Who here believes in "Scientism"?

[Augustus]

This is an example of science at work, though, isn’t it? Lack of replication highlights a problem that is now identified and can be addressed. This is fallibility mitigation at work, is it not?

Your approach seems to relate to treating science normatively whereas my focus is on what the impacts are in the real world.

There is nothing wrong with fallibility mitigation, we need to recognise the fallibility of fallibility mitigation though and consider what it means for knowledge acquisition.

Being well informed requires the acquisition of correct knowledge and the avoidance of false information, particularly false information that you hold with confidence.

If studies replicate at below 50% in a given field, what does that say about the value of that field in producing knowledge? There is an argument you are better off not reading anything as you learn more error than truth.

What would you say? You can't verify these yourself, so you trust that the process is reasonably good at filtering out truth from error. What is an "acceptable" error rate before you have a problem within a field regarding the knowledge value of its output?

Some of these errors may be picked up years or decades later, and some of the people who had learned these as 'knowledge' might correct their beliefs (although we know that correcting false beliefs is not a clean and easy process). Most people will retain significant amounts of false information though, and this will impact aspects of their behaviour.

When people study psychology are they being told "we don't really know if this study is correct" or "if you read a new study, the chances are it is wrong"? People who make decisions based on these aren't doing so while assuming the findings are, on balance or probabilities, false (or at least quite likey to be false).

Regardless of what should normatively happen, in reality people put a high value on things deemed scientific and thus gain confidence in the accuracy of the information.

In this case the unreliable sciences become a significant source of error, and this is a non-trivial problem.

If they can’t be studied scientifically, then you are saying they can’t be studied at all. So yes, of course there are things that are currently beyond our ability to adequately address and speculate on, and in such cases all we can do is to simply say we do not know.

We can't study the demarcation problem scientifically, or create ethical codes scientifically. I still think we can study them and make meaningful statements regarding them.

I do not agree that we should limit the scope of when to apply the demarcation and fallibility mitigation tools found within a scientific framework when seeking knowledge, nor should we suspend rational skepticism in such endeavors.

My premise is that in classic and traditional Philosophy and Theology there is not incorporated within the discipline a framework, mechanisms, a set of principles and standards, that actually mitigate the inherent fallibility in the philosopher.

You express this like people choose not to apply "fallibility mitigation tools found within a scientific framework" to certain areas, rather than in certain areas we simply can't apply them

Earlier you identified we couldn't say utilitarianism is better than virtue ethics scientifically.

When philosophers of science discuss the demarcation problem, what "fallibility mitigation tools" do you think they are not applying that they should be applying?

When you define what you think science is what "fallibility mitigation tools" do you think you apply that they do not? Ditto regarding your ethical values?

The issue I take with your position is your singular focus on how investigators operating within a scientific framework get things wrong. I agree, and say how can it not, as it is human beings doing the investigating. What is at question, is whether the mechanisms put in place to address this inherent fallibility work, and work in such a way as to allow actual progress to be made in addressing and answering the questions we put before ourselves.

Far from being my singular focus, it is not even my main focus. My main focus is on the consequences of these errors in the real world. It is how do we make decisions in a world we only partially understand and can only minimally control.

Your singular focus on errors in science does not acknowledge errors in “non-science” and whether such errors in “non-science” are effectively addressed. Is it your position that “non-science” disciplines are error-free, or are either equally or more adept at addressing and mitigating human error in the knowledge acquisition process? If that is your position, then make the case.

That's not remotely my position and have explicitly stated the opposite multiple times.

My only complaint is an incomplete presentation of available evidence regarding “non-scientific intuitive experts”.

As I never made any point about "non-scientific intuitive experts" in a general sense it is a fallacious comparison. Again, your assumptions about motivations may be clouding your judgement at times.

You don't really think that noting a salesperson or an effective political leader may indeed have a degree of expertise beyond that which can be quantified and replicated scientifically is akin to advocacy for soothsayers and shaman, do you?

Going back to the distinction between technical and practical knowledge from an earlier post, is your view that practical knowledge does not exist and only technical knowledge does?

Understanding factors that may lead to instantly wiping out long-term stability is all part-and-parcel to addressing this complex and difficult problem. The difficulty should not be an excuse to simply throw up our hands and not even try. Perhaps your argument is that the very act of trying will only result in things getting worse, and if so, I would disagree.

Who said anything about not trying? It is just that limiting our attempts at understanding to whatever inaccurate and highly incomplete scientific studies can say at this time will not give us the best chance at success.

The best (or least bad) solutions will contain significant amounts of subjective insights that may come from science, philosophy, history, literature, tradition, personal experience or whatever else is at hand.

We won't have the luxury of being able to "objectively" judge between competing claims either, we just have to hope that whoever is making the decisions happens to be an insightful observer of human society as we can't simply "trust the science".

Overestimation of the accuracy of data and conclusions are simply manifestations of human error and fallibility. If you want to give the specific error of overestimating accuracy the label ‘scientism’, then be my guest, however, I do not see it as useful.

Yes, and scientism is a human failing. Unless we retreat to normative abstractions and how things should work or might work in some far off future, all we can do is look at the world we live in.

In the world we actually live in, people overestimate the accuracy of scientific findings and overestimate its potential to solve certain problems we face. This causes problem. We should aim to mitigate these.

 

[Augustus]

Your adding a term "degree" here you did not state in the past. Your previous statements were in absolute terms

What I did was post a link to an article on the replication crisis.

You claimed "The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism"

I pointed out that this was utter nonsense and you were just reflexively disagreeing with me because your irrational biases delude you so much you can no longer form coherent thoughts when replying to me.

The above is a case in point where you try to defend the fact that you basically made the argument that scientific studies can't be falsified using scientific methods operating under the principle of methodological naturalism because the subject of the replication crisis is, unsurprisingly, replicating scientific studies.

Now you realise how ridiculous that is, instead of just admitting you made a mistake you try to pretend it was actually my error.

Simple fact needs not justification.
The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism.

Now you repeat it again.

I assume by "falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism" you mean "scientific methods operating under the principle of Methodological Naturalism".

The subject in question is replicating scientific studies.

Why would claims regarding the degree to which they can be replicated not be falsifiable?

Yes, science works out the degree to which scientific studies are replicable over time as the knowledge of science advances.

Yes, the RC is an argument that the level of replicability in certain sciences is quite low so I'm unsure why you think it is not falsifiable.

False

It's false that many studies cannot be reproduced or it is false that this damages the credibility of results in those fields?

It's funny how you have to reflexively disagree with me and it makes you take such ludicrous positions on issues. It's like having a puppet dance for you.

Again, your wording is 'begging the question with extreme language, and not truely asking a question, Your uses f 'excessive confidence' makes answering the question problematic. NO, we do not agree,

My question:

Yes/no: do you agree it is possible to have excessive confidence in the published research in certain scientific fields where many studies, perhaps even a majority, fail to reproduce?

You use terms like "extreme language" "excessive confidence" and "egregious exaggeration" despite the fact that my question says "many" and "perhaps even most" when some scientific studies of the issue show 75-90% error rates (these are linked to in the article). Many is basically the most tentative description that could be used accurately.

In August 2015, the first open empirical study of reproducibility in psychology was published, called The Reproducibility Project: Psychology. Coordinated by psychologist Brian Nosek, researchers redid 100 studies in psychological science from three high-ranking psychology journals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, and Psychological Science). 97 of the original studies had significant effects, but of those 97, only 36% of the replications yielded significant findings (p value below 0.05).[11] The mean effect size in the replications was approximately half the magnitude of the effects reported in the original studies. The same paper examined the reproducibility rates and effect sizes by journal and discipline. Study replication rates were 23% for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48% for Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, and 38% for Psychological Science. Studies in the field of cognitive psychology had a higher replication rate (50%) than studies in the field of social psychology (25%).


So what is your argument?

All the studies showing low replication rates are wrong?
The low replication rates are real, but it is not possible to have excessive confidence in results in these fields?
You have no argument and you're just being obtuse and are in a hole and want to keep digging?

 

[shunyadragon]

What I did was post a link to an article on the replication crisis.

You claimed "The above does not represent a subject that is falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism"

You selectively cite stuff to justify your agenda. A sensationalist yellow journalism article cannot justify any such crisis throughout science.

There are problems in replication of research particularly in social sciences, but further research over time resolves it,

I pointed out that this was utter nonsense and you were just reflexively disagreeing with me because your irrational biases delude you so much you can no longer form coherent thoughts when replying to me.

Your pointing is biased selective utter nonsense based on an =anti-science agenda

The above is a case in point where you try to defend the fact that you basically made the argument that scientific studies can't be falsified using scientific methods operating under the principle of methodological naturalism because the subject of the replication crisis is, unsurprisingly, replicating scientific studies.

I pointed out that the problem has limits in social sciences. You generalize the problem over all of science.

Is Economics a Science?

Learn how economics fits into the category of social sciences, and discover the arguments critics make against this classification.

www.investopedia.com

Social Sciences​

Social sciences include fields such as sociology, anthropology, and archaeology but differ from natural sciences, such as physics and chemistry. Social sciences revolve around the relationships between individuals and societies, as well as the development and operation of societies. Unlike most natural sciences, social sciences rely heavily on interpretation and qualitative research methodologies.


However, social sciences also use some quantitative tools used in the natural sciences to chart and understand trends. For example, economists use statistics and mathematical theories to test hypotheses and forecast trends, a process known as econometrics. In addition, many social sciences use surveys and other rigid research methodologies to determine trends and clarify future practices.


Among the social sciences, economics is noteworthy for its early and widespread adoption of formal mathematics in its theoretical development, statistical methods, and quantitative computer applications in its empirical approach to applied research.


The increased reliance on mathematical models to study the economy began with neoclassical economics in the late 19th century and remains essential to theoretical and applied economics.

Now you realise how ridiculous that is, instead of just admitting you made a mistake you try to pretend it was actually my error.

No it is your problem based on your anti-science agenda.

Now you repeat it again.

I assume by "falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism" you mean "scientific methods operating under the principle of Methodological Naturalism".

The subject in question is replicating scientific studies.

Why would claims regarding the degree to which they can be replicated not be falsifiable?

They are potentially falsifiable. By degree is that ALL theories are open to be false, revised or replaced, Science does not deal with absolutes and nothing is proven.

Yes, the RC is an argument that the level of replicability in certain sciences is quite low so I'm unsure why you think it is not falsifiable.

Social sciences that develop their own theories sometimes unfalsifiable may use "hard" science knowledge in their work. I have acknowledged the problems in the falsifiable of some theorie, but you too broadly generalize with an anti-science agenda. Note the limits of social scientists. Some theories in social sciences are falsifiable, but of course not all.

Is Economics a Science?

Learn how economics fits into the category of social sciences, and discover the arguments critics make against this classification.

www.investopedia.com

Economics is generally regarded as a social science, although some critics of the field argue that it falls short of the definition of a science for a number of reasons, including a lack of testable hypotheses, lack of consensus, and inherent political overtones.1 Despite these arguments, economics shares the combination of qualitative and quantitative elements common to all social sciences.

It's false that many studies cannot be reproduced or it is false that this damages the credibility of results in those fields?

You use of "many" has an anti-science agenda. By far most scientists fully realize the limits of their hypothesis and theories especially in social sciences,

It's funny how you have to reflexively disagree with me and it makes you take such ludicrous positions on issues. It's like having a puppet dance.

Your anti-science agenda is not funny it is tragic.

My question:

Yes/no: do you agree it is possible to have excessive confidence in the published research in certain scientific fields where many studies, perhaps even a majority, fail to reproduce?

I don't answer staged begging the question statements that are not truly question, but simply statements to justify your agenda.

You use terms like "extreme language" "excessive confidence" and "egregious exaggeration" despite the fact that my question says "many" and "perhaps even most" when some scientific studies of the issue show 75-90% error rates (these are linked to in the article). Many is basically the most tentative description that could be used accurately.

In August 2015, the first open empirical study of reproducibility in psychology was published, called The Reproducibility Project: Psychology. Coordinated by psychologist Brian Nosek, researchers redid 100 studies in psychological science from three high-ranking psychology journals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, and Psychological Science). 97 of the original studies had significant effects, but of those 97, only 36% of the replications yielded significant findings (p value below 0.05).[11] The mean effect size in the replications was approximately half the magnitude of the effects reported in the original studies. The same paper examined the reproducibility rates and effect sizes by journal and discipline. Study replication rates were 23% for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48% for Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, and 38% for Psychological Science. Studies in the field of cognitive psychology had a higher replication rate (50%) than studies in the field of social psychology (25%).


So what is your argument?

Your anti-science agenda and resorting to constant begging the question and selective references is tragic. You have failed to comprehend the reality of the issues in social sciences that have limited falsifiable hypothesis, but nonetheless the knowledge of social sciences do advance over time with the increased use of basic sciences. Your examples are often extreme and generalized over all science.

All the studies showing low replication rates are wrong?

You have only cited selectively a few to justify your anti-science agenda.agenda,

The low replication rates are real, but it is not possible to have excessive confidence in results in these fields?

In social sciences the problems are acknowledged by those in the field, but your anti-science agenda paints a broad anti-science brush.

You have no argument and you're just being obtuse and are in a hole and want to keep digging?

a great self-evaluation on your part without substance.

 

[Augustus]

You selectively cite stuff to justify your agenda. A sensationalist yellow journalism article cannot justify any such crisis throughout science.

"Sensationalist yellow journalism article" it was a Wikipedia article addressing an issue that is widely acknowledged within the sciences and citing dozens of scientific studies.

It specifically addresses individual sciences rather than claiming these are true "throughout science"

Again, your irrational biases and prejudice make you say the most obviously incorrect things.

Your anti-science agenda and resorting to constant begging the question and selective references is tragic. You have failed to comprehend the reality of the issues in social sciences that have limited falsifiable hypothesis, but nonetheless the knowledge of social sciences do advance over time with the increased use of basic sciences. Your examples are often extreme and generalized over all science.

Quoting a scientific study is now illustrative of "an anti-science agenda"

You have now

a) explicitly complained about me qualifying my statements with the term "certain sciences"
b) claimed that I am generalising to all of science (an obvious lie, but shows you can't even maintain a coherent train of thought any more)

You are just a dancing puppet who has to disagree with me for whatever strange reason you've managed to hallucinate into your mind.

You use of "many" has an anti-science agenda.

Making a far more conservative claim to that made in numerous, quoted, scientific studies is also "an anti-science agenda" as well as "egregiously exaggerated"

Now your biases and prejudices are making you unable to understand simple sentences in basic English, let alone the subject you are trying to discuss.

Would you say the scientific articles that show low replication rates have "an anti-science agenda"?

Would you say the scientists who say the exact same things as me have "an anti-science agenda"?

Would you say attempts to reduce the problems identified by such studies have "an anti-science agenda"?

You have only cited selectively a few to justify your anti-science agenda.agenda,

Are you saying all of the articles are incorrect? Feel free to offer any evidence in support of this claim.

(btw have you now accepted you were wrong to argue that claims regarding replication rates cannot be falsified using scientific methods? I'll assume you are tacitly admitting this)

In social sciences the problems are acknowledged by those in the field, but your anti-science agenda paints a broad anti-science brush.

Your cognitive dissonance is hilarious. I am acknowledging exactly the same thing as "those in the field". You just can't bring yourself to accept this, hence your puppet dancing.

I have never once painted "a broad anti-science brush". Your brain is just so addled with irrational prejudice that you can't think coherently and hallucinate all kinds of nonsense in our discussions. This is why you can only ever claim I did XYZ, but never actually specifically quote me doing XYZ.

I've been very clear that science is the best tool we have to understand the world we live in, that many sciences are highly reliable, but that this level of reliability drops significantly in certain areas (particularly the social sciences).

Here are some examples from this very thread:

The further away from the traditional, hard sciences we apply scientific methods the less reliable they become

When you recognise that science has an excellent track record in some areas, and a much more dubious one in others, we can't simply "trust the science" or consider it objectively beneficial to expand the scope of science into any area and assume it will offer an improvement.

Also, a lot of science relates to human behaviour and society. In fields like psychology and some of the social sciences it may be the case that more than half of published research is incorrect. There are often too many variables at play, and human ability to understand complex domains with nonlinearities and dynamic feedback loops is pretty terrible.

Science is the best tool we have to understand the world we live in, but it is also a major source of false information which is often harmful ( especially outside of the natural sciences).

Just one more lie that you have been caught in. But expecting you to respond rationally or honestly is like expecting to be handed the moon on a stick.

I look forward to the next instalment of puppet dancing and insisting I did XYZ without being able to quote me doing XYZ

 

[shunyadragon]

"Sensationalist yellow journalism article" it was a Wikipedia article addressing an issue that is widely acknowledged within the sciences and citing dozens of scientific studies.

It specifically addresses individual sciences rather than claiming these are true "throughout science"

Again, your irrational biases and prejudice make you say the most obviously incorrect things.



Quoting a scientific study is now illustrative of "an anti-science agenda"

You have now

a) explicitly complained about me qualifying my statements with the term "certain sciences"
b) claimed that I am generalising to all of science (an obvious lie, but shows you can't even maintain a coherent train of thought any more)

You are just a dancing puppet who has to disagree with me for whatever strange reason you've managed to hallucinate into your mind.



Making a far more conservative claim to that made in numerous, quoted, scientific studies is also "an anti-science agenda" as well as "egregiously exaggerated"

Now your biases and prejudices are making you unable to understand simple sentences in basic English, let alone the subject you are trying to discuss.

Would you say the scientific articles that show low replication rates have "an anti-science agenda"?

Would you say the scientists who say the exact same things as me have "an anti-science agenda"?

Would you say attempts to reduce the problems identified by such studies have "an anti-science agenda"?



Are you saying all of the articles are incorrect? Feel free to offer any evidence in support of this claim.

(btw have you now accepted you were wrong to argue that claims regarding replication rates cannot be falsified using scientific methods? I'll assume you are tacitly admitting this)



Your cognitive dissonance is hilarious. I am acknowledging exactly the same thing as "those in the field". You just can't bring yourself to accept this, hence your puppet dancing.

I have never once painted "a broad anti-science brush". Your brain is just so addled with irrational prejudice that you can't think coherently and hallucinate all kinds of nonsense in our discussions. This is why you can only ever claim I did XYZ, but never actually specifically quote me doing XYZ.

I've been very clear that science is the best tool we have to understand the world we live in, that many sciences are highly reliable, but that this level of reliability drops significantly in certain areas (particularly the social sciences).

Here are some examples from this very thread:





Just one more lie that you have been caught in. But expecting you to respond rationally or honestly is like expecting to be handed the moon on a stick.

I look forward to the next instalment of puppet dancing and insisting I did XYZ without being able to quote me doing XYZ

Through all this dialogue you have neglected the fact that scientists in the fields of the social sciences acknowledge the problems when their hypothesis are not falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism, and there are qualitative elements in their research and conclusions. Your attacks and accusations of "scientism" are indeed extreme and anti-science.

The argument in the past has extended past the issues in social sciences.

 

[Augustus]

hrough all this dialogue you have neglected the fact that scientists in the fields of the social sciences acknowledge the problems when their hypothesis are not falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism, and there are qualitative elements in their research and conclusions.

What does this gibberish even mean?

The problem is that many of the studies are falsified, as in their findings cannot be replicated when other scientists repeat their methodologies. The problem is not that they "are not falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism".

This rate of failure varies significantly by discipline or area of research but, in certain sciences, the failure rate may be over 50%, and some studies have it as high as 75-90% in certain areas.

Do you even understand what we are discussing?

The argument in the past has extended past the issues in social sciences.

Neuroscience and areas of medicine have poor rates of replication too.

Your attacks and accusations of "scientism" are indeed extreme and anti-science.

Nope. I simply restate the results of scientific studies, and consider that the high error rates identified by these studies are problematic in the real world.

People make decisions based on these findings, and making decisions based on false information can be harmful, especially if you are overconfident in the accuracy of the information.

I find it remarkable that it is even remotely controversial to say this. Scientism is indeed a magical world as it creates incredible delusions in the minds of people who hear it, so that they end up arguing endlessly against things that they no doubt would agree with in any other context.

 

[RestlessSoul]

Let me preface my arguments by highlighting the fact that I am challenging the status quo that has been established within post-schism philosophy. Resistance to reevaluating that status quo will be strongest for those with high emotional investment in currently held belief, and for deeply entrenched beliefs regarding this subject.

You have characterized my thesis as an *exceptionally broad* definition of what constitutes science. Let us compare it then, to the definition of Philosophy we find in Wikipedia:

Philosophy is a systematic study of general and fundamental questions concerning topics like existence, reason, knowledge, value, mind, and language. It is a rational and critical inquiry that reflects on its own methods and assumptions.​

…​

Major branches of philosophy are epistemology, ethics, logic, and metaphysics.​

…​

Other subfields are aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of history, and political philosophy.​

Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy​

My thesis is that Philosophy 2.0, what has come to be referred to as Science, is all of the above conducted within a framework that both acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility to best abilities. Philosophy 2.0, therefore, is no more and no less broad than Philosophy 1.0, your classic or traditionally practiced philosophical framework that Philosophy 2.0 supersedes.



So we can now set the criticism of “scope” or “breadth” of Philosophy 2.0 aside, or at least have an understanding of my accounting for it.

The question we should be asking ourselves now is why there would be a call for demarcation between what questions should be considered within a framework of Philosophy 2.0 and what should not, and who wants or needs such a demarcation. If the only difference between Philosophy 1.0 and Philosophy 2.0 is that Philosophy 2.0 expressly acknowledges the inherent fallibilities of Homo sapiens and actively seeks mechanisms by which to effectively mitigate those inherent fallibilities while engaging in Philosophy, what then is the intent of such demarcation other than to preserve the classical and traditional practice of Philosophy 1.0 with its lack of an express acknowledgement of the inherent fallibilities of the philosopher nor institutional mandate to mitigating those inherent fallibilities? Perhaps you have other valid reasons to avoid fallibility mitigation?

A quick note on Popper and his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, keeping in mind that in my view “science” is “philosophy”. Popper here, is highlighting two sources of fallibility in the philosopher, the first being a reiteration of the concern raised by David Hume in the mid-18th century regarding inductive reasoning. The second source he describes is the very nature of human thought itself, that human thought consisting of abstract constructs organized and governed within abstract systems require special care and attention to ensure that abstractions used to describe and explain the real world actually remain synthetic with, or correspond to, the real world. *This* is the demarcation that Popper sought to establish and provide a mechanism for, a demarcation between abstractions meant to remain synthetic to the real world and those that are simply analytic in nature. Popper’s book both illustrates these problems, sources of fallibility inherent in the philosopher, and provides a mechanism by which to mitigate that fallibility, mechanisms to be incorporated into the framework of Philosophy 2.0.



People declare all sorts of things. There is no getting around or preventing that. The demarcation you describe is embedded within the scientific framework itself. That is the whole point of having robust mitigation mechanisms. Besides the various forms of charlatanism you list, this would also include things like Theology or Philosophy of the Mind/Consciousness conducted outside the framework of Philosophy 2.0’s fallibility and error mitigation mechanisms. These activities are challenged and recognized for what they are precisely because they lack the falsifiability, explanatory power, and predictive ability found in the answers derived within a scientific framework that directly contradict them.



I can’t speak to this one-line quote because I do not have the complete context within which it is being used. I will say that your use here feels much the same as those who quote single-line bible verses to support whatever argument they are making. Such cherry-picking phrases can easily lend itself to simply supporting/reinforcing confirmation bias.

Well if your challenge to the status quo consists of labelling science as Philosophy 2.0, thereby rendering Philosophy 1.0 obsolete in the process, I think you’re going to need more by way of necessary conditions, than simply the importance of error mitigation mechanisms to the methodology and epistemology of your newly renamed discipline.

Because as @Augustus has been at pains to point out to you several times, error mitigation and avoidance of bias are as highly valued in the study of the humanities as in the natural sciences, notwithstanding the variation in the effectiveness of those mechanisms within any given field of enquiry.

Ref the Popper quote, I provided the context, as follows; 'Science: Conjectures and Refutations', Popper 1963. You can find the full essay in 'Philosophy of Science, the central issues' by Curd, Cover and Pincock, Norton Press 2013. Whilst Popper, like Thomas Kuhn, did draw attention to the fallibility, irrationality and cultural bias of the individual philosopher or scientist, his concern was in how best to establish the scientific status of a theory. To which end he identified refutation as a considerably more valuable tool than confirmation. Both Popper and Kuhn identified their own, not uncontroversial, sets of scientific values which certainly go well beyond commitment to error mitigation.

 

[MikeF]

Well if your challenge to the status quo consists of labelling science as Philosophy 2.0, thereby rendering Philosophy 1.0 obsolete in the process, I think you’re going to need more by way of necessary conditions, than simply the importance of error mitigation mechanisms to the methodology and epistemology of your newly renamed discipline.

Because as @Augustus has been at pains to point out to you several times, error mitigation and avoidance of bias are as highly valued in the study of the humanities as in the natural sciences, notwithstanding the variation in the effectiveness of those mechanisms within any given field of enquiry.

Ref the Popper quote, I provided the context, as follows; 'Science: Conjectures and Refutations', Popper 1963. You can find the full essay in 'Philosophy of Science, the central issues' by Curd, Cover and Pincock, Norton Press 2013. Whilst Popper, like Thomas Kuhn, did draw attention to the fallibility, irrationality and cultural bias of the individual philosopher or scientist, his concern was in how best to establish the scientific status of a theory. To which end he identified refutation as a considerably more valuable tool than confirmation. Both Popper and Kuhn identified their own, not uncontroversial, sets of scientific values which certainly go well beyond commitment to error mitigation.

Well, I think we can both agree that there are a great many folk here on RF that go to great pains to point out to each other where the other err in their thinking. Merely taking great pains to do so in no way speaks to the veracity of the point being stressed.

I find it interesting that you have recharacterized the dichotomy as between "the humanities" and "the natural sciences", whereas I had framed it as between "science" and "philosophy". How are you defining "the humanities"? Isn't it, broadly speaking, the study of human beings?

And what of this phrase "natural sciences"? Seems a word needed to preserve or comport with a specific worldview, one that perhaps holds Homo sapiens as separate and distinct from physical reality? It appears tautological to me, for what would constitute 'unnatural science' or 'artificial science'?

As to error mitigation being valued within philosophy, my argument, perhaps not clearly conveyed, regards "the variation in the effectiveness of those mechanisms" of fallibility mitigation, regardless the aspirations to do so.

Well if your challenge to the status quo consists of labelling science as Philosophy 2.0, thereby rendering Philosophy 1.0 obsolete in the process, I think you’re going to need more by way of necessary conditions, than simply the importance of error mitigation mechanisms to the methodology and epistemology of your newly renamed discipline.

You find my arguments insufficient. I had little confidence that you would find them otherwise.

Perhaps others may find some interest in them, or give them some pause to consider why something should be considered to fall either under the domain of philosophy or the domain of science.

You may not even be happy with the current status quo relationship between science and philosophy. Do you see science, as currently practiced, extending into areas where it should not? Should there be a stark demarcation between "the humanities" and "natural sciences" in your view?

 

[RestlessSoul]

Well, I think we can both agree that there are a great many folk here on RF that go to great pains to point out to each other where the other err in their thinking. Merely taking great pains to do so in no way speaks to the veracity of the point being stressed.

I find it interesting that you have recharacterized the dichotomy as between "the humanities" and "the natural sciences", whereas I had framed it as between "science" and "philosophy". How are you defining "the humanities"? Isn't it, broadly speaking, the study of human beings?

And what of this phrase "natural sciences"? Seems a word needed to preserve or comport with a specific worldview, one that perhaps holds Homo sapiens as separate and distinct from physical reality? It appears tautological to me, for what would constitute 'unnatural science' or 'artificial science'?



You find my arguments insufficient. I had little confidence that you would find them otherwise.

Perhaps others may find some interest in them, or give them some pause to consider why something should be considered to fall either under the domain of philosophy or the domain of science.

You may not even be happy with the current status quo relationship between science and philosophy. Do you see science, as currently practiced, extending into areas where it should not? Should there be a stark demarcation between "the humanities" and "natural sciences" in your view?

The term “Natural Sciences” is generally used to distinguish physics, chemistry, biology etc, from the Social Sciences. There are good reasons to make this distinction, but if anyone ever develops a set of natural laws which can predict human behaviour with a fraction of the accuracy with which Newton’s Laws of Motion predict the actions of massive objects, maybe then the distinction will become redundant.

I see considerable overlap between science and philosophy, and long may that be the case. Physics needs a metaphysics, if it is offer a complete description of the natural world, as Einstein (and Hawking, and others) have all recognised. Indeed, the lifetime of debate between Einstein and his friend Bohr, was predicated on a philosophical disagreement. Philosophy, meanwhile, would soon become irrelevant if it ignored the revolution in scientific discovery unfolding over the last several hundred years.

The Natural Sciences can be characterised as a study of naturally occurring, observable phenomena. But here’s the thing; entities are observable, but terms, concepts and ideas are not. So as soon as science goes beyond observing regularities in nature (and making predictions based on those observations), as soon as it offers explanations of the underlying causes of those observable regularities, then we are into the realm of the philosophy. As Hawking touched on when asked the question, “What is it that puts the fire into the equations?”

 

[MikeF]

Well if your challenge to the status quo consists of labelling science as Philosophy 2.0, thereby rendering Philosophy 1.0 obsolete in the process, I think you’re going to need more by way of necessary conditions, than simply the importance of error mitigation mechanisms to the methodology and epistemology of your newly renamed discipline.

Because as @Augustus has been at pains to point out to you several times, error mitigation and avoidance of bias are as highly valued in the study of the humanities as in the natural sciences, notwithstanding the variation in the effectiveness of those mechanisms within any given field of enquiry.

Ref the Popper quote, I provided the context, as follows; 'Science: Conjectures and Refutations', Popper 1963. You can find the full essay in 'Philosophy of Science, the central issues' by Curd, Cover and Pincock, Norton Press 2013. Whilst Popper, like Thomas Kuhn, did draw attention to the fallibility, irrationality and cultural bias of the individual philosopher or scientist, his concern was in how best to establish the scientific status of a theory. To which end he identified refutation as a considerably more valuable tool than confirmation. Both Popper and Kuhn identified their own, not uncontroversial, sets of scientific values which certainly go well beyond commitment to error mitigation.

I am curious as to whether you feel I satisfactorily address your point that my definition of science was exceptionally broad:

To clarify, my point was that your exceptionally broad definition of what constitutes science, takes no account of a century of academic study and debate concerning exactly this issue of demarcation.

In relation to the scope and breadth of philosophy, do you still consider my definition of science exceptionally broad?

 

[RestlessSoul]

I am curious as to whether you feel I satisfactorily address your point that my definition of science was exceptionally broad:



In relation to the scope and breadth of philosophy, do you still consider my definition of science exceptionally broad?

Maybe I haven’t understood you correctly. Could you save me the trouble of searching back over the thread, and summarise your definition of science again, in brief? Thanks

 

[MikeF]

The term “Natural Sciences” is generally used to distinguish physics, chemistry, biology etc, from the Social Sciences. There are good reasons to make this distinction, but if anyone ever develops a set of natural laws which can predict human behaviour with a fraction of the accuracy with which Newton’s Laws of Motion predict the actions of massive objects, maybe then the distinction will become redundant.

An pray tell, with what precision can one determine the exact location of an electron at any point in time?

We human being create abstract category sets for our own convenience. The categories physics, archeology, chemistry, psychology, biology, history, sociology are created by us to serve our needs. If there is convenience to grouping all Homo sapiens specific studies within a social sciences category, I have no problem with that. To say that social sciences are not science, or somehow not science to the same degree as 'non-social science', I would strongly disagree. Science isn't about specific means and methods, it is about using the best available means and methods to solve the particular question at hand, which may not be the same means and methods required to address and solve a different question. What *is* the same, in all cases, is an adherence to proven principles and standards that effectively mitigate the fallibility of the human beings engaged in these activities. The mitigation process is not fool-poof, does not cure human fallibility, and is not instantaneous. It requires effort over time to work. It is a process that builds a core of knowledge incrementally, a core of knowledge that can be held with confidence.

In short, I do not agree with your rationale for such a distinction.

I see considerable overlap between science and philosophy, and long may that be the case.

Perhaps because they are the same thing as I have been arguing?

The Natural Sciences can be characterised as a study of naturally occurring, observable phenomena. But here’s the thing; entities are observable, but terms, concepts and ideas are not. So as soon as science goes beyond observing regularities in nature (and making predictions based on those observations), as soon as it offers explanations of the underlying causes of those observable regularities, then we are into the realm of the philosophy. As Hawking touched on when asked the question, “What is it that puts the fire into the equations?”

What kind of question is: “What is it that puts the fire into the equations?” Is it an objective one or a subjective one?

What is left after science "offers explanations of the underlying causes of those observable regularities"? Deal with it? Make the most of it? What then, is the role you envision for philosophy after science has figured out what's what?

 

[Nakosis]

What does this gibberish even mean?

The problem is that many of the studies are falsified, as in their findings cannot be replicated when other scientists repeat their methodologies. The problem is not that they "are not falsifiable by Methodological Naturalism".

This rate of failure varies significantly by discipline or area of research but, in certain sciences, the failure rate may be over 50%, and some studies have it as high as 75-90% in certain areas.

Do you even understand what we are discussing?




Neuroscience and areas of medicine have poor rates of replication too.



Nope. I simply restate the results of scientific studies, and consider that the high error rates identified by these studies are problematic in the real world.

People make decisions based on these findings, and making decisions based on false information can be harmful, especially if you are overconfident in the accuracy of the information.

I find it remarkable that it is even remotely controversial to say this. Scientism is indeed a magical world as it creates incredible delusions in the minds of people who hear it, so that they end up arguing endlessly against things that they no doubt would agree with in any other context.

All this simply show that science is working as intended. Science is designed to be self-correcting.

Sure, I've seen politicians misuse the name of science to control the masses. No doubt something they've learned from religion. However, the authority of science cannot come from faith, as it does with religion.

It's authority come from continually proving itself well beyond the point of exhaustion.

Can science be done wrong? Yes.
Can science be misused? Yes.

All you've shown however is that science can be trusted to correct for this.
And, the more you understand science, the more you can prevent it from being done wrong or misused.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Here the distinction between “Science”(Science placed in quotes as we do not agree definition or scope of the term) and History seems to boil down to an assertion that History is not purely empirical and that the conclusions of history are “a bit softer” and contain a lot of conjecture.

If you know anything about me, man, I hope you realize that I dislike debates that get tripped up on definitions. But there is a simple way around this. We can define "science"... "scientism".... "empiricism" any way we we'd like-- so long as we both agree on the definitions at the outset.

That doesn't mean my definitions are to be preferred over yours. We need to BOTH agree on the definitions. I'm cool with going with the Wikipedia definition of each term, if you are. But if you aren't... and since definitions seems to be a sticking point with you, I'm open to reviewing whatever definition you propose. So long as it's reasonable, I'll surely agree to adopt a definition that you propose for the purposes of our discussion.

If the objective of History as a discipline is to acquire as many objective facts about historical events as is practicable, and that such facts should be relayed with fidelity and completeness, how then is that not empirical?

Because it often relies on second-hand accounts and assumptions rather than pure sense data. The only purely empirical aspect of history is archeology. An archeologist says, "We found a half a dozen clay vases in our excavation of the site. They date to 230 BCE."

A historian says, "Such clay vases were likely used to carry water to the city from a nearby river." Another historian may have a different hypothesis. They may think that, due to some of the inscriptions on the vases, that they were used in religious ceremonies and probably contained wine for the festival celebration of a local god."

Different historians will write different papers each arguing one thesis or the other. (Let's assume that these two theories are the most prominent ones.) This is NOT how science tries to get to the bottom of things. While the archeological papers are purely empirical, the history papers may refer to written manuscripts at the time... some manuscripts which hint at vases being used for religious purposes... vases that may or may not resemble the vases found at the site. Different academics advance competing theories. Each theory is open to criticism from other academics. A lot of it is based on conjecture.

Empirical science does not work that way. An empirical scientist would want to test the vases for remnants of wine. If nothing could be determined as to whether the vases ever contained wine, the empirical scientist would just shrug and say, "we'll never know." But not a historian. A historian has no problem referencing written sources and trying to make her best guess as to the true nature of the vases. Science doesn't operate that way. And while I DO find science's methodology to be superior to history, I think history can lead us to genuine information that (possibly) science can't. Why can't science do as well as history sometimes? Because we don't always have access to empirical data needed to form good conclusions. But, as the academic discipline of history shows, we can learn a great deal sometimes without direct empirical data.

It's the "indirectness" of the data that makes history different from science. Historians rely on second-hand accounts. (They don't take the WORD of second hand accounts... much debate can occur over the validity of a written account.) Again, this is NOT how the sciences operate.

A “proponent of science” thinks that knowledge “‘is based on experience’ and that ‘knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification’” and thus held with degrees of confidence. A “proponent of science” has greater confidence in work product produced within a framework that actively mitigates human fallibilities. Work product produced outside such a framework must then be evaluated within such a framework of rational skepticism and human fallibility mitigation in order to assign an appropriate level of confidence to that work product.

Although at one point in my former post, I typed "proponent of science" (that was a typo), I MEANT "proponent of scient-ISM". (I properly typed that the rest of the time.)

I'm personally a proponent of science, so I would never criticize such a view (being a proponent of science, myself). But a proponent of scient-ISM is something I very much am not.

I could make the case that philosophy has and does give us genuine knowledge. But, man. It's a long story. And it might be more of a diversion from this topic than an aid to a discussion of scientism. But, yeah, I'm down to show how philosophy gives us knowledge. But that might be its own thread.

In any case, I wanna hear your responses to the other things I said first.


EDIT:

As an aside, I decided to go look up "scientism" on wikipedia to see how it was defined.

Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.

Interestingly enough, I think you and I AGREE on "the best" part of that definition. Where I think we (may) disagree is on the "only" part. Thoughts on that?

 

[Augustus]

All this simply show that science is working as intended. Science is designed to be self-correcting.

Sure, I've seen politicians misuse the name of science to control the masses. No doubt something they've learned from religion. However, the authority of science cannot come from faith, as it does with religion.

It's authority come from continually proving itself well beyond the point of exhaustion.

Can science be done wrong? Yes.
Can science be misused? Yes.

All you've shown however is that science can be trusted to correct for this.
And, the more you understand science, the more you can prevent it from being done wrong or misused.

I’m not sure 50+% of published research being false is the way things are supposed to work.

I don’t agree that as long as most errors are caught within the next few decades then we don’t need to worry. it’s a problem much if this isn’t caught in the first place and that people are using flawed methodologies and that people will make decisions on this information believing it to be scientifically rigorous.

Treating it as a normative concept where everything is working as expected is to distort reality.

Recognising a problem and correcting this problem are 2 different things.

We know this problem exists yet these fields are still churning out false studies based on the same methodological flaws. Also correcting an error doesn’t extinguish it from the real world, especially when systems or additional ideas have been built on its foundations.

These will have consequences that will extend decades into the future.

When people treat science normatively and focus on platitudes like self-correcting rather than real world consequences of what happens in between false information being produced and it being corrected this is when people become overconfident in the process.

It is not about politicians or bad faith actors “misusing” science, it is that the combination of human, social, institutional and economic factors that exist in the real world scientific process often leads to outcomes that differ from the normative expectation.

The credibility of certain sciences is well earned. This halo effect spreads to areas where it has not been, and generic platitudes about everything working as expected doesn’t help solve this problem.

 

[Nakosis]

I’m not sure 50+% of published research being false is the way things are supposed to work.

I don’t agree that as long as most errors are caught within the next few decades then we don’t need to worry. it’s a problem much if this isn’t caught in the first place and that people are using flawed methodologies and that people will make decisions on this information believing it to be scientifically rigorous.

Treating it as a normative concept where everything is working as expected is to distort reality.

Recognising a problem and correcting this problem are 2 different things.

We know this problem exists yet these fields are still churning out false studies based on the same methodological flaws. Also correcting an error doesn’t extinguish it from the real world, especially when systems or additional ideas have been built on its foundations.

These will have consequences that will extend decades into the future.

When people treat science normatively and focus on platitudes like self-correcting rather than real world consequences of what happens in between false information being produced and it being corrected this is when people become overconfident in the process.

It is not about politicians or bad faith actors “misusing” science, it is that the combination of human, social, institutional and economic factors that exist in the real world scientific process often leads to outcomes that differ from the normative expectation.

The credibility of certain sciences is well earned. This halo effect spreads to areas where it has not been, and generic platitudes about everything working as expected doesn’t help solve this problem.

Sure, but again, this is a problem for the uniformed. The way to combat this is to become informed. Develop one's own mind in scientific thinking.

The point being that science provides the most reliable method of knowledge and understanding. Taking the time to understand science is what combats the "halo" effect. Obviously the "halo" effect gets it name from religion were this is the normative process.

 

[Augustus]

Sure, but again, this is a problem for the uniformed. The way to combat this is to become informed. Develop one's own mind in scientific thinking.

The point being that science provides the most reliable method of knowledge and understanding. Taking the time to understand science is what combats the "halo" effect. Obviously the "halo" effect gets it name from religion were this is the normative process.

That is the point, scientism isn’t a criticism of science, but of the attitude of individuals towards it.

But I’d say it goes beyond the “uninformed” seeing as several disciplines do have quite a significant problem with their levels of reproducibility.

Many practitioners in those fields will be overestimating the reliability of their discipline.

 

[shunyadragon]

That is the point, scientism isn’t a criticism of science, but of the attitude of individuals towards it.

Yes your attitude toward science, and others like Fundamentalist Christians.

But I’d say it goes beyond the “uninformed” seeing as several disciplines do have quite a significant problem with their levels of reproducibility.

This is understood by scientists and corrected over time.

Many practitioners in those fields will be overestimating the reliability of their discipline.

No. Some yes, but you clearly over state the problem.

 

[Augustus]

Yes your attitude toward science, and others like Fundamentalist Christians.

You can’t even form contextually coherent sentences anymore.

Just vapid nonsensical drivel based on your own delusional misunderstandings.

From the man who claimed we can’t use scientific methods to study the degree to which scientific studies are replicable, we now get “fundamentalist Christians overestimate the accuracy of studies in the social sciences and other less reliable sciences”.

Every one a winner. Give the man a coconut

 

[MikeF]

I’m not sure 50+% of published research being false is the way things are supposed to work.

I don’t agree that as long as most errors are caught within the next few decades then we don’t need to worry. it’s a problem much if this isn’t caught in the first place and that people are using flawed methodologies and that people will make decisions on this information believing it to be scientifically rigorous.

Treating it as a normative concept where everything is working as expected is to distort reality.

Recognising a problem and correcting this problem are 2 different things.

We know this problem exists yet these fields are still churning out false studies based on the same methodological flaws. Also correcting an error doesn’t extinguish it from the real world, especially when systems or additional ideas have been built on its foundations.

These will have consequences that will extend decades into the future.

When people treat science normatively and focus on platitudes like self-correcting rather than real world consequences of what happens in between false information being produced and it being corrected this is when people become overconfident in the process.

It is not about politicians or bad faith actors “misusing” science, it is that the combination of human, social, institutional and economic factors that exist in the real world scientific process often leads to outcomes that differ from the normative expectation.

The credibility of certain sciences is well earned. This halo effect spreads to areas where it has not been, and generic platitudes about everything working as expected doesn’t help solve this problem.

You have defined 'scientism' as *both* an "excessive belief in accuracy" and an "excessive scope" of science.

You seem to be arguing above that there are areas where science continually falls short, or is not as successful as it is in other areas. I have absolutely no problem with throwing a glaring spotlight on failures of experiments in science that fail to meet the mark. I don't have a problem with saying that certain problems, namely those involving human behavior, require special handling and full acknowledgement and declaration as to the limits of confidence that can be held in studies that have yet to be replicated or stand up to scrutiny in other ways.

What I do take issue with any notion that the *scope* of science should be limited in some way. I would ask whether you are arguing that since scientific inquiry is struggling to exhibit reliability in some fields that we are to conclude that scientific inquiry is therefore *not applicable* in those fields.

You have claimed that there are other valid sources of knowledge, namely 'non-science intuitive experts'. Is it your express argument that where scientific inquiry struggles it should retreat and yield the field to 'non-science intuitive experts'? Remember of course that to qualify as a 'non-science intuitive expert', one simply has to be perceived as such by *anyone*. I think it is critical to note here that 'non-science intuitive experts' get to avoid the embarrassment of being shown to lack reproducibility because there is no mandate to show demonstrability in the first place.

I laude efforts to highlight the failures of science, for in order to fix failure it must first be recognized and acknowledged as such. But if our framework of inquiry does not even require demonstrability in the first place, how are errors even to be shown?

You said above in regards to faulty science, “Also correcting an error doesn’t extinguish it from the real world, especially when systems or additional ideas have been built on its foundations. These will have consequences that will extend decades into the future.”

What then of “non-scientific” errors in Philosophy or Theology for example? Are there not the same real world consequences and long-term ramifications?

If we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t, isn't it preferable to take the path that at least makes the effort to recognize mistakes in a reliable way and take action to fix them, and thus facilitate incremental and measurable improvements?

An example of what I mean by non-scientific insights:

Who would you put your money on in a sales competition, the best salesperson in a given industry or a leading academic expert on persuasion science?

The salesperson will be using experience, heuristics, intuition, etc. perhaps combined with some scientific insights, and they will be better than the scientist.

I would also like to explore your thought experiment a little more in depth. You ask us to consider a sales competition between an ace salesperson and a leading academic expert on persuasion science. I would like to extend the experiment to a few other cases as a means of really gauging what it is that we are evaluating in your thought experiment. Let’s consider your sales competition as Case 1.

Case 2: Who would we put our money on in a timed contest to completely disassemble and reassemble a Ford F-150 engine, a top engine mechanic specializing in Ford trucks or a Ford design engineer specializing in Ford F-150 engines?

Case 3: In a track and field high jump competition, who will we bet on to win, an Olympic high jumper or a PhD in Sports Physiology and Mechanics who researches methodologies in high jump training and technique?

I think in all three cases we have scenarios that are contrasting those that can *do* a thing very well, and those who are expert in explaining the *how and the why*. Isn’t your thought experiment faulty on the grounds that it is trying to compare apples to oranges?

Let’s focus in again on your sales example. What if we were to have a sales competition between a group of individuals who have earned MBA’s from top graduate programs and a group of individuals that have earned PhD’s in Mathematics from top ranked universities. In two groups of highly intelligent people, is it our expectation that there will not be an advantage shown for those who have studied the science of business?

Notice that in your Case 1 thought experiment, we are to consider an *ace* salesperson, not *any* or the *average*. Do we not expect a Bell Curve distribution in a population for any human activity of *doing*?

Your thought experiment does not highlight a weakness or failing of science, it simply highlights the disparity in the potential for any particular human being to *do* a particular thing. The *doer* will be all the better at the *doing* if using the best and most up to date information in their effort to *do*, don’t you think?