There is a serious logical problem with theistic objective morality. Suppose one states that "God is good." There are only two possibilities implied by this statement. Either the person stating that "God is good" is appealing to "good" as a characteristic outside of God, and thus, the person is effectively asserting that a higher standard of morality exists outside of God, and is judging God by that standard. Thus, God is not the arbiter of morals, rather, his actions are being evaluated as being moral based on a moral standard outside of him. If, on the other hand (and this is the only other possibility), the person stating "God is good" means that "moral goodness" is defined by God's actions, then God is an entirely amoral being. Since "Good" is defined by his actions, then by definition, everything he does must be good, and, therefore, he can do anything, and it will always be good, thus he has no choice between right and wrong, and, hence, he is amoral. In either of the two cases, we have a serious logical problem for theists who state that morality comes from God.