Why does god have to be perfect?

[Enai de a lukal]

This is quite illogical...

Good eye. Its a great example of, to use Bradley's apt phrase, "the finding of bad reasons for what we believe already".

 

[cottage]

All I want to know is it possible for God as defined in the argument to exist.

No, on the basis of the arguments I’ve given I don’t believe it is.

And we cannot say a omnipresent being is anything other than present.

Ah! But we can! “An omnipresent thing is omnipresent” is no different to saying A = A (The law of identity informs us that a thing is the same as itself). We can’t without contradicting ourselves say A is not A. The difficulty is when we presume to apply that concept, a necessary truth, as existence, to objects. If we say a table is a table, there can be no contradiction, and we can conceive of the table not existing, also no contradiction. So, what do we do now? Well, we award it the distinction of necessity; and then we have the “necessarily existing table”. The problem is…the conception of the non-existent table is still possible, notwithstanding the addition of the tem “necessary” and so now we have a contradiction. In sum the question concerns the existence of the table and not the veracity of necessary truths, which are self evident.

Right, and some truths qualify as necessary, and others don’t. The argument is whether or not a MGB qualifies as a necessary truth.

Definitely not, as I’ve explained. If it were equivalent to 2 + 2 = 4 then there would be no atheists. And yet how many antimaths are there in the world, those who can believe that 2 + 2 = 4 is false? The reason for this is simple: “God exists” is not self-evident.

You’ve just made my point for me, cot. We cannot deny 2+2=4 because we know 2+2=4. Suppose there is a astronomically difficult mathematical problem that we DON’T know the answer to, such as how many times does 2 go in to 12345679894938288438291883828918982892919191991832838488483828181^120. We don’t know the answer, right? But if we DID know the answer, it would very difficult for us to deny its truth, or imagine a world in which it wouldn’t be true. But with God, we start off neutral, by NOT knowing whether or not God exists. But once we examine the concept, such as the being’s attributes and necessary nature, it is also difficult to deny, in the same way it is difficult to deny a world at which 2+2=4. Here is why;

You know the concept of God, right? You accept the concept, right? Now can you imagine an omnipresent being to be not present? Can you imagine an omniscient being to not know the answer to a question? Can you imagine an omnipotent being to be unable to do something that is logically possible? In the same way 2+2=4, a omniscient being must know everything, because you can’t imagine a omniscient being to not know something, correct? It is the same thing.

This issue is a fundamental misunderstanding that I’ve already addressed further up the page.In order to be those things, to have those attributes, the object must first exist; but as with any existent thing it can be logically denied, whether a necessary table or a necessary being.

Based on what?

Based on fact.(concerning my statement that the MGB doesn't correspond with ctuality)

based on what?

Based on my mind (and yours) being free of any such ever-present imposition (in answer to that qestion on omnipresence)

For the fact that it is logically possible for us to conceive of the existence of such a being implies the certainty of its existence. Nothing changes, cot. Same logic on the flip side.

I’m surprised you can’t see the distinction here. If, say, I’m reading a claim about aliens I do not on account of my reading about them become certain of their existence. And it is the same in the case of God: having an understanding of the concept does not impose any necessity on the object in my mind as far as its existence is concerned. Whatever object we can think of can be thought to not exist, regardless of any conceptual notion that we dress it up in. And if it is possible to conceive the non-existence of the object then it is demonstrably not necessary.

Anything that is logically possible must be true in some possible world.

It is logically possible that there is no possible world other than this, the actual world! And in this sense of “possible worlds” I mean all entities.

 

[EtuMalku]

It's a trick; the premise is that "its possibly necessary that God exists"; which, to the reader unfamiliar with the modal logic, may seem innocuous enough, because it sounds like they're asking whether it is merely possible that God exists- but that's not what "possibly necessary" means in modal logic, possibly necessary is equivalent to simply necessary. When this is taken into consideration, the premise is clearly inappropriate- nobody would consent to "it is necessary that God exists" unless they already accept the conclusion of the argument.

As I said, its nothing more than sophistry.

Ahhh . . . gotcha! Thank you!

 

[McBell]

I understand it, I just don't accept it. I would hope you know the difference.

then refute the refutation.

And no, merely repeating your original claim is not a refutation.

 

[cottage]

I don't recall implying that it is.

I was just saying we were debating Plantinga, and then suddenly we’re not. However I’m also quite happy to continue with this subject.

*Sigh* That is wrong on so many fronts I don't even know where to begin.

Well, if it’s wrong I’d appreciate you discussing it with me?

Well, where did it come from?

May I ask you to read to read the thesis again? The answer (to your misconceived question) is contained within the argument.

Contingent matter would still have to exist in time, cot.

Yes, that’s correct. And it does. Again, look at the argument.

You really think you have it all figured out, huh cot. LMAO

Well. I wouldn’t exactly say that. <smiles> But as hypotheses I can’t see any obvious fault lines within them.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

The point is plain. Plantinga’s argument fails on the example I’ve given.

I am sorry you feel that way, cot.

I’m quite happy to start with that. But anyway it refutes Plantinga’s formulation as a perfectly good and moral being, which is a stated element of his argument. And so the “greatest conceivable being” isn’t all that great if he isn’t the greatest morally good being, according to Plantinga, who insists that God is morally perfect in every possible world.

That would all depend on whether objective moral values exist and also whether or not omnibenevolence is a "great making" property. But in all honesty, I am not quite sold on omnibenevolence as a "great making" property. In my opinion, a being could be maxed out on the other Omni's except benevolence, and still be a maximally great being, if omnibenvolence is not a great making property. However, as I mentioned before, we still have the historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus...and if that is true, then Jesus is who he said he is and therefore God is omnibenevolent.

As for your second point I don’t believe in an objective moral code and have an argument that rejects such an idea. Your third point is nothing more than an article of faith.

That is fine. If the "third point" you are referring to is about the historicity of Christ, then you are at least half correct. I mean, history itself is faith based, however, we have more reasons than not to believe that it is true from a historical perspective, and mix that in with all of the other arguments that I think are rational and thus true, an excellent case can be made for the Christian God altogether.

This is a special plea in lieu of argument. No I can’t prove that God doesn’t have reasons for causing/permitting evil. Actually I don’t see why he shouldn’t have reasons. Now I come to think of it he must have reasons, but whatever they are there is still a malevolent aspect to it that cannot be undone or waved away.

Well, if you agree that God COULD have sufficient reasons for permitting evil, then there is really no argument from evil, now is there?

From my personal point of view it would be wrong for a thousand reasons, but all of them subjective.

So morality is subjective from your view, gotcha.

God is logically possible if there is no contradiction. But I’ve shown that concept, as an existent thing, is contradictory – at least if it is claimed that it is necessary.

There is no contradiction. It is possible for God to exist and so far I've seen nothing to negate that fact.

You immediately begin as you’ve done with other examples by begging the question and starting with an analogy that is basically the argument you want to prove but dressed in different clothes.

Umm, cot...what are you talking about? I said ALL POSSIBLE NECESSARY TRUTHS MUST BE NECESSARILY TRUE (caps are for emphasis). That proposition applies to ANYTHING that is possibly necessarily true, not just specifically God. It is a religiously neutral statement that applies to ANYTHING that is possibly necessarily true...so unless you are saying that I am "begging the question" for everything that it applies to, then I am not begging the question for anything.

Your stated premise indicates confusion between possible experience and logical necessity, but God isn’t demonstrable in possible experience, and light bulbs (or any other objects) aren’t necessary.

Wait a minute, what? It was an analogy, cot. An analogy that I gave regarding how something can't be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. It was a good example too...and I would like a direct response to it instead of dances around it. Second, saying that God isn't demonstrable in possible experience is something I want evidence for.

So there is no correlation between “possible” and “necessary”. Possibility belongs to experience and necessity to concepts but there is no way to bring them together.

Cmon now cot. You admit that mathematical truths are necessary truths, right? So 7x7=49 is a necessary truth, right? So it is possible for 7 to go in to 49 7 times, right? So that possibility makes it necessarily true, right? It is possible for 7x7=49, therefore, the answer to 7x7 is a necessary 49, right? Get with the program, people.

And that is why I said the argument may be logically valid but empirically false, for it is actually impossible to demonstrate factual necessity.

If something is proven to be necessarily true, it must be possible for it to be necessarily true, otherwise, it WOULDN'T be necessarily true.

No, of course not! But you are assuming the truth value in your premise, which is that something exists necessarily, instead of arguing to such an entity.

I am assuming it because it is true!!! It is possible for God to exist!!! Now we can debate the possibility of God all night long, but I can hardly be accused of begging the question if the premise in question is actually true. I don't need to apologize for making a truthful statement. If I say "it is possible for 2+2=4", I am not begging the question with that statement now, am I? So why am I being accused of begging the question when I say "it is possible for God to exist"? If the statement is true, then it is true based on its own merit and not because of what I say or don't say.

You are stating that such a thing exists, standing in front of me and that now I must deny that it is standing in front of me! That is begging the question. I’m saying there is no Being that imposes its existence on me and I can conceive the concept to be a non-existent object.

No, I am saying IF that were the case you could imagine it NOT to be the case but that wouldn't change the fact that it IS the case.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

So why am I being accused of begging the question when I say "it is possible for God to exist"?.

Because, as I've pointed out to you two or three times now, and as you should know already because its your argument (well, you know what I mean), the argument doesn't just assume that its possible that God exist, it assumes that its possible that God exists necessarily- or, that its possibly necessary that God exists. But "X is possibly necessary" is logically equivalent to "X is necessary"-which, in this argument, is completely begging the question!

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

If better is subjective than against what do you hold the term "maximal" against? What do you use to judge?

Because the other maxi attributes are attributes that are maxed out. Once you are omniscient you are maxed out on knowledge...once you are omnipotent you are maxed out on power...there is no way further point to be reached, no more to gain...but what is considered "better" to you may be different than what is "better" to me.

How can you even mention an idea of will, when you have no idea what that will could even potentially be or is?

I mean if you are talking hypothetically, and in existence in your mind that works fine, but what standards do you have in the actual universe? Because certainly there is a connection between what exists in your mind and the Universe, there must be some standard that is existing for you to consider God a Maximal Being in comparison to something that is not Maximal right?

To make a long story short, I believe in the Christian God, and based on my belief God is in sovereign control of everything and nothing that happens is beyond his knowledge or control. He has a plan for his creation and there is nothing that we can do that would stop it.

 

[McBell]

So morality is subjective from your view, gotcha.

You morality is subjective.
Your gods morality is subjective.
My morality is subjective.

Morality is subjective, period.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Asking whether something is possibly necessary is the same as asking whether its necessary

The same thing you said to me below. No duh. Just like asking if something is possibly contingent the same thing as asking whether it is contingent.

- and there is no reason to suppose it is

It is possibly true, so yes it is.

, because the definition of necessity is that the negation is self-contradictory; "God does not exist" is not self-contradictory (i.e. A&~A), thus "God exists" is not necessary (and since necessary is equivalent to possibly necessary, it is not possibly necessary either).

The negation IS self-contradictory once it is proven that the premises is true. The premise is "IT IS POSSIBLE FOR GOD TO EXIST", which it is. So once that is established, then the negation is self-contradictory because all possible necessary truths must be actually true. So far, you nor anyone else have provided any kind of reasons to believe that the existence of God is not possible, plus I've already made the case and stated WHY the existence of God must be possible.

Seriously, how can you come here with a straight face and try to endorse a modal argument, when you have no clue about basic modal notions like possibility and necessity?

Look, I'm not in to the rhetoric. Since you've used the words "possibility" and necessity"...I will you those two words to make my point. The existence of God is a "possibility", therefore, God's existence is a "necessity".

So how is that for "basic modal notions" like "possibility" and "necessity"?

Wow, thanks for that mind-blowing revelation.

Well, you looked like you could use the help, and this is the season of giving.

Why are you avoiding the question?

The old "ask a question" cop out, eh? I understand.

"It is possible that God exists" is not enough for the MOA; if you replaced the actual premise (that it is possibly necessary that God exists)with this, it would become invalid, EVEN IN S5. Possible and possibly necessary are not the same. Possibly necessary and necessary ARE the same.

Oh my goodness. "It is possible that God exists" IS enough for the MOA, because all possible necessary truths must exist in reality as a fact.

No. The question is whether the existence of God is POSSIBLY NECESSARY.

And the answer to the question is still yes. No matter how you want to rephrase it, the answer is still yes.

Which is the same as asking whether the existence of God is NECESSARY. But that's the conclusion of the argument, and thus having it as a premise is question-begging. (for about the 5th time now...)

Actually the conclusion of the argument is "God necessarily exists", but that is only after the possibility of the being's existence is already established enough to draw that conclusion. All possible necessary truths must exist in reality (for the 56th time now)

You're forgetting your own argument- the argument is that it is possibly necessary that God exists, therefore God exists necessarily.

You know what's funny...how many times have I said "all possible necessarily truths must be actually true". Do you know why saying "it is possibly necessary that God exists" is the same as saying "therefore, God exists necessarily"? Do you know why? It is because ALL POSSIBLE NECESSARY TRUTHS MUST BE NECESSARILY TRUE, as I've constantly said from the time we starting talking about this. So you are making my point for me.

Now, in order for something to be necessarily true, it must be possible for it to be necessarily true. If something is NOT necessarily true, it must not be POSSIBLE for it to be necessarily true. Nothing you say is going to change this, enaidealukal. Nothing. NOTHING. It doesn't matter how much you want to argue this...or how much you dislike the idea of a MGB...doesn't matter. Unless you can demonstrate how the existence of MGB is IMPOSSIBLE, you have NOT refuted the argument. I mean, nice try...you are giving it your all here. But your best is just not good enough, because you can't rebuttal the truth.

But this is just saying "If A, then A". It's valid, but pointless, because nobody who disputes that God exists is going to grant that God exists necessarily (or possibly necessarily, because that's the same thing).

This is a deductive argument...so as long as the premises are true, which they are, then the conclusion follows logically. In other words what I am saying is, it doesn't MATTER they don't grant it....unless they can prove the argument to be false, then they are rejecting it because they just don't like the idea of a MGB (God). Take away all the fluff and feathers and that is what you have.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Because, as I've pointed out to you two or three times now, and as you should know already because its your argument (well, you know what I mean), the argument doesn't just assume that its possible that God exist, it assumes that its possible that God exists necessarily- or, that its possibly necessary that God exists. But "X is possibly necessary" is logically equivalent to "X is necessary"-which, in this argument, is completely begging the question!

Once again, I don't need to apologize for my premises being true. If I say 2x7 is possibly 14, that is equivalent to 2x7 is necessarily 14. But you wouldn't accuse me of begging the question there, would you??? Hmmm

But I got something for you.

1. If it is possible for God to exist, God exist necessarily
2. God necessarily exists, because it is possible for God to exist

There you go. So now what? The conclusion is not assumed in the premises, yet I still wound up with the same result? Wow.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

You morality is subjective.
Your gods morality is subjective.
My morality is subjective.

Morality is subjective, period.

You could of just said "I agree with cot" and saved yourself some key strokes there, Mest.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I was just saying we were debating Plantinga, and then suddenly we’re not. However I’m also quite happy to continue with this subject.

It doesn't matter, cot...the kalam...ontological....anything you want to discuss.

Well, if it’s wrong I’d appreciate you discussing it with me?

Lets discuss it.

May I ask you to read to read the thesis again? The answer (to your misconceived question) is contained within the argument.

I don't remember.

Yes, that’s correct. And it does. Again, look at the argument.

Well, if you agree that it does, that could hardly be a defeater of the argument against an actually infinite past based on the argument I briefly laid out.

Well. I wouldn’t exactly say that. <smiles> But as hypotheses I can’t see any obvious fault lines within them.

You don't see any faults because I haven't really discussed it with you yet haha.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

The existence of God is a "possibility", therefore, God's existence is a "necessity".

No. (x)&#9674;X->&#9633;X is not a theorem in any system of modal logic.

So how is that for "basic modal notions" like "possibility" and "necessity"?

Lol, I couldn't have proved the point any better myself- thanks.

Oh my goodness. "It is possible that God exists" IS enough for the MOA, because all possible necessary truths must exist in reality as a fact.

Do you not notice what you just did there? You say "possibly God exists" is enough for the MOA, because all possibly necessary truths are (true)... Wait, what? I thought you said "possibly God exists", where did possibly necessary come from? You must be very tired, or multi-tasking or something, because this is clearly not right. If the MOA only needs "possibly God exists", then surely all possible truths are true in reality? But that can't be right either, because plenty of possible truths are not actual, and thus cannot be necessary. Since all possibly necessary truths are necessarily true, what the MOA requires is that it is possibly necessary that God exists- not just that its possible that God exists.

But, again, that its possibly necessary that God exists is not the same as that its possible God exist, and the former is logically equivalent to the conclusion of the argument, and thus is clearly question-begging.

You're welcome for drawing you a frickin picture.

All possible necessary truths must exist in reality (for the 56th time now)

You know what's funny...how many times have I said "all possible necessarily truths must be actually true".

It is funny that you keep saying, since it's not even in question.

Unless you can demonstrate how the existence of MGB is IMPOSSIBLE, you have NOT refuted the argument.

I've refuted the argument elsewhere, both on this thread, and on the link I provided. I've been taking a different tack here, and showing that in addition to that, the argument is simply question-begging. Pointing out that an argument is question-begging is not strictly speaking a refutation, because "A, therefore A" is a question-begging argument but it is still valid; all question-begging arguments are valid. The problem is that they are pointless- you assume the conclusion to prove the conclusion; but if the conclusion must be granted for the conclusion to follow, then what the heck does it prove, really? (hint: it starts with an "n" and ends with a "othing")

 

[McBell]

You could of just said "I agree with cot" and saved yourself some key strokes there, Mest.

Are you in disagreement that morality is subjective?
If so, then present a universal absolute moral.

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

Because the other maxi attributes are attributes that are maxed out. Once you are omniscient you are maxed out on knowledge...once you are omnipotent you are maxed out on power...there is no way further point to be reached, no more to gain...but what is considered "better" to you may be different than what is "better" to me.



To make a long story short, I believe in the Christian God, and based on my belief God is in sovereign control of everything and nothing that happens is beyond his knowledge or control. He has a plan for his creation and there is nothing that we can do that would stop it.

Of course, I'm not saying that you don't believe in the Christian God (which I suppose is different than the Jewish God?)

But something that is Omniscient does not have knowledge.

But given your last comment, I can see that you don't actually believe in Free Will.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Are you in disagreement that morality is subjective?
If so, then present a universal absolute moral.

I believe that objective morality exists because I believe God exists. There is no objective morality if God doesn't exist, in my belief.

 

[FranklinMichaelV.3]

I believe that objective morality exists because I believe God exists. There is no objective morality if God doesn't exist, in my belief.

I think what he wants is an example of that objective morality.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

Of course, I'm not saying that you don't believe in the Christian God (which I suppose is different than the Jewish God?)

It is the same God, in my opinion.

But something that is Omniscient does not have knowledge.

Wow. Sometimes, it just isn't worth it...

But given your last comment, I can see that you don't actually believe in Free Will.

Based on??

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

I think what he wants is an example of that objective morality.

An example would be to think that things like murder, rape, etc,these things are wrong regardless of who thinks these things are right. If you don't have a transcedent standard of goodness (God), there is no way these things are objective, and therefore moral standards are subjective.