done.

Some areas of human society can't really be studied scientifically even though we are highly fallible in them.

 

[Eli G]

..."Scientism is the idea that all forms of intellectual inquiry must conform to the model(s) of science in order to be rational" ...

Interesting definition.

I would add: conform to ...certain version of a certain scientific idea...

The truth is that scientists are very divided in their ideas on almost any scientific aspect, and only those who seem to have the most support become "official"... and not necessarily those who are closest to the truth.

 

[Augustus]

Soothsayers come from the very category you have created and defined, the category of non-scientific insightful experts. I felt it important to illustrate exactly what that category entails. The category literally contains *anyone* considered to be an insightful expert by *anyone*.

Not how I would use the term. I could call describe scientists as soothsayers for predicting the future, although this would be idiomatic rather than representing the form that goes with shaman and fortune tellers.

Yeah, I’m gonna have to disagree. It seems you are carefully curating anecdotes that fit the picture you wish to paint as opposed to presenting a full and honest portrayal.

I have no idea what agenda you actually think I have beyond that I simply believe our view is wrong and does not match the available evidence. For someone so interested in bias and fallibility, you may want to reflect critically on whether or not your tendency to assume dishonesty and agendas in others may be clouding your judgement and may reflect your own biases more than any factual reality.

If you would like something more general than a clear and explicit example: Replication crisis - Wikipedia

Based on this, I'm sure you would agree that it is possible to be overconfident in the accuracy of certain sciences and that acting on this false information can be harmful? Agreed?

Take your Long-Term Capital Management example. The investment company is trying to devise quantitative models to predict the behavior of complex markets. The model or models that they developed are essentially experiments, an experiment that worked until it didn’t, at which point *something new was learned*. This however, was not done in an academic or theoretical setting, this was an investment company, and quoting from your reference, that would “basically place a bet” on the models predictions. This example has more to do with gambling and has little bearing on the value of science.

The trading strategy was based on ideas very much derived from an academic and theoretical setting. So much so that the 2 people in question won a Nobel prize in economics based on the evaluation of their peers. That was the model they were using.

The precise problem was that they did assign a probability to being wrong, it was just that they were wrong about this probability and far from being almost impossible, it was in fact quite likely to happen.

The amount of equivocation here is incredible. Logically impossible to be wrong, but as a consequence saying nothing meaningful.

In what way are these non-scientific insights, etc “better” and for whom? Are they objectively better, or are they better because they match one's subjective preferences? If they are objectively better, how do we know? Why is there confidence in the insight or experience? Going back to the stock market, according to research in 2020 by the S&P Dow Jones Indices 88.99% of large-cap US funds have underperformed the S&P500 index over the previous ten years. Funds that are run or managed with the insights and expertise of fund managers. If “non-scientific insights, etc” are really just statistically hit-or-miss, how is that overall objectively better?

The world is not neat and tidy. There is no golden rule to follow to truth. Saying we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation is just an overestimation of human reason of the kind you argue against. And if you don't think that we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation, you basically agree with what I've been arguing. The problem is you've gotten yourself into a bit of a fankle by assuming all kinds of agendas and chicanery so can't really see what I am saying is pretty close to what you are saying. I'm just a bit more sceptical than you about our ability to mitigate our errors.

Given equal situations, a top salesperson will generally outperform and academic expert in persuasion science. This will not simply be luck or random chance, but because sales cannot be reduced to that which can be quantified and described scientifically.

Your example above also seems to support the idea that science is not reliable in certain areas. Many of these major fund have all kinds of Quants and data scientists working for them yet they aren't outperforming random chance.

Random chance is why many scientific studies fail to reproduce, or why many social scientific theories distort the real world as they cannot factor in random events. The real world is random, complex and often beyond our ability to understand fully.

There is no "in general" regarding non-scientific insights, there are only specific situations and insights. Sometimes we simply don't know what is best 'objectively', we have to trust people's insights and judgements and these will often be wrong.

It's not a competition, it is an attempt to answer the question: What should we do in situations where science is not particularly accurate? How does incorrect scientific output impact the process of knowledge formation? In what situations can science lead us down the wrong path and how do we avoid this?

Whatever you want to call insights or experience, if it is real (not chance or lucky guess) then it is within the realm of possibility for science/philosophy to understand and explain the why and the how. Your “non-scientific” knowledge is only knowledge if it is demonstrated to be so. If it is demonstrated then it has been empirically verified and therefore falls within a scientific framework.

I would not agree that science can fully explain something like salesmanship, as aspects are tacit and intuitive.

I'm not sure science can explain what mades a specific leader successful in a specific situation. Many situations we experience are unique and contain too many variables for nice neat solutions.

Knowledge is knowledge if it is correct. Whether this can be demonstrated to others at any given point does not make it "not knowledge".

Galileo was correct that the earth revolved around the sun. At the time of his trial he couldn't prove this, and even most astronomers disagreed with him, but he was correct. It was another decade or so before it could be demonstrated beyond doubt.

Newton's theories were demonstrated to be correct, but they were not. They are still useful knowledge though as they are correct enough.

In many things though, we can't tell what's true from what is false in real time, or perhaps even with hindsight.

Knowledge cannot be reduced to that which can be proven scientifically, it extends to that which has real world utility.

Yes, in the real world, we have to make choices without all the facts and without full understanding. Sometimes we get it right, and sometimes we get it wrong (which can be viewed as a form of empirical trial and error evaluation). I think for most folks, when making such decisions, the desire is to be as well informed as possible and avoid making blind guesses in complete ignorance, especially when there is risk involved. In that respect, the greater the amount of verified knowledge related to the choice the better, in my subjective opinion.

Not if this "verified knowledge" is wrong, as it often is.

The entire point of my argument is that certain sciences are not reliable sources of knowledge, a point which you seem to accept.

Scientism is simply an overestimation of the accuracy and scope of scientific methods, and you accept people can be overconfident in the accuracy of scientific methods and that this can cause problems

Yet you don't accept that scientism exists and insist claiming it does is some kind of intellectually dishonest attempt to promote an agenda.

Your subjective assessment is duly noted.

Do you disagree that we live in an opaque world we can only partially understand and minimally control?

 

[shunyadragon]

Science can’t tell us what a thing is.

Yes it can physically define qhar a thing isl

It can only tell us some of the physical mechanisms involved in generating it. When we presume that our knowing some of these mechanisms means we know what the thing is, we have engaged in scientism. And we have deceived ourselves.

Huh??!?!?

 

[shunyadragon]

Not how I would use the term. I could call describe scientists as soothsayers for predicting the future, although this would be idiomatic rather than representing the form that goes with shaman and fortune tellers.

Scientists do not predict the future.

If you would like something more general than a clear and explicit example: Replication crisis - Wikipedia

Scientist would not attempt to do this.

Based on this, I'm sure you would agree that it is possible to be overconfident in the accuracy of certain sciences and that acting on this false information can be harmful? Agreed?

False assumptions of science to lead to conclusion you want. Not remotely the reality of science.

The trading strategy was based on ideas very much derived from an academic and theoretical setting. So much so that the 2 people in question won a Nobel prize in economics based on the evaluation of their peers. That was the model they were using.

Economics is NOT science though increasingly thaey are trying it use science in their research.

The precise problem was that they did assign a probability to being wrong, it was just that they were wrong about this probability and far from being almost impossible, it was in fact quite likely to happen.

Again not science.

The world is not neat and tidy. There is no golden rule to follow to truth.

True science does not remotely propose this fantasy world. Science says nothing of truth.

Saying we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation is just an overestimation of human reason of the kind you argue against. And if you don't think that we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation, you basically agree with what I've been arguing. The problem is you've gotten yourself into a bit of a fankle by assuming all kinds of agendas and chicanery so can't really see what I am saying is pretty close to what you are saying. I'm just a bit more sceptical than you about our ability to mitigate our errors.

A rather distorted biased view of what is not acience.

Giiven equal situations, a top salesperson will generally outperform and academic expert in persuasion science.

It would not be science. Science does not deal with percission, This is a math and engineering problem. A dalesman would most likely be clueless as to both in theis case.

This will not simply be luck or random chance, but because sales cannot be reduced to that which can be quantified and described scientifically.

True and science would not attempt to do this.

Your example above also seems to support the idea that science is not reliable in certain areas. Many of these major fund have all kinds of Quants and data scientists working for them yet they aren't outperforming random chance.

Science does not falsify or research subjective subjects without objective verifiable evidence.

Random chance is why many scientific studies fail to reproduce, or why many social scientific theories distort the real world as they cannot factor in random events. The real world is random, complex and often beyond our ability to understand fully.

The real world is not random or things happen by Chance. All outcomes of cause and effect events are determined by Natural Laws and natural processes. The variation of the variability of he outcomes can be described by Chaos Theory and fractal math. The predictability of the outcomes will be within a possible predictable range dependent on the number of variables.

Social scientific theories is an oxymoron. Yes sociologist may use science to develop their theories.

There is no "in general" regarding non-scientific insights, there are only specific situations and insights. Sometimes we simply don't know what is best 'objectively', we have to trust people's insights and judgements and these will often be wrong.

It's not a competition, it is an attempt to answer the question: What should we do in situations where science is not particularly accurate? How does incorrect scientific output impact the process of knowledge formation? In what situations can science lead us down the wrong path and how do we avoid this?

I would not agree that science can fully explain something like salesmanship, as aspects are tacit and intuitive.

Science would not attempt this,

I'm not sure science can explain what mades a specific leader successful in a specific situation. Many situations we experience are unique and contain too many variables for nice neat solutions.

Science would not attempt to do this.

Knowledge is knowledge if it is correct. Whether this can be demonstrated to others at any given point does not make it "not knowledge".

You dog just caught it;s tail

Galileo was correct that the earth revolved around the sun. At the time of his trial he couldn't prove this, and even most astronomers disagreed with him, but he was correct. It was another decade or so before it could be demonstrated beyond doubt.

Newton's theories were demonstrated to be correct, but they were not. They are still useful knowledge though as they are correct enough.

The predictability of the scientific method properly applied.

In many things though, we can't tell what's true from what is false in real time, or perhaps even with hindsight.

Knowledge cannot be reduced to that which can be proven scientifically, it extends to that which has real world utility.

Science does not prove anything

Not if this "verified knowledge" is wrong, as it often is.

False incomplete assumption based on an extremely biased agenda.

The entire point of my argument is that certain sciences are not reliable sources of knowledge, a point which you seem to accept.

Scientism is simply an overestimation of the accuracy and scope of scientific methods, and you accept people can be overconfident in the accuracy of scientific methods and that this can cause problems.

If we aray within the realm of what is defined as Methodological Naturalism the above is false.

Yet you don't accept that scientism exists and insist claiming it does is some kind of intellectually dishonest attempt to promote an agenda.

Scientism is not a "thing" that exists. It is an abstract meaningless pejorative accusation by those who for some reason or other reject science as science. So far it has been defined differently in this thread with references.

Do you disagree that we live in an opaque world we can only partially understand and minimally control?

Misleading statement begging the question, because the question is more a statement assuming the conclusion based on your agenda

 

[shunyadragon]

Forgive me, but I'm not going to take your word for it.

Translation: Science is simply the application of Methodological Naturalism to acquire knowledge of our physical existence.

 

[Nakosis]

I thought this quote at the beginning of the essay you link to was interesting and relates specifically to points that have been made in this thread:

"Scientism is the idea that all forms of intellectual inquiry must conform to the model(s) of science in order to be rational.[1] However, the name 'scientism' is a pejorative: no one who holds the view in question will refer to it as scientism. Thus to claim that some view is scientistic is to both describe it and criticize it."

Professor Ring seems to hold the view that the term 'scientism' is indeed a pejorative.

Based on the professor's definition of 'scientism', what non-scientific forms of intellectual inquiry are also rational such that an accusation of 'scientism' is a valid one, and what does it mean to be a form of "rational" inquiry? What criteria must be met to qualify as "rational inquiry"?

I guess I'll have to finish the essay and find out.

I think the "highest" form of the pursuit of knowledge is the use of science.
A lessor rational process is logic. Not as reliable as science but still rational.
The least rational form of the pursuit of knowledge is one based on your feelings.

What other ways are their to go about gathering knowledge?
I imagine most people use a variety of these methods to gain information/knowledge about the world around them.

In some cases, something is "right" for me because it feels right. However logic or science may show me this is not necessarily true.
It feels right is often right enough. However one can go further and verify that it is right with logic and ultimately with science.

Sometimes what you feel you know isn't verifiable by logic or science. It just feels right and it could be. Just because it hasn't been verified by logic or science make it automatically wrong, you just have to accept that knowledge based on feelings is the least reliable type of knowledge.

Certainly I would prefer the reliability of science, but I can't always get that.

 

[Augustus]

Scientists do not predict the future.

Yes they do.

When will Halley's Comet next be visible? When is the next eclipse?

Scientist would not attempt to do this.

Scientists would not attempt to work out the degree to which scientific studies are replicable?

Who do you think noticed the replication crisis? Hotel receptionists? Tennis players? Gibbons?

The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism.

I'm still waiting for you to justify this statement.

So care to address this which you dodged last time around?

The degree to which scientific papers can be reproduced cannot be studied by scientific methods? Are you being serious? The ability for other people to replicate findings is a fundamental purpose of scientific methods.

The replication crisis (also called the replicability crisis and the reproducibility crisis) is an ongoing methodological crisis in which the results of many scientific studies are difficult or impossible to reproduce. Because the reproducibility of empirical results is an essential part of the scientific method,[2] such failures undermine the credibility of theories building on them and potentially call into question substantial parts of scientific knowledge.

The replication crisis is frequently discussed in relation to psychology and medicine, where considerable efforts have been undertaken to reinvestigate classic results, to determine whether they are reliable, and if they turn out not to be, the reasons for the failure.[3][4] Data strongly indicates that other natural and social sciences are affected as well.[5]


Honestly, you are so far gone down your rabbit hole of irrational prejudice that you can't even form semi-coherent ideas any more. If I said the sky was blue you'd argue it was a cow. If I said water was wet you'd argue it was the Dallas Cowboys.


One example of low replication rates:

• Amgen and Bayer reports on lack of replicability in biomedical research: Scientists from biotech companies Amgen and Bayer Healthcare reported alarmingly low replication rates (11–20%) of landmark findings in preclinical oncological research.[34][35]

Back to the definition you still don't understand:

Scientism: an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities)


In short, we agree there are some areas that cannot be studied using scientific methods. The only point you can therefore disagree with me on is whether or not it is possible to hold excessive confidence in the accuracy of scientific methods in certain fields like psychology or economics.

Given the fact that, depending on studies, up to 80-90% of studies in certain fields have not been possible to replicate, it would be a remarkable feat of mental gymnastics to claim that it is not possible for an individual to have excessive confidence in the accuracy of results in this field.

Yes/no: do you agree it is possible to have excessive confidence in the published research in certain scientific fields where many studies, perhaps even a majority, fail to reproduce?

If you answer yes, then you accept scientism, as defined above, is real. You may conjure up some garbled nonsense because you don't understand the definition above, but whether you understand or not is beside the point to whether you've just acknowledged you agree with me.

If you answer no, then it would be quite amusing to see your mental gymnastics in trying to justify your answer.

The choice is yours: agree with me on scientism or try to defend the indefensible

 

[shunyadragon]

Yes they do.

No they do not specifically predict the future.

When will Halley's Comet next be visible? When is the next eclipse?

Science are predicting specific events. You are making the foolish generalizations of predicting the future which is false,

Scientists would not attempt to work out the degree to which scientific studies are replicable?

Your adding a term "degree" here you did not state in the past. Your previous statements were in absolute terms
Yes, science works out the degree to which scientific studies are replicable over time as the knowledge of science advances.

Who do you think noticed the replication crisis? Hotel receptionists? Tennis players? Gibbons?

There is no replication crisis. There are problems with replication of results particularly in social sciences that are worked out over time as the knowledge of science advances. You have an active imagination based on your extreme anti-science agenda.

I'm still waiting for you to justify this statement.

So care to address this which you dodged last time around?

Simple fact needs not justification.
The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism.

The degree to which scientific papers can be reproduced cannot be studied by scientific methods? Are you being serious? The ability for other people to replicate findings is a fundamental purpose of scientific methods.

Yes, the result of scientific papers can be reproduced and be studied by scientific methods in the basic sciences and applied sciences. The problems of replication in social science, which you egregiously exaggerate does not translate into the absolute statements that over time new research can advance the knowledge of social sciences. Your extreme agenda and constantly "begging the question" and hyper-exaggerating the problems in science results in your extremely biased agenda against science. Science over time does resolve problems and the knowledge of science is self correcting.

You live in an ancient Neutionian mechanical world.

The replication crisis (also called the replicability crisis and the reproducibility crisis) is an ongoing methodological crisis in which the results of many scientific studies are difficult or impossible to reproduce. Because the reproducibility of empirical results is an essential part of the scientific method,[2] such failures undermine the credibility of theories building on them and potentially call into question substantial parts of scientific knowledge.

False

The replication crisis is frequently discussed in relation to psychology and medicine, where considerable efforts have been undertaken to reinvestigate classic results, to determine whether they are reliable, and if they turn out not to be, the reasons for the failure.[3][4] Data strongly indicates that other natural and social sciences are affected as well.[5]

Psychology is a social science and employs science to study human behavior and not haed science and medicine are applied science, yes they are frequently discussed so what!?!?!? You have a habit of of an active imagingination presenting a selective extreme paranoid behavior toward science based on your agenda..

Honestly, you are so far gone down your rabbit hole of irrational prejudice that you can't even form semi-coherent ideas any more. If I said the sky was blue you'd argue it was a cow. If I said water was wet you'd argue it was the Dallas Cowboys.


One example of low replication rates:

• Amgen and Bayer reports on lack of replicability in biomedical research: Scientists from biotech companies Amgen and Bayer Healthcare reported alarmingly low replication rates (11–20%) of landmark findings in preclinical oncological research.[34][35]

Back to the definition you still don't understand:

Scientism: an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities)

I understand the definition, Again . . . again and again. HAving a definition does not make it meaningful or useful. IT is pejorative accusation of science based one's rejection of science. Very common used by fundamentalist Christians against evolution.

Selective citation of problems in the applied and social sciences, does not justify your extreme biased agenda against science, and does not take into account that over time in science problems are resolved and the knowledge of science advances..

In short, we agree there are some areas that cannot be studied using scientific methods. The only point you can therefore disagree with me on is whether or not it is possible to hold excessive confidence in the accuracy of scientific methods in certain fields like psychology or economics.

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

Given the fact that, depending on studies, up to 80-90% of studies in certain fields have not been possible to replicate, it would be a remarkable feat of mental gymnastics to claim that it is not possible for an individual to have excessive confidence in the accuracy of results in this field.

Your use of "certain fields" and exaggerated theatrical language makes your questions and statements unanswerable. Begging the question again. Your up front opposition to science as science agenda is the problem.

Yes/no: do you agree it is possible to have excessive confidence in the published research in certain scientific fields where many studies, perhaps even a majority, fail to reproduce?

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

If you answer yes, then you accept scientism, as defined above, is real. You may conjure up some garbled nonsense because you don't understand the definition above, but whether you understand or not is beside the point to whether you've just acknowledged you agree with me.

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

If you answer no, then it would be quite amusing to see your mental gymnastics in trying to justify your answer.

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

The choice is yours: agree with me on scientism or try to defend the indefensible

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

The truth is that scientists are very divided in their ideas on almost any scientific aspect, and only those who seem to have the most support become "official"...

If by "support" you mean evidence, then I'ld be inclined to agree.

and not necessarily those who are closest to the truth.

If you are not going to use evidence as the measure to how close something is to the truth, then how do you propose to go about it instead?

 

[MikeF]

Your entire argument seems to be based on a completely flawed premise though, that outside of the formal sciences, everyone thinks they are infallible and takes no steps to correct any errors. The idea of human fallibility and error correction didn't suddenly appear prior to the "scientific revolution", a specific kind of error correction, experimentation, was applied consistently to the natural sciences.

If that is your takeaway, then perhaps I haven’t done a very good job of explaining my position.

My premise is not that everyone outside of “formal sciences”, whatever you consider that to be, thinks they are infallible or that human beings are not fallible in general. People have thought other people both wrong and stupid at least as long as they have been able to call people wrong and stupid.

My premise is that in classic and traditional Philosophy and Theology there is not incorporated within the discipline a framework, mechanisms, a set of principles and standards, that actually mitigate the inherent fallibility in the philosopher.

Logic, public discourse, reasoned argumentation etc. are attempts to mitigate fallibility.

Attempts that were expressly shown to be ineffective and/or counterproductive and therefore not a means by which to mitigate inherent human fallibility. That is the breakthrough realization that sparked the scientific revolution.

In essence, it was a realization that human beings could reason and talk themselves into believing almost anything.

But seeing as we can't design an experiment to demarcate science from not science, it is the best there is.

“Science” is the framework in which we effectively demarcate between what of our thoughts remains objective and what constitutes subjective preference, or something else entirely, during the knowledge acquisition process. It is a framework that incorporates mechanisms to mitigate human fallibility to the limits of our ability to do so, and thus allows us to assign a realistic assessment as to the confidence with which that knowledge should be held.

This is not a fool-proof system guaranteed to prevent, eliminate any error resulting from inherent human fallibility nor cure inherent fallibility, and hence why I say it only mitigates within the limits of our abilities. However, borrowing your phrase above, it is the best there is.

I agree that no method can tell which [moral/ethical system] is best, …

Excellent. An anchor point of common understanding and agreement.

I even doubt it is possible to conduct some generic experiment to see which best meets politically derived set of metrics as there is no control group, and you would need far too long a time scale before you got any meaningful data. 100 years of 'progress' can be wiped out in an instant and long term stability would take centuries to evaluate.

I agree with the sentiment that the problem is a complex and difficult one to solve. Thankfully, any success that might occur in this regard is in no way dependent on either your or my abilities to conceive a solution.

Understanding factors that may lead to instantly wiping out long-term stability is all part-and-parcel to addressing this complex and difficult problem. The difficulty should not be an excuse to simply throw up our hands and not even try. Perhaps your argument is that the very act of trying will only result in things getting worse, and if so, I would disagree.

Some areas of human society can't really be studied scientifically even though we are highly fallible in them.

If they can’t be studied scientifically, then you are saying they can’t be studied at all. So yes, of course there are things that are currently beyond our ability to adequately address and speculate on, and in such cases all we can do is to simply say we do not know.

 

[MikeF]

Not how I would use the term. I could call describe scientists as soothsayers for predicting the future, although this would be idiomatic rather than representing the form that goes with shaman and fortune tellers.

Am I to gather then, your only objection is use of the term ‘soothsayer’?

Is that tacit agreement then of the statement, “The category [non-scientific intuitive experts] literally contains *anyone* considered to be an insightful expert by *anyone*.”

I have no idea what agenda you actually think I have beyond that I simply believe our view is wrong and does not match the available evidence. For someone so interested in bias and fallibility, you may want to reflect critically on whether or not your tendency to assume dishonesty and agendas in others may be clouding your judgement and may reflect your own biases more than any factual reality.

My only complaint is an incomplete presentation of available evidence regarding “non-scientific intuitive experts”.

If you would like something more general than a clear and explicit example: Replication crisis - Wikipedia

This is an example of science at work, though, isn’t it? Lack of replication highlights a problem that is now identified and can be addressed. This is fallibility mitigation at work, is it not?

Based on this, I'm sure you would agree that it is possible to be overconfident in the accuracy of certain sciences and that acting on this false information can be harmful? Agreed?

Human beings are fallible, so it is definitely possible for human beings to be overconfident in the accuracy of science, whatever the discipline or subject at hand. Is there a mechanism in place to bring this overconfidence to light? Once brought to light, is the error double-down upon, or are remedies sought?

My contention is not that science is error free, my contention is that “non-science” disciplines do not incorporate effective fallibility and error mitigation as is found within a scientific framework.

If I am incorrect in this, I would love to have you explain the effective fallibility mitigating mechanisms incorporated into classic, traditional Philosophy and Theology.

The trading strategy was based on ideas very much derived from an academic and theoretical setting. So much so that the 2 people in question won a Nobel prize in economics based on the evaluation of their peers. That was the model they were using.

The precise problem was that they did assign a probability to being wrong, it was just that they were wrong about this probability and far from being almost impossible, it was in fact quite likely to happen.

The world is not neat and tidy. There is no golden rule to follow to truth. Saying we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation is just an overestimation of human reason of the kind you argue against. And if you don't think that we should automatically follow whatever science deems most accurate in any given situation, you basically agree with what I've been arguing. The problem is you've gotten yourself into a bit of a fankle by assuming all kinds of agendas and chicanery so can't really see what I am saying is pretty close to what you are saying. I'm just a bit more sceptical than you about our ability to mitigate our errors.

Given equal situations, a top salesperson will generally outperform and academic expert in persuasion science. This will not simply be luck or random chance, but because sales cannot be reduced to that which can be quantified and described scientifically.

Your example above also seems to support the idea that science is not reliable in certain areas. Many of these major fund have all kinds of Quants and data scientists working for them yet they aren't outperforming random chance.

Random chance is why many scientific studies fail to reproduce, or why many social scientific theories distort the real world as they cannot factor in random events. The real world is random, complex and often beyond our ability to understand fully.

There is no "in general" regarding non-scientific insights, there are only specific situations and insights. Sometimes we simply don't know what is best 'objectively', we have to trust people's insights and judgements and these will often be wrong.

The issue I take with your position is your singular focus on how investigators operating within a scientific framework get things wrong. I agree, and say how can it not, as it is human beings doing the investigating. What is at question, is whether the mechanisms put in place to address this inherent fallibility work, and work in such a way as to allow actual progress to be made in addressing and answering the questions we put before ourselves.

Your singular focus on errors in science does not acknowledge errors in “non-science” and whether such errors in “non-science” are effectively addressed. Is it your position that “non-science” disciplines are error-free, or are either equally or more adept at addressing and mitigating human error in the knowledge acquisition process? If that is your position, then make the case.

It's not a competition, it is an attempt to answer the question: What should we do in situations where science is not particularly accurate? How does incorrect scientific output impact the process of knowledge formation? In what situations can science lead us down the wrong path and how do we avoid this?

All great questions. The same must be asked of “non-science” disciplines as well. If the answers to these questions are the same, then it is as I have been saying, it all falls under the same big umbrella, all requiring the same fallibility mitigation to both avoid going down the wrong path and recognize when we have already done so.

I would not agree that science can fully explain something like salesmanship, as aspects are tacit and intuitive.

I'm not sure science can explain what mades a specific leader successful in a specific situation. Many situations we experience are unique and contain too many variables for nice neat solutions.

Two clichés seem apt, “Never say never.” and “Time will tell.”

Knowledge is knowledge if it is correct. Whether this can be demonstrated to others at any given point does not make it "not knowledge".

Galileo was correct that the earth revolved around the sun. At the time of his trial he couldn't prove this, and even most astronomers disagreed with him, but he was correct. It was another decade or so before it could be demonstrated beyond doubt.

Newton's theories were demonstrated to be correct, but they were not. They are still useful knowledge though as they are correct enough.

In many things though, we can't tell what's true from what is false in real time, or perhaps even with hindsight.

Knowledge cannot be reduced to that which can be proven scientifically, it extends to that which has real world utility.

This is the scientific process in action. We have started from complete ignorance, yet we continually and methodically build our understanding of ourselves and the world around us. Yes, we still have a ways to go yet.

Scientism is simply an overestimation of the accuracy and scope of scientific methods, and you accept people can be overconfident in the accuracy of scientific methods and that this can cause problems

Overestimation of the accuracy of data and conclusions are simply manifestations of human error and fallibility. If you want to give the specific error of overestimating accuracy the label ‘scientism’, then be my guest, however, I do not see it as useful.

As to scope, I still maintain that to limit the scope of what is to be addressed within a scientific framework only serves to limit the application of demarcation and fallibility mitigation as I have described above, circumventing effective fallibility mitigation.

Yet you don't accept that scientism exists and insist claiming it does is some kind of intellectually dishonest attempt to promote an agenda.




Do you disagree that we live in an opaque world we can only partially understand and minimally control?

I certainly agree that flawed and fallible human beings can overestimate the accuracy of scientific work product and that the goal should be to hold all such work product with the appropriate level of confidence. I certainly agree that some problems are harder to solve than other problems.

I do not agree that we should limit the scope of when to apply the demarcation and fallibility mitigation tools found within a scientific framework when seeking knowledge, nor should we suspend rational skepticism in such endeavors.