Why does god have to be perfect?

[Koldo]

Being perfect also includes all imperfections. If it did not, it wouldn't be perfect.

I believe in a 'perfect' God, because anything less than 'perfect' wouldn't be God.

It's like coming second in a race...you still didn't come first, you still did not win, even though you came close to winning, but 'near enough isn't good enough'.

It also depends on what your expectations are and what you mean by 'perfect'.

That's rather contradictory.

'The perfect diamond is the most flawed diamond'.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I mean actual as existing in reality and not just as a concept in a proposition.

Thought so.

The answer must be a resounding No! And for two reasons: Straight off no contradiction is implied in denying the concept and as the object doesn’t exist in this world, which being actual is also a possible world, then, according to the argument, it is demonstrably impossible for it to exist at all. The argument is therefore mute.

I don't get it.

But that has nothing to do with what I’m saying. The argument insists that we accept the concept (which, actually, we are not obliged to do as I explain further down the page) but it cannot anywhere demonstrate the object’s existence, which it must according to the argument if it is necessary existent in all possible worlds.

The object is demonstrated based on it's mere possibility, and I've explained why countless times.

And on the question of necessary truths, 2 + 2 = 4 is a necessarily true example and we cannot know it or understand it to be anything but true; but if, as you say, “we don’t know whether God exists” then “God exists” cannot be on a level with 2 + 2 = 4, a demonstrable necessary truth that we don’t discover by beginning from the notion of possibility, but is presented intuitively and indisputably as absolute and certain.

Um cot, if the premise is that God is beginningless and eternal, then I can't think of such existence to be anything but true, on the same level as 2+2=4. In fact, if you think of a world existing without a MGB, then you are thinking of a world at which an object that cannot fail to exist, not existing. Makes no sense. 2+2=4 true in all possible worlds, right? So I must ask; what possible world does a being that cannot fail to exist, actually fail to exist? My point exactly. Third, it doesn't matter anyway, because no matter how much you "think" you can image a world without God doesn't mean anything, because if such a being exist, it's existence is independent of what you think it is true about it, or what you think is false about it.

The Maximally Great Being is thus inferior compared with the 2 + 2 = 4 example of a necessary truth, which means it is contradictory and therefore an impossible concept.

Actually the example fails because as I just pointed out; it doesn't matter. If you and God are staring at each other face to face, and you close your eyes and imagine that God isn't there, does that change the fact that God is actually there? If you close your eyes and imagine that God doesn't exist in reality, will that matter, if he does in fact exist? Absolutely not.

1. There is no logical or factual reason to believe God exists, therefore:
2. The concept can be denied without contradiction
3. If God doesn’t exist (2) then his existence is impossible

All three are false.

<cringe> Please, not so condescending!

:beach:

Wrong! The Being does fail to exist! For we don’t accept the opening premise and the concept can therefore be denied at the starting gate.

I am still trying to figure out how you claim God's existence is not possible. That should be the focal point. There is no way you can demonstrate the existence of God as a impossibility, and if you can, I haven't seen it yet.

What I’m saying is the certainty necessarily implied in the premises of the argument together with its conclusion is neither true in experience nor true in an ontologically necessary or literal sense. The matter is settled by what the argument purports to present but is unable to deliver, which is that we can’t think what is unable to be thought.

So basically you are saying since you can think of God not existing, then God must not exist? Is that it? You don't see how silly it is? Ok:

Lets say there is a rock on the mountain, and the rock exists necessarily. It is a 100% proven fact that it exists necessarily. It can never fail to exist. Now, I can easily think of the rock disappearing and thus discontinuing its existence. That is easy. But does that change the fact that the rock is still there? Does me imagining the rock disappearing change the fact that it is by nature a necessary rock? No and No. The rock is still there, and its necessity is completely INDEPENDENT of my thoughts of it's ceased existence.

That is why the MOA (unlike St. Anslem's version) doesn't care about thoughts, it cares about possibilities. It seems as if you are using Anslem's version, but you are just using it on the flipside. But yeah, the MOA only cares about possibilities, and I haven't seen one good reason that you've given to explain why the existence of a MGB isn't possible in any world.

Plantinga’s purely logical argument is based on the premise that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same way at the same time, i.e. where if it is possible that a thing is necessarily the case then the thing in question necessarily is the case.

Exactly!!! The only question is, is it possible? Yes or No? If it is possible, then of course it is true.

I’m saying there is no such possibility, for while we cannot conceive of a married bachelor for example, or a two-sided triangle, there is not the least difficulty in conceiving the non-existence of a Maximally Great Being.

Same answer as above. Necessity is not dependent upon what we can think. If God actually exist then your thinking of him not existing doesn't make him cease to exist.

A necessary truth can be denied with the lips but not with the mind, and try as we might we cannot conceive of the concept, 2 + 2, as being the equal of anything but 4;but there is no such difficulty when we think of ‘God’, for every object that is distinctly conceivable can also be conceived to be non-existent, and implies no contradiction. That is the logical litmus test in this case!

But that is absurd, cot...because if that is the case then God actually does exist, because we can also think of God existing, as a necessary being. So based on your entire argument if we can think of God NOT existing as a necessary being, he can't be necessary, right? Well, since we can think of him AS a necessary being, then he must be necessary, right? It is the same thing.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I don't know what that means, but I don't see why a discussion forum wouldn't be a perfectly reasonable place to carry on... you know, a discussion.

Because you don't seem to be excelling in the group discussions so I am trying to invest some time with one on one correspondences with you. Consider it a last ditch effort.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Because you don't seem to be excelling in the group discussions so I am trying to invest some time with one on one correspondences with you. Consider it a last ditch effort.

Your pretense at arrogance doesn't mitigate the fact that you're still beating a hasty retreat; unable or unwilling to defend your ****-poor argument. Can't say I blame you- it must get old being embarrassed on all these threads out in public where everyone can see.

Perhaps you should take my advice, and acquaint yourself with the fundamentals of logic and philosophy so that you can at least make a go of defending indefensible arguments (doing so without any understanding of basic logical terms and whatnot has proved to not be very fruitful for you).

Anyways, if you ever grow a pair, I'll be here waiting.

 

[cottage]

Um cot, if the premise is that God is beginningless and eternal, then I can't think of such existence to be anything but true, on the same level as 2+2=4.

But you’re beginning with “we don’t know whether God exists” in which case the proposition most certainly is not on the same terms as 2 + 2 = 4, which is immediately and demonstrably necessarily certain! Self-evidently!

In fact, if you think of a world existing without a MGB, then you are thinking of a world at which an object that cannot fail to exist, not existing. Makes no sense. 2+2=4 true in all possible worlds, right? So I must ask; what possible world does a being that cannot fail to exist, actually fail to exist? My point exactly.

If there is one possible world where the Being, that cannot fail to exist, fails to exist, then as the Being does not exist in all possible worlds there cannot exist such a Being. There is such a possible world, one that has yet to come into existence. And since the Being cannot exist in worlds that are possible to exist, but do not yet exist, there is no Being that exists in all possible worlds. There is therefore no Being.

There are many things that are true because they cannot without contradiction be false, such as definitions, tautologies and propositions where the conclusion agrees with the premises. The modal argument is all of the aforementioned, in that it is analytical. But its internal truth cannot inform us what is true of the world outside the structure of the argument. And the argument I’ve given immediately above also suffers the same constraint!

A further point is that it is possible that the Being does not have maximal greatness or excellence. God is certainly not “all good” as Plantinga supposes; and therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist. And from which it follows that it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist.

Third, it doesn't matter anyway, because no matter how much you "think" you can image a world without God doesn't mean anything, because if such a being exist, it's existence is independent of what you think it is true about it, or what you think is false about it.

This has nothing to do with what “I think is true about it” but whether we can hold in our minds two conflicting ideas – no different to any logical proposition, written, spoken or thought.

Actually the example fails because as I just pointed out; it doesn't matter. If you and God are staring at each other face to face, and you close your eyes and imagine that God isn't there, does that change the fact that God is actually there? If you close your eyes and imagine that God doesn't exist in reality, will that matter, if he does in fact exist? Absolutely not.

But you are question begging here by assuming the conclusion in advance. I’m saying there is no God because the supposed necessity is inferior to and incompatible with every other necessary truth. God is not self-evident, which is why this particular argument has to begin not from necessity but from possibility. If almighty God, the Absolutely Necessary Being, the Creator and sustainer of all things were truly existent then it would be impossible to conceive the contrary. And yet it is!

All three are false.

No, they are not.

So basically you are saying since you can think of God not existing, then God must not exist? Is that it? You don't see how silly it is? Ok:
Lets say there is a rock on the mountain, and the rock exists necessarily. It is a 100% proven fact that it exists necessarily. It can never fail to exist. Now, I can easily think of the rock disappearing and thus discontinuing its existence. That is easy. But does that change the fact that the rock is still there? Does me imagining the rock disappearing change the fact that it is by nature a necessary rock? No and No. The rock is still there, and its necessity is completely INDEPENDENT of my thoughts of it's ceased existence.

Do you not see how “silly” that example of yours is, when you are begging the question by assuming the existence of a concept in dispute?

Same answer as above. Necessity is not dependent upon what we can think. If God actually exist then your thinking of him not existing doesn't make him cease to exist.

“Actually exists”? God is a mere concept! If it were argued to a conclusion that was factual we would then be discussing it in empirical or objective terms. But Plantinga’s modal argument is purely logical and conceptual and hence it is refuted by the same means. We cannot conceive of a married bachelor or a two-sided triangle but the non-existence of any object or being that is distinctly conceivable is possible for the imagination and can never imply a contradiction, and that includes God! And this argument doesn't "make God cease to exist"; it demonstrates that he cannot both exist and not exist and our being able to conceive the latter makes the former concept impossible.

But that is absurd, cot...because if that is the case then God actually does exist, because we can also think of God existing, as a necessary being. So based on your entire argument if we can think of God NOT existing as a necessary being, he can't be necessary, right? Well, since we can think of him AS a necessary being, then he must be necessary, right? It is the same thing.

It most certainly is not "absurd", now please read on:

We can conceive of God as existing necessarily. But it is possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist. So, we have two conceptions: p or not-p. Both are conceivable, but not at the same time, and as it is possible to conceive the non-existence of any object then its non-existence is logically possible and therefore it cannot be necessary, but - just a single instance of not-p demonstrates the contradiction. Therefore there is no necessarily existent God.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Your pretense at arrogance doesn't mitigate the fact that you're still beating a hasty retreat; unable or unwilling to defend your ****-poor argument. Can't say I blame you- it must get old being embarrassed on all these threads out in public where everyone can see.

:beach:

Perhaps you should take my advice, and acquaint yourself with the fundamentals of logic and philosophy so that you can at least make a go of defending indefensible arguments (doing so without any understanding of basic logical terms and whatnot has proved to not be very fruitful for you).

Anyways, if you ever grow a pair, I'll be here waiting.

:beach:

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

But you’re beginning with “we don’t know whether God exists” in which case the proposition most certainly is not on the same terms as 2 + 2 = 4, which is immediately and demonstrably necessarily certain! Self-evidently!

But 2+2 = 4 regardless of whether we know it or not. Our knowledge or ignorance on the matter doesn't change the fact, now does it?

If there is one possible world where the Being, that cannot fail to exist, fails to exist, then as the Being does not exist in all possible worlds there cannot exist such a Being.

Thanks for re-emphasizing on a point that I MADE myself.

There is such a possible world, one that has yet to come into existence. And since the Being cannot exist in worlds that are possible to exist, but do not yet exist, there is no Being that exists in all possible worlds. There is therefore no Being.

There are many things that are true because they cannot without contradiction be false, such as definitions, tautologies and propositions where the conclusion agrees with the premises. The modal argument is all of the aforementioned, in that it is analytical. But its internal truth cannot inform us what is true of the world outside the structure of the argument. And the argument I’ve given immediately above also suffers the same constraint!

As I said before, the only way to negate the argument is to show why the existence of such a being is impossible, and nothing you've said thus far as demonstrated the impossibility of such a being. That is what I am waiting on.

A further point is that it is possible that the Being does not have maximal greatness or excellence.

No it isn't because all attributes of the Being are just as NECESSARY as the existence of the being itself. Second, the statement itself is absurd. How can it be possible that an "maximally great being" not have maximal greatness? Makes no sense.

God is certainly not “all good” as Plantinga supposes; and therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist. And from which it follows that it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist.

If God is not all good, then there are no objective moral values, correct?

This has nothing to do with what “I think is true about it” but whether we can hold in our minds two conflicting ideas – no different to any logical proposition, written, spoken or thought.

Like I said before, if God is standing right in front of you, you can still imagine that he wasn't, but that wouldn't change the fact that he IS, now would it?

But you are question begging here by assuming the conclusion in advance.

Re-read the argument and tell me the point at which the conclusion is being assumed in advance.

I’m saying there is no God because the supposed necessity is inferior to and incompatible with every other necessary truth.

And every "other" necessary truth is inferior to God because without God, physical reality wouldn't exist based on the argument from contingency and the philosophical arguments against infinity. Only a maximally great being can create a universe from nothing, with time included in the "nothing".

God is not self-evident, which is why this particular argument has to begin not from necessity but from possibility. If almighty God, the Absolutely Necessary Being, the Creator and sustainer of all things were truly existent then it would be impossible to conceive the contrary. And yet it is!

And it is impossible for me to think at how the event of my birth came to past if there were an infinite amount of moments/days/years/seconds/centuries leading up to it. That is impossible, so if is impossible, yet it came to past, that must mean that there weren't an infinite amount of moments leading up to my birth, so therefore, time is finite. If time is finite, it had a beginnng, so what could be the originator of time itself? Hmmm, it couldn't be anything physical, right? Hmmm, only an eternal being that was outside of time could give time its beginning...and to be eternal is to not depend on anything other than yourself for your existence....and to not depend on anything other than yourself for yourself is to be NECESSARY.

Do you not see how “silly” that example of yours is, when you are begging the question by assuming the existence of a concept in dispute?

No, what I did was give you an example of something that we could KNOW was necessary, but still being able to make such a thing disappear with our minds. But that doesn't change the fact that the thing is still necessary, no matter how many mental tricks you want to play.

“Actually exists”? God is a mere concept!

So are numbers.

We cannot conceive of a married bachelor or a two-sided triangle but the non-existence of any object or being that is distinctly conceivable is possible for the imagination and can never imply a contradiction, and that includes God!

You just said you can't conceive of a married bachelor, right? Can you conceive of a being which cannot fail to exist to not exist?? It's the same thing!!!

And this argument doesn't "make God cease to exist"; it demonstrates that he cannot both exist and not exist and our being able to conceive the latter makes the former concept impossible.

Cot, so you are telling me that you can conceive the thought of an omnipresent being, to not be present? Makes no sense. If you can think of such a being, then it isn't the same being in question. In the beginning of the argument, the concept of a MGB is described, and omnipresence is one of its attributes. Given this concept, there is no way anyone can logically say that they can imagine such a being to NOT be present if they grant the given concept. You've already granted the concept because you already described it as "the absolute necessary being" above. So if you can imagine such a being to NOT exist, then you are actually not talking about the same being.

It most certainly is not "absurd", now please read on:
We can conceive of God as existing necessarily. But it is possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist.

So, we have two conceptions: p or not-p. Both are conceivable, but not at the same time, and as it is possible to conceive the non-existence of any object then its non-existence is logically possible and therefore it cannot be necessary, but - just a single instance of not-p demonstrates the contradiction. Therefore there is no necessarily existent God.

You have to have more than that, cot. You claim that you can conceive of God not existing, and I claim I can conceive of God existing...so if you are telling me that God must not exist because you can conceive God to not exist, then I can tell you that God must exist, because I CAN conceive of God existing. What makes your conclusion any better than mines? So because you can conceive of God not existing, that means that God can't exist? Well, the same line of reasoning applies on the flip side, well because I can conceive of God existing, that means he must exist. That is the problem with this argument based on what we can conceive. That is why the question is about possibilities...is it possible? God's existence is either possible or impossible, and I haven't seen any logical reasons from you nor anyone else as to why it is impossible.

 

[idav]

A further point is that it is possible that the Being does not have maximal greatness or excellence. God is certainly not “all good” as Plantinga supposes; and therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist. And from which it follows that it is necessarily true that a perfectly good Being doesn’t exist.

That idea is possible as well as probable, I don't think the maximally powerful and good being is probable. Saying something is possible isn't really saying much, I would say anything is possible but it certainly doesn't make it true or necessary.

 

[idav]

That is why the question is about possibilities...is it possible? God's existence is either possible or impossible, and I haven't seen any logical reasons from you nor anyone else as to why it is impossible.

Anything is possible but not everything is necessarily true just cause it's possible. Anything is possible cause we can conceive anything. Only things that are probable are likely to be true. One of my arguments is that the maximal being is improbable.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Anything is possible but not everything is necessarily true just cause it's possible.

Um, idav...that isn't what I said or implied. The argument is not that everything which is possible is necessarily true. The argument is anything that is possibly necessarily true, MUST be necessarily true.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

And "possibly necessarily true" is a logical concept which has no correlate in reality. Its a formalism, that's all. "Possibly necessarily true that X" translates to "there is at least one possible world such that X is true in every possible world"; clearly this is redundant since if X is true in all possible worlds, then X is true in at least one possible world. Thus, "X is possibly necessary" is equivalent to "X is necessary"- but then, the premise that God's existence is possibly necessary is equivalent to saying God's existence is necessary; which is begging the question.

In any case, this is sort of moot point since there are a whole host of other fatal objections to the MOA as well, as virtually everyone at all acquainted with the matter is well aware.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

For a fairly rigorous discussion of several versions of the modal ontological argument, as well as why none of them work, see here.

 

[idav]

Um, idav...that isn't what I said or implied. The argument is not that everything which is possible is necessarily true. The argument is anything that is possibly necessarily true, MUST be necessarily true.

That really doesn't change the argument. To me the statements have the same issue. It is possible that it is necessary but that also means that it is possible that it isn't necessary in that it is possible it could have been done another way. No truth is necessary unless we can prove there is no other possibility. When working in our imaginations anything is possible.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

That really doesn't change the argument. To me the statements have the same issue. It is possible that it is necessary but that also means that it is possible that it isn't necessary in that it is possible it could have been done another way.

idav...follow me closely...

1. You admit that is it possible for God to exist necessarily (correct me if im wrong)
2. You claim that it is also possible for God to exist necessarily
3. Based on #1, if it is possible for God to exist necessarily, how can that possibility be actualized???

If it is possible, you should be able to tell me how the possibility be actualized. Please enlighten me.

No truth is necessary unless we can prove there is no other possibility.

With necessary truths you don't have to prove other possibilities, all you need to do is at least prove that it is possible for the given premise.

When working in our imaginations anything is possible.

And with necessary truth, if it is possible, it is true.

 

[Poeticus]

Why does god have to be perfect?

Perfection is subjective.

 

[Poeticus]

I am not looking of a debate...

Don't worry, Bob. This is Religious Topics --> Comparative Religion. It isn't in the debates section. You are a-okay, friend.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

And "possibly necessarily true" is a logical concept which has no correlate in reality. Its a formalism, that's all.

Starting off on the wrong end of the spectrum, yet again huh. You say "possible necessarily true" does not correlate in reality. Yet 2+2=4...so it is possible for 2+2 to = 4...which DOES correlate in reality. I guess being wrong doesn't bother you.

"Possibly necessarily true that X" translates to "there is at least one possible world such that X is true in every possible world"; clearly this is redundant since if X is true in all possible worlds, then X is true in at least one possible world. Thus, "X is possibly necessary" is equivalent to "X is necessary"- but then, the premise that God's existence is possibly necessary is equivalent to saying God's existence is necessary; which is begging the question.

No it isn't begging the question because the conclusion "God exists" is based on the fact that it is POSSIBLE for him to exist. If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it must exist because it can't be possibly true, but actually false. That is just not how necessity works.

In any case, this is sort of moot point since there are a whole host of other fatal objections to the MOA as well, as virtually everyone at all acquainted with the matter is well aware.

Really? Then im sorry I missed it.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Starting off on the wrong end of the spectrum, yet again huh. You say "possible necessarily true" does not correlate in reality.

Possible necessity is formalism since it is not anything distinct from logical necessity; as I said, "X is possibly necessary" is equivalent to "there is one possible world in which X is true in all possible worlds"; if X is true in all possible worlds, it is true in at least one. And if X is true in all possible worlds, X is necessary.

Yet 2+2=4...so it is possible for 2+2 to = 4...which DOES correlate in reality.

You're not replying to the point I'm making. 2+2=4 is necessarily true. And trivially, (&#8704;x)&#9633;X->&#9674;X (as an axiom in modal logic), so 2+2=4 is possible as well. But saying that 2+2=4 is possibly necessary says exactly no less and no more than that 2+2=4 is necessary. Thus, the argument attempts to trick the reader by getting them to assent to a prima facie innocuous premise (to the untutored reader, that is), that it is possible that God exists necessarily, when this premise contains the conclusion and is not something the reader would ever assent to, unless they already accepted the conclusion of the argument; this is textbook question-begging.

I guess being wrong doesn't bother you.

Less smoke more fire, please.

No it isn't begging the question because the conclusion "God exists" is based on the fact that it is POSSIBLE for him to exist.

No, its based on the premise that it is possible for him to exist necessarily, or to be possibly necessary. Which is equivalent to saying he exists necessarily. Of course, if you had even the slightest acquiescence with modal logic, you would have to admit as much-
&#9633;X (X is necessary) is logically equivalent to &#9674;&#9633;X (it is possible that X is necessary).

If not, provide an interpretation for &#9674;&#9633;X and &#9633;X such that one is true and the other is false. You can't, because they are equivalent, and have the same truth-value on all truth-value assignments. Which means that the premise "It is possible God exists necessarily/It is possibly necessary God exists" is equivalent to "God exists necessarily", which means the argument is question-begging.

Oops.

If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it must exist because

Because what I said above. Thanks for conceding the point.

Really? Then im sorry I missed it.

As our previous discussions have demonstrated, you do not qualify as someone "well acquainted" with the matter, given that you've clearly never even taken a basic course in logic; in other words, that comment did not apply to you.

 

[Kilgore Trout]

No it isn't begging the question because the conclusion "God exists" is based on the fact that it is POSSIBLE for him to exist. If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it must exist because it can't be possibly true, but actually false. That is just not how necessity works.

You might want to start by looking up what "possible" means in the dictionary. And "necessary." Heck, just start at the a's and work your way through. Then check out a basic primer on logic, while you're at it.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Possible necessity is formalism since it is not anything distinct from logical necessity; as I said, "X is possibly necessary" is equivalent to "there is one possible world in which X is true in all possible worlds"; if X is true in all possible worlds, it is true in at least one. And if X is true in all possible worlds, X is necessary.

No doubt.

You're not replying to the point I'm making. 2+2=4 is necessarily true. And trivially, (&#8704;x)&#9633;X->&#9674;X (as an axiom in modal logic), so 2+2=4 is possible as well. But saying that 2+2=4 is possibly necessary says exactly no less and no more than that 2+2=4 is necessary.

Well yeah, that is because we KNOW that 2+2 = 4. My point is if we know X is true, it must be possible for X to be true, because if it weren't possible, we wouldn't know that it is true. In order for us to know it is true, it must be possible for it to be true. Not only that, but even if we didn't know that for a fact that 2+2=4, it wouldn't change the fact that if it were possible for 2+2 to = 4...that would make it necessary for 2+2 to = 4. For necessity, all we need is the mere possibility.

Thus, the argument attempts to trick the reader by getting them to assent to a prima facie innocuous premise (to the untutored reader, that is), that it is possible that God exists necessarily, when this premise contains the conclusion and is not something the reader would ever assent to, unless they already accepted the conclusion of the argument; this is textbook question-begging.

This is not question-begging at all. This is an argument based on deduction. I am drawing my conclusion based on the validity of the premises. As long as the premises are true, then the conclusion just flows logically. There is not one premise of the argument that is false, and if you think that it is...please enlighten me.

No, its based on the premise that it is possible for him to exist necessarily, or to be possibly necessary. Which is equivalent to saying he exists necessarily. Of course, if you had even the slightest acquiescence with modal logic, you would have to admit as much-
&#9633;X (X is necessary) is logically equivalent to &#9674;&#9633;X (it is possible that X is necessary).

It's funny how you are making it seem as if you are presenting this big revelation to me. Everything you just said is what I've been saying all along, which is all possible necessary truths must be actually necessarily true...and if one is to admit the possibility of God, one admits that God exist. I have been saying this almost from day 1...over about two dozen times now. So please.

If not, provide an interpretation for &#9674;&#9633;X and &#9633;X such that one is true and the other is false. You can't, because they are equivalent, and have the same truth-value on all truth-value assignments. Which means that the premise "It is possible God exists necessarily/It is possibly necessary God exists" is equivalent to "God exists necessarily", which means the argument is question-begging.

I've already stated the fact that I am drawing my conclusion based on true premises, and until you can prove one of the premises false (which you can't), then you have no leg to stand on.

As our previous discussions have demonstrated, you do not qualify as someone "well acquainted" with the matter, given that you've clearly never even taken a basic course in logic; in other words, that comment did not apply to you.

When I said "I'm sorry I missed it"..I was implying that I missed it because it hasn't been made...not that it was made, and I missed it. But as I previously said, I guess being wrong doesn't bother you.