Why does god have to be perfect?

[Call_of_the_Wild]

This is a distraction and is not part of Plantinga’s Ontological Argument.

I don't recall implying that it is.

However if we must wander away from the discussion here are two alternatives that I’ve already given elsewhere on the forum:
The world has not always existed; there was nothing before the world and one day it will cease to be. It is finite, and uncaused since there is no contradiction in denying any necessity in cause and effect, which being a contingent principle belongs to the world; and nor is there any necessity or empirical evidence for acts of creation, no evidence whatsoever, it being nothing more than an arbitrary act of the mind.

*Sigh* That is wrong on so many fronts I don't even know where to begin.

The world neither created itself nor did it come from nothing since causation began and will end with the world. (Fundamentally the Big Bang Theory.)

Well, where did it come from?

The world is self-existent, i.e. contingent matter sustained within the world by an eternal, immutable quality. There is neither causal regression nor any infinitely forward progression since being immaterial it is not within the constraints of time.

Contingent matter would still have to exist in time, cot.

And note that this is to apply exactly the same premise of an unknown entity that the God hypothesis seeks to employ, but with the clear advantage that the world, having actual existence, has more objective reality than what is merely believed to exist as a matter of religious faith cluttered with contradictions and confused precepts.

You really think you have it all figured out, huh cot. LMAO

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Many have already demonstrated the irrationality of the concept your pushing. Are we reading the same thread? lol

If all you have to offer is the irrational responses of other people on here, and you honestly think that their responses to the argument have juice to them, then...:sorry1:

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Nope, that is not what is going on.
You blundered when you moved your goal posts and they are trying to explain said blunder, but you are not understanding their explanations.

I understand it, I just don't accept it. I would hope you know the difference.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Is it possible, yes or no?

Possibly necessary? That's the same as asking whether its necessary- and there is no reason to suppose it is, because the definition of necessity is that the negation is self-contradictory; "God does not exist" is not self-contradictory (i.e. A&~A), thus "God exists" is not necessary (and since necessary is equivalent to possibly necessary, it is not possibly necessary either).

Semantics.

No, logic.

Huh?

I'm not sure how to phrase it any more plainly. "It is possibly necessary that God exists" is a premise of your argument, but it is equivalent to "it is necessary that God exists"- which contains the conclusion of the argument. If your premise contains the conclusion, that's called "begging the question". I asked to you explain how using the equivalent to your conclusion as a premise of the argument is not question-begging (although the question is rhetorical; I'm not expecting an answer, because that is the definition of begging the question).

 

[EtuMalku]

The possibility that some require the existence of a god for whatever their reason is obvious when one looks at the history of religions and the psychology of the human mind.

Is that really the premise of this lengthy thread?

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I've seen you use the opposite argument when faced with the problem of evil in saying that "I don't understand it, but it's true" Or something or another to that effect.

Um sorry but no. That is not what I said or implied. What said was the moral argument was not an argument that is of my particular interest, even though I can defend it nonetheless.

But anyway I was saying that simply saying that you have no standard to actually say what an omni-max being would be. You could certainly say it exists, but you have no standard to equate it to outside of your own mind.

I can still ask the question of "Is it possible that entity X exist as a living reality". And I do have a standard, which I've repeated over and over again so to state that I have no standard "to equate it to outside of my mind" is to NOT have been reading the content of my posts.

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

Um sorry but no. That is not what I said or implied. What said was the moral argument was not an argument that is of my particular interest, even though I can defend it nonetheless.



I can still ask the question of "Is it possible that entity X exist as a living reality". And I do have a standard, which I've repeated over and over again so to state that I have no standard "to equate it to outside of my mind" is to NOT have been reading the content of my posts.

I was talking to your response that "i don't understand it therefore it doesn't exist" comment is equivalent to comments you have made that "I don't understand it therefore it does exist"

But you don't have a standard.

What is the standard that you would use for a maximal being? A non-maximal universe? A maximal being cannot produce anything short of maximum. Do you believe that this Universe is the best that can be done? Or do you believe that there is a better universe out there?

 

[idav]

If all you have to offer is the irrational responses of other people on here, and you honestly think that their responses to the argument have juice to them, then...:sorry1:

I've already done the same as others. You can't imagine a premise into true existence.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

But you don't have a standard.

What is the standard that you would use for a maximal being? A non-maximal universe? A maximal being cannot produce anything short of maximum. Do you believe that this Universe is the best that can be done? Or do you believe that there is a better universe out there?

"Better" is a subjective term. There is no intrinsic value. God does everything in a way that will ensure that his divine will is imposed.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I've already done the same as others. You can't imagine a premise into true existence.

I agree, which is why I am not imagining the premise in to true existence.

 

[cottage]

Point?

The point is plain. Plantinga’s argument fails on the example I’ve given.

If you don’t think moral goodness is a “great making” property, then we can not include omnibenevolence as one of God’s attribute’s, and you are still left with the other three “omnis”. So you still have the greatest conceivable being. Second, if you believe in objective moral values, then you have to in turn believe in God. Third, based on the historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, that in itself means that Jesus is who he said he is, and thus we have a morally perfect God.

I’m quite happy to start with that. But anyway it refutes Plantinga’s formulation as a perfectly good and moral being, which is a stated element of his argument. And so the “greatest conceivable being” isn’t all that great if he isn’t the greatest morally good being, according to Plantinga, who insists that God is morally perfect in every possible world. As for your second point I don’t believe in an objective moral code and have an argument that rejects such an idea. Your third point is nothing more than an article of faith.

Can you prove that God doesn’t have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil and suffering? How do you know? You can’t possibly know the mind of God and his reasons with your own finite mind. So how do you know?

This is a special plea in lieu of argument. No I can’t prove that God doesn’t have reasons for causing/permitting evil. Actually I don’t see why he shouldn’t have reasons. Now I come to think of it he must have reasons, but whatever they are there is still a malevolent aspect to it that cannot be undone or waved away.

So if you have a daughter, and a madman rapes and kills your daughter, that act isn’t objectively wrong? Yes or no?

From my personal point of view it would be wrong for a thousand reasons, but all of them subjective.

The truth value of the argument depends on one crucial premise/question, and that is; is it possible for God to exist? That is a proposition. The answer is YES. Everything after that logically flows to the conclusion, which is…God exists.

God is logically possible if there is no contradiction. But I’ve shown that concept, as an existent thing, is contradictory – at least if it is claimed that it is necessary.

Yes it does..if we are talking necessity..it surely does. For all possible necessary truths must be necessarily true. To say that something is possibly necessarily true, but actually false is nonsensical. That is like saying it is possible for a light bulb to remain necessarily on for all eternity, but in reality, the light is actually off. If it were merely possible for the light bulb to remain on for all eternity, the light wouldn’t be actually (and currently) off!!! If it were possible, there would be NO circumstances at which the light would be off, and the fact that it is actually off means that there is no possibility at which it COULD be necessarily on for all eternity. So with a MGB (God), if it is possible for such a being to exist, then there is no possibility at which he could NOT exist, so if it is possible, God must exist!!! Wasn’t that just beautiful?

You’ve given me a very good example here and that’ll help me to demonstrate my argument more clearly. You immediately begin as you’ve done with other examples by begging the question and starting with an analogy that is basically the argument you want to prove but dressed in different clothes. Your stated premise indicates confusion between possible experience and logical necessity, but God isn’t demonstrable in possible experience, and light bulbs (or any other objects) aren’t necessary. So there is no correlation between “possible” and “necessary”. Possibility belongs to experience and necessity to concepts but there is no way to bring them together. And that is why I said the argument may be logically valid but empirically false, for it is actually impossible to demonstrate factual necessity.

Wait a minute, cot…so every time someone uses an analogy for object X, they are begging the question for the conclusion that they want? My point is, regardless of whether or not object X exists or not, your imagination is not dependent upon the truth value of the proposition.

No, of course not! But you are assuming the truth value in your premise, which is that something exists necessarily, instead of arguing to such an entity. You are stating that such a thing exists, standing in front of me and that now I must deny that it is standing in front of me! That is begging the question. I’m saying there is no Being that imposes its existence on me and I can conceive the concept to be a non-existent object.

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

"Better" is a subjective term. There is no intrinsic value. God does everything in a way that will ensure that his divine will is imposed.

If better is subjective than against what do you hold the term "maximal" against? What do you use to judge?

How can you even mention an idea of will, when you have no idea what that will could even potentially be or is? I mean if you are talking hypothetically, and in existence in your mind that works fine, but what standards do you have in the actual universe? Because certainly there is a connection between what exists in your mind and the Universe, there must be some standard that is existing for you to consider God a Maximal Being in comparison to something that is not Maximal right?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

The possibility that some require the existence of a god for whatever their reason is obvious when one looks at the history of religions and the psychology of the human mind.

Is that really the premise of this lengthy thread?

No; the subject is the "modal ontological argument" for the existence of God; a sophistical and fallacious attempt to trick the reader into thinking the existence of God has been somehow demonstrated. If you'd like to see a couple versions of the argument, as well as the scholarly refutations of them, see here. I'd encourage @cottage, @FranklinMichael, and anyone else interested in the matter to take a glance, good stuff there, and quite conclusive.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Possibly necessary? That's the same as asking whether its necessary- and there is no reason to suppose it is, because the definition of necessity is that the negation is self-contradictory; "God does not exist" is not self-contradictory (i.e. A&~A), thus "God exists" is not necessary (and since necessary is equivalent to possibly necessary, it is not possibly necessary either).

Huh?

I'm not sure how to phrase it any more plainly. "It is possibly necessary that God exists" is a premise of your argument, but it is equivalent to "it is necessary that God exists"- which contains the conclusion of the argument.

Once again, enaideal..."it is possibly necessary that God exists" is a PROPOSITION. The statement is either true or false.

1. Enaidealukal's existence is possibly necessarily true
2. Therefore, enaidealukal's existence is necessarily true

Look at #1, do you not agree that the statement is either true or false? Now, do you not agree that if it were true, that #2 would also be true?? Yes or no? Even if we didn't know whether or not your existence is necessarily true, would you not agree that if it were possible for it to be true, that #2 would still follow logically??

Looking at #1 and #2, we KNOW that both are false, right? But suppose we didn't know, would that change the fact that even if we DON'T know, the same line of reasoning would apply?

So in essence we start off nuetral by saying:

"I don't know whether God exists, but if the existence of God is possible, God must exist."

Now stop right there!! We are saying "IF" the existence of God is possible. Keyword: IF. Now at this point, the ONLY question is, IS THE EXISTENCE OF GOD POSSIBLE? Yes or no?? If yes, then God must exist, if no, then God doesn't exist, and it is impossible for God to exist. So which one is it? Yes or no? The answer is YES. So therefore, God exists.

If your premise contains the conclusion, that's called "begging the question". I asked to you explain how using the equivalent to your conclusion as a premise of the argument is not question-begging (although the question is rhetorical; I'm not expecting an answer, because that is the definition of begging the question).

Me: God necessarily exists
You: That is a bold statment, how do you know?
Me: Because, it is possible for God to exist (possibly necessary)

The argument is ultimately if it is possible for God to exist, then God exists, because all possible necessary truths must be necessarily true. It is inescapable.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Huh?

Asking whether something is possibly necessary is the same as asking whether its necessary- and there is no reason to suppose it is, because the definition of necessity is that the negation is self-contradictory; "God does not exist" is not self-contradictory (i.e. A&~A), thus "God exists" is not necessary (and since necessary is equivalent to possibly necessary, it is not possibly necessary either).

Seriously, how can you come here with a straight face and try to endorse a modal argument, when you have no clue about basic modal notions like possibility and necessity?

Once again, enaideal..."it is possibly necessary that God exists" is a PROPOSITION.

No. Duh.

The statement is either true or false.

Wow, thanks for that mind-blowing revelation.

Look at #1, do you not agree that the statement is either true or false? Now, do you not agree that if it were true, that #2 would also be true?? Yes or no? Even if we didn't know whether or not your existence is necessarily true, would you not agree that if it were possible for it to be true, that #2 would still follow logically??

Why are you avoiding the question?

"I don't know whether God exists, but if the existence of God is possible, God must exist."

"It is possible that God exists" is not enough for the MOA; if you replaced the actual premise (that it is possibly necessary that God exists)with this, it would become invalid, EVEN IN S5. Possible and possibly necessary are not the same. Possibly necessary and necessary ARE the same.

We are saying "IF" the existence of God is possible. Keyword: IF. Now at this point, the ONLY question is, IS THE EXISTENCE OF GOD POSSIBLE? Yes or no??

No. The question is whether the existence of God is POSSIBLY NECESSARY. Which is the same as asking whether the existence of God is NECESSARY. But that's the conclusion of the argument, and thus having it as a premise is question-begging. (for about the 5th time now...)

The argument is ultimately if it is possible for God to exist, then God exists, because all possible necessary truths must be necessarily true. It is inescapable.

You're forgetting your own argument- the argument is that it is possibly necessary that God exists, therefore God exists necessarily. But this is just saying "If A, then A". It's valid, but pointless, because nobody who disputes that God exists is going to grant that God exists necessarily (or possibly necessarily, because that's the same thing).

 

[EtuMalku]

I don't know whether God exists, but if the existence of God is possible, God must exist.

No . . . no . . . absolutely En Oh "NO"

What insane rationale is this?
No one knows if a god exists or doesn't . . . that's a given.
But there is a possibility . . . agreed.
There is no reason why this possibility must now become an actuality.

 

[cottage]

No; the subject is the "modal ontological argument" for the existence of God; a sophistical and fallacious attempt to trick the reader into thinking the existence of God has been somehow demonstrated. If you'd like to see a couple versions of the argument, as well as the scholarly refutations of them, see here. I'd encourage @cottage, @FranklinMichael, and anyone else interested in the matter to take a glance, good stuff there, and quite conclusive.

Thank you, enaidealukal. A bit of that is familiar that we touched on at college yonks ago. I remember there was a particular refutation, on a single point, that to me seemed trivial, that ran to dozens of closely-typed pages that almost sent me to sleep. I can’t remember the conclusion, which was gossamer-thin but nevertheless acknowledged to be sound. Not my cup of tea at all.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Thank you, enaidealukal. A bit of that is familiar that we touched on at college yonks ago. I remember there was a particular refutation, on a single point, that to me seemed trivial, that ran to dozens of closely-typed pages that almost sent me to sleep. I can’t remember the conclusion, which was gossamer-thin but nevertheless acknowledged to be sound. Not my cup of tea at all.

Kane has an excellent article on the MOA that is pretty readable; you can view it here. The Stanford article is also pretty good. In my estimation, although they are all ultimately unsound, Hartshorne's version is FAR better than Plantinga's; Plantinga's contains a bunch of redundant steps (i.e. using modal theorems as premises for... no apparent reason that I can discern) and is the most obviously question-begging. Hartshorne's is a bit better, as it is valid in some modal systems (but not all; in any that do not include the Brouwer principle, it is invalid), and less clearly question-begging, but still ultimately unsound.

The moral of the story, as with all arguments of natural theology, is that there is no argument for the existence of God that is not either invalid or question-begging. Thus, one can only "prove" that God exists if one assumes that God exists- a valid procedure, but rather pointless, as I remarked to our friend here.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

No . . . no . . . absolutely En Oh "NO"

What insane rationale is this?
No one knows if a god exists or doesn't . . . that's a given.
But there is a possibility . . . agreed.
There is no reason why this possibility must now become an actuality.

It's a trick; the premise is that "its possibly necessary that God exists"; which, to the reader unfamiliar with the modal logic, may seem innocuous enough, because it sounds like they're asking whether it is merely possible that God exists- but that's not what "possibly necessary" means in modal logic, possibly necessary is equivalent to simply necessary. When this is taken into consideration, the premise is clearly inappropriate- nobody would consent to "it is necessary that God exists" unless they already accept the conclusion of the argument.

As I said, its nothing more than sophistry.

 

[Thana]

Huh?



Once again, enaideal..."it is possibly necessary that God exists" is a PROPOSITION. The statement is either true or false.

1. Enaidealukal's existence is possibly necessarily true
2. Therefore, enaidealukal's existence is necessarily true

Look at #1, do you not agree that the statement is either true or false? Now, do you not agree that if it were true, that #2 would also be true?? Yes or no? Even if we didn't know whether or not your existence is necessarily true, would you not agree that if it were possible for it to be true, that #2 would still follow logically??

Looking at #1 and #2, we KNOW that both are false, right? But suppose we didn't know, would that change the fact that even if we DON'T know, the same line of reasoning would apply?

So in essence we start off nuetral by saying:

"I don't know whether God exists, but if the existence of God is possible, God must exist."

Now stop right there!! We are saying "IF" the existence of God is possible. Keyword: IF. Now at this point, the ONLY question is, IS THE EXISTENCE OF GOD POSSIBLE? Yes or no?? If yes, then God must exist, if no, then God doesn't exist, and it is impossible for God to exist. So which one is it? Yes or no? The answer is YES. So therefore, God exists.



Me: God necessarily exists
You: That is a bold statment, how do you know?
Me: Because, it is possible for God to exist (possibly necessary)

The argument is ultimately if it is possible for God to exist, then God exists, because all possible necessary truths must be necessarily true. It is inescapable.

This is quite illogical...