• Welcome to Religious Forums, a friendly forum to discuss all religions in a friendly surrounding.

    Your voice is missing! You will need to register to get access to the following site features:
    • Reply to discussions and create your own threads.
    • Our modern chat room. No add-ons or extensions required, just login and start chatting!
    • Access to private conversations with other members.

    We hope to see you as a part of our community soon!

Why does god have to be perfect?

cottage

Well-Known Member
Ok I understand that, but if God's existence is even POSSIBLE, then God must exist. When dealing with the nature of necessity, all that is required is the minimum possibility. Once that is established, then it logically follows that what is possibly necessarily true is in fact necessarily true.



Sorry idav, but that won't work given the fact that the Modal Ontological argument is logically sound.

1. It is at least possible for a MGB (maximally great being) to exist.
2. If it is possible for a MGB to exist, a MGB must exist in some possible world.
3. If a MGB exists in some possible world, a MGB must exist in all possible worlds.
4. If a MGB exists in all possible worlds, a MGB must exist in this world.
5. Conclusion: A maximally great being exists in this world.

Now 2-5 just follows logically from 1. The only way out of this is for you to negate the first premise, which I don't think you can do. So as long as #1 is true, 2-5 just follows logically.

So as long as it is possible for God to exist, there can't be an "if God doesn't exist" scenario at which such a proposition can possibly be true. That is like saying "If a one-sided stick does exist..." the statement alone is incoherent and while you can certainly make the statement, there can be no truth value to the statement.

Here is my updated objection to Plantinga's Ontological Arument, which I believe overides any formal proof.

Plantinga’s argument follows the form of logic known as Axiom S5 that states if a thing's definition only allows it to exist necessarily, which of course it does in this case, then if there is a possible world in which it exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Now every world that isn’t necessary is contingent, and therefore possible worlds are possible beings. By definition the concept of Supreme Being is the only necessary being, and thus there are no possibly necessary worlds. And if God can be conceived to be non-existent in this the actual (and therefore) possible world then it follows that there is no Maximally Great Being in every world, which means that no Maximally Great Being exists of necessity. Now from this point I must mention John Locke, who said there is no innate idea of God, which would seem to be correct. Even theist philosopher Descartes showed with his Cogito ergo sum that he was unable to conceive of himself as being always in existence; he said "I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." And that is to say when he is not thinking then by his own argument there can be nothing always necessarily in existence, not himself and not God. Thus his first principle (and his proof of God) failed.) And as Hume said ‘it will always be possible for us at any time to conceive the non-existence of what we formally conceived to exist.’ He also said: ‘…nor can the mind lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain in always in being in the same manner that we lie under the necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.’

In sum, there is no entailment from ‘God has necessary existence’ to ‘Necessarily God exists.’ For if it is possible to conceive the non-existence of any object then its non-existence is possible and therefore it cannot be necessary. There is no being or entity that imposes its necessary existence on my thoughts; there is therefore no necessarily existent entity. The three Aristotelian laws of thought, which are intuitive and demonstrable, are the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and the law of identity, all of which in simple terms mean that we cannot think what cannot be thought. Consider the principle of identity, A=A is analytic: (‘a thing is the same as itself’). Notice it isn’t possibly necessary but immediately, intuitively, and necessarily certain. If Almighty God, the creator of all things is a Maximally Great, necessarily existent being it would be as absurd to deny that truth as it would be say A=A is false - and with equal veracity. If a thing is necessary and an absolute truth then it cannot be thought as false as with the 2 + 2 = 4 example that Hume mentioned. Similarly a thing that is all red cannot at the same time be conceived of as being all blue; it’s an impossible conception, as would be an object that is not the same as itself. And yet, regardless of any definition, concept, or proposition we can conceive of there being no God, which would be impossible if God’s existence is necessary, certain and true. The real existence of an object cannot be demonstrated via a proposition (which of course is why nobody believes in God because of the ontological argument); at most all that can be done is to show that the conclusion follows from valid premises and in which case the conclusion is said to be sound. So the soundness is arrived at due to the validity of the premises and not to any factual or ontological certitude; therefore one can’t suppose the existence of a necessarily existent being by virtue of the terms and their relationship in a sentence. But in any case what actually governs logical expressions is the question of whether we can think what cannot be thought. And whatever can be conceived of as existent can also be conceived to be non-existent, and since the God concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no God that can be thought as remaining always in existence. And on that account it self-evidently cannot be necessary.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
Here is my updated objection to Plantinga's Ontological Arument, which I believe overides any formal proof.

Plantinga’s argument follows the form of logic known as Axiom S5 that states if a thing's definition only allows it to exist necessarily, which of course it does in this case, then if there is a possible world in which it exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Now every world that isn’t necessary is contingent, and therefore possible worlds are possible beings. By definition the concept of Supreme Being is the only necessary being, and thus there are no possibly necessary worlds. And if God can be conceived to be non-existent in this the actual (and therefore) possible world then it follows that there is no Maximally Great Being in every world, which means that no Maximally Great Being exists of necessity. Now from this point I must mention John Locke, who said there is no innate idea of God, which would seem to be correct. Even theist philosopher Descartes showed with his Cogito ergo sum that he was unable to conceive of himself as being always in existence; he said "I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." And that is to say when he is not thinking then by his own argument there can be nothing always necessarily in existence, not himself and not God. Thus his first principle (and his proof of God) failed.) And as Hume said ‘it will always be possible for us at any time to conceive the non-existence of what we formally conceived to exist.’ He also said: ‘…nor can the mind lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain in always in being in the same manner that we lie under the necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.’

In sum, there is no entailment from ‘God has necessary existence’ to ‘Necessarily God exists.’ For if it is possible to conceive the non-existence of any object then its non-existence is possible and therefore it cannot be necessary. There is no being or entity that imposes its necessary existence on my thoughts; there is therefore no necessarily existent entity. The three Aristotelian laws of thought, which are intuitive and demonstrable, are the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and the law of identity, all of which in simple terms mean that we cannot think what cannot be thought. Consider the principle of identity, A=A is analytic: (‘a thing is the same as itself’). Notice it isn’t possibly necessary but immediately, intuitively, and necessarily certain. If Almighty God, the creator of all things is a Maximally Great, necessarily existent being it would be as absurd to deny that truth as it would be say A=A is false - and with equal veracity. If a thing is necessary and an absolute truth then it cannot be thought as false as with the 2 + 2 = 4 example that Hume mentioned. Similarly a thing that is all red cannot at the same time be conceived of as being all blue; it’s an impossible conception, as would be an object that is not the same as itself. And yet, regardless of any definition, concept, or proposition we can conceive of there being no God, which would be impossible if God’s existence is necessary, certain and true. The real existence of an object cannot be demonstrated via a proposition (which of course is why nobody believes in God because of the ontological argument); at most all that can be done is to show that the conclusion follows from valid premises and in which case the conclusion is said to be sound. So the soundness is arrived at due to the validity of the premises and not to any factual or ontological certitude; therefore one can’t suppose the existence of a necessarily existent being by virtue of the terms and their relationship in a sentence. But in any case what actually governs logical expressions is the question of whether we can think what cannot be thought. And whatever can be conceived of as existent can also be conceived to be non-existent, and since the God concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no God that can be thought as remaining always in existence. And on that account it self-evidently cannot be necessary.


That is all cute and all, but I need straight-forward talk. All of that is much to abstract for my feeble mind :D
 

McBell

Unbound
As I keep saying, it doesn't matter how something is defined...I can define you to be a necessary being, but does that mean that you are? Obviously not.

So why do you try so hard trying to define god into existence?

Merely claiming "by the very definition of 'god', god has to exist" is not a very compelling argument.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
So why do you try so hard trying to define god into existence?

Because this is an argument which attempts to prove the existence of a MGB (God), and before we can ponder whether or not such a being exists, we have to define what this being is. This is not just the case with God, but anything.

Merely claiming "by the very definition of 'god', god has to exist" is not a very compelling argument.

But that is what "necessary truths" mean anyway. All necessary truths, and possible necessary truths have to be either necessarily true or necessarily false. God is no exception. So it isn't as if there is a special pleading for God, but rather anything that is necessarily true or false.
 

McBell

Unbound
Because this is an argument which attempts to prove the existence of a MGB (God), and before we can ponder whether or not such a being exists, we have to define what this being is. This is not just the case with God, but anything.



But that is what "necessary truths" mean anyway. All necessary truths, and possible necessary truths have to be either necessarily true or necessarily false. God is no exception. So it isn't as if there is a special pleading for God, but rather anything that is necessarily true or false.

Yet you still have not shown that your necessary god is necessary...
You simply make the declaration then play word games trying to support your declaration.
 

Thana

Lady
I am not looking of a debate but an understanding of why people need to believe in a perfect God. Why do you feel god must be omni-anything.

From a few conversations I don't know if anyone can explain so I will also take your view on why you think people need a perfect god.


Because in our primitive brains and limited vocabulary and understanding, Perfect is the only word we can come up with to best describe the awesomeness of our God.

Or something like that :cool:
 

InformedIgnorance

Do you 'know' or believe?
Attribution of characteristics (including 'omni______') is done in order to reflect a comprehension of the concept which incorporates a series of claims which are done to explain certain things, to provide emotional support, etc. It comes down to this intended use; to facilitate the concept, certain attributions are made in order to attempt to make the claim internally consistent.

As to why these attributions might be omni this is probably in order to avoid the potential for any comparison to find such a 'god' to have less of a desirable attribute than what it is being compared to; the god concept would hardly seem all that impressive (which is something they want) if some person were more intelligent (for example). God 'must' (to avoid this) be the 'most' intelligent (for example) and what does that mean exactly: An abstract idea of the incorporation of a positive attribute (such as intelligence) - to be considered the pinnacle of exemplification which no comparison could find lacking; this is often held to be true regardless of attribution of either directly or indirectly contradictory claims - even if similar in the degree of exemplification of that attribute; which once the adherent is aware of tends to trigger some need to determine a manner by which to minimise cognitive dissonance.

Even assuming there is a supernatural entity, there is nothing to suggest it would need to be cognizant let alone particularly intelligent; yet the attribution (of not mere intelligence, but super intelligence) is usually made anyway - because of the assorted claims we make and the need to justify those claims in an internally consistent fashion.
 
Last edited:

cottage

Well-Known Member
Yet you still have not shown that your necessary god is necessary...
You simply make the declaration then play word games trying to support your declaration.

You’ve made a good point! Plantinga’s modal argument entails that the concept must obtain in all possible worlds, of which the actual world is one; but from the concept of an entity that owes its existence to no other thing, it does not follow, for there is no way to demonstrate, that the object has existence in the actual world. And a “Maximally Excellent Being” without metaphysical necessity, able to act and interact with the world, and with its attributes safe from contradiction, is quite evidently no more than a tautological relation of terms. But then that’s why nobody believes in God because of this argument.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
Yet you still have not shown that your necessary god is necessary...

If you carefully examine the actual argument, then you would see why God is necessary. God is necessary because it is possible for "him" to be necessary, and anything that is possibly necessarily true must be actually true.

For example, there is no possible world at which Mestemia's existence is necessary, because if it were possible, your existence would be actually necessary, due to the fact that your existence cannot be POSSIBLY necessarily true, but yet false. See?

So with God, there is a possible world at which God's existence IS necessary, so if it is necessary in some possible world, it must be necessary in ALL possible worlds, because necessity is not something that varies from world to world. It is either necessarily true in all possible worlds, or necessarily false in all possible worlds. So if there is at least one possible world at which God's existence is necessary, then it logically follows that God's existence is necessary in all possible worlds, including this world. Therefore, God exists in this world.

You simply make the declaration then play word games trying to support your declaration.

Hahaha word games :p
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
You’ve made a good point!

I'm sorry you feel that way.

Plantinga’s modal argument entails that the concept must obtain in all possible worlds, of which the actual world is one;

Yeah, based on the "concept" of a necessary being. The actual world is one of the "possible" worlds at which such a beings existence is actualized.


but from the concept of an entity that owes its existence to no other thing, it does not follow, for there is no way to demonstrate, that the object has existence in the actual world.

Yes it does, cot. If the being's existence is necessary then of course it has existence in the actual world.

And a “Maximally Excellent Being” without metaphysical necessity, able to act and interact with the world, and with its attributes safe from contradiction, is quite evidently no more than a tautological relation of terms. But then that’s why nobody believes in God because of this argument.

I don't know where you are going what the above quote, but as I keep stressing, if it is possible, it must be true.
 

McBell

Unbound
If you carefully examine the actual argument, then you would see why God is necessary. God is necessary because it is possible for "him" to be necessary, and anything that is possibly necessarily true must be actually true.

For example, there is no possible world at which Mestemia's existence is necessary, because if it were possible, your existence would be actually necessary, due to the fact that your existence cannot be POSSIBLY necessarily true, but yet false. See?

So with God, there is a possible world at which God's existence IS necessary, so if it is necessary in some possible world, it must be necessary in ALL possible worlds, because necessity is not something that varies from world to world. It is either necessarily true in all possible worlds, or necessarily false in all possible worlds. So if there is at least one possible world at which God's existence is necessary, then it logically follows that God's existence is necessary in all possible worlds, including this world. Therefore, God exists in this world.



Hahaha word games :p

Thank you for proving my point.
You have not presented anything to show that god is necessary other than your declaration that god is necessary and then word games in an attempt to support your claim.

You seem to be under the delusion that "possible" means "it is".

Do you hold this same argument for everything that is "possible"?
Like Unicorns, flying spaghetti monster, big foot, fairies, etc.
If not, why does your god get a free pass?
 

InformedIgnorance

Do you 'know' or believe?
If you carefully examine the actual argument, then you would see why God is necessary. God is necessary because it is possible for "him" to be necessary, and anything that is possibly necessarily true must be actually true.
The statement regarding the possible existence of an MGB exists, actually contains a rather significant problem for your case - the what constitutes a MGB (depending on how this concept is framed for example incorporating logically inconsistent claims) may not refer to any possible entity.

Likewise with the second line of your argument; while I am familiar with the discussion of multiverses, this is a purely theoretical concept at this time - there is nothing to suggest that there is such a realm, let alone that your statement regarding its contents is true.

The third simply does not follow; common arguments for this claim would include the assertion that to be maximally great it must exist in all possible universes - this is yet another assertion with nothing to suggest its validity.
The fourth is true. There is just no reason to believe one to three are (and thus no reason to believe the fifth holds true); the argument is not sound; but let's pretend it were for a moment.

In such circumstances, the claim that the Christian God(s) are the only gods would be a lie, because using the very same logic Allah exists, indeed it could easily be applied to polytheism too, Brahma, Shiva and Vishnu exist, Odin and his hoard of Nordic gods exist... likewise using the exact same logic one could create a counter-claim for almost any current theological claim - one could for example posit:

1. It is at least possible that CLAIM (belief in Jesus necessarily results in eternal torment) is true
2. If it is possible for CLAIM to be true, CLAIM must be true in some possible world.
3. If CLAIM is true in some possible world, CLAIM must be true in all possible worlds.
4. If CLAIM must be true in all possible worlds, CLAIM must be true in this world.
5. Conclusion: CLAIM (belief in Jesus necessarily results in eternal torment) is true in this world.

This approach to validating claims is completely without merit; the above argument though logically equivalent to your own is inane through its poor formulation and layers of unjustified assumptions; I could subsequently use the EXACT same logic using the negation of that claim and obtain a conclusion with exactly the same validity. This line of argument simply does not work.
 
Last edited:

cottage

Well-Known Member
Yeah, based on the "concept" of a necessary being. The actual world is one of the "possible" worlds at which such a beings existence is actualized.

But the being isn't actualized, is it, and that's the point! If it were we wouldn't be having this discussion. See (1), below



Yes it does, cot. If the being's existence is necessary then of course it has existence in the actual world.

But it doesn't! Show me evidence of necessary existence in this, the actual world?

Very simply the real existence of an object cannot be demonstrated via a proposition. All that can be done is to show that the conclusion follows from valid premises and in which case the conclusion is said to be sound. So the soundness is arrived at due to the validity of the premises and not to any factual or ontological certitude; therefore one can’t suppose the existence of a necessarily existent being by virtue of the terms and their relationship in a sentence.



I don't know where you are going what the above quote, but as I keep stressing, if it is possible, it must be true.
Here’s a summary of my previous arguments, evidential (1), logical (2), and the conclusion (3).

1) The S5 modal argument entails that the concept must obtain in all possible worlds, of which the actual world is one; but from the concept of an entity that owes its existence to no other thing, it does not follow, for there is no way to demonstrate, that the object has existence in the actual world. And a “Maximally Excellent Being” without metaphysical necessity, unable to act and interact with the world, with its attributes not safe from contradiction, is quite evidently no more than a tautological relation of terms.

2) The three Aristotelian laws of thought, which are intuitive and demonstrable, are the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, and the law of identity, all of which in simple terms mean that we cannot think what cannot be thought. Whatever can be conceived of as existent can also be conceived to be non-existent, and since a concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no thought remaining always in existence. There is no being or entity that imposes its necessary existence on my thoughts; there is therefore no necessarily existent entity, a statement that invites no contradiction.

3) And if God can be conceived to be non-existent in this the actual (and therefore) possible world then it follows that there is no Maximally Excellent Being in every world, which means that no Maximally Excellent Being exists of necessity.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
Thank you for proving my point.
You have not presented anything to show that god is necessary other than your declaration that god is necessary and then word games in an attempt to support your claim.

You seem to be under the delusion that "possible" means "it is".

Do you hold this same argument for everything that is "possible"?
Like Unicorns, flying spaghetti monster, big foot, fairies, etc.
If not, why does your god get a free pass?

I will leave you and you misunderstandings alone.
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
I will leave you and you misunderstandings alone.
This is what he does when he is shown how poor his argument is. He likes it even less when he has to actually deal with someone familiar with the modal ontological argument, natural theology, or logic in general because he doesn't even really understand the argument he's endorsing in the first place. Easier to tuck tail and run.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
But the being isn't actualized, is it, and that's the point! If it were we wouldn't be having this discussion. See (1), below

First off, what do you mean by "actualized". Maybe we have a different definition.

But it doesn't! Show me evidence of necessary existence in this, the actual world?

Is it possible for a MGB to exist in the actual world? Yes or no? No matter what answer you give, you are still in deep waters.

Very simply the real existence of an object cannot be demonstrated via a proposition.

When dealing with necessity, it can!! "1+1 = possibly 2". That is a proposition, right? Either the statement is true or false. If it is possible for 1+1 = 2, then it must be true, right? It can't be possible for 1+1 = 2, but 1+1= actually 43. Do you see?

All that can be done is to show that the conclusion follows from valid premises and in which case the conclusion is said to be sound. So the soundness is arrived at due to the validity of the premises and not to any factual or ontological certitude; therefore one can’t suppose the existence of a necessarily existent being by virtue of the terms and their relationship in a sentence.

Let me break this down step by step, cot. Lets start off neutral, as agnostics haha.

1. We both don't know whether God (as defined in the argument) exists
2. Despite our ignorance, we understand that either God exists, or God doesn't exist
3. We realize that if God does exist, it would be impossible for God to not exist
4. We realize that if God doesn't exist, it would be impossible for God to exist
5. We acknowledge that despite our ignorance, God's existence is at least possible

Now look at #5, If we agree that God's existence is possible, we are saying "It is possible that a being exist, a being which cannot fail to exist."

Now, pay close attention, because this is where I might lose you. This being cannot fail to exist, right (if it existed)? That means it exists necessarily, right? So if it is possible for such a being to exist necessarily, then the mere option of it NOT existing at all is nonsensical, because if it were possible for it to not exist at all, it wouldn't be possible for it to be necessary!!!

Necessary existence is not something that you can have one minute and not have the next. So if it is possible for God to exist necessarily, then God must actually exist, because if it is possible, yet false, it couldn't have been possible in the first place, because if it were possible, it would be true, because it can't be possibly true but actually false. Now that may work for contingency, but not with necessity.
 

Call_of_the_Wild

Well-Known Member
This is what he does when he is shown how poor his argument is. He likes it even less when he has to actually deal with someone familiar with the modal ontological argument, natural theology, or logic in general because he doesn't even really understand the argument he's endorsing in the first place. Easier to tuck tail and run.

I've been waiting 6 months for a decent argument from you, and no luck yet :no:
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
I've been waiting 6 months for a decent argument from you, and no luck yet :no:
If you've been waiting, then why did you excuse yourself from the conversation and not make any subsequent replies or posts? A pretty curious way of waiting. In any case, I'd be more than willing to continue to educate you about the MOA, the SOA, or any other argument for the existence of God you care to discuss (since they are all, without exception, invalid or question-begging).
 
Top