Why Morality cannot come from God

[anonymous9887]

I consider it love when you definitively protect society from monsters. That being said, I think it should be near impossible to get and you practically have to have your DNA all over everything plus a video of you bragging as you do the deed.


Some people shouldn't have kids and some people can't have kids.


I've heard it said it doesn't deter other criminals.

It sure does manage to stop the ones we shot, though.


Why? There are evil gods and goddesses just as there are "good" ones.


Faith the size of a mustard seed can move mountains, which are not movable, at least by humans. So Jesus is lying.


But He doesn't always do that, hence the confusion.

Sorry I made the mistake, I should have said monotheist. none the less there would still have to be a superior god that created all things. who created those god's? So I ultimately believe one true god is true and the angels he created may be referred to as gods (Psalms 8:5) in the sense of description of high position.

 

[Truthseeker]

The evidence clearly indicates that the death penalty has not deterred nor decreased the murder rate, but over the millennia many people have been wrongfully executed for a crime they did not commit, and many more did not receive a balanced trial that resulted in the death penalty, because of race, religion or ethnicity.

I think the jury is not in on the death penalty. The trouble with the death penalty today is that it takes 15 years or longer to execute them, because of endless appeals. If one allowed only one appeal it might be a deterrent today.

 

[blü 2]

I agree that 'morality' lacks 'existence' in the same sense that 'straight line' lacks existence. I understand that this is your main point and I agree: no one here will be capable of producing a 'real morality' for you.

Dang!

But 'objective' does not mean 'to have existence' where 'existence' is in the same sense as 'carbon' or 'light' or 'stars'. 'Objective' means 'not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts'.

'To be objective' is a way for a human to consider a question, and has the qualities you mention. However, it's not possible for a moral rule, a maths rule, a physics rule, a rule for line-dancing, to possess such a quality. A human applying such a rule might proceed 'with objectivity' but the rule will remain a rule, that's to say a concept, not a thing with objective existence, not a thing existing in external ('objective') reality independently of the concept of it.

For example, when a mathematician proves that 'the square root of 2 is irrational', he arrives at an objective 'fact' by proof, not by subjective 'opinion' based on how he feels about it.

No he doesn't. Instead he arrives at a conclusion validly derived in accordance with the rules of the relevant branch of maths. The rules, and the processes, and the mathematical objects they apply to, are all conceptual, and the objects, exactly like our Euclidean straight line, have no counterpart in reality.

'Imaginary' does not mean 'subjective'. If that were the case, we would throw out quite a bit of thinking (including the rules of logic).

Then where I've said 'exist only in imagination', please read, 'exist only in mentation'.

Being a concept existing inside minds does not automatically make a concept subjective. That way of thinking is absurd: it turns the very idea of something being 'objective' into a subjective matter; under those rules there is no such thing as objective reality.

Not quite. The question is whether the concept refers to something with objective existence (eg 'this chair'), in which case it's about reality, or not (eg 'a chair'), in which case it's about, and only about, things in mentation.

Otherwise, we would be saying the equivalent of pieces of paper with bunches of letters written on them are 'brain-like' things that hold concepts (which sounds like a bunch of nonsense to me)... unless you think physics textbooks actually spend time thinking...

No, a complete definition of a 'brain-like thing' will depend on the conclusions we reach in the course of brain research, but these already show that the very great majority of brain activity is done by the nonconscious brain, . You may be aware of the experiments some years ago which showed that the brain had already made a particular decision up to ten seconds before the conscious brain was aware of the decision. Or more simply, ponder where the words you speak or type 'are', up to the millisecond before you say or type them ─ only very rarely in the conscious brain.

More relevant is the fact that morality applies primarily to thinking beings such as human beings. What does morality even mean when there is nothing to which it applies?

First, morality is a quality that may be attributed to a roughly-defined set of animal, usually human, attitudes about the relationship of the individual to others, and the decisions and behaviors that result from them. These have their sources in genetic tendencies, such as child nurture and protection, dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial, which are present in all societies. Or they may derive from particular customs, such as whether a wedding entails a dowry, a bride-price or neither, how to hold a knife and fork, whether and if so when you may spit or fart, and so on. And then each human has a conscience, the sense / conviction that certain rules of behavior have universal application, and aren't simply opinions (though the list of such rules will vary with the individual).

So morality ranges from largely fixed, like child nurture, to arbitrary (blackballed for wearing inappropriate socks, the moral judgment 'not a person we want to associate with').

(The Ten Commandments are an egregious example of arbitrary selection and crap draftsmanship. Don't get me started.)

When the state of Indiana tried to pass a law squaring the circle, it wouldn't have made squaring the circle a fact!

If I had to do that, I'd start by offering a replacement definition of a circle, so that it fitted my maths and not Euclid's.

The 'objective test' that you are using is a test for 'real existence' and not a test for 'objectivity'.

As I said, I don't agree that 'objectivity' can be used here in the sense you propose. (And I continue to equate 'objective existence' with 'real existence', in contrast to 'existence solely in mentation'.)

 

[blü 2]

Source? Within reach if I turn my chair I have a book called "A system of Ethics." The book does make reference to Christianity in chapter 2 and three of Book 1. However, since Book III alone, has 11 chapters,and the entire book is nearly 700 pages, I think it is fair to say that this issue goes well beyond the scope of religion.

I hope nothing I said suggested otherwise.

I think we are talking past each other. As I understand it, you are saying a moral theory is only objective if it is independent of our brains. My understanding is that a moral principle is objective if it is independent of cultural and is true whether anyone recognizes it.

That would immediately encounter the problem, what objective test will tell us whether moral statement A is objective or not? Without such a test, and I can't imagine how it could exist, it's all down to opinion, no?

To quote him [Greg Klebanoff]
" [...] by “objective moral law” most philosophers mean moral principals that are true independent of cultural conditioning and independent of whether anyone recognizes them. If I say “Torturing babies for fun is wrong” is an objective moral law, I mean it is true in all cultures (regardless of whether a given culture recognizes it as wrong or not) and true regardless of whether anyone believes it or not. Belief that there are objective moral laws or moral facts is called “moral realism.”

If the statement read, "The great majority of humans would agree that torturing human babies for fun is wrong" then I'd agree. But the instinctive imperative behind the concept of child nurture and protection arises from genetics (where its benefits for mammalian surviving and breeding are self-evident), not from some abstract Platoland where moral principles drift lazily to and fro (not that I attribute such a view to you). And the instinct, being the product of natural selection (as witness its existence across the animal kingdom, though outside of mammals it's not the sole available tactic), is not of itself concerned with morality, nor is it the product of any moral view, but arises from Darwinian practicalities.

We could be missing an opportunity to have a good discussion of what kind of moral principle can be formulated without reference to religion.

Why not? I outlined my view in #83 above, if you'll pardon me quoting myself ─

... morality is a quality that may be attributed to a roughly-defined set of animal, usually human, attitudes about the relationship of the individual to others, and the decisions and behaviors that result from them. These have their sources in genetic tendencies, such as child nurture and protection, dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial, which are present in all societies. Or they may derive from particular customs, such as whether a wedding entails a dowry, a bride-price or neither, how to hold a knife and fork, whether and if so when you may spit or fart, and so on. And then each human has a conscience, the sense / conviction that certain rules of behavior have universal application, and aren't simply opinions (though the list of such rules will vary with the individual).​

So morality ranges from largely fixed, like child nurture, to arbitrary (blackballed for wearing inappropriate socks, the moral judgment 'not a person we want to associate with').​

Personally, I think Rawls "theory of Justice" has a lot going for it. He tries to argue for a principle of universal justice that has utilitarianism as a foundation. No easy feat!

Er, yes, a fine trick if he can pull it off. I haven't read Rawls since last century, and I haven't come across that one.

 

[Curious George]

Again . . . problems claiming morality can be 'objective' when you are not certain whether or not 'it exists,' and you are claiming 'some claim it does.' This represents a vague subjective claim of the mind of those that claim 'it' does without objective evidence beyond the human mind.

If you are incapable of discussing something which you can theoretically understand but do not know for certain, that is your baggage.

 

[Curious George]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you appear to be saying you don't understand your own use of the term 'objective morality'. If that's so, then it seems odd that you should express surprise when I told you I couldn't think of what such an expression might mean.

And it also seems odd that, having been asked three times for an example of a moral rule with objective existence, you were unable either to provide one, or to say, I can't.

Anyway, the point of discussion is to learn, and when that happens, that's good (but good as a subjective judgment, not as an objective quality of the learning, of course).

You are wrong. I understand the use of the term. Whether I am decided that morality is objective however is not decided.

Objective morality is a system of moral facts which are necessarily true.

 

[Curious George]

Dang!
'To be objective' is a way for a human to consider a question, and has the qualities you mention. However, it's not possible for a moral rule, a maths rule, a physics rule, a rule for line-dancing, to possess such a quality. A human applying such a rule might proceed 'with objectivity' but the rule will remain a rule, that's to say a concept, not a thing with objective existence, not a thing existing in external ('objective') reality independently of the concept of it.
No he doesn't. Instead he arrives at a conclusion validly derived in accordance with the rules of the relevant branch of maths. The rules, and the processes, and the mathematical objects they apply to, are all conceptual, and the objects, exactly like our Euclidean straight line, have no counterpart in reality.
Then where I've said 'exist only in imagination', please read, 'exist only in mentation'.
Not quite. The question is whether the concept refers to something with objective existence (eg 'this chair'), in which case it's about reality, or not (eg 'a chair'), in which case it's about, and only about, things in mentation.
No, a complete definition of a 'brain-like thing' will depend on the conclusions we reach in the course of brain research, but these already show that the very great majority of brain activity is done by the nonconscious brain, . You may be aware of the experiments some years ago which showed that the brain had already made a particular decision up to ten seconds before the conscious brain was aware of the decision. Or more simply, ponder where the words you speak or type 'are', up to the millisecond before you say or type them ─ only very rarely in the conscious brain.
First, morality is a quality that may be attributed to a roughly-defined set of animal, usually human, attitudes about the relationship of the individual to others, and the decisions and behaviors that result from them. These have their sources in genetic tendencies, such as child nurture and protection, dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial, which are present in all societies. Or they may derive from particular customs, such as whether a wedding entails a dowry, a bride-price or neither, how to hold a knife and fork, whether and if so when you may spit or fart, and so on. And then each human has a conscience, the sense / conviction that certain rules of behavior have universal application, and aren't simply opinions (though the list of such rules will vary with the individual).

So morality ranges from largely fixed, like child nurture, to arbitrary (blackballed for wearing inappropriate socks, the moral judgment 'not a person we want to associate with').

(The Ten Commandments are an egregious example of arbitrary selection and crap draftsmanship. Don't get me started.)
If I had to do that, I'd start by offering a replacement definition of a circle, so that it fitted my maths and not Euclid's.
As I said, I don't agree that 'objectivity' can be used here in the sense you propose. (And I continue to equate 'objective existence' with 'real existence', in contrast to 'existence solely in mentation'.)

I do not think I have ever heard a person argue that geometry, (euclidian or non-), was subjective.

 

[Sunstone]

...thus he has no choice between right and wrong, and, hence, he is amoral.

Interesting choice of terms, "amoral". I'm not arguing with it, but I find defining "amoral" as "having no choice between right and wrong" interesting.

Apart from that, I'm wondering whether in the OP, "God's moral goodness" is being defined by "God's actions" or by "God's being"?

I know you state, "moral goodness is defined by God's actions", but I think this passage seems to me capable of being interpreted as defining God's moral goodness by both his actions and his being:

If, on the other hand...the person stating "God is good" means that "moral goodness" is defined by God's actions, then God is an entirely amoral being. Since "Good" is defined by his actions, then by definition, everything he does must be good, and, therefore, he can do anything, and it will always be good, thus he has no choice between right and wrong, and, hence, he is amoral.​

If on the other hand, you were to re-work the passage to clarify that you were speaking only of the moral goodness of God's actions, it might read something like this:

If, on the other hand...the person stating "God is good" means that "moral goodness" is defined by God's actions, then God's actions are entirely amoral. Since "Good" is defined by his actions, then by definition, everything he does must be good, and, therefore, he can do anything, and it will always be good, thus he has no choice between right and wrong, and, hence, his actions are always amoral.​

To my mind, the passage -- even re-worked to eliminate an ambiguity -- raises an interesting question.

Suppose it could be known that god consistently acts in such ways as amount in practice to optimizing the well-being of all humans except, of course, @Debater Slayer (I mean, not even a deity would want to optimize that rascal's well-being). Could we distinguish between god's actions and the consequences of god's actions in such a way as to both (1) acknowledge that god's actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but (2) the consequences of god's actions are good?

Put differently, can we say "objective" moral goodness is not defined by god's actions, but rather by the consequences of god's actions?

Again, suppose god miraculously intervened in the world in such a way as to bring about the Lisbon earthquake of 1531. Further suppose that the quake and subsequent tsunami, despite slaughtering about 30,000 people, somehow resulted over the course of eternity in optimizing the well-being of every human (except DS, who it merely annoyed). Are we then permitted to:

(1) Distinguish between the moral value of god’s actions and the moral value of the consequences of his actions

(2) In order to pronounce his actions amoral but the consequences good,

(3) And to further pronounce the consequences "objectively" good?​

Last, if all three of the above points could somehow be answered in the affirmative, then wouldn't that mean god could be considered the ultimate source of objective moral goodness? That is, assuming first that the Cosmic Clown actually exists to begin with.

Personally, I have no opinion in the matter...as of yet.

 

[shunyadragon]

I apologize for suggesting you were not familiar with Ethics and morality. It wasn't constructive and was surely patronizing. Clearly you have done a great deal of thinking about these and other issues.
Source? Within reach if I turn my chair I have a book called "A system of Ethics." The book does make reference to Christianity in chapter 2 and three of Book 1. However, since Book III alone, has 11 chapters,and the entire book is nearly 700 pages, I think it is fair to say that this issue goes well beyond the scope of religion.

I easily acknowledge the different views of morals and ethics described and compared in references like the above, but I do not consider the concept of an 'objective morality' well accepted outside of Christian apologetics.

In apologetics Christianity the concept 'objective morals' must exists as a factual basis for 'good' human morals and the only possible source is Craig.

Yes some secular have tried to propose a natural 'objective morality,' and the following source reviews these efforts and the problems with this effort from a secular perspective. The following citation from the source describes the problem of considering morality in terms factual assertions. The rest of the article goes into considerable detail from the Christian and secular perspective.

From: How Morality Has the Objectivity that Matters—Without God

Moral Judgments Versus Factual Assertions
The practical function of morality is the key to understanding why moral judgments are not true or false in the same way that factual statements are true or false. The objective/subjective dichotomy implicitly assumes that moral judgments are used primarily to describe, so they must have either an objective or subjective reference. But, as indicated, moral judgments have various practical applications; they are not used primarily as descriptive statements.

 

[shunyadragon]

I do not think I have ever heard a person argue that geometry, (euclidian or non-), was subjective.

Of course not but morals and ethics do not have a factual basis as geometry;

From: How Morality Has the Objectivity that Matters—Without God

Moral Judgments Versus Factual Assertions
The practical function of morality is the key to understanding why moral judgments are not true or false in the same way that factual statements are true or false. The objective/subjective dichotomy implicitly assumes that moral judgments are used primarily to describe, so they must have either an objective or subjective reference. But, as indicated, moral judgments have various practical applications; they are not used primarily as descriptive statements.

The above source goes into considerable detail concerning the approach of Christian apologetics, and secular efforts to describe a natural objective morality, The conclusion is that there can be objective attributes of morals and ethics, but morals and ethics becomes problematic is you consider it factual as being objective, like geometry.

 

[shunyadragon]

I think the jury is not in on the death penalty. The trouble with the death penalty today is that it takes 15 years or longer to execute them, because of endless appeals. If one allowed only one appeal it might be a deterrent today.

I would refer to the use of the death penalty over time and in different countries, regardless of how it is specifically enforced today in the USA. The conclusions are very clear; there is not relationship between the death penalty and lower rates of criminal murder.

Part of the reason for the process you describe in the USA today is the long history of a large number of innocent people who were executed in the past, particularly the high proportion of blacks.

 

[LuisDantas]

Put differently, can we say "objective" moral goodness is not defined by god's actions, but rather by the consequences of god's actions?

Again, suppose god miraculously intervened in the world in such a way as to bring about the Lisbon earthquake of 1531. Further suppose that the quake and subsequent tsunami, despite slaughtering about 30,000 people, somehow resulted over the course of eternity in optimizing the well-being of every human (except DS, who it merely annoyed). Are we then permitted to:

(1) Distinguish between the moral value of god’s actions and the moral value of the consequences of his actions

(2) In order to pronounce his actions amoral but the consequences good,

(3) And to further pronounce the consequences "objectively" good?​

Last, if all three of the above points could somehow be answered in the affirmative, then wouldn't that mean god could be considered the ultimate source of objective moral goodness? That is, assuming first that the Cosmic Clown actually exists to begin with.

Personally, I have no opinion in the matter...as of yet.

We would then have to ask why we humans have moral discernment if it turns out to be useless.

I don't think that can be done in a way that preserves the premise of the existence of this rather unlikely god.

 

[blü 2]

You are wrong. I understand the use of the term. Whether I am decided that morality is objective however is not decided.

Thank you for the clarification.

Objective morality is a system of moral facts which are necessarily true.

But I can find no meaning in that statement, whereas you apparently can. What's an example of a moral fact?

 

[shunyadragon]

If you are incapable of discussing something which you can theoretically understand but do not know for certain, that is your baggage.

No your baggage, and your statements of uncertainty . . .

What? You are confounding the subject. I am not sure whether or not morality objectively exists. I do understand that some claim it does, and it is not an anachronism.

 

[Paradox22]

ct. I am not sure whether or not morality objectively exists. I do understand that some claim it does, and it is not an anachronism.

I tend to agree. My point is that it doesn't necessarily involve religion. For example, Kant's categorical imperative has nothing to do with religion. I don't think much of it, but it is just an example. Granted, Kant also tried to argue the existence of a god based on morality, but that is different. Utilitarian theories of morality have nothing to do with God. I think these have more going for it, especially if they can be formulated to account for justice. I refer you to Rawls for that. I think his book is called a "Theory of Justice." If someone were to read only one book on moral philosophy,I would definitely recommend that.

 

[shunyadragon]

Objective morality is a system of moral facts which are necessarily true.

The problem with this in the history of humanity and in different cultures and religions is that the morals are not consistently objective and uniform to be necessarily true. I do not believe that you nor anyone else can provide a specific standard of morals and ethics that are 'necessarily true,' which would the claim of many Christian apologists like Craig.


Which standard would you provide a specific objective necessarily true standard for the following morals and ethics.

It is an objective fact that 'wrongful death' is immoral in virtually all cultures in the history of humanity, but the differences as to what is 'wrongful death' from culture to culture over time has a very high subjective variation.

It is an objective fact that most, not all, cultures in history believe wrongful taking of property is immoral, but the actual standard varies from culture to culture in history.

Is divorce immoral is a problem because it is highly variable and not necessarily immorally true. The New Testament and the Roman Church state it is immoral, the Old Testament allows divorce, and many if not most Christians today do not consider it immoral.

Slavery being immoral shows no consistent necessarily true moral standard over time and in different cultures and religions.

The concept of lying, 'bearing false witness.' is too highly variable between cultures and over time to have any objective standard.

 

[shunyadragon]

I tend to agree. My point is that it doesn't necessarily involve religion. For example, Kant's categorical imperative has nothing to do with religion. I don't think much of it, but it is just an example. Granted, Kant also tried to argue the existence of a god based on morality, but that is different. Utilitarianism is another system/principle of morality that has nothing to do with God. I think this has more going for it.

I agree to. in a way, but the problem is @Curious George has made conflicting incoherent statements concerning the nature of his belief that the standard of 'objective morality' is necessarily true and objective.

 

[shunyadragon]

But I can find no meaning in that statement, whereas you apparently can. What's an example of a moral fact?

There may be examples of moral facts, such as all cultures in the history of humanity have a moral standard for 'wrongful death,' but the the variation in the standard in different cultures, over time, and how 'wrongful death' penalties is highly variable and subjective, and specifically defined moral is not 'necessarily true.

This leads to the conclusion that systems of morals and ethics may have objective attributes, but differences and how morals and ethics are enforced have many subjective attributes.

In the dictionaries, sociology and anthropology 'morals, ethics, nor morality are defined as specifically objective nor subjective,

 

[Paradox22]

... morality is a quality that may be attributed to a roughly-defined set of animal, usually human, attitudes about the relationship of the individual to others, and the decisions and behaviors that result from them. These have their sources in genetic tendencies, such as child nurture and protection, dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial, which are present in all societies. Or they may derive from particular customs, such as whether a wedding entails a dowry, a bride-price or neither, how to hold a knife and fork, whether and if so when you may spit or fart, and so on. And then each human has a conscience, the sense / conviction that certain rules of behavior have universal application, and aren't simply opinions (though the list of such rules will vary with the individual).

I like it! We agree more than we disagree. I have given a lot of consideration to morality based largely on culture. I guess you would describe it as cultural relativism. I'm inclined to believe that morality evolved in society independent of religion. It's original basis was the ability of people to have empathy for each other. But that would not be complete because a satisfactory principle of morality has to explain why moral principles also include non-human members of the moral community. That's where a form of utilitarianism can go. Justice is a huge challenge to Utilitarian theories. That's why I am interested in writers that try to make an argument that justice is compatible with some form of Utilitarian principle of morality. Or at least, with some sort of consequence-based principle. But again, these are higher level particulars. At it's most fundamental level, it is not based on spiritualism or theism, but on a naturalism and culture. Again, I want to stress that I agree with much of where you are, and I'm not surprised that most people, including you, do not go beyond this in the direction of cultural relativism. It is not very popular, and has it's own problems.

 

[Paradox22]

he above source goes into considerable detail concerning the approach of Christian apologetics, and secular efforts to describe a natural objective morality, The conclusion is that there can be objective attributes of morals and ethics, but morals and ethics becomes problematic is you consider it factual as being objective, like geometr

Good source! Thank you.

If you provide the link because you agree with much of that article, then we agree more than we disagree. It is also a good source because it touches on the Euthyphro Dilema, which brings us back to the original question. I would just like to highlight two parts of the article that seem to relevant to how we are having problems agreeing on what "objective" morality is.

"In rejecting the proposition that moral judgments are equivalent to factual statements about the world, I am not endorsing the proposition that moral judgments are subjective. A subjective statement is still a descriptive statement that is determined to be true by reference to facts. It’s simply a descriptive statement referring to facts about our inner states—our desires, our sentiments—as opposed to something in the world. To claim that moral judgments are subjective is to claim that they are true or false based on how a particular person feels. That’s not how most of us regard moral judgments."

"In conclusion, the claim that we need God to provide morality with objectivity does not withstand analysis. To begin with, God would not be able to provide objectivity, as the argument from Euthyphro demonstrates. Moreover, morality is neither objective nor subjective in the way that statements of fact are said to be objective or subjective; nor is that type of objectivity really our concern. Our legitimate concern is that we don’t want people feeling free “to do their own thing,” that is, we don’t want morality to be merely a reflection of someone’s personal desires. It’s not.

How Morality Has the Objectivity that Matters—Without God