Who here believes in "Scientism"?

[vulcanlogician]

Not everything that is evidence-based is science.

Could you elaborate?

 

[Augustus]

To declare areas of inquiry explicitly off limits to science can only be seen as a desire to shield those areas from this process of demarcation and error mitigation.

On any issue involving human opinion that is not incredibly simple, assuming that anything is “the only reason” people could think that usually says more about the biases of the person saying it than what they have perceived in the target. Our own biases can make us unable to comprehend fairly simple points when they go against what we would like to believe and have made a public commitment to promoting.

The point in question reflects an absolutely mainstream position held by many scientists who are interested in the philosophy of science, including many of the greatest minds in history such as Einstein who noted the following:

I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today - and even professional scientists - seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is - in my opinion - the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth.

When your argument requires you to believe that the only reason Einstein could value and differentiate the philosophy of science was a "desire to shield those areas from this process of demarcation and error mitigation", someone concerned with error mitigation and the avoiding bias might start to look more critically at their own thought processes.

Even the way you negatively frame it as “declaring specifically off limits” betrays a failure to comprehend the point being made.

You have been corrected on this claim so many times by people who are clearly not trying to shield any areas from error mitigation, yet it seems impervious to revision. Why do you think that is?

This is exactly wrong. We do not demarcate what is science from what is not science because science *is* the demarcation tool. It is the tool to demarcate between what is objective and corresponds to the real world, what is subjective preference, and what is purely analytic abstraction. Science is the demarcation tool with the mandate to identify and mitigate sources of human error in both the demarcation process and knowledge acquisition process.

First of all, this is a philosophical argument you are making here relating to things like epistemology and the philosophy of science. Ironically, you seem to making these philosophical arguments as if you see them as objective facts (although it is possible you ares imply stating your subject opinion so if that is the case, fair enough).

Secondly, this is completely circular reasoning akin to saying we can differentiate between a moral and immoral behaviour simply by looking at what behaviour conforms with morality.

We don't have something called science we just get out of a bottle and place on whatever issue we would like, so when you say "science is XYZ and its goal is to discover ABC" you are explicitly making (non-falsifiable) philosophical arguments.

This is exactly my point. Whether it is an insistence on claiming certainty where none is possible, or passing off subjective preference as universal truth, all of it speaks to human fallibility and wherever humans are involved, in the pursuit of any knowledge seeking endeavor you wish to claim, these very human failings have to be acknowledged and addressed.

It is not a science problem, it's a people problem, which is the very thing that science is designed to address and mitigate.

Science is a human activity, so to say it is not a science problem is to retreat into the world of normative abstraction. Deeming something "scientific" also gives it great credibility in the eyes of many.

Accepting there are limitations to the accuracy and scope of the sciences as exist in the world of limited human cognitive capacity, and that other factors such as commerce and institutional bias, etc. also may corrupt the process and that these can cause real problems when people make decisions based on these is to accept that scientism is a problem as per how I said I used the term (which is one of the standards definitions).

I imagine you would agree that when people are overconfident in a particular economic theory because it is "scientific", and then they cause huge financial losses as a result of this, then this is something problematic.

In complex social domains, to make things "scientific", we often have to simplify or distort them, hence the reason certain fields are not really reliable.

All of this is based on a flawed, narrowly defined caricature of what science is.

It says literally nothing about what science is, and specifically notes effective science uses both kinds.. You seem to be reading things which aren't there (perhaps out of prejudice), it just describes 2 types of knowledge and notes that a certain type of person only really accepts one exists. It is really a criticism of a particular approach to philosophy.

Many scientists would indeed accept that both types of knowledge exist, in fact a similar theory of knowledge was proposed by the sceintist Michael Polanyi.

All these issues relate to human behavior, both human error and the complexity of modeling human social systems where the the active elements involved do not exhibit fixed properties (behaviors), rather, they are dynamic entities, the complexities of which are too numerous to get into, but simply put, they can be intuitive and counter-intuitive, predictable and unpredictable.

The level of difficulty in solving the problem does not negate the necessity to correctly demarcate the elements involved and ensure error mitigation in the investigative/problem-solving process. To claim otherwise would only seem to indicate a desire to express opinions on these questions free from error mitigation.

Again, when I have I ever argued in favour of removing error mitigation from the process? I honestly must have explicitly stated this 20 times to you.

Let's try again for the nth time.

In complex domains, the process of error mitigation is often ineffective and may even be a source of error in itself. In such domains, we may need to look at more things than simply what the current scientific literature says. It may be that non-scientific insights, heuristics, etc can be useful in these domains, although they can't be 'proved' to be correct other than by the test of time.

What I also said earlier was:

I wouldn’t say the only way to think of knowledge is a) true/false as established by science or b) opinion and subjective preference.

Prior to the Soviet Union collapsing some people predicted it would happen, for reasons that later turned out to be correct. They were not doing science, but they did offer useful and accurate insights into the world.

Many others said incorrect things about the USSR, and at the time no one could prove who was right or wrong. But the people who were proved right with hindsight were correct in the observations at the time they made them. Sometimes this may be the best we can do.

The World is too messy to just have true/false and opinion/preference as categories of information.

Look at a field like psychology where by some estimates more than half of published research is false (whatever the percentage is, it’s significant).

The more research I read, the more misinformed I would become, regardless of any actual knowledge I acquired.

In physics, a leading expert will have vastly better knowledge than a non-scientific but astute observer of the natural world. I’m not sure we can guarantee that someone deemed a leading expert in psychology would necessarily have a more useful understanding of human behaviour than a highly astute observer of human society.

Wisdom requires the acquisition of useful knowledge and the avoidance of anti-knowledge (incorrect information retained as true that can cause problems).

I would also put my money on an ace salesperson being better at sales than a leading academic who writes papers on the science of persuasion.


So would you say we would get a better understanding of human psychology by a) only looking at published scientific literature or b) looking at scientific literature along with history, fiction, philosophy, sales, etc?

 

[Augustus]

Do you think I was trying to misrepresent your views to make my own views seem more palatable? If so, sorry. I'm not trying to do that. Do you think that was my goal?

No, not at all. I just think you completely misunderstood what I was saying, but in good faith.

The word scientism does seem to play tricks with people's minds as it seems to activate a desire to "defend science".

Do you have any objections to this idea? And: are you a person?

Sorry, I was really referring to the people discussing this from a secular rational perspective who are all basically saying pretty much the same thing regarding the benefits and limitations of science (e.g. you, me, @exchemist @MikeF )

As far as I can see everyone agrees that:

a) Science is the best tool we have to understand the world
b) Some sciences are significantly more reliable than others, especially those that relate to complex domains
c) Humans are fallible and human institutions and societies can magnify problems
d) Making decisions on incorrect information can be harmful, especially if we are overconfident in accuracy of the information
e) We should try not to make decisions based on incorrect information whenever this could lead to harm
f) We should display intellectual humility regarding our ability to discern truth from error, but humans have a tendency to overconfidence in their beliefs

I don't see how someone could hold to all of the above, but not see "excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of enquiry" as something that can cause problems.

Is there any of this you disagree with?

 

[Nakosis]

I don't really see how one can consider science a valuable tool, and not consider scientism, to some extent, a problem.

Only among those lacking a fundamental understanding of science.
Actual scientific thinking doesn't allow scientism in the pejorative sense.

To me science and critical thinking go hand in hand. You can't have one without the other.

So I see science and scientism in the pejorative sense as completely different philosophies. One can't both support science as the only reliable method for gathering knowledge and "scientisim" at the same time.

 

[Augustus]

Only among those lacking a fundamental understanding of science.
Actual scientific thinking doesn't allow scientism in the pejorative sense.

To me science and critical thinking go hand in hand. You can't have one without the other.

So I see science and scientism in the pejorative sense as completely different philosophies. One can't both support science as the only reliable method for gathering knowledge and "scientisim" at the same time.

This is a kind of no true Scotsman. Treating science as a normative concept rather than a fallible human activity is a terrible idea.

For me, looking at science as it exists in the real world is far more relevant than thinking how an ideal type science should exist in theory.

Forget the word scientism as it seems to confuse people.

Do you believe it is possible for individuals to have excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of enquiry, and that this can indeed cause real world problems?

If not why not?

 

[Nakosis]

This is a kind of no true Scotsman. Treating science as a normative concept rather than a fallible human activity is a terrible idea.

Accepting human fallibility is the norm in science. It's not science without this. It is more like saying you can't be a true Scotsman without some physical evidence like DNA tying you to Scotland. IOW, the acceptance of human fallibility is in the DNA of science.

For me, looking at science as it exists in the real world is far more relevant than thinking how an ideal type science should exist in theory.

Forget the word scientism as it seems to confuse people.

Do you believe it is possible for individuals to have excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of enquiry, and that this can indeed cause real world problems?

Yes, if they don't really understand science in the first place.

If not why not?

Because if they actually understood science they would know excessive belief is not part of science. Though I see no problem with science being applied to all areas of inquiry since human fallibility is built into the scientific method.

 

[Augustus]

Yes, if they don't really understand science in the first place.

Then you accept scientism is real and is a problem (as per the definition I gave).

Because if they actually understood science they would know excessive belief is not part of science. Though I see no problem with science being applied to all areas of inquiry since human fallibility is built into the scientific method.

Normatively, but humans are fallible and prone to overconfidence in their beliefs, especially when they consider them to be “objective”.

 

[exchemist]

Could you elaborate?

News reporting?

 

[exchemist]

Not to be cheeky, but how is it determined to be evidence?

What "it" are you referring to?

 

[MikeF]

On any issue involving human opinion that is not incredibly simple, assuming that anything is “the only reason” people could think that usually says more about the biases of the person saying it than what they have perceived in the target. Our own biases can make us unable to comprehend fairly simple points when they go against what we would like to believe and have made a public commitment to promoting.

The point in question reflects an absolutely mainstream position held by many scientists who are interested in the philosophy of science, including many of the greatest minds in history such as Einstein who noted the following:
...
First of all, this is a philosophical argument you are making here relating to things like epistemology and the philosophy of science. Ironically, you seem to making these philosophical arguments as if you see them as objective facts (although it is possible you ares imply stating your subject opinion so if that is the case, fair enough).

Secondly, this is completely circular reasoning akin to saying we can differentiate between a moral and immoral behaviour simply by looking at what behaviour conforms with morality.

We don't have something called science we just get out of a bottle and place on whatever issue we would like, so when you say "science is XYZ and its goal is to discover ABC" you are explicitly making (non-falsifiable) philosophical arguments.

Science is a human activity, so to say it is not a science problem is to retreat into the world of normative abstraction. Deeming something "scientific" also gives it great credibility in the eyes of many.

Accepting there are limitations to the accuracy and scope of the sciences as exist in the world of limited human cognitive capacity, and that other factors such as commerce and institutional bias, etc. also may corrupt the process and that these can cause real problems when people make decisions based on these is to accept that scientism is a problem as per how I said I used the term (which is one of the standards definitions).

I imagine you would agree that when people are overconfident in a particular economic theory because it is "scientific", and then they cause huge financial losses as a result of this, then this is something problematic.

In complex social domains, to make things "scientific", we often have to simplify or distort them, hence the reason certain fields are not really reliable.

It says literally nothing about what science is, and specifically notes effective science uses both kinds.. You seem to be reading things which aren't there (perhaps out of prejudice), it just describes 2 types of knowledge and notes that a certain type of person only really accepts one exists. It is really a criticism of a particular approach to philosophy.

Many scientists would indeed accept that both types of knowledge exist, in fact a similar theory of knowledge was proposed by the sceintist Michael Polanyi.

Again, when I have I ever argued in favour of removing error mitigation from the process? I honestly must have explicitly stated this 20 times to you.

Let's try again for the nth time.

In complex domains, the process of error mitigation is often ineffective and may even be a source of error in itself. In such domains, we may need to look at more things than simply what the current scientific literature says. It may be that non-scientific insights, heuristics, etc can be useful in these domains, although they can't be 'proved' to be correct other than by the test of time.

What I also said earlier was:

I wouldn’t say the only way to think of knowledge is a) true/false as established by science or b) opinion and subjective preference.

Prior to the Soviet Union collapsing some people predicted it would happen, for reasons that later turned out to be correct. They were not doing science, but they did offer useful and accurate insights into the world.

Many others said incorrect things about the USSR, and at the time no one could prove who was right or wrong. But the people who were proved right with hindsight were correct in the observations at the time they made them. Sometimes this may be the best we can do.

The World is too messy to just have true/false and opinion/preference as categories of information.

Look at a field like psychology where by some estimates more than half of published research is false (whatever the percentage is, it’s significant).

The more research I read, the more misinformed I would become, regardless of any actual knowledge I acquired.

In physics, a leading expert will have vastly better knowledge than a non-scientific but astute observer of the natural world. I’m not sure we can guarantee that someone deemed a leading expert in psychology would necessarily have a more useful understanding of human behaviour than a highly astute observer of human society.

Wisdom requires the acquisition of useful knowledge and the avoidance of anti-knowledge (incorrect information retained as true that can cause problems).

I would also put my money on an ace salesperson being better at sales than a leading academic who writes papers on the science of persuasion.

So would you say we would get a better understanding of human psychology by a) only looking at published scientific literature or b) looking at scientific literature along with history, fiction, philosophy, sales, etc?

You have defined scientism as an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.

I think your comments quoted above pertain primarily to the second aspect of your definition, of one having an excessive belief in the scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry. My interpretation here is that you are saying there are areas of inquiry where science should not apply or is inappropriate. Am I correct in that interpretation?

I also infer from your definition and your comments above that science is a distinct and separate activity from philosophy (with a minor concession to there being some small overlap), that they, in essence, are not the same thing. Is this a correct interpretation on my part?

If I am interpreting you correctly, then this is where we fundamentally disagree. We are not in agreement on what science is and to what it can and should be applied to.

My position is that science *is* philosophy. I see philosophy, as envisioned by the ancient Greeks who devised it, as consisting of any and all areas of inquiry into general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist. Science, or “The New and Improved Philosophy”, or Philosophy 2.0, is still philosophy, with the same objective of asking and answering general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist.

So what has changed between Philosophy 1.0 and Philosophy 2.0? It is not about methods and means, as these vary and are specific to the question at hand. One does not use the same methods and means to study economic markets to also study black holes within distant galaxies or the behavior of Chimpanzees. What is different about Philosophy 2.0 is the understanding that a posture of rational skepticism is required to be maintained toward philosophers themselves, toward the investigators. It is an acknowledgement and acceptance in the inherent fallibility of human beings and that active steps to mitigate that fallibility are required. This is the fundamental and necessary difference, establishing the framework for error mitigation in the inquiry process, the rest falling to the details of identifying and mitigating sources of error throughout this endeavor, an endeavor to answer any and all of the general and fundamental questions that philosophy, now philosophy 2.0, sets before itself.

You said above, “We don't have something called science we just get out of a bottle and place on whatever issue we would like, so when you say "science is XYZ and its goal is to discover ABC" you are explicitly making (non-falsifiable) philosophical arguments.”

This gets to the core of my position. Science is philosophy. Philosophy 2.0 is an abstract system with improvements over Philosophy 1.0, and it is an abstract system or framework that requires demarcation between the falsifiable and the non-falsifiable to which you refer. How else is one aware of whether falsifiability is relevant and applicable if there is not the active intent to establish and keep track of the demarcation between the falsifiable and non-falsifiable? This is all part of the mandate for error mitigation, and hence the necessity to bring all forms of rational inquiry within the error mitigating framework of Philosophy 2.0, incorporating mechanisms with which to establish this demarcation between what is falsifiable and what is not, as well as acknowledging and clearly demarcating subjective preference in order to address and evaluate it as such.

This is why I would argue that there is no limit or restriction on the scope of science, or Philosophy 2.0. It is the overarching framework within which the mechanisms necessary to establish these required demarcations then allow us to keep track of exactly what it is that we are talking about, to which realm of rational inquiry we are engaged, be it the real world, pure abstraction, or subjective preference, or a mixture (as is most often the case surround issues of human behavior).

Let’s take a specific example. It is my recollection that in the past you have said that the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics is outside of the scope of science (and of course, correct me if my recollection is incorrect). If the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics as a discipline acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the moral philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility as well as establishes mechanisms with which to clearly demarcate between what can be considered falsifiable and that which cannot, how can this be considered anything other than a scientific approach? If none of that is done, then shouldn’t that affect our confidence in the work product derived from the discipline Philosophy of Morals and Ethics?

Turning back to your definition of ‘scientism’, if there is no line of inquiry outside the scope of science, then your definition of scientism contracts to “an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.” Which, of course, we would recognize as such because the belief would be established as being excessive scientifically, yes? If the excessive belief is due to ignorance or lack of fluency in science on the part of the individual, is it really necessary to categorize such folks into an -ism? If we are referring to folks who are highly fluent in the sciences that make excessive claims, then it would seem we are instead talking about a psychological issue, something that might be better described in the DSM?

Perhaps there are areas of inquiry (ie seeking answers determined valid with some degree of confidence to answerable questions, or acknowledging questions as currently unanswerable) where you feel the error mitigation and demarcations of science still do not apply. In such cases where you feel such error mitigation and demarcations of science do not apply, what provides confidence in these answers garnered outside of a scientific framework of inquiry?

 

[Bear Wild]

You have defined scientism as an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.

I think your comments quoted above pertain primarily to the second aspect of your definition, of one having an excessive belief in the scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry. My interpretation here is that you are saying there are areas of inquiry where science should not apply or is inappropriate. Am I correct in that interpretation?

I also infer from your definition and your comments above that science is a distinct and separate activity from philosophy (with a minor concession to there being some small overlap), that they, in essence, are not the same thing. Is this a correct interpretation on my part?

If I am interpreting you correctly, then this is where we fundamentally disagree. We are not in agreement on what science is and to what it can and should be applied to.

My position is that science *is* philosophy. I see philosophy, as envisioned by the ancient Greeks who devised it, as consisting of any and all areas of inquiry into general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist. Science, or “The New and Improved Philosophy”, or Philosophy 2.0, is still philosophy, with the same objective of asking and answering general and fundamental questions about human beings and the world in which they exist.

So what has changed between Philosophy 1.0 and Philosophy 2.0? It is not about methods and means, as these vary and are specific to the question at hand. One does not use the same methods and means to study economic markets to also study black holes within distant galaxies or the behavior of Chimpanzees. What is different about Philosophy 2.0 is the understanding that a posture of rational skepticism is required to be maintained toward philosophers themselves, toward the investigators. It is an acknowledgement and acceptance in the inherent fallibility of human beings and that active steps to mitigate that fallibility are required. This is the fundamental and necessary difference, establishing the framework for error mitigation in the inquiry process, the rest falling to the details of identifying and mitigating sources of error throughout this endeavor, an endeavor to answer any and all of the general and fundamental questions that philosophy, now philosophy 2.0, sets before itself.

You said above, “We don't have something called science we just get out of a bottle and place on whatever issue we would like, so when you say "science is XYZ and its goal is to discover ABC" you are explicitly making (non-falsifiable) philosophical arguments.”

This gets to the core of my position. Science is philosophy. Philosophy 2.0 is an abstract system with improvements over Philosophy 1.0, and it is an abstract system or framework that requires demarcation between the falsifiable and the non-falsifiable to which you refer. How else is one aware of whether falsifiability is relevant and applicable if there is not the active intent to establish and keep track of the demarcation between the falsifiable and non-falsifiable? This is all part of the mandate for error mitigation, and hence the necessity to bring all forms of rational inquiry within the error mitigating framework of Philosophy 2.0, incorporating mechanisms with which to establish this demarcation between what is falsifiable and what is not, as well as acknowledging and clearly demarcating subjective preference in order to address and evaluate it as such.

This is why I would argue that there is no limit or restriction on the scope of science, or Philosophy 2.0. It is the overarching framework within which the mechanisms necessary to establish these required demarcations then allow us to keep track of exactly what it is that we are talking about, to which realm of rational inquiry we are engaged, be it the real world, pure abstraction, or subjective preference, or a mixture (as is most often the case surround issues of human behavior).

Let’s take a specific example. It is my recollection that in the past you have said that the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics is outside of the scope of science (and of course, correct me if my recollection is incorrect). If the Philosophy of Morals and Ethics as a discipline acknowledges the inherent fallibility of the moral philosopher and takes active measures to mitigate that fallibility as well as establishes mechanisms with which to clearly demarcate between what can be considered falsifiable and that which cannot, how can this be considered anything other than a scientific approach? If none of that is done, then shouldn’t that affect our confidence in the work product derived from the discipline Philosophy of Morals and Ethics?

Turning back to your definition of ‘scientism’, if there is no line of inquiry outside the scope of science, then your definition of scientism contracts to “an individual having an excessive belief in the accuracy of scientific methods when applied to all areas of inquiry.” Which, of course, we would recognize as such because the belief would be established as being excessive scientifically, yes? If the excessive belief is due to ignorance or lack of fluency in science on the part of the individual, is it really necessary to categorize such folks into an -ism? If we are referring to folks who are highly fluent in the sciences that make excessive claims, then it would seem we are instead talking about a psychological issue, something that might be better described in the DSM?

Perhaps there are areas of inquiry (ie seeking answers determined valid with some degree of confidence to answerable questions, or acknowledging questions as currently unanswerable) where you feel the error mitigation and demarcations of science still do not apply. In such cases where you feel such error mitigation and demarcations of science do not apply, what provides confidence in these answers garnered outside of a scientific framework of inquiry?

Here is my understanding of scientism which is not science but a way of life. It is someone who creates a relationship to the world around based solely what the findings of science tells us about the world and through rational thought to exclude things that cannot be tested or where physical evidence that is reproducible is not obtainable. It is living a purely rational life or as rational has humans can get to. In psychological terms this is placing the ego as the only or primary aspect of the mind that is conducting behavior. The unconscious is just a supportive aspect to support the ego and maintain the body. Things like soul, spirit, premonitions, astrology, gods, goddesses, numinous beings, fairies, elves, and ghosts or the continuing presence of ancestors and spirit possessions as well as direct extended connection with the land would not be considered as real. Does that seem to be at least a reasonable approximation and if not please correct it. To have a fair conversation we need some understanding. Thanks.

 

[MikeF]

Here is my understanding of scientism which is not science but a way of life. It is someone who creates a relationship to the world around based solely what the findings of science tells us about the world and through rational thought to exclude things that cannot be tested or where physical evidence that is reproducible is not obtainable. It is living a purely rational life or as rational has humans can get to. In psychological terms this is placing the ego as the only or primary aspect of the mind that is conducting behavior. The unconscious is just a supportive aspect to support the ego and maintain the body. Things like soul, spirit, premonitions, astrology, gods, goddesses, numinous beings, fairies, elves, and ghosts or the continuing presence of ancestors and spirit possessions as well as direct extended connection with the land would not be considered as real. Does that seem to be at least a reasonable approximation and if not please correct it. To have a fair conversation we need some understanding. Thanks.

I'm not sure what tack to take here. If you have read the post you quoted, I am essentially arguing that I do not see the term 'scientism', as has been defined in several ways by folks on RF, as a useful term and it is not one that I use.

For example, here is a definition that was used in a video lecture posted in another thread:

Susan Haaek's scientism criteria:​

1. Using words like "science" and "scientific" as honorific terms of generic epistemic praise.​

2. Adopting the manners and terminology of science regardless of whether they are useful or not.​

3. An obsession with demarcating science from pseudoscience. - dis​

4. A preoccupation with identifying a scientific method to demarcate science from other activities.- dis​

5. An attitude that seeks to deploy science to answer questions beyond its scope.​

6. Denying or denigrating the usefulness of non-scientific activities, particularly within the humanities.​

Here is the link to my response to this definition of 'scientism' in that thread: LINK

In looking at your definition, I have some issues with it. For one, I don't really relate to the idea of "having a relationship to the world". I see relationships as existing between conscious creatures, other people and pets for example. I think I get the gist of what you are saying. I also can't say I understand all that you may mean when you use the terms 'ego' and 'unconscious'.

You then give a long list of things like gods, ghosts, and elves to be things someone who subscribes to 'scientism' does not believe in. Since gods are on the list, does that mean atheists are automatically scientismist solely by virtue of their atheism, or does one have to reject the whole list to qualify?

Perhaps the term Physicalism would most closely fit with what you are trying to describe, which is a term I understand. You can let me know if it fits with what you are trying to describe.

If this is your definition of 'scientism' and it is useful to you, then that's fine. Your definition does not make the term any more useful for me, though. If I grant you that there are those subscribe to Physicalism and who also do not believe in your list of things not believed in, where would you like the conversation to go from this point?

 

[MikeF]

Scientism is inappropriate reliance on science, typically by extending its remit too far or by dismissing other relevant but non-scientific considerations. So your asteroid example is a poor one. A better one (though possibly not perfect either) might be something like demolishing terraced housing in London after the war, to replace the houses with tower blocks. From a scientific viewpoint, these were modern, hygienic, efficient at using space, etc. Yet many became vandalised, graffiti-ridden hotbeds of drugs and crime. What was ignored was the lack of human scale and the consequent feelings of alienation they inspired in the occupants.

Another might be a view that the appeal of a musical composition can in principle be accounted for purely by analysing the frequencies and rhythms of the notes - a sort of silly reductionism, applied on principle.

I don't think you are being quite fair here. We are often presented situations in which we do not have all the relevant facts or a complete understanding of all the variables involved.

In your example above, is it your contention that there were those who knew beforehand, through non-scientific means, that building these tower blocks to replace terraced housing was going to lead to vandalism and graffiti-ridden hotbeds of drugs and crime? Was it know beforehand that these buildings were destined to instill feelings of alienation? I am ignorant of whatever post-war debate may have revolved around the construction of the tower blocks and do not know what was known or discussed about the buildings.

You attribute the vandalism, crime, drugs, and alienation to these new, modern, hygienic, space efficient buildings. Was this outcome a uniform one for all tall, modern, hygienic, space efficient building built in the post-war era? What about in other cities in Britain and other countries. Do all high-rise buildings instill alienation?

I think another big question would be whether these conditions were present to any degree in these areas before their construction. Also, in this post-war era, did these symptoms you describe occur in other, non-high rise neighborhoods?

What other factors may have played a role in the demise of these communities? What other governmental policies were involved? What was the economy like during this period? Was there ample job opportunities and low unemployment? Was the wage scale sufficient?

The other aspect that your comment doesn't really address is that even if there was some scientific indication beforehand that these building my not work out well for the target population, the decisions are made in the political realm. If city council members are presented a plan that accommodates the human scale but is deemed way to expensive to build, that is not the fault of science or a scientific approach. Unless there was some clear understanding that these buildings were going to turn out as poorly as they did, decisions have to be made and building built.

It would be my view that a scientifically oriented post-mortem would be required to really get a handle on all the variables involved and draw informed conclusions as to why these projects turned out poorly. This would then further our understanding and be used to help inform future decisions and hopefully avoid similar outcomes in future projects. Again, though, no matter the quality of our scientific understanding (in the broadest sense of the term), if politics are involved there is no guarantee the best advice will be followed.

 

[MikeF]

But I'll give you another example from the practical world. I watched a video today about the cuts to the UK railways network made by a notorious guy called Beeching in the 1960s. The object was to reduce the losses being made by the railway and in this it was partly successful. All very scientifically done, by analysing passenger traffic volumes by route and closing the most unprofitable lines - thousands of miles of them. However, what was left out out of the calculations was the effect on the communities cut off by the closures: the social dimension and the wider impact on the economies of these places. These intangible aspects of decision-making are quite often neglected by the people of a scientific persuasion, as they have difficulty putting a value on them in their cost/beneft calculations. Science doesn't help a lot in assessing such things.

This is 20/20 hindsight though, right? Did anyone anticipate the problems it would cause? What were the mandates set out by the political entities when trying to solve this problem of rail lines loosing money?

The real question is whether there were lessons learned and have those lessons been applied to future decisions. We now *have* the experience of ancillary and potentially problematic impacts to changes in an established system like this. I know in the US we have all kinds of impact studies that are required now that have to be completed before all but the smallest projects can be approved. There are density studies, traffic studies, environmental impact studies, storm water management studies, etc. It is the political arena that sets the priorities and the budgets and hence are "out of the hands" of science.

 

[Bear Wild]

I'm not sure what tack to take here. If you have read the post you quoted, I am essentially arguing that I do not see the term 'scientism', as has been defined in several ways by folks on RF, as a useful term and it is not one that I use.

For example, here is a definition that was used in a video lecture posted in another thread:

Susan Haaek's scientism criteria:​

1. Using words like "science" and "scientific" as honorific terms of generic epistemic praise.​

2. Adopting the manners and terminology of science regardless of whether they are useful or not.​

3. An obsession with demarcating science from pseudoscience. - dis​

4. A preoccupation with identifying a scientific method to demarcate science from other activities.- dis​

5. An attitude that seeks to deploy science to answer questions beyond its scope.​

6. Denying or denigrating the usefulness of non-scientific activities, particularly within the humanities.​

Here is the link to my response to this definition of 'scientism' in that thread: LINK

In looking at your definition, I have some issues with it. For one, I don't really relate to the idea of "having a relationship to the world". I see relationships as existing between conscious creatures, other people and pets for example. I think I get the gist of what you are saying. I also can't say I understand all that you may mean when you use the terms 'ego' and 'unconscious'.

You then give a long list of things like gods, ghosts, and elves to be things someone who subscribes to 'scientism' does not believe in. Since gods are on the list, does that mean atheists are automatically scientismist solely by virtue of their atheism, or does one have to reject the whole list to qualify?

Perhaps the term Physicalism would most closely fit with what you are trying to describe, which is a term I understand. You can let me know if it fits with what you are trying to describe.

If this is your definition of 'scientism' and it is useful to you, then that's fine. Your definition does not make the term any more useful for me, though. If I grant you that there are those subscribe to Physicalism and who also do not believe in your list of things not believed in, where would you like the conversation to go from this point?

You seem to a better understanding of the word scientism than I do so I worded it in the way I understood the meaning and appreciate your reply. I am not familiar as to how Haaek came up with her criteria and do not know how official that criteria are. Let me ask you how you might compare scientism to another term I have heart "New Atheism" as in the writings of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennett. I may be confusing Ideas do not want to create more confusion with responses because I have the term incorrect in my mind.

In describing of having a relationship with the world I mean how we see ourselves in relate to the world around us conscious and unconscious, the animate and the object. Do we our relationship to everything around as purely physical vs spiritual for instance. What I meant for ego is the more rational cognitive that can more easily put into words vs the unconscious which is more intuitive feeling aspect of us and that is harder to express into words.

 

[MikeF]

Not everything that is evidence-based is science.

Could you elaborate?

News reporting?

News reporting is certainly information, but does it automatically rise to the level of evidence? In my view, the communicated information is more akin to raw data, raw data that requires evaluation using the rational skepticism of scientific inquiry. The information requires sorting into what, of the information presented, is meant to represent facts and what is meant to represent subjective opinion.

Of that which is meant to represent facts, what confidence can we assign to them? Are the facts corroborated in some way? What or who are the sources and do they have known subjective preferences that directly relate to the fact set being presented?

Of that which is meant to represent subjective opinion, what informs, verifies, justifies those opinions? What confidence or trustworthiness can be assigned to the opinion holder?

Of the raw information being presented by a news outlet, is it being corroborated by other news outlets? What are the subjective preferences (biases) of the news outlets and how do those preferences relate to the information being presented?

We may trust a particular news outlet to do all the required science necessary to generate reliable evidence out of the raw data of information, but that means scientific principles and standards are being applied and we only have confidence that the news being presented is evidence because of that.

 

[PureX]

I'm not sure what tack to take here. If you have read the post you quoted, I am essentially arguing that I do not see the term 'scientism', as has been defined in several ways by folks on RF, as a useful term and it is not one that I use.

For example, here is a definition that was used in a video lecture posted in another thread:

Susan Haaek's scientism criteria:​

1. Using words like "science" and "scientific" as honorific terms of generic epistemic praise.​

2. Adopting the manners and terminology of science regardless of whether they are useful or not.​

3. An obsession with demarcating science from pseudoscience. - dis​

4. A preoccupation with identifying a scientific method to demarcate science from other activities.- dis​

5. An attitude that seeks to deploy science to answer questions beyond its scope.​

6. Denying or denigrating the usefulness of non-scientific activities, particularly within the humanities.​

Here is the link to my response to this definition of 'scientism' in that thread: LINK

In looking at your definition, I have some issues with it. For one, I don't really relate to the idea of "having a relationship to the world". I see relationships as existing between conscious creatures, other people and pets for example. I think I get the gist of what you are saying. I also can't say I understand all that you may mean when you use the terms 'ego' and 'unconscious'.

You then give a long list of things like gods, ghosts, and elves to be things someone who subscribes to 'scientism' does not believe in. Since gods are on the list, does that mean atheists are automatically scientismist solely by virtue of their atheism, or does one have to reject the whole list to qualify?

Perhaps the term Physicalism would most closely fit with what you are trying to describe, which is a term I understand. You can let me know if it fits with what you are trying to describe.

If this is your definition of 'scientism' and it is useful to you, then that's fine. Your definition does not make the term any more useful for me, though. If I grant you that there are those subscribe to Physicalism and who also do not believe in your list of things not believed in, where would you like the conversation to go from this point?

That's a very weak definition of scientism. 1 through 4 are childish and irrelevant. Maybe that's a part of scientism among 10 year olds, but not among intelligent adults. 5 and 6 are the only accurate traits listed, and they do not give a full picture of the scientism mindscape as they completely ignore the absurd dependence on philosophical materialism. Which is the engine that fuels the 'scientism' hive-mind.

 

[MikeF]

You seem to a better understanding of the word scientism than I do so I worded it in the way I understood the meaning and appreciate your reply. I am not familiar as to how Haaek came up with her criteria and do not know how official that criteria are. Let me ask you how you might compare scientism to another term I have heart "New Atheism" as in the writings of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennett. I may be confusing Ideas do not want to create more confusion with responses because I have the term incorrect in my mind.

In describing of having a relationship with the world I mean how we see ourselves in relate to the world around us conscious and unconscious, the animate and the object. Do we our relationship to everything around as purely physical vs spiritual for instance. What I meant for ego is the more rational cognitive that can more easily put into words vs the unconscious which is more intuitive feeling aspect of us and that is harder to express into words.

To be frank, I have no idea what "New Atheism" is, I know who Richard Dawkins is but have never read anything by him or heard him speak. I have seen references to Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett on RF, but know nothing really of them other than an association with whatever "New Atheism" is. Given that, I can't really make an informed analysis or provide an opinion.

Going back to 'scientism', my experience with the term is limited to how it is presented and used here on RF. My view as informed by that experience is that the term is primarily used as a pejorative against those who challenge a strongly held belief or attitude on scientific grounds. The implied charge being that the person arguing from a scientific perspective is doing so in a way that is somehow incorrect or inappropriate.

 

[PureX]

To be frank, I have no idea what "New Atheism" is, I know who Richard Dawkins is but have never read anything by him or heard him speak. I have seen references to Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett on RF, but know nothing really of them other than an association with whatever "New Atheism" is. Given that, I can't really make an informed analysis or provide an opinion.

Going back to 'scientism', my experience with the term is limited to how it is presented and used here on RF. My view as informed by that experience is that the term is primarily used as a pejorative against those who challenge a strongly held belief or attitude on scientific grounds. The implied charge being that the person arguing from a scientific perspective is doing so in a way that is somehow incorrect or inappropriate.

They are NOT arguing from a scientific perspective. They are arguing from a scientism (philosophical materialist) perspective. The problem is that you cannot see the difference. As is also true of many others, here. Because from your perspective, they are the same thing. Though they are not the same thing at all.

 

[MikeF]

Sorry, I was really referring to the people discussing this from a secular rational perspective who are all basically saying pretty much the same thing regarding the benefits and limitations of science (e.g. you, me, @exchemist @MikeF )

As far as I can see everyone agrees that:

a) Science is the best tool we have to understand the world
b) Some sciences are significantly more reliable than others, especially those that relate to complex domains
c) Humans are fallible and human institutions and societies can magnify problems
d) Making decisions on incorrect information can be harmful, especially if we are overconfident in accuracy of the information
e) We should try not to make decisions based on incorrect information whenever this could lead to harm
f) We should display intellectual humility regarding our ability to discern truth from error, but humans have a tendency to overconfidence in their beliefs

I don't see how someone could hold to all of the above, but not see "excessive belief in the accuracy and scope of scientific methods when applied to all areas of enquiry" as something that can cause problems.

Is there any of this you disagree with?

My comments or concerns regarding your list:

a) Science is the best tool we have to understand the world

Instead of saying that science is the best tool we have to understand the world, I would say that it is the best tool we have to understand reality, all that is, Homo sapiens included.

b) Some sciences are significantly more reliable than others, especially those that relate to complex domains

All I will say here is that not all problems are the same, nor present the same challenges. *All* the work product of science is held with varying degrees of confidence.

c) Humans are fallible and human institutions and societies can magnify problems

I agree. I would simply add that human institutions can also mitigate problems.

d) Making decisions on incorrect information can be harmful, especially if we are overconfident in accuracy of the information

I agree. I would add that we must acknowledge that we are also having to make decisions with incomplete information, and there is no getting around that. Each choice made under these circumstances adds to our understanding regardless of whether the choice was deemed helpful or harmful after the fact.

e) We should try not to make decisions based on incorrect information whenever this could lead to harm

Again, this relates to your point d), we often have to operate without complete information and without complete understanding. Yes, the goal or aspiration is to not make decisions that lead to harm, if harm occurs despite best efforts, then it becomes a lesson learned and a data point to inform future decisions.

f) We should display intellectual humility regarding our ability to discern truth from error, but humans have a tendency to overconfidence in their beliefs.

Absolutely. Hence the necessity to work within a framework that catalogs past errors, provides mechanisms to both prevent repeating errors and anticipate future sources of error. It is a framework that acknowledges that despite best efforts, we can only hope to mitigate error to some degree but not eliminate it or prevent it entirely, as we are forced to operate from a position of ignorance, without complete understanding or knowledge.

Given all of the above, it seems the very problems you are concerned about are addressed and mitigated within the scientific framework itself. In other words, if the goal or desire is to mitigate human error in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding of reality, science seems the best framework in which to achieve that goal, it falls within the *scope* of science.