Do you Think we have Free Will

[Copernicus]

Questions answered inpost #493. In fact this post provides a reference that details the history of the recent history of the research from Libet research where the dominant view of this and other early research support Determinism up to the near present where determinism seriously questions determinism, and allows for limited Free Will.

Sorry, but post #493 links to a Bartleby article behind a paywall, so all I have is the text in your post, which still does not directly address what you mean by "limited free will". The controversial Libet experiment and others like it only demonstrate that you aren't up to date on that subject. It has been a strong influence in the social media debate, but it has met with strong pushback from researchers. Libet himself never touted it as a demonstration about or against free will, a concept that remains largely undefined and unanalyzed in the popular social media debates over his research. Just as an example of the pushback, see this 2019 Scientific American article:

How a Flawed Experiment “Proved” That Free Will Doesn’t Exist

The author, psychologist Steve Taylor, is a Christian who brings religion into the article (quite unnecessarily, IMO), but I think you should pay attention to some of his criticisms of what the "readiness potential" actually shows, among other things. In psychology, operational definitions can be especially tricky when it comes to explaining the significance of results in everyday language. In the end, his experiment is just about when people become conscious of a decision point is without actually telling us how that relates to making an choice that, in hindsight, could have been made differently.

But all of that is beside the point. What you failed to demonstrate to me in that post and others was a willingness to clarify your technical term "limited free will" in your own words without referring me to external references that don't actually use the term. From the perspective of compatibilism, free will can be defined as a fully determined process, and all experiments like Libet's can show is that what we call "free will" is a fully determined process. So, no help there with what you are on about. In the past, your posts had seem to support the compatibilist position, but I really don't know where you are on the subject at this point.

 

[Polymath257]

I have never found a definition of 'free will' that seems coherent.

One big problem is figuring out what it would even mean to say that there is more than one possible future. How would that be tested? How could we know? We could do the same experiment over, but the new experiment would have a different past and a different sequence of preceding events (including the first experiment) and so would not be expected necessarily to give the same result, right?

Of course, we could do the best physics we have, which is probabilistic and does NOT have a single future for each place and time, but rather has a range of probabilities of what might occur. Of course, this is verified by the type of experiments in the previous paragraph and might not be relevant.

Irrespective of the free will debate, are events determined by previous events? What does/could this mean and how would we know?

Also, at the very minimum, we would expect a 'free choice' made by me would align with my desires. If the effect of my 'will' is random with respect to my 'will', that would seem to not align with the overall notion of 'free will'. So whether or not there is free will is partly determined by whether I can put my desires into action.

Now, it is commonplace that people have desires and they take steps to put those desires into action. This happens on a daily basis. But it begs the question of whether those desires are determined by previous events. It seems to be fully compatible with determinism that I can put my desires into effect at least part of the time. But if the desires themselves are predetermined, that doesn't seem to fit the notion of 'free will' either.

So, can I change my desires? Well, desires certainly *can* change over time and I can, with limited ability, decide to change some of my desires over time. But, of course, I have to *want* to change those desires and put *that* desire into action. It seems clear that at some point in this regress *I* have no actual say. And that seems to mean that I do NOT have the free will to decide to decide to decide.... which seems to mean I don't have free will at all.

I think it is quite relevant to look at what happens in our brains when we 'make a choice'. The difficulty is interpretation. Does the fact that there is an readiness potential before our conscious awareness of a choice really mean that choice was not 'free'. or does it just mean that free choice didn't become conscious until later? Must 'free choices' always happen in the consciousness, or can reflex actions be 'free' (for me, I would say not, but some seem to disagree). If the choice is made because of *previous* conscious decisions (like to go along with an experiment), does that make the choice free even if it happened unconsciously?

Frankly, the free will debate often seems like a debate over definitions as much as anything else. In this regard it is very similar to discussions of consciousness. Nobody seems to have a good definition. Nobody seems to agree with the definitions offered by others. And so no real advances are made because no new knowledge can be found because nobody agrees on the subject matter.

 

[Nakosis]

It is more not a viable option like Libertarian Free Will or Compatibilism based on the evidence.

I believe the degree of Free Will is more inherent in the nature of being human,a nd not specific social considerations like incarceration. It is true that different cultures and religions are different in the degree of the factors they represent constraints or limits on Free Will, but all cultures and religions do represent factors that limit Free Will.

Agree sort of. It is useful as far as a discussion to consider the different options. Yes, those that believe in Determinism only consider there to be no Free Will likely supporting the research like that if Libit. I believe Libertarian Free Will is not a real option. There for we need to explore a middle ground of limited Free Will. Compatibilism is just another version of determinism.

I did provide a good comprehensive reference in post #493 that concluded that neither Libertarian Free Will nor extreme Determinism are not viable.


As described previously or Moral systems are basically a necessary part of human social existence regardless of whether humans have Free Will or not. Moral Responsibility is a product of our evolution for humans to survive as intelligent omnivores with social hierarchy of families and tribes. Our primate ancestors and relatives have similar, but more primitive social structure and Moral Responsibility required for their survival.

I read something like chaos theory a while ago. Something about rain drops not being exactly determined but falling within a range of possibilities.

I suppose that shows that a cause can have a range of effects not just a single necessary effect. So there could have come into existence numerous different universes from the same initial "Big Bang".

Still you have to have will/volition as a causal which chooses a single outcome of the possible effects.

 

[Kathryn]

I didn't vote one way or the other because I believe that free will vs predestination both can be supported and to me, they are both clearly truisms. How they work together is a mystery but I am fine with waiting to understand it, and I believe I will one day.

 

[Polymath257]

I read something like chaos theory a while ago. Something about rain drops not being exactly determined but falling within a range of possibilities.

I suppose that shows that a cause can have a range of effects not just a single necessary effect. So there could have come into existence numerous different universes from the same initial "Big Bang".

Still you have to have will/volition as a causal which chooses a single outcome of the possible effects.

Usually the technical term 'chaos' is used in a deterministic situation with sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Maybe a bit of background is relevant.

Newtonian physics was deterministic: it described the motion of matter by means of differential equations that have the property that if there is *perfect* information at some time, the solution is uniquely determined for all other times. So, if you could know the exact location and velocity of all matter in the universe at some time, then the motion would be fixed for all times. This is used, of course, when using physics to determine where a planet will be in 200 years, or the motion of a projectile, etc.

This, of course, clashed with notions of free will. It says in very clear terms that all actions we take are 'determined' by what happened in the past. Even worse, they are determined by what happened at any fixed time in the past.

That said, the stipulation that all conditions be known *perfectly* is unrealistic in the extreme. For many situations, this isn't a major problem: being off by a small amount in the 'initial conditions' leads to development that stays close to the predictions. But it was found that some situations have sensitive dependence on initial conditions: small errors propagate quickly and destroy any predictability after a while. The weather is a common example, and leads to the 'butterfly flapping its wings giving rise to a tornado a month later'. While this isn't technically correct, the idea that small errors now can lead to predictions that are way off in a fairly short period of time *even under determinism* gives the idea of chaos.

So, chaos in a system is literally that small errors in initial conditions quickly lead to large errors in predictions. Small effects magnify and propagate making it impossible to make accurate predictions.

It is clear that there are many systems that are chaotic in this sense. For the discussion of free will, it is clear that very small effects in a single brain can lead to very large effects later. In fact, this is what seems to happen for most 'choices' that are made: small differences in our thoughts lead to large differences in the world around us.

But, again, this is all under an umbrella of determinism: if there were *perfect* information, the later times would be determined.

And this is one version of compatibilism that could be argued: in the case of choices, the nexus of causality is in our brains. Small differences in initial conditions would lead to a different decision. So, in the absence of perfect information, it appears there is more than one possible future and we *decide* which future comes about: the choices are in our brains and so are 'us' doing the choosing. It is 'free' in the sense that events outside of our brains are not the main things that determine future events.

But still, it just doesn't seem like free will even then, huh?

 

[Nakosis]

Usually the technical term 'chaos' is used in a deterministic situation with sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Maybe a bit of background is relevant.

Newtonian physics was deterministic: it described the motion of matter by means of differential equations that have the property that if there is *perfect* information at some time, the solution is uniquely determined for all other times. So, if you could know the exact location and velocity of all matter in the universe at some time, then the motion would be fixed for all times. This is used, of course, when using physics to determine where a planet will be in 200 years, or the motion of a projectile, etc.

This, of course, clashed with notions of free will. It says in very clear terms that all actions we take are 'determined' by what happened in the past. Even worse, they are determined by what happened at any fixed time in the past.

That said, the stipulation that all conditions be known *perfectly* is unrealistic in the extreme. For many situations, this isn't a major problem: being off by a small amount in the 'initial conditions' leads to development that stays close to the predictions. But it was found that some situations have sensitive dependence on initial conditions: small errors propagate quickly and destroy any predictability after a while. The weather is a common example, and leads to the 'butterfly flapping its wings giving rise to a tornado a month later'. While this isn't technically correct, the idea that small errors now can lead to predictions that are way off in a fairly short period of time *even under determinism* gives the idea of chaos.

So, chaos in a system is literally that small errors in initial conditions quickly lead to large errors in predictions. Small effects magnify and propagate making it impossible to make accurate predictions.

It is clear that there are many systems that are chaotic in this sense. For the discussion of free will, it is clear that very small effects in a single brain can lead to very large effects later. In fact, this is what seems to happen for most 'choices' that are made: small differences in our thoughts lead to large differences in the world around us.

But, again, this is all under an umbrella of determinism: if there were *perfect* information, the later times would be determined.

Yes, I meant the idea of theory reminded me this other paper I read regarding the unpredictability of rain drops. It was a long time ago. If I can find it again, I'll reference it.

And this is one version of compatibilism that could be argued: in the case of choices, the nexus of causality is in our brains. Small differences in initial conditions would lead to a different decision. So, in the absence of perfect information, it appears there is more than one possible future and we *decide* which future comes about: the choices are in our brains and so are 'us' doing the choosing. It is 'free' in the sense that events outside of our brains are not the main things that determine future events.

But still, it just doesn't seem like free will even then, huh?

Yes, that is the problem with determinism. It defines free will as something which can't exist. Therefore determinism is not particularly useful to a discussion on free will.

Whereas I say free will can be understood as relative to the number of options available for us to choose from. The greater number of options we have to choose among the greater degree of free will we have.

I'm looking at how, well I guess we won't call it chaos theory, but unpredictability could be useful in an argument. Chaos theory simply tries to pull unpredictability under the umbrella of determinism.

As I said, I don't see the concept of determinism as useful in understanding free will. However if there was an alternate theory which didn't rely on an Epicurus swerve, that would certainly support my view that determinism is not a necessary element of free will.

Unfortunately, at this point, It is still relying on the possibility of overdeterminism without a known physical component since I don't intend to argue from a dualist POV.

 

[Polymath257]

Yes, I meant the idea of theory reminded me this other paper I read regarding the unpredictability of rain drops. It was a long time ago. If I can find it again, I'll reference it.



Yes, that is the problem with determinism. It defines free will as something which can't exist. Therefore determinism is not particularly useful to a discussion on free will.

The question is whether determinism is true or not. If it *is* true, then free will can't exist (at least in the usual sense). So that would answer the question.

Also, many of the basic equations of (Newtonian) physics are deterministic: if you know initial conditions perfectly, then you can say precisely what will happen for all time.

Whereas I say free will can be understood as relative to the number of options available for us to choose from. The greater number of options we have to choose among the greater degree of free will we have.

And that is part of the question: how many options do we really have? Is it simply an illusion that it *appears* we have more than one option? If determinism is true, then it is an illusion. Of course, it might still be an illusion even if determinism is false.

I'm looking at how, well I guess we won't call it chaos theory, but unpredictability could be useful in an argument. Chaos theory simply tries to pull unpredictability under the umbrella of determinism.

Not tries: it is a mathematical description of how small errors propagate even in a deterministic system. So, even if the laws of physics are deterministic and even if we knew the actual form of those laws and even if we were able to solve those equations mathematically, unless we can put perfect information about initial conditions into those equations, we would *still* not be able to make accurate predictions after a fairly short period of time.

An easy example, can be done on most calculators. Find 1 divided by 3. Then multiply by 4 and subtract 1. Then multiply by 4 again and subtract 1. Then do it again and again.

What *should* happen mathematically is that you will get 1/3-->4/3-->1/3-->4/3-->1/3, alternating.

What happens on most calculators is that fairly quickly the numbers go off track, going quite far away from 1/3 or 4/3. (if it works on yours for 1/3 and 4, do 1/7 and 8).

The reason? Round off error. Most calculators work with an approximation. Every time you multiply by 4, though, the error also gets multiplied by 4. Even if the initial approximation is quite good, that expansion of the error grows to overwhelm any answer you might get.

As I said, I don't see the concept of determinism as useful in understanding free will.

Again, if determinism is true, then free will is simply false under most definitions. That would certainly clarify the issue.

However if there was an alternate theory which didn't rely on an Epicurus swerve, that would certainly support my view that determinism is not a necessary element of free will.

Unfortunately, at this point, It is still relying on the possibility of overdeterminism without a known physical component since I don't intent to argue from a dualist POV.

 

[shunyadragon]

Usually the technical term 'chaos' is used in a deterministic situation with sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Maybe a bit of background is relevant.

Yes, incomplete.

Newtonian physics was deterministic: it described the motion of matter by means of differential equations that have the property that if there is *perfect* information at some time, the solution is uniquely determined for all other times. So, if you could know the exact location and velocity of all matter in the universe at some time, then the motion would be fixed for all times. This is used, of course, when using physics to determine where a planet will be in 200 years, or the motion of a projectile, etc.

True, but no longer considered an adequate nature of our physical existence,

This, of course, clashed with notions of free will. It says in very clear terms that all actions we take are 'determined' by what happened in the past. Even worse, they are determined by what happened at any fixed time in the past.

This is the extreme of :Hard Determinism" which is too Newtonian.

That said, the stipulation that all conditions be known *perfectly* is unrealistic in the extreme. For many situations, this isn't a major problem: being off by a small amount in the 'initial conditions' leads to development that stays close to the predictions. But it was found that some situations have sensitive dependence on initial conditions: small errors propagate quickly and destroy any predictability after a while. The weather is a common example, and leads to the 'butterfly flapping its wings giving rise to a tornado a month later'. While this isn't technically correct, the idea that small errors now can lead to predictions that are way off in a fairly short period of time *even under determinism* gives the idea of chaos.

The bold is not only technically incorrect it is a misleading urban myth. As described below "small errors," is incorrect. The fact that each cause and effect event outcome is within a limited range of outcomes extremes are not only unlikely in the long term of outcomes, but limited by many factors.

So, chaos in a system is literally that small errors in initial conditions quickly lead to large errors in predictions. Small effects magnify and propagate making it impossible to make accurate predictions.

The use of "small errors" here is incorrect when considering how Chaos theory describes the fractal nature of our existence. It is far better descriptive to say: Chaos theory describes the fractal nature of the "variation" in the outcomes of cause and effect events with multiple variables. Variation in the possible outcomes of cause and effect outcomes are not "errors."

It is clear that there are many systems that are chaotic in this sense. For the discussion of free will, it is clear that very small effects in a single brain can lead to very large effects later. In fact, this is what seems to happen for most 'choices' that are made: small differences in our thoughts lead to large differences in the world around us.

But, again, this is all under an umbrella of determinism: if there were *perfect* information, the later times would be determined.

That is the problem with 'Hard Determinism.' It is too Newtonian

And this is one version of compatibilism that could be argued: in the case of choices, the nexus of causality is in our brains. Small differences in initial conditions would lead to a different decision. So, in the absence of perfect information, it appears there is more than one possible future and we *decide* which future comes about: the choices are in our brains and so are 'us' doing the choosing. It is 'free' in the sense that events outside of our brains are not the main things that determine future events.

Careful, there are not multiple versions of compatibilism as defined, which does not allow for true Free Will. The various versions of Limited Free Will should be considered as possible.

But still, it just doesn't seem like free will even then, huh?

Not with compatibilism, but versions of 'Limited Free Will yes,

 

[shunyadragon]

Sorry, but post #493 links to a Bartleby article behind a paywall, so all I have is the text in your post, which still does not directly address what you mean by "limited free will". The controversial Libet experiment and others like it only demonstrate that you aren't up to date on that subject. It has been a strong influence in the social media debate, but it has met with strong pushback from researchers. Libet himself never touted it as a demonstration about or against free will, a concept that remains largely undefined and unanalyzed in the popular social media debates over his research. Just as an example of the pushback, see this 2019 Scientific American article:

How a Flawed Experiment “Proved” That Free Will Doesn’t Exist

The author, psychologist Steve Taylor, is a Christian who brings religion into the article (quite unnecessarily, IMO), but I think you should pay attention to some of his criticisms of what the "readiness potential" actually shows, among other things. In psychology, operational definitions can be especially tricky when it comes to explaining the significance of results in everyday language. In the end, his experiment is just about when people become conscious of a decision point is without actually telling us how that relates to making an choice that, in hindsight, could have been made differently.

But all of that is beside the point. What you failed to demonstrate to me in that post and others was a willingness to clarify your technical term "limited free will" in your own words without referring me to external references that don't actually use the term. From the perspective of compatibilism, free will can be defined as a fully determined process, and all experiments like Libet's can show is that what we call "free will" is a fully determined process. So, no help there with what you are on about. In the past, your posts had seem to support the compatibilist position, but I really don't know where you are on the subject at this point.

I answered your questions, which based on your claims of 'knowledge' you should have been aware of the answers anyway.

It took the few bucks to open the source, If you are not willing to that it is your problem. I really do not care for your reference from Scientific American. It is biased on a religious agenda. This is the only reference you have cited. I am not sure why you bothered with this one. You have failed to clearly and specifically present your view and have not presented references to support it. You have dodged the issue with obfuscation and semantics to split frog hairs and not address the subject.

The definition of compatibilism is clear and specific, and not tricky or foggy as you assert, The concept of Limited Free Will is NOT Compatibilism. It takes into consideration the documented limits on human Free Will, and supports the limited ability of humans to potentially make choices within a range of choices limited by the factors the constrain Free Will. Hard Determinism and Compatibilism dos not allow.

Your dismissal of Chaos Theory as 'Modernism' reflects your intentional ignorance of contemporary math and science. It definitely a major factor in outcomes of cause and effect event in nature and the nature of human choices

In previous posts I have fully described my view of "Potential limited Free Will."

 

[Copernicus]

I answered your questions, which based on your claims of 'knowledge' you should have been aware of the answers anyway.

It took the few bucks to open the source, If you are not willing to that it is your problem. I really do not care for your reference from Scientific American. It is biased on a religious agenda. This is the only reference you have cited. I am not sure why you bothered with this one. You have failed to clearly and specifically present your view and have not presented references to support it. You have dodged the issue with obfuscation and semantics to split frog hairs and not address the subject.

Scientific American would not have published it, if it were devoid of some scientific merit. The authors shout-out to religion bit should have been ignored, as I advised in my post. And, as I pointed out, all the Libet experiments can show is that free will must be defined in a way that is compatible with determinism. Hence, they are nothing more than a distraction to my efforts to get you to explain a term that you use and your cited references do not.

The definition of compatibilism is clear and specific, and not tricky or foggy as you assert, The concept of Limited Free Will is NOT Compatibilism. It takes into consideration the documented limits on human Free Will, and supports the limited ability of humans to potentially make choices within a range of choices limited by the factors the constrain Free Will. Hard Determinism and Compatibilism dos not allow.

Please stop claiming that I said that the definition of compatibilism is "not tricky or foggy as you assert." Those are your words, not mine. You claim that "limited free will" is incompatible with compatibilism. So far, it appears a bald claim to me that remains to be clarified--a clarification that I cannot seem to elicit from you. Instead, you handwave towards some references that only demonstrate deterministic elements that occur in the process of making a choice, but we both know that compatibilism is merely the claim that "free will" can be defined in a way that is compatible with determinism. That is why it is called compatibilism! What you need to do is explain where free will is not limited and then how that is inconsistent with compatibilism. So far, everything you've said about "limited free will" strikes me as perfectly consistent with a compatibilist position. Perhaps the problem here is that you have lost sight of the difference between hard determinism and compatibilism.

Your dismissal of Chaos Theory as 'Modernism' reflects your intentional ignorance of contemporary math and science. It definitely a major factor in outcomes of cause and effect event in nature and the nature of human choices

No, no, no. I never dismissed chaos theory. I complained that your use of that term came off as postmodernist rhetoric, not "Modernism", in the specific post I was replying to. I am perfectly happy with chaos theory, just not the way you were bandying it about in your post.

In previous posts I have fully described my view of "Potential limited Free Will."

This is why I accuse you of "handwaving". I can read all the references you gave me and reread your past posts, but that doesn't help me understand what is in your head when you claim that your term "limited free will" is not consistent with compatibilism. Hence, I keep asking for clarification in your own words, especially since none of your references explain what "limited free will" is and your posts never quite say where the incompatibility with compatibilism lies. The meaning of your term is like a "greased pig" that you keep challenging me to catch.

 

[We Never Know]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

What about making choices for future events?
They are not fully determined by past events nor fully random, they are planned choices.

 

[anna.]

* In this context Free Will is defined as the ability to make choices that are not fully determined by past events nor fully random

I know this is a hard question and that nobody claims to have 100% certanity..... but in your opinion what is more likely to be true?... do you think humans have the aility to make choices ?

I don’t know.

I’m in the bookstore right now, looking through Robert Sapolsky‘s latest book called Determined. I haven’t kept up with him lately, and didn’t even know it was coming out. I’m excited to read it. I have a couple of his other books, including Behave, and whatever Robert Sapolsky has to say, I’m gonna sit up and pay attention.

I‘ve read Harris on determinism and he makes some good points which are difficult to reconcile with Christianity - and the basic human belief that we have control over our actions. The very idea goes against so much in the human psyche that it almost seems dangerous to entertain it.

 

[IndigoChild5559]

I really do not care for your reference from Scientific American. It is biased on a religious agenda.

Scientific American has a religious agenda? Surely you jest!

 

[Copernicus]

What about making choices for future events?
They are not fully determined by past events nor fully random, they are planned choices.

Well, that is the point. Before the point at which a choice is made, the choice is undetermined. Afterwards, it has already been made and is therefore determined. The only question is what we normally mean when we use the expression "free will". That is all this argument has ever been about. For those with a specific religious agenda, it is about being free to disobey God, so divine moral strictures come into play. For those who lack a religious agenda, factors other than a deity's commands, come into play.

However, the compatibilist position is that we are all essentially "moist robots" that exercise "free will" or not, depending on how you define the concept of free will. My position is that it can be defined as a fully determined process, so the interesting question then becomes whether actual robots that we build have anything like free will. If not, why not? The answer to that question helps us define what free will is within a determinist framework. It also helps us to define the nature of human cognition and intelligence.

 

[shunyadragon]

Scientific American would not have published it, if it were devoid of some scientific merit. The authors shout-out to religion bit should have been ignored, as I advised in my post. And, as I pointed out, all the Libet experiments can show is that free will must be defined in a way that is compatible with determinism. Hence, they are nothing more than a distraction to my efforts to get you to explain a term that you use and your cited references do not.

Regardless of who published it this is not a reference I care for.

Please stop claiming that I said that the definition of compatibilism is "not tricky or foggy as you assert." Those are your words, not mine. You claim that "limited free will" is incompatible with compatibilism. S

Itis not the accepted definition oc Compatibilism that is tricky and foggy. It is your view expressed in your posts and you do not accept the two sources I provided that define Compatibilism as not truly believing in any Free Will.

So far, it appears a bald claim to me that remains to be clarified--a clarification that I cannot seem to elicit from you. Instead, you handwave towards some references that only demonstrate deterministic elements that occur in the process of making a choice, but we both know that compatibilism is merely the claim that "free will" can be defined in a way that is compatible with determinism. That is why it is called compatibilism! What you need to do is explain where free will is not limited and then how that is inconsistent with compatibilism. So far, everything you've said about "limited free will" strikes me as perfectly consistent with a compatibilist position. Perhaps the problem here is that you have lost sight of the difference between hard determinism and compatibilism.

We are most definitely not communicating. As defined in two references. Yes, compatibilism is compatible with determinism, because the bottomline it rejects Free Will. It may strike you, but Limited Free Will is NOT compatible with Compatibilism, because it allows limited Free Will, where Compatibilism does not.

No, no, no. I never dismissed chaos theory. I complained that your use of that term came off as postmodernist rhetoric, not "Modernism", in the specific post I was replying to. I am perfectly happy with chaos theory, just not the way you were bandying it about in your post.

Nonetheless you have odd objections calling it post-modernist rhetoric. and an apparent lack of understanding. Chaos Theory does not come off as any such thing, I am NOT bandying it about. I am using it appropriately in the context of the natural nature of human will.

This is why I accuse you of "handwaving".

No handwaving on my part, but I see it from your perspective concerning your attitude concerning my references.

I can read all the references you gave me and reread your past posts, but that doesn't help me understand what is in your head when you claim that your term "limited free will" is not consistent with compatibilism.

IT is not compatible with Compatibilism as defined. Compatibilism DOES NOt acknowledge any true Free Will

Hence, I keep asking for clarification in your own words, especially since none of your references explain what "limited free will" is and your posts never quite say where the incompatibility with compatibilism lies. The meaning of your term is like a "greased pig" that you keep challenging me to catch.

I see a problem with your comprehension of the English language, obfuscation and dodging in and out of semantics.

Your the "greased pig!"

 

[shunyadragon]

What about making choices for future events?
They are not fully determined by past events nor fully random, they are planned choices.

. . . based on the chain of cause and effect of past choices and knowledge of past events, and of course, has better chance of being true if based on objective evidence,

There is no such thing as randomness in this scenario.

 

[shunyadragon]

Scientific American has a religious agenda? Surely you jest!

No, this only concerns the article cited, and it was not an agenda it was a slant of the article.

 

[IndigoChild5559]

No, this only concerns the article cited, and it was not an agenda it was a slant of the article.

I read the article. I found no religious slant.

 

[Nakosis]

The use of "small errors" here is incorrect when considering how Chaos theory describes the fractal nature of our existence. It is far better descriptive to say: Chaos theory describes the fractal nature of the "variation" in the outcomes of cause and effect events with multiple variables. Variation in the possible outcomes of cause and effect outcomes are not "errors."

This is what I read too. The result of variations in output of a single causal event that were not determined by anything prior to the event. However this only allows that our current universe is one possible variation that could have resulted from the "Big Bang" event. I at least accept this possibility.

Not with compatibilism, but versions of 'Limited Free Will yes,

Ok, so lets say these variations of outputs from causes allow for the existence of a non-determined universe.
What is the mechanism which allows for will to affect these possible variations?
Alright, thought is causal. Are you saying there exists variations in the output of our iterative thinking?

 

[shunyadragon]

This is what I read too. The result of variations in output of a single causal event that were not determined by anything prior to the event. However this only allows that our current universe is one possible variation that could have resulted from the "Big Bang" event. I at least accept this possibility.

Careful the chain of cause and effect outcomes in nature and in human decisions still follow the same limits of Natural Laws and natural processes, and influence the present and future decisions. All possible variations in our choices in the past. present and future still are subject to the natural limits and the nature of being evolved humans.

Ok, so lets say these variations of outputs from causes allow for the existence of a non-determined universe.

No, I do not believe our physical universe is absolutely mechanistically determined by Newtonian standards, but it remains determined within a range of possibilities with in the constraints if Natural Laws. Chaos Theory determines our physical existence in that all Maple leaves are different, but all Maple leaves look like Maple leaves, and all galaxies are different, but all look like galaxies. The number of possible variables involved in each case determines the possible range of outcomes.

What is the mechanism which allows for will to affect these possible variations?

The natural variation of the cause and effect outcomes in nature and our choices, though limited allows for a variation in outcomes. There are simple examples in everyday life such as when we dress in the morning. Many limiting factors in life, culture and such things as weather determine what we wear, but within these limits we may choose a limited range of clothing. Though in some cultures the limits are more constrained and people do wear the same thing every day with few variations such as in traditional Islam.

Alright, thought is causal. Are you saying there exists variations in the output of our iterative thinking?

Our thoughts are both limiting in the chain of cause and effect of our thinking and the possible range of thoughts may be potentially causal, but again limited. I do believe that the nature of human thinking potentially looks for alternative solutions of problems, but still within a limited range of possible choices.