You have defined scientism as an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.
I think your comments quoted above pertain primarily to the second aspect of your definition, of one having an excessive belief in the scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry. My interpretation here is that you are saying there are areas of inquiry where science should not apply or is inappropriate. Am I correct in that interpretation?
I also infer from your definition and your comments above that science is a distinct and separate activity from philosophy (with a minor concession to there being some small overlap), that they, in essence, are not the same thing. Is this a correct interpretation on my part?
If I am interpreting you correctly, then this is where we fundamentally disagree. We are not in agreement on what science is and to what it can and should be applied to.
My position is that science *is* philosophy. I see philosophy, as envisioned by the ancient Greeks who devised it, as consisting of any and all areas of inquiry into general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist. Science, or “The New and Improved Philosophy”, or Philosophy 2.0, is still philosophy, with the same objective of asking and answering general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist.
So what has changed between Philosophy 1.0 and Philosophy 2.0? It is not about methods and means, as these vary and are specific to the question at hand. One does not use the same methods and means to study economic markets to also study black holes within distant galaxies or the behavior of Chimpanzees. What is different about Philosophy 2.0 is the understanding that a posture of rational skepticism is required to be maintained toward philosophers themselves, toward the investigators. It is an acknowledgement and acceptance in the inherent fallibility of human beings and that active steps to mitigate that fallibility are required. This is the fundamental and necessary difference, establishing the framework for error mitigation in the inquiry process, the rest falling to the details of identifying and mitigating sources of error throughout this endeavor, an endeavor to answer any and all of the general and fundamental questions that philosophy, now philosophy 2.0, sets before itself.
You said above, “We don't have something called science we just get out of a bottle and place on whatever issue we would like, so when you say "science is XYZ and its goal is to discover ABC" you are explicitly making (non-falsifiable) philosophical arguments.”
This gets to the core of my position. Science is philosophy. Philosophy 2.0 is an abstract system with improvements over Philosophy 1.0, and it is an abstract system or framework that requires demarcation between the falsifiable and the non-falsifiable to which you refer. How else is one aware of whether falsifiability is relevant and applicable if there is not the active intent to establish and keep track of the demarcation between the falsifiable and non-falsifiable? This is all part of the mandate for error mitigation, and hence the necessity to bring all forms of rational inquiry within the error mitigating framework of Philosophy 2.0, incorporating mechanisms with which to establish this demarcation between what is falsifiable and what is not, as well as acknowledging and clearly demarcating subjective preference in order to address and evaluate it as such.
This is why I would argue that there is no limit or restriction on the scope of science, or Philosophy 2.0. It is the overarching framework within which the mechanisms necessary to establish these required demarcations then allow us to keep track of exactly what it is that we are talking about, to which realm of rational inquiry we are engaged, be it the real world, pure abstraction, or subjective preference, or a mixture (as is most often the case surround issues of human behavior).
Let’s take a specific example. It is my recollection that in the past you have said that the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics is outside of the scope of science (and of course, correct me if my recollection is incorrect). If the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics as a discipline acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the moral philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility as well as establishes mechanisms with which to clearly demarcate between what can be considered falsifiable and that which cannot, how can this be considered anything other than a scientific approach? If none of that is done, then shouldn’t that affect our confidence in the work product derived from the discipline Philosophy of Morals and Ethics?
Turning back to your definition of ‘scientism’, if there is no line of inquiry outside the scope of science, then your definition of scientism contracts to “an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.” Which, of course, we would recognize as such because the belief would be established as being excessive scientifically, yes? If the excessive belief is due to ignorance or lack of fluency in science on the part of the individual, is it really necessary to categorize such folks into an -ism? If we are referring to folks who are highly fluent in the sciences that make excessive claims, then it would seem we are instead talking about a psychological issue, something that might be better described in the DSM?
Perhaps there are areas of inquiry (ie seeking answers determined valid with some degree of confidence to answerable questions, or acknowledging questions as currently unanswerable) where you feel the error mitigation and demarcations of science still do not apply. In such cases where you feel such error mitigation and demarcations of science do not apply, what provides confidence in these answers garnered outside of a scientific framework of inquiry?