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Who here believes in "Scientism"?

shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
With no clear demarcation between natural science, social science, and pseudoscience, proponents of astrology, creation science, the paranormal, Marxist theory of history, etc would be able to declare themselves scientists without challenge, and thus acquire for their own disciplines some of the status afforded to science in the modern world. An example of how problematic this can be, came when in 1969 the American Association for the Advancement of Science accepted the Parapsychology Association as an associate member. Members of the scientific community were understandably unhappy with that decision.

To this end, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Thagard each devised a set of necessary conditions for genuine science. In particular, Popper’s concept of falsification has come to be regarded as something of a gold standard of demarcation, not least anomg working scientists themselves.

The empirical method alone is not enough to distinguish science from pseudoscience, as Popper observed when pointing out that “The [empirical] method may be exemplified by astrology, with it’s stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation - horoscopes, biographies, cosmological charts etc.” Somewhat more controversially, Popper was of the opinion that Marxist historical theory, psychoanalysis, and individual psychology ought not to claim scientific status for themselves, as theories developed in those disciplines were not falsifiable, in sharp contrast to the physical theories of Newton, Einstein etc.

“One can sum all this up by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is it’s falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”
- Popper, Conjectures and Refutations 1963

To clarify, my point was that your exceptionally broad definition of what constitutes science, takes no account of a century of academic study and debate concerning exactly this issue of demarcation.
I do not believe the demarcation is vague and nebulous as far as the real world of science is concerned if my interpretation of your post is correct. If a belief is not supported by objective verifiable evidence it is not subject to the falsification of theories and hypothesis based on Methodological Naturalism. No need for a long diatribe to justify an agenda.

The philosophers cited did contribute over time, particularly Popper, but they did not define Methodological Naturalism, which to a degree evolves as the frontiers of science advance .What has resulted is science is an evolving self correcting body of knowledge when new information is available.

The Parapsychological Association is not as controversial as you portray it.


The Parapsychological Association is an international professional organization of scientists and scholars engaged in the study of psi (or 'psychic') experiences, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, psychic healing, and precognition. First established in 1957, the PA has been an affiliated organization of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 1969.

The mission of the PA is to:

  • Promote scholarship and scientific inquiry into currently unexplained aspects of human experience
  • Disseminate responsible information to the wider public and to the scientific community
  • Integrate this information with knowledge from other disciplines
As a non-profit, non-adjudicating organization, the PA endorses no ideologies or beliefs other than the value of rigorous scientific and scholarly inquiry. There is a level of membership for everyone interested in the scientific and scholarly advancement of parapsychology. Join or donate today.

There is nothing in scientific knowledge that represents truth, absolutes or infallible claims.
 
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shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
I believe some clarification and review of the basics of the problem with the term "Scientism" and Methodological Naturalism, and the philosophies under the general category of 'Naturalism.'

In review of some references those that reject any knowledge beyond the limits of the defined methods of Methodological Naturalism mostly call themselves simply Naturalists. Self definition of those that believe in philosophy or other belief system is the honest way to refer to them and not name calling derogatory names like "Scientism." A comparable example would be to describe those that believe in religions and other belief systems that believe in beings and spiritual worlds beyond the verifiable physical existence as "Mythicist" believers in "Mythicism."

It is abundantly clear that those who have a selective agenda against science that does not support their world view, such as @Augustus and @PureX use 'Scientism" in a derogatory manner and often associate science with atheism. This is common among Fundamentalist Christian believers and others that selectively reject science. This negates any positive connotation of the term "Scientism."

I believe in God, but an important issue, particularly among the believers of ancient tribal religions is that many of their beliefswith empasis on the miraculous and supernatural, have no objective justification today from an objective perspective. The Naturalists indeed have an objective basis for their worldview, The weakness is it is a philosophical view that cannot be verified by science,

The following reference represents in detail what the view of 'Naturalism' is:


In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces operate in the universe. In its primary sense it is also known as ontological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism, pure naturalism, philosophical naturalism and anti-supernaturalism.


The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a long winded detailed description of all the ramifications and difference in Naturalism, but I prefer to simplify the philosophy in terms of the real world.

 
I believe some clarification and review of the basics of the problem with the term "Scientism" and Methodological Naturalism, and the philosophies under the general category of 'Naturalism.'

I believe you should improve your reading skills so you actually address the topic being discussed rather than something completely unrelated that you are calling by the same term.

I did try to explain this.

You can lead a horse to water though…

It is abundantly clear that those who have a selective agenda against science that does not support their world view, such as @Augustus and @PureX use 'Scientism" in a derogatory manner and often associate science with atheism. This is common among Fundamentalist Christian believers and others that selectively reject science. This negates any positive connotation of the term "Scientism."

Continuing your unsupported lies again?

I asked you to quote me doing any of that, but you can’t. Still you continue to lie about it.

It really is a strange thing for an adult to do, unfortunately it seems to be your MO.

I’m an atheist and am presenting rational arguments that many scientists would also make.

So far you haven’t even reached the level where you understand the basic definition being used. As such you are just barking up the wrong tree as usual, and will remain completely impervious to reason or evidence.

Scientism (noun): an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities)

 

Regiomontanus

Eastern Orthodox
Within the last few months or so, it's been claimed that there are "many" here at RF who believe in and/or advocate for "scientism", i.e., the notion that science is the means to answer all questions, or at least is the means to answer all questions worth answering.

I've been a member here for quite some time, but I can't recall seeing anyone advocating such a view. So, to clear this up I'm starting this thread for all of you RF members who do. If you are an advocate for "scientism", please reply to this post with something like "Yes, I am an advocate for scientism as you have described it".

Also, let's keep this focused on the point of the thread, which means no debates about what is or isn't "scientism", whether gods exist, evolution/creationism, or anything else. The thread quite literally has a singular purpose and I'd like to keep it that way.


Most of the regulars here are devotees of that mental affliction, clearly!
 

Regiomontanus

Eastern Orthodox
Scientism is as the OP stated the belief that science has the answer for everything. I see that accusation most often arising from creationists when trying to counter evolution. But evolution is clearly not a case of scientism. It says nothing about the existence of a God or not. It only deals with the origin of species and not morals or other complex problems. It is usually a false accusation and a red herring.

A very biased sample you refer to. Clearly, though, you and many of the other regulars here are advocates of this flawed worldview, IMHO, And this has nothing to do with evolution, per se.
 

Subduction Zone

Veteran Member
A very biased sample you refer to. Clearly, though, you and many of the other regulars here are advocates of this flawed worldview, IMHO, And this has nothing to do with evolution, per se.
I made that post because quite often creationists falsely call the theory of evolution "scientism". That is probably because it refutes their personal version of God and they have heard that science cannot refute God. Actually science cannot refute valid versions of God. But it can refute invalid versions. If a person insists that the world is flat because God says so, and believe it or not there are people that say that, then science easily refutes that version of God. Does it refute all versions? No, not even close. Is it scientism to show the endless evidence for a spherical Earth? Again, no.
 
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shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
I believe you should improve your reading skills so you actually address the topic being discussed rather than something completely unrelated that you are calling by the same term.

I did try to explain this.

You can lead a horse to water
If this is the case you will die of thirst,
Continuing your unsupported lies again?
No need what posted is correct.
I asked you to quote me doing any of that, but you can’t. Still you continue to lie about it.

It really is a strange thing for an adult to do, unfortunately it seems to be your MO.

I’m an atheist and am presenting rational arguments that many scientists would also make.
You tist the arguments Scientists make to the point it is not recognizable as what scientists actually believe.
So far you haven’t even reached the level where you understand the basic definition being used. As such you are just barking up the wrong tree as usual, and will remain completely impervious to reason or evidence.

Scientism (noun): an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities)


I understand the definition very well. Notice it is accuatory in terms of describing what is simply a 'ontological Naturalist's view of science as an "exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities.)" This derogatory definition is incomplete, because the derogatory use use extend to any science one does not like in what I objected to in post #922. Just having a definition does not mean it is an appropriate definition for what is simply 'Ontological Naturalism,' which does not exaggerate anything. It is simply a well defined philosophy.
 
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You tist the arguments Scientists make to the point it is not recognizable as what scientists actually believe.

Quote or it never happened and we can all accept you are continuing to lie.

You make lots of garbled claims, yet never can manage to directly quote anything that supports them. Funny that. It's almost as if you are making them up...

I understand the definition very well. Notice it is accuatory in terms of describing what is simply a 'ontological Naturalist's view of science as an "exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities.)" This derogatory definition is incomplete, because the derogatory use use extend to any science one does not like in what I objected to in post #922. Just having a definition does not mean it is an appropriate definition for what is simply 'Ontological Naturalism,' which does not exaggerate anything. It is simply a well defined philosophy.

No you don't, or you wouldn't respond with this garbled nonsense that has nothing to do with anything I've said.

Now, without hallucinating some more nonsense, explain to me what you disagree with from the following:

Ontological naturalists, including scientists, can and do believe that some sciences are significantly more accurate than others, and that there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science).

Bonus points if you can then work out why it means you don't understand the basic definition, and why what you said previously was garbled nonsense and had nothing to do with anything I said. I won't hold my breath regarding either...
 

Audie

Veteran Member
I do not believe the demarcation is vague and nebulous as far as the real world of science is concerned if my interpretation of your post is correct. If a belief is not supported by objective verifiable evidence it is not subject to the falsification of theories and hypothesis based on Methodological Naturalism. No need for a long diatribe to justify an agenda.

The philosophers cited did contribute over time, particularly Popper, but they did not define Methodological Naturalism, which to a degree evolves as the frontiers of science advance .What has resulted is science is an evolving self correcting body of knowledge when new information is available.

The Parapsychological Association is not as controversial as you portray it.


The Parapsychological Association is an international professional organization of scientists and scholars engaged in the study of psi (or 'psychic') experiences, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, psychic healing, and precognition. First established in 1957, the PA has been an affiliated organization of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 1969.

The mission of the PA is to:

  • Promote scholarship and scientific inquiry into currently unexplained aspects of human experience
  • Disseminate responsible information to the wider public and to the scientific community
  • Integrate this information with knowledge from other disciplines
As a non-profit, non-adjudicating organization, the PA endorses no ideologies or beliefs other than the value of rigorous scientific and scholarly inquiry. There is a level of membership for everyone interested in the scientific and scholarly advancement of parapsychology. Join or donate today.

There is nothing in scientific knowledge that represents truth, absolutes or infallible claims.
What dors the PA actually do?
 

shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
What dors the PA actually do?
PA does not do dors . . . He He!

PA does research on the paranormal based on acceptable scientific standards. I am not certain as to what they contribute to science, I looked at their website and I do not believe their research and conclusions makes supernatural assumptions
 
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shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
Quote or it never happened and we can all accept you are continuing to lie.

You make lots of garbled claims, yet never can manage to directly quote anything that supports them. Funny that. It's almost as if you are making them up...



No you don't, or you wouldn't respond with this garbled nonsense that has nothing to do with anything I've said.

Now, without hallucinating some more nonsense, explain to me what you disagree with from the following:

Ontological naturalists, including scientists, can and do believe that some sciences are significantly more accurate than others, and that there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science).

Bonus points if you can then work out why it means you don't understand the basic definition, and why what you said previously was garbled nonsense and had nothing to do with anything I said. I won't hold my breath regarding either...
I believe that Naturalists do the same research and publish in journals in all disciplines just as other scientists. Those with religious beliefs that do not agree with Ontological Naturalism research and publish in the same fields,

The bold above reflects your selective agenda against science that does not agree with your antiquated philosophical agenda, thus in appropriate name calling "Scientism."
 
I believe that Naturalists do the same research and publish in journals in all disciplines just as other scientists. Those with religious beliefs that do not agree with Ontological Naturalism research and publish in the same fields,

The bold above reflects your selective agenda against science that does not agree with your antiquated philosophical agenda, thus in appropriate name calling "Scientism."

Oh dear... :facepalm:

Your big "gotcha" is that I believe "there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science)"?

So you believe logic, the demarcation problem, ontology, ethics etc. can be studied purely using experimental scientific methods? Is that your argument?

Also, would you say that people studying the Replication Crisis can only be doing so based on an "antiquated philosophical agenda", and are definitely not honest scientists interested in improving the sciences and making their findings more reliable?

Unless you agree with both of the above statements, I fail to see how your "gotcha" above makes any sense seeing as it means that honest, scientifically minded people can indeed believe "there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science)."

Once again, you have spectacularly failed to comprehend multiple simple posts due to your closed-minded prejudice and bias. Well done.
 
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shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
Oh dear... :facepalm:

Your big "gotcha" is that I believe "there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science)"?
Yes there are areas of beliefs that cannot be falsified by scientific methods such as the existence of Gods, Divine beings. and spiritual realms beyond the physical existence.
So you believe logic, the demarcation problem, ontology, ethics etc. can be studied purely using experimental scientific methods? Is that your argument?
The demarcation of the application of Methodological Naturalism is based on what can be studied , researched and falsified.

If the research on ethics can be based on objective verifiable evidence and falsified as a hypothesis than it can be research based on Methodological Naturalism.

Questions concerning Logic are a philosophical methodology and cannot be researched and falsified by scientific methods. I do not of any scientists attempt to do this,

Ontological NAturalism is a philosophy and belief. It is not falsifiable by scientific methods.
Also, would you say that people studying the Replication Crisis can only be doing so based on an "antiquated philosophical agenda", and are definitely not honest scientists interested in improving the sciences and making their findings more reliable?
The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism.


Unless you agree with both of the above statements, I fail to see how your "gotcha" above makes any sense seeing as it means that honest, scientifically minded people can indeed believe "there are areas of enquiry where scientific methods are either not feasible (for example logic) or not reliable (for example many areas of social science)."
I answered the above the rest is your problem based on your philosophical agenda,
Once again, you have spectacularly failed to comprehend multiple simple posts due to your closed-minded prejudice and bias. Well done.
Phfffft! . . . Plop!!!
 
The demarcation of the application of Methodological Naturalism is based on what can be studied , researched and falsified.

If the research on ethics can be based on objective verifiable evidence and falsified as a hypothesis than it can be research based on Methodological Naturalism.

Questions concerning Logic are a philosophical methodology and cannot be researched and falsified by scientific methods. I do not of any scientists attempt to do this,

Ontological NAturalism is a philosophy and belief. It is not falsifiable by scientific methods.

Excellent, we agree that not everything can be studied by scientific methods.

The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism.

Jesus wept, this is embarrassing even by your standards :facepalm:

The degree to which scientific papers can be reproduced cannot be studied by scientific methods? Are you being serious? The ability for other people to replicate findings is a fundamental purpose of scientific methods.

The replication crisis (also called the replicability crisis and the reproducibility crisis) is an ongoing methodological crisis in which the results of many scientific studies are difficult or impossible to reproduce. Because the reproducibility of empirical results is an essential part of the scientific method,[2] such failures undermine the credibility of theories building on them and potentially call into question substantial parts of scientific knowledge.

The replication crisis is frequently discussed in relation to psychology and medicine, where considerable efforts have been undertaken to reinvestigate classic results, to determine whether they are reliable, and if they turn out not to be, the reasons for the failure.[3][4] Data strongly indicates that other natural and social sciences are affected as well.
[5]


Honestly, you are so far gone down your rabbit hole of irrational prejudice that you can't even form semi-coherent ideas any more. If I said the sky was blue you'd argue it was a cow. If I said water was wet you'd argue it was the Dallas Cowboys.


One example of low replication rates:
  • Amgen and Bayer reports on lack of replicability in biomedical research: Scientists from biotech companies Amgen and Bayer Healthcare reported alarmingly low replication rates (11–20%) of landmark findings in preclinical oncological research.[34][35]


Back to the definition you still don't understand:

Scientism: an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities)


In short, we agree there are some areas that cannot be studied using scientific methods. The only point you can therefore disagree with me on is whether or not it is possible to hold excessive confidence in the accuracy of scientific methods in certain fields like psychology or economics.

Given the fact that, depending on studies, up to 80-90% of studies in certain fields have not been possible to replicate, it would be a remarkable feat of mental gymnastics to claim that it is not possible for an individual to have excessive confidence in the accuracy of results in this field.

Yes/no: do you agree it is possible to have excessive confidence in the published research in certain scientific fields where many studies, perhaps even a majority, fail to reproduce?

If you answer yes, then you accept scientism, as defined above, is real. You may conjure up some garbled nonsense because you don't understand the definition above, but whether you understand or not is beside the point to whether you've just acknowledged you agree with me.

If you answer no, then it would be quite amusing to see your mental gymnastics in trying to justify your answer.

The choice is yours: agree with me on scientism or try to defend the indefensible ;)
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
To clarify, my point was that your exceptionally broad definition of what constitutes science, takes no account of a century of academic study and debate concerning exactly this issue of demarcation.

Let me preface my arguments by highlighting the fact that I am challenging the status quo that has been established within post-schism philosophy. Resistance to reevaluating that status quo will be strongest for those with high emotional investment in currently held belief, and for deeply entrenched beliefs regarding this subject.

You have characterized my thesis as an *exceptionally broad* definition of what constitutes science. Let us compare it then, to the definition of Philosophy we find in Wikipedia:

Philosophy is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions.
Major branches of philosophy are epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics.
Other subfields are aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of history, and political philosophy.

My thesis is that Philosophy 2.0, what has come to be referred to as Science, is all of the above conducted within a framework that both acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility to best abilities. Philosophy 2.0, therefore, is no more and no less broad than Philosophy 1.0, your classic or traditionally practiced philosophical framework that Philosophy 2.0 supersedes.

With no clear demarcation between natural science, social science, and pseudoscience, proponents of astrology, creation science, the paranormal, Marxist theory of history, etc would be able to declare themselves scientists without challenge, and thus acquire for their own disciplines some of the status afforded to science in the modern world. An example of how problematic this can be, came when in 1969 the American Association for the Advancement of Science accepted the Parapsychology Association as an associate member. Members of the scientific community were understandably unhappy with that decision.

To this end, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Thagard each devised a set of necessary conditions for genuine science. In particular, Popper’s concept of falsification has come to be regarded as something of a gold standard of demarcation, not least anomg working scientists themselves.

The empirical method alone is not enough to distinguish science from pseudoscience, as Popper observed when pointing out that “The [empirical] method may be exemplified by astrology, with it’s stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation - horoscopes, biographies, cosmological charts etc.” Somewhat more controversially, Popper was of the opinion that Marxist historical theory, psychoanalysis, and individual psychology ought not to claim scientific status for themselves, as theories developed in those disciplines were not falsifiable, in sharp contrast to the physical theories of Newton, Einstein etc.

“One can sum all this up by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is it’s falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”
- Popper, Conjectures and Refutations 1963

So we can now set the criticism of “scope” or “breadth” of Philosophy 2.0 aside, or at least have an understanding of my accounting for it.

The question we should be asking ourselves now is why there would be a call for demarcation between what questions should be considered within a framework of Philosophy 2.0 and what should not, and who wants or needs such a demarcation. If the only difference between Philosophy 1.0 and Philosophy 2.0 is that Philosophy 2.0 expressly acknowledges the inherent fallibilities of Homo sapiens and actively seeks mechanisms by which to effectively mitigate those inherent fallibilities while engaging in Philosophy, what then is the intent of such demarcation other than to preserve the classical and traditional practice of Philosophy 1.0 with its lack of an express acknowledgement of the inherent fallibilities of the philosopher nor institutional mandate to mitigating those inherent fallibilities? Perhaps you have other valid reasons to avoid fallibility mitigation?

A quick note on Popper and his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, keeping in mind that in my view “science” is “philosophy”. Popper here, is highlighting two sources of fallibility in the philosopher, the first being a reiteration of the concern raised by David Hume in the mid-18th century regarding inductive reasoning. The second source he describes is the very nature of human thought itself, that human thought consisting of abstract constructs organized and governed within abstract systems require special care and attention to ensure that abstractions used to describe and explain the real world actually remain synthetic with, or correspond to, the real world. *This* is the demarcation that Popper sought to establish and provide a mechanism for, a demarcation between abstractions meant to remain synthetic to the real world and those that are simply analytic in nature. Popper’s book both illustrates these problems, sources of fallibility inherent in the philosopher, and provides a mechanism by which to mitigate that fallibility, mechanisms to be incorporated into the framework of Philosophy 2.0.

With no clear demarcation between natural science, social science, and pseudoscience, proponents of astrology, creation science, the paranormal, Marxist theory of history, etc would be able to declare themselves scientists without challenge, and thus acquire for their own disciplines some of the status afforded to science in the modern world.

People declare all sorts of things. There is no getting around or preventing that. The demarcation you describe is embedded within the scientific framework itself. That is the whole point of having robust mitigation mechanisms. Besides the various forms of charlatanism you list, this would also include things like Theology or Philosophy of the Mind/Consciousness conducted outside the framework of Philosophy 2.0’s fallibility and error mitigation mechanisms. These activities are challenged and recognized for what they are precisely because they lack the falsifiability, explanatory power, and predictive ability found in the answers derived within a scientific framework that directly contradict them.

“The [empirical] method may be exemplified by astrology, with it’s stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation - horoscopes, biographies, cosmological charts etc.”

I can’t speak to this one-line quote because I do not have the complete context within which it is being used. I will say that your use here feels much the same as those who quote single-line bible verses to support whatever argument they are making. Such cherry-picking phrases can easily lend itself to simply supporting/reinforcing confirmation bias.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I'm more than happy to note what happened. It was two-fold, an acceptance of the limits to human reason and the adoption of an experimental methodology to mitigate this:


The experimental approach is justified primarily by appeals to the weakness of our sensory and cognitive capacities. For many seventeenth-century English thinkers these weaknesses were understood as consequences of the Fall. Boyle and Locke, for their part, also place stress on the incapacities that necessarily attend the kind of beings that we are. But in both cases, the more important issue is the nature of human capacities rather than the nature of the Deity. And if the idea of a fall away from an originally perfect knowledge begins to decline in importance towards the end of the seventeenth century, it nonetheless played a crucial role by drawing attention to the question of the capacities of human nature in the present world...

One of the first texts that [Francis] Bacon would have had to contend with was the ‘Organon’, a collection of Aristotle’s writings on logic. All undergraduates were expected to become familiar with its contents, and until well into the seventeenth century university statutes prescribed monetary penalties for those guilty of transgressions against Aristotle’s logic.

Bacon’s early resistance to the Aristotelianism he encountered at university and his later ambition to establish new foundations for learning are both evident in the title of what is probably his best known philosophical work: Novum organum – (The New Organon, 1620). At this point it should be unnecessary to labour the fact that Bacon has a conception of natural philosophy as an enterprise devoted to a recovery of Adamic knowledge of nature and dominion over it.

Each of the two sections of the Novum Organum concludes with an injunction to recover the dominion over nature that was lost as a consequence of the Fall. As for the impediments to this recovery, Bacon saw in the long-standing tradition of Aristotelian logic an implicit recognition of the fact that ‘the human intellect left to its own course is not to be trusted’. But Bacon was convinced that the purveyors of logic had systematically misidentified the nature of mental errors and the means by which they were to be corrected. The champions of the old Organon ‘have given the first place to Logic, supposing that the surest helps to the sciences were to be found in that’. In Bacon’s judgement, ‘the remedy is altogether too weak for the disease’. The impotence of logic in the face of the human propensity for error could be attributed to two factors. First, the logicians had simply underestimated the extent of the problem they were seeking to rectify.154 ‘The root cause of nearly all evils in the sciences’, Bacon wrote, is that ‘we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind.’ As a consequence, ‘we neglect to seek for its true helps’.155 Second, not realising that error stems from multiple failures of the human mind, they had prescribed a single generic remedy.156

In order to arrive at a true interpretation of nature, Bacon insists, we need to begin with an understanding of human faculties and their limitations. In the Novum Organum, then, Bacon identifies the senses, memory, and reason as the faculties involved in knowledge, and seeks specific ‘ministrations’ or ‘helps’ to heal their inherent infirmities.157 These infirmities, which for Bacon ‘have their foundation in human nature itself’, are referred to as ‘the idols of the tribe’, the first category of four ‘idols of the mind’ to which Bacon attributes the errors of human knowledge.158 For Bacon, the deficiencies of the senses provide the first occasion for error: ‘By far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understanding pro- ceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses.’159The senses, which are ‘infirm and erring’, fail us in two ways. Sometimes they provide no information; sometimes they provide false information...

Bacon believed that a better ‘help’ for the senses was experimentation: ‘For the subtlety of experiments is far greater than that of the sense itself, even when assisted by exquisite instruments.’" Peter Harrison - The Fall of Man and the foundations of modern science

Seems Sir Francis and I are in complete accord.

Problem: Homo sapiens are inherently fallible.
Solution: Find mechanisms which facilitate the mitigation of that fallibility.

Sir Francis realized that experimentation was one such mechanism that mitigated human fallibility. We certainly recognize, from our experience gained over some 400 years since, a vast array of ways in which human fallibility can be expressed and the requirement of a battery of mechanisms and approaches with which to mitigate them all.

I would also like to stress that the problem of fallibility recognized by Sir Francis is inherent in the philosopher, and hence, *whatever* question the philosopher sets before themselves in *whatever* field or category of inquiry will require mitigation of that inherent fallibility.


Because they are not things that can be tested using experimentation. By only focusing on the first of the 2 changes, you seem to assume they must have been motivated by their belief they were infallible.

Pretty weak. Mitigating human fallibility goes well beyond test tubes and telescopes. As stated above the second change was not “experimentation”, the second change was recognizing the need to mitigate human fallibility, which would be in whatever form required by the problem at hand.

I can't design an experiment to decide if virtue ethics are superior to utilitarianism though. There is no experiment that can tell me what knowledge is and on what grounds it is justified, or that can demarcate science from not science. I can use reason, accept my weaknesses and try to mitigate them while trying to answer these questions, but I can't create an experimental methodology to prove my hypothesis.

There is no Philosophy, whether it is classic and traditional Philosophy or Science, that can tell us whether virtue ethics are superior to utilitarianism, period. The metric for measuring such superiority is based solely on subjective preference, which becomes clear when such questions are addressed with a scientific framework of fallibility mitigation. That set of metrics, if it is to be applied across society as a whole, is decided politically and justified through negotiation and compromise, or simply by imposition from those with sufficient power to do so. Once the metric is determined, *then* experimentation (using that term in the broadest sense) can begin to evaluate which of the two approaches, virtue ethics or utilitarianism best meet the politically derived set of metrics, or whether some entirely different abstract ethical system would be best.
 

MikeF

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
No idea where you get the idea about soothsayers from, it seems very far from what I said. If there are no meaningful non-scientific insights that can be made on anything, it's a wonder we survived until the scientific revolution without actually knowing anything other than what the shaman told us ;)

Soothsayers come from the very category you have created and defined, the category of non-scientific insightful experts. I felt it important to illustrate exactly what that category entails. The category literally contains *anyone* considered to be an insightful expert by *anyone*. So, while it includes your hypothetical top salesperson and a plumber, it would also include a Korean saju reader, and Donald J. Trump.

If you are in some way excluding the saju reader and Donald Trump from this category you have created, then I would argue that you are using science to do it.

Here is but one example in one country that relates to confidence given to "soothsayers":

Unlike in the West, where fortune tellers are often seen as phony characters out to scam those desperate to learn what the stars have in store for them, clairvoyants hold an everyday relevance in South Korea.
In fact, there are some 300,000 fortune tellers in the country, in addition to 150,000 mudang (or shamans), who provide clairvoyance by communicating with spirits in addition to performing traditional ceremonies such as exorcisms.
According to a report by Trend Monitor, a Korean market research firm, more than two-thirds of those surveyed stated that they see a fortune teller at least once a year. Many of these Koreans visit between December and February, to see what awaits them in the new solar and lunar years.
Major crossroads in life are also a common time for a divinely steer. University students consult tarot readers at career fairs to determine potential employers. Businessmen might opt to have a reading to select an auspicious date to launch a new venture. Couples check their compatibility before marriage, and even politicians have controversially turned to clairvoyants for guidance.


What I said (minor edits for clarity):

And we need to accept [there are fields of science] where it is not [very] reliable, and that in complex domains (lets say economics) trying to force reality into a form that can be quantified 'scientifically' often misses out or distorts [aspects of] reality in a manner that can render the information actively harmful (plenty examples of "scientific" theories leading to errors and even financial crises often because they make people overconfident in their accuracy).

Is there any of that you disagree with? If you want an example: Long-Term Capital Management - Wikipedia

Yeah, I’m gonna have to disagree. It seems you are carefully curating anecdotes that fit the picture you wish to paint as opposed to presenting a full and honest portrayal.

Wherever there is a dearth of necessary data or information upon which to make an accurate determination, accuracy will suffer. The less the data or the lower the quality of data the worse it will be. That is merely a fact of life. As far as science goes, it is part of the principles and standards of science to attach the appropriate level of confidence in such low accuracy situations. If decisions in the real world need to be made in a low data, low information environment, then one makes the best assessment with what little information is available, and if there is risk involved, make the best determination of risk associated with acting on various options as well as not acting at all.

Take your Long-Term Capital Management example. The investment company is trying to devise quantitative models to predict the behavior of complex markets. The model or models that they developed are essentially experiments, an experiment that worked until it didn’t, at which point *something new was learned*. This however, was not done in an academic or theoretical setting, this was an investment company, and quoting from your reference, that would “basically place a bet” on the models predictions. This example has more to do with gambling and has little bearing on the value of science.

Beyond this, cherry-picking anecdotal examples of what, in your subjective opinion, you consider to be a “misuse of science” will not necessarily be considered a “misuse of science” by others, nor does it give an accurate measure or extent of the alleged problem, nor does it accurately compare and contrast it to negative outcomes overall, or that occur when scientific understanding should be used, but is not. In your investment example, how many bad trades and fortunes lost have occurred relying on “non-scientific intuitive expertise”? I find your argument wanting.

My conclusion to the above, therefore:

Sometimes non-scientific insights, expertise, experiences, heuristics and so forth are [imperfect, but may be] the best we have [in certain specific circumstances], but when people think "more scientific [must always] = better" we increase the chances of error.

The amount of equivocation here is incredible. Logically impossible to be wrong, but as a consequence saying nothing meaningful.

In what way are these non-scientific insights, etc “better” and for whom? Are they objectively better, or are they better because they match one's subjective preferences? If they are objectively better, how do we know? Why is there confidence in the insight or experience? Going back to the stock market, according to research in 2020 by the S&P Dow Jones Indices 88.99% of large-cap US funds have underperformed the S&P500 index over the previous ten years. Funds that are run or managed with the insights and expertise of fund managers. If “non-scientific insights, etc” are really just statistically hit-or-miss, how is that overall objectively better?

An example of what I mean by non-scientific insights:

Who would you put your money on in a sales competition, the best salesperson in a given industry or a leading academic expert on persuasion science?

The salesperson will be using experience, heuristics, intuition, etc. perhaps combined with some scientific insights, and they will be better than the scientist.

Your example here centers around human behavior and recognizing the particular emotional intelligence of the top performer of a particular activity, sales. It is more than clear at this point in our overall understanding of the world, that intellectual ability and potential is not a uniform and identical ability across all individuals in a given population. We also fully recognize that no matter how smart someone may be, they can still get things wrong. There is *always* a need to mitigate human fallibility when things matter.

The philosophy/science part involves the understanding the how and why of this individual being able to outperform the majority of their peers, as it is not by magic or some dark art beyond the ken of science.

Let’s look at some factors that a rational skeptic might consider when presented with your anecdote that should be considered when trying to evaluate the “why” of your salesperson's success. One factor might be access to quality leads. Is the top salesperson in a position to get first choice (for any number of reasons) on potential leads? Is the market booming for the product being sold such that it is selling itself, and our “top performer” has simply had the luck of landing a few high volume clients that push that salesperson's sales to the top of the rankings? Has our “top performer” been tested in selling other products in other industries and markets?

So if we can accept that non-scientific insights exist, and that many decisions we need to make don't have nice, accurate scientifically prescribed courses of action to follow, sometimes generic human expertise based on a range of non-scientific insights, expertise, experiences, heuristics and so forth is the best we have.

Whatever you want to call insights or experience, if it is real (not chance or lucky guess) then it is within the realm of possibility for science/philosophy to understand and explain the why and the how. Your “non-scientific” knowledge is only knowledge if it is demonstrated to be so. If it is demonstrated then it has been empirically verified and therefore falls within a scientific framework.

Yes, in the real world, we have to make choices without all the facts and without full understanding. Sometimes we get it right, and sometimes we get it wrong (which can be viewed as a form of empirical trial and error evaluation). I think for most folks, when making such decisions, the desire is to be as well informed as possible and avoid making blind guesses in complete ignorance, especially when there is risk involved. In that respect, the greater the amount of verified knowledge related to the choice the better, in my subjective opinion.

That is the consequence of living in an opaque world we only party understand and can only minimally control.

Your subjective assessment is duly noted.
 
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Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
Science is the only way to obtain reliable knowledge about any subject. Is that an excessive view of science.

The only benefit one gets from studying any subject which does not use scientific methodology is one of self-titillation. So, that's not saying there is no benefit, only there is no benefit beyond that. Is that an excessive view?
 

PureX

Veteran Member
Science is the only way to obtain reliable knowledge about any subject. Is that an excessive view of science.

The only benefit one gets from studying any subject which does not use scientific methodology is one of self-titillation. So, that's not saying there is no benefit, only there is no benefit beyond that. Is that an excessive view?
Absurdly so. Yes.
 

PureX

Veteran Member
Science is not philosophy. It is a method of enquiry that ascribes to a couple philosophical axioms.
 
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