As I employ the principle, all posits have the burden of proof. In the case of Objector above, W or its negation is not his posit. He has a burden of proof for the posits he makes. Arguing that the Objector has to argue W or its negation misses the point.
That is what is being argued by Falvlun and I in this thread.
Disbelief is not represented in claim by the negation of W. The Objector has his own posits to deal with.
As a matter of fact the negation of W is a legitimate proposition, and a sceptic has good reason to question that extraordinary assertion: The central claim here concerns the putative existence of a supernatural being, and the OP herself states that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, a cliché perhaps, but one that most people agree with, and so disbelief is justified in the absence of this extraordinary evidence. It seems to me that in this thread the final determination is being subtlety laid aside as if it is of reduced consequence with the real problem being the sceptics justification.
If someone makes an argument or asserts a denial then by definition it is a claim. However while the sceptic must be able to justify the disbelief to himself, which he does for the reasons Ive given previously, he can also ask for proof of the existence of gods without having to first justify his disbelief to the theist. And the sceptic cannot shift the burden by returning the question to the sceptic with the question-begging Why dont you believe in gods? If the proposition God exists is true then it is for the advocate to prove it, since non-existence cannot be proved by the sceptic. As Favlun herself said the theist has the greater burden, and I maintain that burden is carried throughout.
Yet, disbelief is easily represented by an assertion. "I don't, or cannot, believe that."
Of course, as in every argument ever made against the existence of God. An assertion is generally described as a confident or forceful statement or a positive declaration or argument, but not one of uncertainty or ambiguity where a thing might or might not be. Disbelief can be held through a lack of common experience as Ive already indicated, and Gods non-existence does not follow as a necessary assertion and a consequent of disbelief. Its not being proposed in such cases that there is, or there is not a God, that one particular is true and the other false.