Do you Think we have Free Will

[leroy]

But what did you mean when you said that given that hypothetical scenario I had the ability to choose B? Elaborate what exactly you mean by that. What does it mean to have the ability to choose B?

it simply means that you are capable of doing ether A or B

 

[Koldo]

it simply means that you are capable of doing ether A or B

If you know that I will necessarily do B, how do you figure I am capable of doing A?

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

Can you prove (beyond reasonable doubt) empirically that you disagree……………. No…………..you can´t run any test nor any experiment that could show that you disagree or agree with anything-

It seems like you don't understand what empiricism is. It's determining what is true about the world using reason to properly attach significance to the evidence of the senses. I don't know what you mean by testing, but yesterday, while sitting on the terrace, I noticed and heard raindrops falling, and I knew it was raining. I suppose you could call looking and heating the rain fall a test, but I'd call it acquiring and interpreting the evidence of the senses.

I don’t think you are lying. I grant that you disagree. I simply trust you and I have confidence that you wouldn’t lie nor have a delusion.

Then I've convinced you I disagreed. And you learned that empirically - properly interpreting the evidence of your senses. You read words I wrote, and you properly understood that they disagreed with yours. You don't have to trust that I disagreed with you. You can read that I do.

It's a slightly different question whether my apparent disagreement was sincere, but you've made a judgment there.

I disagree that you believe me because you trust me. I don't believe that you trust me. You simply evaluated the evidence of your senses in the light of your previous experiences with people and your general understanding of their motivations and behaviors and decided that it was much more likely that I was being sincere when I told you I disagreed than that I actually agreed with you but was pretending to disagree. You've seen plenty of the opposite - people pretending to agree when they have other ideas that they choose to not express - but you know that there are few situations where it would be advantageous to pretend to disagree, and so conclude that though that is possible here, it is very unlikely. No trust is involved.

The basic dispute here between the empiricists and the faith-based thinkers is whether there is a second path to knowledge besides empiricism. The empiricist says no. It seems that you are trying to make the case that I have beliefs about the world that aren't derived from the interpretation of the evidence of the senses, and your argument is based in doing tests, as if empiricism means doing experiments beyond looking, listening, smelling, tasting, touching, remembering, and reasoning. This is how we learn the facts that we employ in daily life, how we know where to find a gas station, how we know why we need to gas and when we need it. We interpret and remember experience, and rely on our memories to make decisions here and now when evidence arises.

That refers to learning about the world on the other side of our skin. There is also the physical reality of our bodies. We also learn about how our bodies work and respond through inner senses that tell us the orientation and movement of the body, and when it is thirsty or nauseous, and this is empiricism as well, albeit of more subjective and less universal truths. This is how we know what I like to eat and what we will dislike. I've discovered empirically that strawberries taste good to me but broccoli does not, knowledge which reliably allows me to make choices that direct outcomes.

The faithful want to claim that their beliefs are also knowledge and that empiricism isn't the only path to knowledge, but the empiricist disagrees that those beliefs are knowledge. They're untested and often untestable ideas which cannot be known to be correct or incorrect because they predict nothing about reality or experience. THAT's your testing in empiricism - experiencing physical reality - which is unavailable for beliefs about gods, afterlives and the supernatural. These are all creations of the imagination, not knowledge about or derived from the evidence of the senses properly interpreted.

 

[leroy]

If you know that I will necessarily do B, how do you figure I am capable of doing A?

well, because I know you ,

 

[Koldo]

well, because I know you ,

?

 

[leroy]

It seems like you don't understand what empiricism is. It's determining what is true about the world using reason to properly attach significance to the evidence of the senses. I don't know what you mean by testing, but yesterday, while sitting on the terrace, I noticed and heard raindrops falling, and I knew it was raining. I suppose you could call looking and heating the rain fall a test, but I'd call it acquiring and interpreting the evidence of the senses.

Then I've convinced you I disagreed. And you learned that empirically - properly interpreting the evidence of your senses. You read words I wrote, and you properly understood that they disagreed with yours. You don't have to trust that I disagreed with you. You can read that I do.

It's a slightly different question whether my apparent disagreement was sincere, but you've made a judgment there.

I disagree that you believe me because you trust me. I don't believe that you trust me. You simply evaluated the evidence of your senses in the light of your previous experiences with people and your general understanding of their motivations and behaviors and decided that it was much more likely that I was being sincere when I told you I disagreed than that I actually agreed with you but was pretending to disagree. You've seen plenty of the opposite - people pretending to agree when they have other ideas that they choose to not express - but you know that there are few situations where it would be advantageous to pretend to disagree, and so conclude that though that is possible here, it is very unlikely. No trust is involved.

The basic dispute here between the empiricists and the faith-based thinkers is whether there is a second path to knowledge besides empiricism. The empiricist says no. It seems that you are trying to make the case that I have beliefs about the world that aren't derived from the interpretation of the evidence of the senses, and your argument is based in doing tests, as if empiricism means doing experiments beyond looking, listening, smelling, tasting, touching, remembering, and reasoning. This is how we learn the facts that we employ in daily life, how we know where to find a gas station, how we know why we need to gas and when we need it. We interpret and remember experience, and rely on our memories to make decisions here and now when evidence arises.

That refers to learning about the world on the other side of our skin. There is also the physical reality of our bodies. We also learn about how our bodies work and respond through inner senses that tell us the orientation and movement of the body, and when it is thirsty or nauseous, and this is empiricism as well, albeit of more subjective and less universal truths. This is how we know what I like to eat and what we will dislike. I've discovered empirically that strawberries taste good to me but broccoli does not, knowledge which reliably allows me to make choices that direct outcomes.

The faithful want to claim that their beliefs are also knowledge and that empiricism isn't the only path to knowledge, but the empiricist disagrees that those beliefs are knowledge. They're untested and often untestable ideas which cannot be known to be correct or incorrect because they predict nothing about reality or experience. THAT's your testing in empiricism - experiencing physical reality - which is unavailable for beliefs about gods, afterlives and the supernatural. These are all creations of the imagination, not knowledge about or derived from the evidence of the senses properly interpreted.

Well you are just redifining the term empiricist.

However regardless on what words you what to use, it is still true that you grant claims that are untestable and unfalsifiable (like the claim that you disagree with XXXX)

I've discovered empirically that strawberries taste good to me but broccoli does not, knowledge which reliably allows me to make choices that direct outcomes.

Make choices? That is a Strange thing to say for someone who doesn’t believes in free will.

 

[leroy]

?

Assuming that I have absolute knowledge

1 I would know if you have the ability to A and B

2 I woud know which would you do A or B

 

[Koldo]

Assuming that I have absolute knowledge

1 I would know if you have the ability to A and B

2 I woud know which would you do A or B

I think our disagreement comes down to what constitutes the ability to do A and B.

Would you say that a robot has free will? I am asking because a robot can also have the ability to do A or B by the standard you have brought to the table. If you disagree, please elaborate.

 

[Ponder This]

The definition of free will is central.

I reject the definition for free will provided by @leroy and I explained why.

I have made it already: Your former post is an example of what we get when one doesn't read about a subject but proceeds to make baseless commentary about it.

It's unfortunate that you didn't contribute meaningfully to the discussion and there is no need for me to respond further.

 

[Koldo]

I reject the definition for free will provided by @leroy and I explained why.


It's unfortunate that you didn't contribute meaningfully to the discussion and there is no need for me to respond further.

Since I have already stated that your rejection of that definition is grounded on nothing other than ignorance about the subject, I also have nothing else to add for now.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

you are just redifining the term empiricist.

Disagree.

Remember, it's my claim that YOU don't know what empiricism is, so your comment that I've redefined it carries no weight. You'd need to actually point out where you think my definition deviates from what you think the word empiricism means, and why you but not I are correct.

it is still true that you grant claims that are untestable and unfalsifiable (like the claim that you disagree with XXXX)

Disagree again.

I've made my argument, but you haven't attempted to rebut it. Simply dissenting and saying what you believe instead, which might not even contradict my words, is ineffectual. My claim that I disagree with an idea is testable and falsifiable. I don't know why you keep saying otherwise, but I don't expect you to make a cogent argument in support of your contention above. You didn't address any of the content of my last post that addressed why I disagree. It's a bad habit.

Failure to attempt to falsify an opinion with a contradictory, evidenced counterargument prevents progress in every subthread we enter. Look at where we are now. I've made my various arguments, and though you say or imply that you disagree, they all stand unrebutted. Merely expressing dissent is irrelevant without rebuttal.

And I have no difficulty determining empirically when you disagree. I really don't understand what your point is there referring to tests to confirm your dissent. I can read that you do. That's evidence to the senses that means you disagree, and that's acquiring knowledge empirically. If only you would ever address any comments like that one with rebuttal, but you never do and won't here, either. You'll just express dissent again if you respond to these words at all, but not with counterargument.

Make choices? That is a Strange thing to say for someone who doesn’t believes in free will.

And here's yet another area where you haven't understood or addressed what I wrote.

For starters, I never said that I rejected the possibility of free will, just that it may be an illusion and that I am fine with that if it's the case. I have no dog in this hunt. And if free will is an illusion, then the experience of the self having had a choice is illusion. In that case, it's neural circuits generating output deterministically. Calling it a choice would be to make the same mistake as thinking that a calculator or computer made the right choice in an addition problem when it made no choice at all even though other outcomes to the addition, all erroneous, seem like possible choices for it.

How about addressing that specifically, and either agreeing with it or pointing out a phrase you disagree with and give your argument for why it isn't correct? If you can't or won't, Leroy, I don't think that I can help you at all, since you don't seem to understand anything I write and you don't rebut, just dissent without any indication that you've understood what you're disagreeing with or why you disagree with it. We will never resolve a single issue until you do, and you've convinced me that you cannot and do not understand what is being asked of you. I don't mind writing out my thoughts once or maybe twice, but I see no point in continuing to address posts that fail to rebut mine or repeating myself endlessly.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

Before I answer the question I'd like to address your definition of free will. You state tha a free choice is a choice that is either not fully random or not fully determined. The first question I have is how you define "random" and how you define "determined." The next question would be, if full determinism implies no free will and full randomness implies no free will, is there some combination of a certain proportion of determinism and randomness that magically becomes "free will?"

 

[shunyadragon]

it simply means that you are capable of doing ether A or B

I believe it is more involved than simply capable o doing or choosing A or B. Needs more clarification.

The concepts of the different versions of determinism acknowledge that humans can make decisions withing a limited range of choices. The problem arises whether humans can and will make choices outside these limitations.

Those that believe in Libertarian Free Will believe humans can make decisions of what humans ought to do not limited by the constrains of determinism.

Libertarianism (metaphysics) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe.

The question of 'Moral Responsibility; is an important issue in the justification of Libertarian Free Will. In that all humans are not limited by issues of Determinism in making moral Free Will decisions.

This neglects the fact that Moral Responsibility is a factor in all the cultures of humanity in the past and now regardless of whether Free Will exists or not. In this Moral Responsibility is not an issue of Free Will. Over time legal systems have begun to acknowledge issues such as mental illness, and other issues into consideration concerning Moral Responsibility that ar enot subject to Free Will.

 

[Balthazzar]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

Determinism, as defined above.

 

[Clizby Wampuscat]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

I have not seen any good evidence to believe either way. I tend to believe we do not. It does seem like we do have free will in our everyday life. We seem to be making decisions freely and I do live my life like I do have free will and I think a society needs to operate like we do. But I am not sure we can ever know.

 

[shunyadragon]

I have not seen any good evidence to believe either way. I tend to believe we do not. It does seem like we do have free will in our everyday life. We seem to be making decisions freely and I do live my life like I do have free will and I think a society needs to operate like we do. But I am not sure we can ever know.

This is in line with my view of Limited Potential Free Will within the context of Determinism. Thi is different from Compaibiliam, where Compatibilism is iffy on whether we in reality have any free will. The concept of Potential Limited Free Will allows for a limited range of decision we can make within the limits of Determinism, but does not specifically limited the range of possible decisions, It only proposesses the potential of making decisions and not that humans do, because of the limits of Determiniam.



The following reference is a dialogue on Philosophy Stock Exchange on Limited Free Will. It is bit of a long dialogue, but interesting if one wants to take the time.

What is “limited free will”?

I have heard that humans have a limited or constrained free will, especially when biological limitations are brought up. However, Merriam-Webster dictionary says: Limited 1a: confined within limits:

philosophy.stackexchange.com

 

[Clizby Wampuscat]

This is in line with my view of Limited Potential Free Will within the context of Determinism. Thi is different from Compaibiliam, where Compatibilism is iffy on whether we in reality have any free will. The concept of Potential Limited Free Will allows for a limited range of decision we can make within the limits of Determinism, but does not specifically limited the range of possible decisions, It only proposesses the potential of making decisions and not that humans do, because of the limits of Determiniam.



The following reference is a dialogue on Philosophy Stock Exchange on Limited Free Will. It is bit of a long dialogue, but interesting if one wants to take the time.

What is “limited free will”?

I have heard that humans have a limited or constrained free will, especially when biological limitations are brought up. However, Merriam-Webster dictionary says: Limited 1a: confined within limits:

philosophy.stackexchange.com

Great thank you. I will read later.

 

[Copernicus]

This is in line with my view of Limited Potential Free Will within the context of Determinism. Thi is different from Compaibiliam, where Compatibilism is iffy on whether we in reality have any free will. The concept of Potential Limited Free Will allows for a limited range of decision we can make within the limits of Determinism, but does not specifically limited the range of possible decisions, It only proposesses the potential of making decisions and not that humans do, because of the limits of Determiniam.



The following reference is a dialogue on Philosophy Stock Exchange on Limited Free Will. It is bit of a long dialogue, but interesting if one wants to take the time.

What is “limited free will”?

I have heard that humans have a limited or constrained free will, especially when biological limitations are brought up. However, Merriam-Webster dictionary says: Limited 1a: confined within limits:

philosophy.stackexchange.com

The distinction made between compatibilism and limited potential free will strikes me as too vague to be one with a difference. By that I mean that compatibilism can be defined in such a way as to include whatever it is that the PLFW proponents are attempting to say. It is just the position that free will is fully definable within a deterministic system, because having choices to make and then selecting one of them in ignorance of the full consequences is a process determined by limited knowledge of the future. In hindsight, other choices could always have been selected, once events reveal those consequences, but the scope of determinism in these debates always includes hindsight. So the act of making a choice is always viewed from that perspective. If one believes in libertarian free will, then one only does so by forgetting the omniscience granted to those who have the advantage of viewing the future as if it were hindsight. The illusion of free will in that sense simply considers that hindsight would have been different if a different choice had been made with the advantage of foresight, an advantage that one never has when deciding to take an action.

 

[shunyadragon]

The distinction made between compatibilism and limited potential free will strikes me as too vague to be one with a difference. By that I mean that compatibilism can be defined in such a way as to include whatever it is that the PLFW proponents are attempting to say. It is just the position that free will is fully definable within a deterministic system, because having choices to make and then selecting one of them in ignorance of the full consequences is a process determined by limited knowledge of the future. In hindsight, other choices could always have been selected, once events reveal those consequences, but the scope of determinism in these debates always includes hindsight. So the act of making a choice is always viewed from that perspective. If one believes in libertarian free will, then one only does so by forgetting the omniscience granted to those who have the advantage of viewing the future as if it were hindsight. The illusion of free will in that sense simply considers that hindsight would have been different if a different choice had been made with the advantage of foresight, an advantage that one never has when deciding to take an action.

You define Compatibilism too broadly. Compatibilism is one of the most misunderstood philosophies concerning Free Will.

Compatibilism

"Soft determinism (or compatibilism) is the position or view that causal determinism is true, but we still act as free, morally responsible agents when, in the absence of external constraints, our actions are caused by our desires.

Compatibilism does not maintain that humans are free. Compatibilism does not hold that humans have free will.

Compatibilism holds that:

1) the thesis of determinism is true, and that accordingly all human behavior, voluntary or involuntary, like the behavior of all other things, arises from antecedent conditions, given which no other behavior is possible: all human behavior is caused and determined

2)voluntary behavior is nonetheless free to the extent that it is not externally constrained or impeded

3) the causes of voluntary behavior are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent: acts of will or volitions, choices, decisions, desires etc...

Compatibilism is NOT a position that combines the libertarian and determinist positions.

Compatibilism is NOT a compromise of the two other positions.

Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans are "a little bit" free.

Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans have "limited free will".

Compatibilism is NOT a position that holds that humans have some free will.

Compatibilism is determinism with a slight modification for the sake of appearances and for our language use. It is a position taken because of the perceived need to have some idea of accountability or responsibility for human behavior."


It is late, but tomorrow I will go into more detail, but the concept of Potential Limited Free Will is not remotely a form of Compatibilism.

Though I do not equate Compatibilism with 'Soft Determinism.'

 

[Copernicus]

It is late, but tomorrow I will go into more detail, but the concept of Potential Limited Free Will is not remotely a form of Compatibilism.

Though I do not equate Compatibilism with 'Soft Determinism.'

First of all, you are hanging a lot on a web page of course material from a CUNY Queens College philosophy course. Do you have firsthand experience with this course or the professor teaching it? I think that the short list of exclusions you found in that web page are open to varying interpretation and debate, and I'm not at all clear on how he or she would develop those topics. A better source for the term would be the entry for Compatibilism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which enumerates several different types of compatibilism and arguments against compatibilism by incompatibilists who criticize those types. I believe that the material there fully supports what I have been saying above--that compatibilists tend to focus on how to define the expression "free will" within the framework of determinism. Incompatibilists say that it can't be done.

My main problem with "limited free will" is that I just don't know what that means, and searching for authoritative source material on the subject doesn't seem to do much to illuminate the concept. What I would like to see is a clear definition of the concept that shows it is distinct from conventional approaches to compatibilism and incompatibilism. What is the middle position here? I look forward to your explanation. From what I've read of your posts, they seem in line with my point that incompatibilists equivocate on whether the perceiver of an action has or does not have knowledge of the outcome of that action. Compatibilists frame free will in the context of not knowing the outcome, whereas they frame determinism in the context of knowing the outcome. Incompatibilists invariably jump between the two perspectives as it suits them.