This gets to the core of my position. Science is philosophy. Philosophy 2.0 is an abstract system with improvements over Philosophy h 1.0, and it is an abstract system or framework that requires demarcation between the falsifiable and the non-falsifiable to which you refer. How else is one aware of whether falsifiability is relevant and applicable if there is not the active intent to establish and keep track of the demarcation between the falsifiable and non-falsifiable? This is all part of the mandate for error mitigation, and hence the necessity to bring all forms of rational inquiry within the error mitigating framework of Philosophy 2.0, incorporating mechanisms with which to establish this demarcation between what is falsifiable and what is not, as well as acknowledging and clearly demarcating subjective preference in order to address and evaluate it as such.
I’m happy to view science as a subset of philosophy. It is more natural philosophy 2.0 (give or take) though rather than philosophy 2.0.
Much of the rest of philosophy is still as it was as it can not be turned into science in any recognisable sense of the term (logic, ontology, ethics, epistemology, etc.)
You have defined scientism as an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.
I think your comments quoted above pertain primarily to the second aspect of your definition, of one having an excessive belief in the scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry. My interpretation here is that you are saying there are areas of inquiry where science should not apply or is inappropriate. Am I correct in that interpretation?
I’m more concerned with the accuracy, but it’s just you don’t seem to have any issues with accepting many areas of science are far less reliable than others. It’s a pretty straightforward argument after all.
Scope and accuracy are related though. The further away from the traditional, hard sciences we apply scientific methods the less reliable they become.
Scope and accuracy are not entirely independent variables.
Overall though, I focus on how science exists as a human activity and how it is used and misused in the real world. Too many people who object to the term scientism tend to talk about science in normative terms relating to how things should work.
Here is the link to my response to this definition of 'scientism' in that thread:
LINK
I’d say here you misunderstand his arguments, in the same way you seem to misunderstand what certain people are arguing in this thread.
1, 2 and 5 may involve charlatanism, but are really just about the prestige of science in the modern world and a tendency to want to make things more “scientific”. This is often done with very serious, scholarly and well meaning intentions.
You are worried about people presenting opinion and subjectivity as objective fact, but science is a far greater source of this than formal philosophy these days.
I’d say that, in a not insignificant number of cases, the social sciences are impacted by the personal beliefs of the researchers.
Let’s take a specific example. It is my recollection that in the past you have said that the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics is outside of the scope of science (and of course, correct me if my recollection is incorrect). If the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics as a discipline acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the moral philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility as well as establishes mechanisms with which to clearly demarcate between what can be considered falsifiable and that which cannot, how can this be considered anything other than a scientific approach? If none of that is done, then shouldn’t that affect our confidence in the work product derived from the discipline Philosophy of Morals and Ethics?
Case in point.
Many people think a scientific approach to ethics would be an improvement (and usually think it would support their ethical values).
Science can play a role in identifying people’s preferences and the best way to achieve these, but this relates as much to policy as it does to ethics.
Science cannot tell you which of many competing values are superior though. For example, should we be utilitarians? If we are, where do we draw the line between greater good and individual rights?
So I can’t in any way see this as representing “scientific ethics”, and by adding the label to give greater credibility, it muddies the water between subjective preference and objective fact. Many would accept moral philosophy has many subjective variables after all.
We can see the problems of 'scientific' ethics in the past, where things like social Darwinism and Marxism had ethical principles believed to be scientific and thus objective truths.
“Scientific” ethics can be a way to turbocharge error.
These would also be examples of scientism where scientific principles were applied beyond their effective boundaries. We would call these pseudoscience nowadays, but that is not how they were always seen at the time (Although scientism as a pejorative was basically invented to critique Marxist pretensions of objectivity and rigour when creating their social and historical theories). Social Darwinism and eugenics were widely accepted within the respectable scientific community though.
Unsurprisingly, scientific ethics are not inherently humanistic or positive, they simply reflect the values of those who are creating them with a veneer of scientistic objectivity.
Turning back to your definition of ‘scientism’, if there is no line of inquiry outside the scope of science, then your definition of scientism contracts to “an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.” Which, of course, we would recognize as such because the belief would be established as being excessive scientifically, yes? If the excessive belief is due to ignorance or lack of fluency in science on the part of the individual, is it really necessary to categorize such folks into an -ism? If we are referring to folks who are highly fluent in the sciences that make excessive claims, then it would seem we are instead talking about a psychological issue, something that might be better described in the DSM?
The -ism matters as it is something humans do that needs a label so we can try to avoid it.
Because of the status of science in the modern world, and the fact that labelling things 'scientific' functions in a manner similar to labelling them 'objectively true' we need to understand that people often overestimate the accuracy of scientific knowledge in many fields.
And we need to accept the limited utility of science in fields where it is not reliable, and that in complex domains (lets say economics), trying to force reality into a form that can be quantified 'scientifically' often misses out or distorts reality in. a manner that can render the information actively harmful (plenty examples of "scientific" theories leading to errors and even financial crises often because they make people overconfident in their accuracy.
Sometimes non-scientifc insights, expertise, experiences, heuristics and so forth are the best we have, but when people think "more scientific = better" we increase the chances of error.